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PREF ACE 
With deep interest I have followed the Indonesian people's fight for 
freedom and independence from 1945 onwards. This interest has come 
to be centred in particular on the question of how religions, especially 
Islam, were involved in this struggle, and what role they would fulfil 
in the new Indonesia. 
Af ter having lived and worked in Indonesia from 1946 to the end 
of 1960, I was twice more enabled to visit Indonesia thanks to grants 
from the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical 
Research (WOTRO). It was during these sojourns in particular, from 
May to October 1966 and from February to July 1969, th at the material 
for this study was collected, supplemented and checked. 
For the help I received during these visits I am greatly indebted to 
so many Indonesian informants that it is impossibie to mention them 
all. Moreover, some of them would not appreciate being singled out by 
name. But while offering them these general thanks I am thinking of 
them all individually. 
In spite of all the help given and patience shown me, this publication 
is bound to be full of shortcomings. An older Muslim friend, however, 
once encouraged me by reminding me that perfection belongs only to 
God (al-kamäl li'lliJh). Nevertheless, I should like to offer my apologies 
for errors and mis takes ; I would appreciate it if readers drew my 
attention to them. 
This treatise on Islam in Indonesia is written by someone who is, 
indeed, neither a Muslim nor an Indonesian, but who honestly wis hes 
to make a contribution to mutual understanding and respect between 
people whose lives are determined by different cultural and religious 
backgrounds. 
In trying to understand each other we cannot avoid asking each 
other questions, sometimes critical questions, perhaps even "awkward" 
questions. It should, however, be borne in mind that the author, as a 
Christian theologian, would be just as much prepared to ask such 
questions concerning Christianity and its doctrines, and concerning the 
lüe of the Churches and of Christians themselves. 
VI PREF ACE 
A few remarks of a technical nature must be made here. Firstly, for 
the transliteration of Arabic words the system of the Encyclopaedia of 
Islam has been followed ; where one Arabic letter has to be transliterated 
with two roman letters (th, dj, kh, dh, sh, gh), for reasons of cost they 
have not been underlined. However, when Arabic words occur in an 
Indoncsian context the Indonesian transliteration of the Arabic words 
has of ten been kept. 
Unfortunately, there is no uniformity in the Indonesian transliteration 
of Arabic words. Indonesian Muslims, however, are following more and 
more the system used in the new translation of the Qur'än (see "AI-
Quräan dan Terdjemahnja", published by the Indonesian Ministry of 
Religion, Vol. I, p. 148). Differences between the Indonesian trans-
literation and that of the Encyclopaedia of Islam include: 
E.!. th ts Ind. E.!. ~ sh Ind. 
IJ, h h q, dh 
kh eh th 
dh dz ? zh 
sh SJ ~ q. 
Special attention should be paid to the difficulty that sh in the 
Indonesian transliteration stands for the Arabic ~ad (in such words as 
shalat or sholat, and in such names as Anshary and Ash-Shiddiqy), and 
th stands for tG' (e.g. in bathin, Thalib, Thaha). 
Arabic, Indonesian and other foreign words are printed in italics. 
The plural form of some common words is made by adding a roman s, 
thus: ulamas, kiyais, abangans, kampungs, etc. 
Indonesian names are spelt as far as possible in accordance with the 
wishes of their owners (for example, using the Dutch oe for u, in 
Soekarno, Mohamad Roem, etc.), while the names of organizations 
are spelt as is usual in Indonesia (Muhammadijah, Nahdatul Ulama). 
When referring to verses from the Qur'än the so-called Eastern 
numbering is used. Quotations in English are of ten taken from the 
explanatory translation by Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall ("The 
Meaning of the Glorious Koran"). 
The draft manuscript for this book was translated from the Dutch 
by Mrs. C. A. Franken. lts final form was established by means of 
consultations between the au thor and Mr. S. O. Robson of the editorial 
staff of the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology. 
Oegstgeest I Leiden 
August, 1970. 
B.J. B. 
T ABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE .... v 
INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER I: THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE (1945-1955) 7 
1. Benefits from the ]apanese Period . 7 
2. Facing up to the Problem . 15 
3. Looking for a Compromise . . . 23 
4. The Decision . . . . . . . . 34 
5. The Fight for Freedom (1945-1950) 39 
6. Strife between the Parties (1950-1955) 45 
7. The Darul Islam Revolts . 54 
8. Religio-Political Publications. . . . 75 
CHAPTER II: THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY AMID 
INCREASING TENSIONS (1955-1965) 85 
1. Political Developments up to 1959 . 85 
2. The Ideological Struggle (1959) 90 
3. "Guided Democracy" (1959-1965) 99 
4. The Ministry of Religious Affairs 105 
5. Islamic Educational Institutions . 112 
6. Soekamo and Islam. . . . . 123 
CHAPTER III: ISLAM AND THE "NEW ORDER" 
(1965 and af ter ). . . . . . 
1. The Thirtieth of September and its Aftermath 
2. New Hope for Muslims 






CHAPTER IV: A PRELIMINARY STOCKTAKING 
1. Political Topics . . . . . . . 
2. Partial Realization of Islamic Law . 
3. Regional Endeavours: Atjeh. . . 
4. Working toward an Islamic Society 
5. Religious Instruction and Textbooks 
6. A Muslim "Theology of Religions" 
7. Reformation, Liberalization, Modemization . 










APPENDICES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND THEIR MEANING ... 264 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS REFERRED TO ...... 267 
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 
INTRODUCTION 
The term "Modern Indonesia" in the title of this book is intended 
to refer to the Republic of Indonesia which was created on August 17th, 
1945. Hence, 25 years af ter Independence, the question may be posed 
as to how Islam has struggled to make its impact felt in the early history 
of modern Indonesia. 
Now it has rightly been said, "To discuss the position of Islam in 
contemporary Indonesia involves the entire Indonesian situation".1 
Moreover, this history is so recent that it has not yet really become 
history. Anyone who has experienced some part of that history, living 
in Indonesia, also knows th at many details were obscurc· even at the 
moment when they took place. How can one hope to reconstruct later 
the true background of events? Who knows the many pcrsonal rivalries, 
ambitions and intrigues of contemporary history which are so commonly 
presented to the public as fundamental matters? Moreover, how can a 
foreigner presume to understand the Indonesian situation, when his 
Indonesian informants again and again hasten to explain th at for them, 
too, all kinds of things have been obscure? 
Thc best that can be done at this stage is for many investigators, each 
working along their own lines, to attempt to describe developments in 
Indonesia, and in this way each to contribute a part toward a complete 
picture in the future. As far as the political, cultural, sociologie al and 
economie aspects are concerned, many publications have already appcar-
ed, such as those of George MeT. Kahin, Ruth McVey, Herbert Feith, 
Bernhard Dahm, Clifford Geertz, J. M. van der Kroef and others.2 
In these studies mention is made again and again of questions concerning 
Islam. It is, however, both neccssary and useful to pay attention to Islam 
in a more direct way, and to approach developments in Indonesia from 
the point of view of Islam, or in other words, to sketch the recent history 
of Islam in Indonesia. 
1 C. A. o. van Nieuwenhuijze, Islam and National Self-Realization in Indonesia, 
in Bulletin d'Informations du Centre pour l'Etude des Problèmes du Monde 
Musulman Contemporain, 1958, Fase. VII, p. 80. 
2 See List of Publications Referred to. 
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It could be ohjected that it is still too early to do this. However, I 
would like to "steal" Clifford Geertz's remark th at for the time heing 
"sketches may he all that can he expected", and as yet no oils - "yet 
there is something to he said for sketches as for oils".3 
That an attempt should he made to draw such a sketch is shown hy 
Wilfred CantweIl Smith's famous hook, "Islam in Modern History". 
Lengthy chapters are devoted to the Arahs, to Turkey, India and 
Pakistan. But in the few lines on Indonesia it is said that in the case 
of Indonesia "there has been a very serious disregard, both hy Western 
students and, even more striking, hy Muslims of other areas. The role 
of Islam in contemporary Indonesia, and of Indonesia in contemporary 
Islam, has still to be not only assessed hut noticed ... " 4 
It is interesting to see how this remark occurs again in a hook hy the 
Indonesian author Rosihan Anwar; this hook is a sort of modern Muslim 
catechism written in the form of a discussion between Wak Hadji and 
Hadji Wa'ang. Speaking of the role of Islam, the former says that too 
few studies have heen made of Islam in Indonesia. Surprised, his friend 
answers, "Oh, how can you say that? Just look at the list of names of 
Dutch schol ars who have studied Islam here, and the hooks they have 
puhlished!" But Wak Hadji maintains that Indonesia has received less 
attention than Egypt, Turkey, and so on, and he adds: "I on ce read a 
hook hy someone who writes that the role of Islam in contemporary 
Indonesia and of Indonesia in contemporary Islam has still to be assessed 
and noticed. The author of that book said that here in Indonesia there 
is Islamically something distinctive and fascinating and potentially very 
rich." 5 
W. C. Smith's abovementioned remark is achallenge to try to add 
something to our knowledge of the recent history of Islam in Indonesia. 
It must hy now he more or less possihle to sketch in the outlines, and to 
indicate the chief characteristics that are important for the Indonesian 
chapter of Islam in modern history. 
In this endeavour we can link up with Harry J. Benda's hook on 
developments during the Japanese occupation.6 In his Preface, Benda 
3 Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed, New Haven/London 1968, p. X. 
4 Wilfred CantweIl Smith, Islam in Modern History, Princeton 1957, p. 295. 
I) Rosihan Anwar, Islam dan Anda, Djakarta 1962, p. 107, quoting Smith, 
Islam, p. 295. 
6 Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, The Hague/Bandung 
1958. 
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remarks that his book deals with developments on the island of Java 
only. But he considers this limitation as not too serious a drawback. 
Af ter all, "Though Islam in the other areas has undeniably played 
- and continues to play - a leading role in the political evolution of 
Indonesia, it is on Java that it has found its most important organi-
zational expression. It is there, also, that Islamic groups have been most 
directly involved in the shaping of Indonesian politics in genera!." 7 
As a sequel to Benda, a sketch must be made of developments in 
Indonesia af ter 1945. For the time being it will neither be possible nor 
necessary to attempt completeness. Not every fact or occurrence, and 
not all aspects of the subject, can he treated. As far as possible, however, 
an attempt must be made to arrive at a preliminary interpretation of 
the developments, even though such an assessment will surely be 
subjective. 
In order to sketch the role of Islam in modern Indonesia, attention 
must also be paid to the developments, problems and tendencies within 
Islam and the Muslim community itself. We shall therefore have to 
listen to what conscious adherents of Islam and well-qualified Islamic 
leaders say and write. In th is connection, Gibb's judgement is still valid: 
" ... it is not to the masses but to the leaders that we must look if we 
are to judge of the present tendencies in religious thought".8 To this 
end, there are a great number of publications available in Indonesian, 
written by Indonesian Muslims; we intend letting these Indonesian 
Muslims speak for themselves by drawing on a representative selection 
of their publications. 
This does not mean that we are going to adhere solely to a discussion 
of religious thought and its development, th at is to say, Islamic ideas 
and their history. Islam is a practical religion, related to dunyä wa 
äkhira (this world and the world to come) and it includes dïn wa dawla 
("religion" and government or "politics" ). For this reason sociological 
studies such as those by Clifford Geertz are very important, even though 
theologians - both Islamic and Christian - are of ten suspicious of the 
methods and results of sociological research. 
Geertz wanted to study and record the religious and cultural life of 
the small town of Paré ("Modjokuto") in Java, in order to make it a 
basis for a sketch of "the Religion of Java".9 The distinction which 
7 Benda, The Crescent, p. 4. 
8 H. A. R. Gibb, Whither Islam?, London 1932, p. 372. 
9 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, IIIinois 1960. 
'.,:' 
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Geertz made with regard to the religion of Java was certainly not a new 
one, but had formerly also been current among Javanese Muslims. This 
is at least true as far as the distinction between the so-called santri 
variant and the abangan variant is concerned (a santri is originally a 
pupil of a classical Indonesian religious boarding-school, while the 
so-called abangan variant indicates the syncretistic popular religion). 
I t will be useful to observe the reactions of Indonesian Islamic schol ars 
to this sociological approach, even though one may not agree with them. 
It so happens that Muslims use other terms for the distinction, and give 
a different content to them. A Muslim prefers to speak of "Islam" 
- orthodox or modern Islam - and its consciously faithful adherents, 
rather than the santri and the santri variant or the santri civilization. 
From a religious point of view the abangans are those who know little 
of Islam and are but little concerned with the precepts of Islam, though 
they also consider themselves to be Muslims. Nowadays many of them 
would call themselves "Muslims, but not so fanaticai", that is to say, 
not so strict; in other words, they are "statistical Muslims" (Ind. muslim-
statistik ). In any case, Muslims consider this distinction first and fore-
most a religious differentiation in relation to the question of whether or 
not one is a consciously devout Muslim. For this reason they tend to 
emphasize the fact th at these two variants cannot be clearly divided and 
certainly do not indicate two separate groups. They stress that the so-
called abangan variant of religion in Java ought to be regarded as a 
variant within Islam and the Muslim community. Is it not true that 
within every religion and every religious community the number of really 
practising members is fairly limited? 
Muslim informants object even more strongly to the distinction which 
Geertz made when speaking of the priyayi variant of religion in Java 
(the priyayi class is the Javanese aristocracy and gentry ), th at is to say, 
the world of the wajang (shadow play) and Javanese mysticism. Can 
this sociological category, they say, be simply placed alongside the 
religious distinction of santri and abangan? Ought not the priyayi class 
and its behaviour, from a religious point of view, be judged on the basis 
of the differentiation expressed by the terms santri and abangan? Is it 
not possible to he a good Muslim and at the same time admire much 
of what Geertz counts as belonging to the priyayi variant of the religion 
in Java? The well-known Indonesian Professor Rasjidi says of himself 
that abangan-Islam and orthodox Islam are simultaneously present in 
him, while moreover he wants to be a modern Muslim. Speaking of 
abangan-Islam he means th at he too likes gamelan music, the wajang 
INTRODUCTION 5 
and the serimpi dances, which according to Geertz's differentiation 
be long to the priyayi variant,1o 
So Geertz studied the current cultural situation in Paré in order to 
draw some condusions concerning the religion of Java. As one of its 
aspects he also came into contact with Islam or the so-called santri 
religion. In a later study called "Islam Observed" he considers the 
characteristics of the world of the abangans and priyayis as the "main-
line traditions" of Java, while the santri variant is termed a "counter-
tradition", indicated as "scripturalism" and regarded as a "scripturalist 
interlude" .11 
In my opinion there is room for another approach alongside the 
sociological. That is to say, we may take as our point of departure the 
Islamic world of ideas and its history, in order to see how Islam functions 
as a living force in the new Indonesia. It will be necessary and fruitful 
to approach developments during the last 25 years in Indonesia from this 
point of view as weil, and to provide some material concerning specific-
ally Islamic activities, problems and tendencies. 
As has been said, it is possible to link up with Benda's work. Speaking 
of the religious developments in Indonesia during the Japanese occup-
ation from the point of view of the so-called santri civilization, Benda 
condudes: "The history of Indonesian Islam is, then, the history of this 
expanding santri civilization and its impact upon the religious, social 
and political life of Indonesia",12 Benda ends his survey with the 
condusion that what the Japanese left behind them in 1945 was "a more 
truly Islamic Java, a Java doser to the ideals of the santri civilization, 
than had existed in March 1942",13 
This condusion highlights some questions of primary importance with 
regard to the interpretation of the most recent history of Islam in Indo-
nes ia. Wh at course did the struggle of th is so-called santri civilization 
take in order to realize its ideals? Or in other words, how did Islam 
(orthodox and modern or neo-orthodox) strive to put Islamic principles 
into practice in Indonesian state and society af ter 1945? And in how far 
has th at struggle been successful - that is to say, not only in resulting 
in an external expansion, but also in a more thorough Islamization of 
Indonesian society and its individual members? 
10 M. Rasjidi, Mengapa aku tetap memeluk Agama Islam, Djakarta 1968, 
pp. 10-11. 
11 Geertz, Islam, passim. 
12 Benda, The Crescent, p. 14. 
13 Benda, The Crescent, p. 187. 
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Furthennore, Clifford Geertz may be right when he says that Islam 
has not brought unifonnity to Indonesia. 14 But it could be that the 
developments of the last 25 years tend more than ever - at least 
extemally - toward the expansion and strengthening of a unifonn 
Islam, through religious education and publications, the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, and so on. If this assumption is correct, then, as weIl 
as through sociological case-studies, the situation will also have to be 
approached from the viewpoint of the "history of Islam", paying special 
attention to the abovementioned questions conceming the interpretation 
of its recent history. 
In the first three chapters of this book we intend giving a historical 
sketch of the developments which took place during these 25 years. 
These years will be divided into three sections : the period of political 
struggle (1945-1955), the period of the intemal strengthening of the 
Islamic community amid increasing tensions (1955-1965), and the time 
af ter September 30th, 1965, a date which marks the beginning of a third 
period in the modem history of Islam in Indonesia. In the final chapter, 
a preliminary stocktaking will be made of a number of contemporary 
activities, problems and tendencies in Islam in modem Indonesia. 
14 Geertz, Islam, p. 12. 
CHAPTER I 
THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE 
(1945-1955 ) 
1. Benetits trom the Japanese Period 
According to Benda, it is possible to differentiate three leading groups 
in the former Dutch East Indies towards the end of th at regime. Firstly, 
there was the aristocracy, that is to say the priyayis in Java, the ulèë-
balangs (Ind. hulubalang) in Atjeh, and elsewhere the radjas (rajahs) 
and other adat-chiefs. They formed "the cornerstone of the Dutch 
colonial system for many decennia, if not centuries") On the other hand 
the Indonesian nationalist movement was growing and took shape in 
many organizations. Hence in the second place we can mention those 
nationalists who were united in non-confessional organizations, the 
"secular" nationalists as Benda called them (correctly always putting 
the "secular" in inverted commas). Then in the third place there was 
the group of Islamic leaders or Muslim nationalists. In th is study the 
last group will require much attention. Among them were intellectuals 
with a Western upbringing, as weIl as traditional ulamas (religious 
scholars or "scribes" ). To the latter belonged, for example, the Javanese 
kiyais (indicated by a capital K. before their name, just as a following 
capital H. shows a hadji). The title Kiyai is given by the people to "an 
independent religious teacher not belonging to the official scribes con-
nected with the mosques".2 Many of them were heads of, or teachers at, 
a pesantrèn, an institution which even now is of ten gratefully depicted 
as the nursery for Islamic leaders who resisted colonial domination.3 
The role of the first group, the priyayis, was in fact finished at the 
arrival of the Japanese in March 1942, the unofficial end of the former 
1 Benda, The Crescent, p. 199. 
2 G. W. J. Drewes, in Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization, ed. by 
Gustave E. von Grunebaum, Chicago 1955, p. 309. I also refer to this essay 
as a general introduction to Indonesian Islam. 
3 See for example Al-Djami'ah, Madjalah Ilmu Pengetahuan Agama Islam, 
no. 5-6, Jogjakarta 1965, p. 96. 
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Dutch East Indies. Part of this aristocracy certainly hoped in 1945 that 
they would be reinstated in their former position of power.4 And for 
their part, the returning administration of the Dutch East Indies hoped 
for renewed co-operation from this aristocracy af ter 1945 as weIl, for 
instance in the creation of federal states as opposed to the "Jogja 
Republic". But the Indonesian revolution destroyed the dreams of a 
new alliance between these two forces. Within the Indonesian Republic 
there remained a place for members of this aristocracy, providing they 
wanted to serve the national cause with their personal qualities and as 
ordinary citizens. Certainly there emerged from th is group a number 
of intellectuals who later devoted themselves to building the new Indo-
nes ia, either as individuals or as members of a political party (generally 
one of the "secular" nationalist parties ) . 
More important for the modern history of Islam in Indonesia are 
the second and third groups, the "secular" nationalists and the Islamic 
leaders. Among the so-called secular nationalists were to be found -
besides a few Christians from Christian areas such as North Sulawesi 
(Celebes) - many abangan Muslims and nominal Muslims. One must 
not forget, however, that a number of devout Muslims also belonged 
to the "secular" (that is to say non-Islamic) nationalist organizations. 
These were people who regarded Islam in the first place as din, in the 
sense of a personal religion, and not as an ideological system to be put 
into practice in the area of daw/a (government or politics). The latter, 
however, became - in all kinds of variation and nuance - the ideal 
of the third group, the Islamic leaders, who were united in Islamic 
parties and organizations. 
As far as developments during the Japanese occupation are concerned, 
we can adopt the conclusions of Benda, who summarizes these develop-
ments as follows: "For quite some time, the Japanese seemed in fact 
more ready to make concessions to Islamic, rather than to nationalist, 
let alone priyayi, demands.... Only fairly late in the occupation -
[that is to say, when a losing Japan hegan to allow preparations to be 
made for an independent Indonesia] - were concessions to the Muslim 
elite in fact paralleled, and ultimately overshadowed in importance, by 
increasing and decisive support to the 'secular' nationalists .... By th at 
time, however, Indonesian Islam had been allowed to gain a position 
of unprecedented strength from which it could no longer he easily 
4 So for instanee in Atjeh; cf. A. J. Piekaar, Atjèh en de oorlog met Japan, 
's-Gravenhage-Bandung 1949, p. 247. 
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displaced by the nationalist leadership .... " 5 So af ter all there was, 
even in the ]apanese period, an obvious rivalry between both groups. 
It was natural th at the ]apanese occupying power should try to use 
religion - in this case Islam - for its own wartime ends. "The ]apanese 
considered Islam as one of the most effective means to penetrate into 
the spiritual recesses of Indonesian life and to infuse the influence of 
their own ideas and ideals at the bot tom of the society. For exactly the 
same reasons, Christianity was chosen in the Philippines as an important 
vehicle for ideological penetration." 6 The way in which th at took pi ace, 
however, need not be retold here. 7 For our purpose the benefits which 
the ]apanese period yielded for Islam and the Muslim community in 
Indonesia are more important. 
Perhaps, then, two or three things may be mentioned: the creation 
of an Indonesian Office for Religious Affairs, the foundation of the 
Masjumi, and thirdly perhaps the formation of the Hizbu'llah. Much 
material concerning these developments can be found collected in the 
nearly 1,000 page long biography and collected writings of K. H. A. 
Wahid Hasjim.8 Here follow some remarks on each of these three 
benefits from the ]apanese period. 
The Office for Religious Affairs (in ]apanese Shümubu; in Indonesian 
Kantor Urusan Agama) more or less took the place of the colonial 
"Office for Native Affairs". But it expanded to become the apparatus 
5 Benda, The Crescent, pp. 201-202. Benda's division between the "santri" 
and the "secular nationalists" has been criticized by L. Sluimers, who believes 
th at Benda laid too much stress on Islam as a separate political force playing 
an independent role, while according to Sluimers the conflict which arose 
during the ]apanese occupation was rather a conflict between conservatives 
and non-conservatives, cross-cutting religious boundaries (L. Sluimers, 
"Nieuwe Orde" op Java: de Japanse bezettingspolitiek en de Indonesische 
elites 1942-1943, in Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 124, 
no. 3, 's-Gravenhage 1968, pp. 336-365). In my opinion, however, the 
developments af ter 1945 tend to prove that Benda's approach is still usabIe, 
especially if we are trying to sketch the recent history of Islam in Indonesia 
from an Islamic point of view. 
6 M. A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia, thesis Léiden 1955, p. 200. 
7 Cf. Benda, The CTescent; C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, Japanese Islam Policy 
in Java, 1942-1945, in Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia, The 
Hague-Bandung 1958, pp. 109-160. 
8 Sedjarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim dan karangan tersiaT, ed. by 
H. Aboebakar at a request from the Minister of Religion dated March 23rd, 
1954, in memoriam of his predecessor who died in a motoring accident on 
April 19th, 1953; published in Djakarta, 1957; from now on referred to as 
"Wahid Hasjim". 
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which later managed all kinds of affairs formerly divided up among 
the Departments of Home Affairs, of Justice and of Education and 
Public Worship. The first senior post which the Japanese entrusted to 
an Indonesian in their administration was that of head of this Office 
for Religious Affairs.9 This office had been headed by the Japanese 
Colonel Hori from the end of March 1942, but on October lst, 1943 
Hoesein Djajadiningrat was put in charge. Looking back, however, it 
was still more important that the man who was appointed to this pos i-
tion on August lst, 1944, was K. Hasjim Asj'ari, head of the famous 
pesantrèn Tebu-ireng (Djombang, East Java), a conservative Muslim, 
who had, however, great authority as a kiyai. As he was al ready chair-
man of the Masjumi, which will be discussed shortly, the authority his 
name carried covered two important organizations. Through this appoint-
ment Wahid Hasjim, the son of K. Hasjim Asj'ari, got the opportunity 
to begin his career, for while the father continued his work in East Java 
his position in Djakarta was in fact held by the son.10 
From Aprillst, 1944,11 a start was made to found regional offices 
for religious affairs in every residency (parts of a province). U nder the 
leadership of people such as Wahid Hasjim and Kahar Muzakkir (not 
to be mistaken for the later South Sulawesi rebel Kahar Muzakkar ), the 
foundations were laid for the future Ministry of Religious Affairs and 
its regional offices, a unique institution, to which special attention will 
be paid later on. In 1950 Wahid Hasjim became Minister of Religion 
in the first cabinet of the United Indonesian Republic (af ter the 
recognition of Independence by the Dutch). And it was he who 
organized the Ministry of Religious Affairs to an important extent, 
and sa left his mark on it. 
The second benefit from the ]apanese period was the formation of 
the Masjumi, the name being a contraction of Madjlis Sjuro Muslimin 
Indonesia, correctly translated by Benda as "Consultative Council of 
Indonesian Muslims",12 This Masjumi may be considered the successor 
to the M.I.A.I., the initials of Madjlisul lslamil aclaa Indonesia, the 
Supreme Indonesian Council of Islam, or less correctly the Great Islamic 
9 Benda, The Crescent, pp. 126, 201. 
10 Benda, The Crescent, p. 273, n. 80-81; compare Wahid Hasjim, p. 331 ff. 
11 Aeeording to Wahid Hasjim, p. 597. 
12 Benda, The Crescent, p. 151. "Counei1 of Indonesian Moslem Associations", 
George MeT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca 
New York 1952, p. 156, and "Couneil of Indonesian Moslem Organizations", 
Clifford Geertz, The Religion, p. 142, are incorrect. 
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Council of Indonesia.1 3 In 1937 this M.I.A.I. had resulted from the 
Al-Islam Congresses, which had been held since 1921. 
The dissolution of the M.I.A.I. in October 1943 was probably con-
sidered necessary by the ] apanese because this organization had been set 
up through the Muslims' own initiative, as a federation of Islamic 
organizations among whose leaders were men with a strongly anti-
colonial and non-cooperative background.14 Or in the words of Aziz, 
the M.I.A.I. began by being anti-Dutch (the immediate cause being the 
marriage law made by the colonial government in 1937), and became 
anti-foreign, and therefore might weIl become anti-]apanese.15 On the 
other hand, the Masjumi which began life on December lst, 1943, was 
in fact a creation of the ]apanese authorities. The long list of activities 
and aims of the (more religious) M.I.A.1.16 apparently had to give 
pI ace to the one (more political) goal of the Masjumi: that of "strength-
ening the unity of all Islamic organizations", and of "aiding Dai Nippon 
in the interests of Greater East Asia".1 7 
According to Aziz, the more obvious reason for substituting the 
Masjumi for the M.I.A.I. was th at two of the most important Islamic 
organizations - the Muhammadijah and Nahdatul Ulama (N.U.) -
had not joined the M.I.A.1. 18 These two were now, with all the others, 
included in the Masjumi, which moreover recognized individual member-
ship. Both these associations were traditionally non-political in character. 
The Muhammadijah (mu~ammadïya) came into existence in 1912 as a 
socio-religious association, due to the initiative of K. H. Ahmad Dahlan, 
who was working as a teacher at a school which gave its name to this 
association. The association fought for reformist principles, which, 
coming from Egypt, had stirred the Islamic world. On the other hand, 
the Nahdatul Ulama (nahejat al-Culamä) - that is, the Awakening of 
the Scribes - which was founded in 1926, can be considered as a 
movement of ulamas to maintain the traditional ]avanese way of life 
and to defend the authority of the four orthodox madhähib (sing. 
madhhab, school of law). The leading positions in the new Masjumi 
were apparently fairly weIl distributed among supporters of both N.U. 
13 Cf. Wahid Hasjim, p. 311; Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 120; Benda, 
The Crescent, p. 90. 
14 Cf. Benda, The Crescent, p. 151; also Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 152 ff. 
15 Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 205. 
1G Cf. Wahid Hasjim, p. 326. 
17 Benda, The Crescent, p. 150. 
18 Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 205. 
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and Muhammadijah ideas.1 9 Various prominent members of the 
Masjumi also held important posts in the Office for Religious Affairs. 
As has been said, K. Hasjim Asj'ari was chairman of the Masjumi; one 
of the vice-chairmen was his son Wahid Hasjim. 
The significance of these developments has been described by Aziz 
as follows: "The Islamic leaders who were generally distrusted by the 
Dutch authority came as a closed group in direct contact with the highest 
governing body. The hierarchical order maintained during Dutch rule 
among the administrators was th us knocked down. The separation 
between church and state [religion and politics] came practically to an 
end. Islam obtained a privileged position in the political system in which, 
next to the secular administration, a religious apparatus had been 
created. The japanese th us brought about a fundamental change in the 
traditional method of governing, by the increase of power for Islam" 
(that is to say, a change in the structure of the government by enhancing 
the influence of Islam) .20 
The formation of these two organizations, the Office for Religious 
Affairs and the Masjumi, meant in fact that an apparatus had been 
given to Indonesian Islam (whatever the japanese may have intended 
with them) that was going to be of great importance for the future. 
Islam as a religious system had received an apparatus which afterwards 
could expand to become a Ministry of Religious Affairs - created 
during the second Sjahrir cabinet, March 1946 - with a network of 
regional offices all over Indonesia. And Islam as a political power, its 
wings clipped during the colonial period, would soon be able to play 
its part via the Masjumi, which on November 7th, 1945, was reorganized 
as a political party. 
The third benefit accruing from the japanese period at the end of 
1944 21 is the establishment of the Hizbu'llah ("God's Forces", or "the 
party of Allah" according to Sura 5 : 56; 58 : 22), a sort of military 
organization for Muslim youths. 22 According to Benda, the Masjumi 
appointed the leaders of this organization in january 1945. lts chairman 
was Zainul Arifin ("one of the Nahdatul Ulama delegates in the 
19 See Wahid Hasjim, pp. 351-352. 
2() Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, pp. 205-206. 
21 According to A. A. Zorab, De Japanse bezetting van Indonesië, thesis Leiden 
1954, p. 107. 
22 To what extent and in which way Christian youths here and there joined 
the Hizbu'llah - as some rumours have it - will have to he examined 
more closely. 
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Masjumi executive"); among the leaders were Mohamad Roem, Anwar 
Tjokroaminoto, Jusuf Wibisono and Prawoto Mangkusasmito, later to 
become well-known politicians.23 Though according to Herbert Feith 
the N.U. leaders led the Islamic guerilla organizations Hizbu'llah and 
Sabili'llah,24 this is only true of the first chairman, and probably of the 
leaders of smaller military units in the fight for independence. The 
names just cited are associated with the Muhammadijah and P.S.l.I., 
rather than the N.U. 
The formation of the Hizbu'llah is probably of importance because 
many of its me mb ers were later included in the national army. That 
meant that in the Indonesian army there was an important infusion 
of Muslim "santris". In the course of time many Christians also joined 
the Indonesian army (e.g. from the former colonial army). This charac-
teristic of the army might be a difference from the navy and air force, 
of which both officers and men generally came from a more "secular" 
background (for example, education at a state secondary school, supple-
mented by a special training in the U.S.A.). It could weIl be that this 
difference in atmosphere even continued to make itself feit up to the 
events of September 30th, 1965 and their aftermath. 
Weighing up the Japanese occupation, it tums out that the Muslim 
community made important gains. Therefore it need surprise no-one 
that Islamic leaders tend to paint the former colonial period very black. 
Right up to the latest Indonesian publications, the colonial religious 
policy is ascribed in particular to the influence of the Dutch Islamic 
scholar C. Snouck Hurgronje, who still has a very bad name among 
Muslims in Indonesia (with the exception of one recent example of a 
"rehabilitation" by the abovementioned Prof. Rasjidi, which will be 
reviewed at the end of this book) .25 According to general opinion, 
Snouck Hurgronje was "the muf ti of the Dutch imperialists".26 It was 
he who wanted to restrict Islam to being "a religion only of the mosque", 
and who urged the Dutch on with "What you have inherited from 
your fathers, defend (Ind. pertahankanlah), in order to keep it forever" 
(af ter a less correct Indonesian translation of some lines of Goethe 
23 Benda, The Crescent, p. 280, n. 26. 
24 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 
Ithaca New York 1962, p. 233. "Sabïli'lläh" means: (fighters in) the way 
of God. 
25 H. M. Rasjidi, Islam dan Indonesia Dizaman Modern, Djakarta 1968. 
20 M. Isa Anshary, Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, Bandung 1949, p. 156. 
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quoted by Snouck) .27 According to oral information, others add th at 
Snouck Hurgronje wanted to stimulate the tendency of Indonesian 
Islam toward mysticism, in order that Islam might become a "religion 
of the soul" as is Christianity in the opinion of Muslims. In my 
experience, in Atjeh a Dutchman is warmly welcomed, "providing you 
come with good intentions, not like Snouck Hurgronje who brought 
disaster to this area". The chief criticism of the eolonial religious policy 
is comprised in the formula th at "religion had to be an exclusively cultic 
(spiritual) matter and was precluded from having anything to do with 
affairs of state" .28 
Benda, too, points out that colonial religious policy was based on the 
division of Islam into areligion and a political power; in aceordance 
with Snouck Hurgronje's suggestions, the colonial govemment should 
be neutral towards Islam as a religion (in its narrower sense), and 
watchful of Islam as a political power. 29 Benda suggests that "Snouck's 
seemingly plausible, yet facile, separation of religion and polities in 
Islam was, to say the least, unrealistic", because "it be lied the very 
universalism of the faith".3o Naturally Snouck Hurgronje was aware 
of this problem. But was not this sort of separation between "religion" 
and "polities" the only possibility - and th us the most realistic policy -
that a colonial govemment could attempt to carry out? 
It is understandable that Islamic leaders looked forward with great 
expectations to the independence of Indonesia. For them, the Japanese 
occupation had put an end to the dark centuries of colonial domination, 
which, being a govemment by infidels over Muslims, was impossible to 
accept or tolerate. What Islamic leaders had longed for, was basically 
achieved, thanks to the Japanese period: an Islam which, so to speak, 
had got hands and feet (an Office for Religious Affairs, the Masjumi, 
and the Hizbu'llah) to set itself in motion and make itself feit in 
Indonesian society. And th is endeavour to assert itself would become the 
struggle of Islam in the new Indonesia. 
Islamic leaders would agree with Benda th at "separation of religion 
and poli tics ... was at best a temporary phenomenon of Islam in decline. 
27 H. Ruslan Abdulgani, lsi Kitab Sutji Al-Quräan guna membakar semangat 
Mahasiswa didalam suasana sekarang, in Al-Djami'ah, July 1965, p. 33. 
The lines by Goethe, quoted by Snouek Hurgronje in Nederland en de Islam, 
p. 85, are: "Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast, Erwirb es, urn es zu 
besitzen". Snouek rneant: "erwirb es", try to win it in a spiritual/euItural 
way, through what was ea11ed an association poliey. 
28 Wahid Hasjirn, p. 597. 
29 Benda, The Crescent, pp. 23, 196. 
30 Benda, The Crescent, p. 29. 
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In an era of Islamic awakening, it could not survive for long, either in 
independent Muslim lands or in Islamic areas ruled by non-Muslirns." 31 
A reformer such as Rashi"d Riçlä - in Indonesia a well-known name -
also "has reaffirmed the inseparability of Islam as areligion and Islam 
as apolitical entity by stating that Islam is not fully in being so long 
as there does not exist astrong and independent Muslim state that is 
able to put into operation the laws of Islam".32 Later on, Pakistan 
became a shining example for many Indonesian Muslims. But some of 
them realized from the beginning, and others were to discover af ter-
wards, that putting Islamic law into practice is not as simple as holding 
a theory on an Islamic State. Af ter all, "the experienee of Pakistan 
suggests that a decree to the effect th at 'This is to be an Islamic state' 
tends to create rather than to solve problems".33 
Here we arrive at the heart of the problem concerning the role and 
the struggle of Islam in modern Indonesia. This is the question which 
from the very beginning thrusts itself upon us: to wh at extent is the 
idea of an Islamic State - or the functioning of Islamic law in state 
and society - subjectively meaningful as an ideal for believers, and in 
how far is it a realizable conception ? That would become the burning 
question immediately upon the proclamation of Independence. 
2. Facing up ta the Prablem 
The japanese government made a vague promise concerning Indo-
nesia's independenee on September 7th, 1944, against the time that the 
Allies might he defeated. On March Ist, 1945, this promise was repeated, 
rather more explicitly. It is not necessary to give the details here of the 
political developments during this last phase of the japanese occupation 
and the events surrounding the proclamation of Independenee on August 
17th, 1945.34 Information can be restricted to what is important for the 
recent history of Islam in Indonesia.35 
31 Benda, The Crescent, p. 29. 
32 G. E. von Grunebaum, Modern Islam, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1962, p. 207. 
33 Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 162. 
34 For the politica1 facts and developments, see Benda, The Crescent, pp. 
169-194; further Kahin, Nationalism, and for the developments af ter 1950 
Feith, The Decline. The Indonesian source which gives facts and official 
documents from the period August 17th, 1945 to December 31st, 1946 is 
Osman Raliby, Documenta Historica I, Djakarta 1953. 
35 For the discussion conceming the basis of the new state, the most important 
Indonesian source is the work of Muh. Yamin, primarily his pamphlet 
Proklamasi dan Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Djakarta/Amsterdam 1951; 
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As areaction to Koiso's announcemcnt of September 7th, in October 
1944 the leaders of the Masjumi called on their members "to prepare 
Muslims for the liberation of their country and their religion".36 One 
result was the aforementioned formation of the Hizbu'llah. The decla-
ration of March lst, 1945, resulted in the setting up of a Committce to 
inquire into what should be done in preparation for independence.37 
This Committee was instituted in Djakarta on April 29th. It numbered 
62 members, so that it can be referred to as the "Committee of 62". 
The Japanese appointed Dr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat to chair the 
meetings. 
Before this Committee held its first session (May 29th to June lst, 
1945) its members were informed by the J apanesc in Indonesia -
through Nishimura - that Germany had given up the struggle but that 
Japan would fight on alone. Af ter pointing to "the need for careful 
deliberation concerning the new state's constitution", Nishimura con-
tinued as follows. "As far as the position of religion in the new govern-
ment is concerned, let me say th at the attitude of the Military Admin-
istration with regard to this matter could be compared to a sheet of 
white paper. While we very clearly appreciate the bonds which exist 
between the Indonesian people and Islam, the Dai Nippon authorities 
have not the slightest blueprint or plan concerning the pI ace which the 
lslamic religion should occupy in the government, or what the rclation-
ship should be between Islam and other religions. As I already eXplained 
to you, gentlemen, the Indonesian people must realize its own ideals in 
further the three volumes of his chaotic standard work Naskah Persiapan 
Undang-undang Dasar 1945, with texts of speeches and minutes of meetings 
between May 29th and August 19th, 1945, and the minutes of the meetings 
of Parliament and Constituent Assembly, March-June 1959 about the "return 
to the Constitution of 1945"; finally the additional fourth volume, Pemba-
hasan Undang-undang Dasar Republik Indonesia, Djakarta 1959-1960. 
Unfortunately, with regard to the work of Yamin - and other Indonesian 
sources for political history - the question has to be put concerning the 
extent to which this attempt to write history springs from an interest in 
history, and the extent to which this writing of history has been put to the 
service of a special, present-day goal, a certain propaganda or politica! aim. 
Of other Indonesian sources, I mention the exact, short summaries of the 
most important documents in Ali Basja Loebis' pamphlet, Undang2 Dasar 
RL 1945 (Sedjarah pertumbuhan dan pendjelasan pasa!2nja) , Djakarta 
1963. The most important Indonesian contribution from the Protestant 
point of view is W. B. Sidjabat, Religious Toleranee and the Christian Faith, 
Djakarta 1965 (thesis Princeton 1960). 
36 Benda, The Crescent, pp. 175-176. 
37 In Indonesian: Badan untuk menjelidiki usaha-usaha persiapan kemerdekaan. 
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establishing its ncw state - Nippon will only lend its aid in these 
endeavors ... " 38 
Meanwhile Indonesian leaders had already drawn up various papers 
concerning independence. Muh. Yamin even quotes the text of an 
"Indonesian Independence Act" and a "Regulation on the Provisional 
Government of Indonesia", drawn up by Supomo, Subardjo and 
Maramis as early as 1942.39 It is not clear whether the Committee of 62 
dealt with these documents. Papers on defence, economy, finance and 
the educational system of the new state, however, were probably specially 
prepared for the meeting of the Committee.40 
The first session of the Committee of 62 was devoted to only one 
subject, namely the basis for the intended Indonesian state. At the 
meeting of May 29th, 1945, Muh. Yamin made a speech on account 
of which it has been said in the post-Soekarno period that the Pantjasila 
- the Indonesian state philosophy summarized in the Five Principles -
was in fact a creation of Yamin's, and not Soekarno's.41 IC the content 
of th is speech really was the same as the text printed in the standard 
work of Yamin, then one would in deed have to draw th is conclusion, 
as in th is speech a number of principles and terms are used which 
afterwards were laid down in the Pantjasila and in the Preamble of the 
1945 Constitution.42 
In paragraph I of this speech, under the heading Peri Kebangsaan 
(N a tionalism ), Yam in argued tha t the I ndonesian state should be 
founded not on opinions simply borrowed from other peoples, but on 
principles which are rooted in Indonesian civilization. Then, under the 
heading Peri Kemanusiaan (Humanitarianism/Internationalism), it is 
stressed that the sovereignty of Indonesia means being adopted into the 
38 Quoted by Benda, The Crescent, pp. 188-189. 
39 Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 761-772. 
40 Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 729-752. 
41 Cf. Pandji Masjarakat, one of the most influential Islamic magazines in 
Indonesia, ed. by HAMKA, no. 19, Djakarta, October 1967, p. 6, and also 
the articles by Mohamad Roem in Pandji Masjarakat, nos. 11, 12, 13, 
March-April 1967, as weil as K. H. M. Isa Anshary, Mudjahid Dacwah, 
Bandung 1964, p. 156. 
42 Cf. Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 83-107. With regard to the division of th is speech 
into 5 paragraphs and their headings - almost the same as the five principles 
of the Pantjasila - one cannot avoid asking whether this composition and 
headings were not later additions. Elsewhere the au thor admits th at he 
edited his archive material somewhat before publication; cf. the following 
note. 
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family of nations. In paragraph 111, Peri Ketuhanan (Belief in God), 
it is stated that belief in God belongs to Indonesian civilization, so that 
the state of Indonesia should have a religious basis (Ind. akan berke-
Tuhanan). Af ter that, in paragraph IV, under the heading Peri Kerak-
jatan (Democracy), three principles are brought forward which later 
reappear in the Preamble of the Constitution. They are "mutual 
deliberation" (permusjawaratan/musjawarah, taken from Sura 42 : 38) 
by the "representatives" (perwakilan) of every section of the population, 
carried out with "wise policy" (hikmah kebidjaksanaan). The last-
mentioned term is eXplained as meaning sound, logical reasoning which 
should replace irrationality and pre-logical thinking. In paragraph V, 
under the heading Kesedjahteraan Rakjat, Keadilan Sosial (Public 
Welfare, Social Justice), explanations are given conceming the extent 
of Indonesian territory and conceming citizens of foreign birth, followed 
by only a few remarks on the welfare of the population which would 
be an aim of an independent Indonesia. 
According to the abovementioned standard work of Yamin, he 
added a draft constitution as an appendix to his speech of May 29th, 
1945. If that draft had the same wording as afterwards published in 
his book, it must be concluded that - apart from very minor changes -
this draft of Yamin's appears to have become the Indonesian Constitution 
of 1945.43 The article on religion (art. 29) runs as follows: (1) The 
State shall be founded on the Belief in the One and Only God (Ind. 
Ketuhanan Jang Maha Esa); (2) The State shall guarantee the freedom 
of every inhabitant to profess his own religion and to worship according 
to his own religion and belief. 44 
Unfortunately Yamin does not give the minutes of this first session 
of the Committee of 62. The speech made by Supomo at the meeting 
43 Cf. Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 719-728. Here Yamin admits that the arrangement 
into articles and chapters was a later addition. What did his draft copy 
originally look like? 
44 The English translation given in Yamin's work (Naskah, I, p. 54) runs as 
follows: "Sect. 1. The State shall be based upon belief in the all-embracing 
God. Sect. 2. The State shall guarantee the freedom of the people to profess 
and to exercise their own religion". The translation of Ketuhanan lang 
Maha Esa with "belief in the all-embracing God" sounds more Hindu-
Javanese than orthodox IslamÎc. A later (and more official?) translation 
can be found in Yamin, Naskah, 111, pp. 755-761. The article there runs 
as follows: "( 1) The State shall be based upon Belief in the Dne, Supreme 
God. (2) The State shall guarantee freedom to every resident to adhere 
to his respective religion and to perform his religious duties in conformity 
with that religion and that faith". 
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on May 31st, however, is quoted in full. 45 From this speech it appears 
that the problems brought forward by "Moh. Hatta and other speakers" 
had centred on three questions: the question of the structure of the state 
(unitary or federal), the question of the relationship between state and 
religion, and the question of whether Indonesia should become a republic 
or a monarchy. The second question brings us to the heart of our subject. 
This part of Supomo's speech is important enough to be quoted here 
almost unabridged. 
"The honourable member Moh. Hatta", said Supomo, "has already 
eXplained in some detail that in a unitary state of Indonesia affairs of 
state should be separated from religious matters. Indeed it is quite dcar 
that there are two opinions on this question: thc opinion of the members 
who are theologians (Ind. ahli agama) and who argue that Indonesia 
should become an Islamic State, and the other proposal advocated by 
Moh. Hatta, th at is to say a national unitary state which separatJes 
affairs of state from Islamic affairs - in othcr words: not an Islamic 
State. Why do I say 'not an Islamic State'? The expres sion 'Islamic 
State' does not have the same significance as the formulation th at 'the 
state is founded on the high ideals of Islam'. I shall explain the 
difference. 
In a country organized as an Islamic State, the state cannot be 
separated from religion. State and religion are one, a whoie. Islam is, 
as you know, a religious, social and political system, based on the 
Qur'än which is the source of all precepts for the life of a Muslim. It 
has already been eXplained that Turkey - we look once again to other 
countries for examples - was a true Islamic State before the year 1924. 
Af ter 1924, Turkey changed the character of the state and is no langer 
an Islamic State. The religion of the Turkish people is indeed Islam, 
but as a state, as far as the govemmental system is concerned, Turkey 
is no longer an Islamic State. Egypt, Irak, Iran and Saudi Arabia, on 
the other hand - these are indeed Islamic States. 
Do we want to create an Islamic State in Indonesia? I have already 
reminded you of thc advice of the [Japanese] Govemment th at we should 
not simply follow the example of other states, but must be aware of the 
real identity of Indonesian society ... Due to its geographical situation, 
Indonesia has a character different from countries such as Irak, Iran, '. 
Egypt or Syria, states with an Islamic character (Corpus Islami~~n;y. 
Indonesia is part of East Asia and is a member of the Greater East 
Asian Prosperity Sphere. To this belong, for instance, Japan, China, 
45 Yarnin, Naskah, I, pp. 109-121. 
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Manchukuo, the Philippines, Thailand and Burma, which are not 
Islamic States. Of course this fact is not yet sufficient reason for rejecting 
the establishment of the state of Indonesia as an Islamic State -- that 
I would not say. But it is surely an important factor which must be 
remembered. 
I would also remind you that in Islamic States themselves, for instance 
in Egypt, Iran and Irak, there have always been different opinions on 
the way in which the sharîca (Islamic law) ought to be brought into 
agreement with international demands, with present-day requirements, 
with modern thought ... A very large group of people says that it is 
simply not allowed, but another group says: adaptation to a new age is 
indeed possible ... MuJ:lammad cAbduh, whose name is widely known 
and who has followers here too, says: 'The Sharîca can of course be 
altered by means of idjmàc or mutual deliberation, provided it does not 
clash with the Qur'än and Tradition'. Others hold a still more radical 
opinion, such as cAli cAbd al-RäziJ.<:, who says that religion has to be 
separated from the law concerning state affairs. In short, within Islamic 
States there are opposing views with regard to the question of what 
the law of the land must be like in order to be in agreement with 
modern thought ... 
Supposing we create an Islamic State - then dissension will also 
arise in our society, and this Study Committee will probably also get 
into difficulties when deliberating the question. But, gentlemen, creating 
an Islamic State in Indonesia would mean that we are not creating a 
unitary state. Creating an Islamic State in Indonesia would mean setting 
up a state that is going to link itself to the largest group, the Islamic 
group. If an Islamic State is created in Indonesia, then certainly the 
problem of minorities will arise, the problem of small religious groups, 
of Christians and others. Although an Islamic State will safeguard the 
interests of other groups as weIl as possible, these smaller religious groups 
will certainly not be able to feel involved in the state. Therefore the 
ideals of an Islamic State do not agree with the ideals of a unitary state 
which we all have sa passionately looked forward to ... 
Hence I propase, and decIare myself to be in agreement with, the 
point of view of those who want to establish a national unitary state . .. 
which transcends all groups, and respects and is aware of the special 
identity of every group, bath large and smal!. As a matter of course 
religious affairs wiU be separated from state affairs in th is national 
unitary state, and as a matter of course in this national unitary state 
religious affairs will be left in the hands of the religious groups con-
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cerned. And as a matter of course everyone in such a state will be free 
to profess any religion he likes. Both the largest and the smallest group 
will feel at one with the state (in a foreign language: will 'feel at home' 
in his state). 
Honourable members! A national unitary state does not mean a state 
with an a-religious character. No. This national unitary state ... will 
have a lofty moral basis, such as is also advocated by Islam. 
For example, in the state of Indonesia citizens must be stimulated 
to love their fatherland, to devote themselves to and sacrifice themselves 
for the sake of the country, to gladly serve the fatherland, to love and 
serve their leaders and the state, to bow down to God, to think of God 
every moment. All this must constantly be promoted and used as a 
moral basis for this national unitary state. And I am convinced that 
Islam will strengthen these principles ... " 
On the last day of this session, June 1st, 1945, Soekarno made a 
famous speech which afterwards was published under the title "The 
Birth of the Pantja Sila".46 
Soekarno began his address with a long introduction. He stressed that 
the Committee should not discuss all th is too "ponderously", and should 
not want to arrange every detail in advance, but should clearly realize 
th at Indonesia must be free, now, now, now! Af ter th is warming-up (it 
may have lasted about 20 minutes) he then posed the question: on what 
philosophical basis ought th is free Indonesia to be built? The answer was 
that a philosophy of life (W eltanschauung) should be sought which 
everyone could agree on. It should not be a state just for one section, 
giving power to a single group, but a state which is "all for all". There-
fore the first principle was nationalism (kebangsaan) , in the sense of 
an awareness of being together one nation, not in the narrow chauvinistic 
sense of "Deutschland über alles". 
The second principle should therefore be internationalism (though 
not cosmopolitanism, which would deny the nation ) or humanitarianism 
(peri-kemanusiaan). And the third? If it should be "all for all" in the 
Indonesian state, then the third principle should be mutual deliberation 
(pcrmusjawaratan) , by means of representation (perwakilan) in order 
to bring about general agreement (mufakat). In other words, democracy. 
4G Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 61-81. A summary based on the EngJish translation 
by the Indonesian Ministry of Information (The Birth of Pantjasila, 
Jakarta 1950) can be found in Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 122-127. We base 
ours on the Indonesian text found in Yamin. 
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As far as the fourth principle was concerned, said Soekarno, "in the last 
three days I have not yet heard this principle mentioned 47 - 1 mean 
the principle of social welfare (kesedjahteraan), that is to say, the ideal 
of being free from poverty in Free Indonesia".48 In th is way the expect-
ation of the people, linked to the coming of the Ratu Adil (the righteous 
king), would be fulfilled through realizing social justice. 
As the fifth principle Soekarno named Belief in God (Ketuhanan), 
which is not only of importance for the people in general but also for 
every Indonesian personally, each one in accordance with his own 
religion, and with respect for that of others. 
Thanks to a hint from a linguist, said Soekarno, he wanted to call 
these five principles Pantja Sila, the five principles or fundamentals 
on which the Indonesian state was to be built. I t would also be possible 
to condense these five into three: nationalism and humanitarianism 
together could be called socio-nationalism, democracy and welfare socio-
democracy. Together with Belief in God (ke-Tuhanan) the result would 
be the Tri Sila. It was even possible to comprise all this in one genuine 
Indonesian phrase, namely gotong-rojong (mutual help) - between rich 
and poor, Muslims and Christians, born Indonesians and Indonesians of 
foreign descent. The realization of these principles would demand effort 
- so Soekarno ended his speech - and the struggle would not end with 
the creation of a free Indonesian state, but would also have to be con-
tinued within that free Indonesia. 
One longer quotation from this speech of Soekarno is relevant here. 
When speaking of the third principle, deliberation by the people's 
representatives, he said: "For Muslims this is the best pi ace to promo te 
religion. We, I too, we are Muslims - a thollsand apologies, my being 
a Muslim is far from perfect! - but if you opened my breast and could 
see my heart, then what you would see is surely an Islamic heart. And 
this Islamic heart of 'Bung Karno' wants to defend Islam by mutual 
agreement, achieved by deliberation, namely in Parliament ... That is 
the place to promote the demands of Islam... If we really are an 
Islamic people, let us then work as hard as we can, to see that the 
greatest number of seats in the Parliament which we shall form will be 
held by Islamic representatives... If we take it that Parliament has 
100 members, then let us work, work as hard as possible, so th at 60, 70, 
80, 90 of the representatives sitting in Parliament will be Muslims, 
47 In spite of the speech by Yamin? See above, paragraph V from Yamin's 
speech. 
48 Yamin, Naskah, I, p. 75. 
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Islamic leaders. Then the laws which Parliament promulgates will 
naturally be Islamic laws. Yes, I am even convineed th at only when 
something like this happens, only then can it be said that Islam really 
lives in the soul of the people, so th at 60 %, 70 %, 80 %, 90 % of the 
representatives are Muslims, Islamic leaders, Islamic ulamas . .. Accept 
principle number three ... And let the Muslims and the Christians work 
as hard as possible in Parliament. H, for instance, the Christians want 
every letter of the regulations of the state of Indonesia to be in agreement 
with the Bibie, let them work as if their lives depended on it, sa that a 
large proportion of the representatives who are members of Parliament 
will be Christians. That is reasonable - 'fair play'." 
It may be concluded that during this first session of the Committee 
of 62 the problem which the new Indonesia was to be confronted with 
came into the open. It was th is problem: should the official basis of the 
Indonesian state be formed by Islamic principles, expressed in an Islamic 
terminology, or would Indonesia be based on the Pantjasila and become 
a model of a multi-religious state, where followers of different religions 
(together with an increasing number of "humanists") live and work 
together with respect for one another? 
Unfortunately, Yamin's work does not give the speeches and remarks 
made by Islamic leaders such as K. Bagus H. Hadikusumo, K. H. M. 
Mansur, Sukiman, Wahid Hasjim, Kahar Muzakkir and H. Agus Salim 
during this first session of the Committee of 62. The three orators 
- Yamin, Supomo and Soekarno - clearly made their choice for a 
national Pantjasila state; the most convincing was perhaps Supomo. 
According to Yamin the address by Soekarno aroused great enthusiasm. 
But did this apply to everyone? And was this really due to what he said, 
or only to how he said it? Af ter the meeting, when the members began 
to concentrate on the "homework" which they took with them, did not 
some of them - in particular the Islamic leaders - no ti ce that things 
seemed to be moving in a direction they had not intended? 
3. Looking tor a Compromise 
A so-called Small Committee from the Committee of 62 continued 
the work in Djakarta af ter the first session.49 Soekarno, Hatta, Sutardjo, 
49 This infonnation and more that follows is taken from the minutes of the 
second session of the Committee of 62, July 10th-16th, 1945, as taken down 
by Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 143-396. 
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Wahid Hasjim, Hadikusumo, Oto Iskandardinata, Yamin and Maramis 
were members of it. They dealt with the 32 proposals suggested by 
40 members which were submitted in writing between June 1st and 
20th, 1945; about 20 members pressed for a proclamation of free Indo-
nesia as soon as possible.50 
In Yamin's book we find a draft for a Declaration of Independence 
which ought to be mentioned here.5i It is not c1ear when exactly this 
draft came into being. lt begins with a condemnation of Dutch colonial-
ism, while Japan is praised and thanked for its fight for the freedom 
and welfare of East Asia. lts concluding words later reappear in the 
Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, namely th at now the blessed hour 
has come when the people of Indonesia, thanks to the mercy of God, 
can proclaim their independence. This fairly lengthy draft for a 
declaration of independence was, however, overtaken byevents, and on 
August 17th, 1945 replaced by a proclamation consisting of only two 
sentences, signed by Soekarno and Hatta. 
One of the points at issue in June 1945 was apparently the question 
of whether it might not be better to realize independence in two phases: 
firstly a provisional proclamation of the independent state of Indonesia 
under the supervision of Japan and pending Japan's defeat, to be 
followed by a further dec is ion concerning the structure of the new state, 
to be taken in due time when freedom had been won. For such a first 
phase, Hoesein Djajadiningrat, Supomo, Suwandi, Singgih, Sastro-
muljono, Sutardjo and Subardjo drafted a provisional Constitution, 
which was submitted to the Small Committee on June 15th. According 
to that draft the leadership of the state would be entrusted not to only 
one person but to a Directory of three, sin ce a truly representative body 
could not be elected for the time being.52 
More important, however, was the debate which continued and 
intensified between the "secular" nationalists and the Islamic leaders, 
in contemporaneous lndonesian sources always indicated as golongan 
kebangsaan and golongan Islam. Now it happened that the Central 
5() According to Soekarno in the report which he gave at the opening of the 
second session of the Committee of 62 on July lOth, 1945. Cf. Yamin, 
Naskah, I, pp. 147-148. 
51 The text can be found in Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 755-756. It is undated. 
As Yamin certainly did not give the reports and minutes of all the meetings 
of every committee and sub-committee, let alone informal discussions, the 
chronological order of the drafts cannot, as far as I can see, be fixed 
precisely. 
52 Cf. Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 713-717. 
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Advisory Council met in Djakarta on June 18th, 1945.53 A number of 
Indonesians who were also members of the Committee of 62 held seats 
on this Council. Moreover a number of members of the Committee of 62 
lived in Djakarta. Therefore Soekarno, chairman of the Small Com-
mittee, called together all available members of the Committee of 62, 
in all 38 people. From them a group of 9 members came forward who 
were to look for a solution to the increasing tension between the 
Nationalists and the Islamic faction. 
At a meeting on June 22nd, 1945, which must have been extremely 
difficult, these 9 leaders managed in the end to arrive at a compromise. 
They formulated a "gentlemen's agreement" which was intended to 
become the Preamble of the Constitution, or at least the working paper 
for the discussion on it. Some weeks later Yamin named this politica! 
document the "Djakarta Charter" (Ind. Piagam Djakarta).54 Outside 
Indonesia little interest has apparently been taken in this document.55 
However, in retrospect it can be conduded that later discussions on the 
relationship of State and Islam in Indonesia were to a large extent 
determined by some words from this Djakarta Charter. 
The text of the Djakarta Charter indudes the dosing words of the 
draft dedaration of independence (which was never used in the end) 
combined with the dosing sentence from the preamble of Yamin's draft 
Constitution. From a later remark of Hatta's, the reverse order of events 
could be deduced, that is, that af ter the Djakarta Charter of June 22nd, 
mtended as a draft preamble to the Constitution, the lengthy dedaration 
of independence was drawn up.56 However that may be, it is important 
to turn our attention to the content of the Djakarta Charter. The 
document is difficult to translate.57 It runs like this: 
"As independenee is the right of every people, any form of subjugation 
in this world, being contrary to humanity (peri kemanusiaan) and 
justice (peri keadilan), must he abolished. 
Now the struggle of the Indonesian independence movement has 
reached the blessed hour in which the Indonesian people have safe and 
53 Cf. Benda, The Crescent, p. 190. 
54 Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 228, 240. 
55 One looks in vain in Benda and Kahin, for example. 
56 For the remarks by Hatta, see the minutes of August 18th, 1945 in Yamin, 
Naskah, I, p. 40l. 
57 Compare the different translations of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution 
in Yamin, Naskah, I, p. 49 and 111, p. 753; also Yamin, Pembahasan, p. 97; 
further Charles Wolf Jr., The lndonesian Story, New York 1948, p. 165. 
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sound been led to the portals of the Indonesian state, which is to be 
independent, united, sovereign, just and prosperous. 
By the Grace of Almighty God (Rachmat Allah Jang Maha Kuasa) 
and moved by the highest ideals to lead a free nationallife (berkehidupan 
kebangsaan), the Indonesian people hereby declare their independence 
(kemerdekaannja) . 
Further, in order to establish for the Indonesian state a government 
which will protect the whole Indonesian people and all Indonesian 
territory, and to promote public welfare (kesedjahteraan), to raise the 
educationallevel of the people, and to participate in establishing a world 
order founded on freedom, everlasting peace and social justice, national 
independence is hereby expressed in a Constitution of the Indonesian 
state which is moulded in the form of the Republic of Indonesia, resting 
upon the people's sovereignty and founded on [the following principles]: 
the Belief in God (ke-Tuhanan), with the obligation for adherents of 
Islam to practise Islamic law, in accordance with the principle of a 
righteous and moral humanitarianism (kemanusiaan); the unity (persa-
tuan) of Indonesia, and a democracy (kerakjatan) led by the wise policy 
(hikmat kebidjaksanaan) of the mutual deliberation of a representative 
body (permusjawaratan perwakilan) and ensuring social justice (keadilan 
sosial) for the whole Indonesian people." 58 
The nine signatories of the Djakarta Charter were the following. 
There were Soekarno and Hatta, belonging to the so-called secular 
nationalists, as did A. A. Maramis (originating from a Protestant area); 
on the other hand there were Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (former chairman 
of the Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia) , Abdulkahar Muzakkir (= Kahar 
Muzakkir, already mentioned), H. Agus Salim (the "Grand Old Man" 
of the former Sarekat Islam, which later became the abovementioned 
P.S.I.I.), then Achmad Subardjo (originally left-wing, but in 1945 and 
1951-1952 Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Masjumi), also Wahid 
Hasjim - "perhaps the most prominent representative of Indonesian 
Islam at the close of the ]apanese era", as Benda maintains 59 - and 
finally Muh. Yamin, who, like Soekarno, belonged to the "sec ui ar" 
nationalists. 
In all the debates of this period this document is typified as a 
compromise between "the nationalist group" and "the Islamic group". 
58 For the original Indonesian text of this Djakarta Charter see Appendix I, 
at the end of this book. 
59 Benda, The Crescent, p. 189. 
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Only in recent years is the Christian group said to have been represented 
by Maramis and therefore mentioned as a third partner. But according 
to oral information th is se ems to be incorrect. Maramis represented the 
"secular" nationalists, and it is said that he too, being a non-Muslim, 
had his objections to this compromise, but did not want to endanger the 
proclamation of independence. However, it was Latuharhary (later to 
be governor of the Moluccas) who was considered the representative of 
the Christians; and Latuharhary apparently dissociated himself from 
looking for such a compromise. 60 
The crucial sentence in the Djakarta Charter is, of course, the 
stipulation that the state was to be founded on belief in God "with the 
obligation for adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law". In present-day 
Indonesia this sentence is referred to as "the seven words", dengan 
kewadjiban mendjalankan Sjari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pcmeluknja. 
Does this formula mean a more or less Islamic State? Does it have legal 
consequences, so that the government has to work for and watch over 
the execution of Islamic law? Should the government promulgate sepa-
rate laws for the Muslims (e.g. in connection with marriage), or even 
see to the fulfilment of religious duties in the narrower sense of the 
word? Or does this formula only carry meaning as a pious stimulus for 
the Muslims? But if so, why does it appear in the draft of the Preamble 
of the Constitution? Or in other words, what has the state to do with 
it? Or is it only a spent cartridge as a sop to the traditional orthodox? 
In short, is this formula a starting point from which to work in the 
direction of an Islamic State, or is it only a last remnant of a lost 
struggle for an Islamic State? These are some of the questions which 
later arose and became dominant in the debate on the position of Islam 
in the new Indonesia. 
From July 10th to 16th, 1945, the Committee of 62, in the meantime 
supplemented by six new members,61 met again. 
First of all, Soekarno, as chairman of the Small Committee reported 
on work that had meanwhile been going on. He began his address on ce 
again with an appeal for haste: in this session they had to come to an 
agreement on the structure of the state and on its Constitution, so that 
Tokyo could recognize the independence of Indonesia and install a 
government in Djakarta. Then Soekarno told of the initial difficulties 
00 Compared with Latuharhary's remarks during the second session of the 
Committee of 62 - to be discussed later - this oral information sounds 
reliable. 
61 Yamin, Naskah, I, p. 145. 
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between representatives of the two factions, and of the agreement 
achieved by the nine signatories of a draft for the preamble (rantjangan 
preambule / pembukaan) of the Constitution. Applause folIowed the 
reading aloud of the text of this Djakarta Charter. 
On the first day of this session the form of government for the new 
state (republic or kingdom) was debated. On the part of the Muslims 
some advocated a king, as "God's representative on earth", or a republic 
with an I mäm as head of state. Before this could be voted on, a moment 
of silence was moved and K. Bagus H. Hadikusumo recited the Süra 
al-FätilJa (the first Sura of the Qur'än). Then 55 out of the 64 members 
voted for a republic, while the head of the new state was to be a 
president; 6 votes feIl for a king, 2 for "something else" - probably 
this meant an imäm. Lengthy discussion folIowed on the extent of 
Indonesian territory; the morning session of July 11 th was also taken up 
with this subject. The minutes contain interesting material concerning 
the debates about Malaya, North Borneo, Portuguese Timor, New Guinea 
and the Philippines. 
In the further meetings on that day preparatory discussions were held 
on the coming Constitution. Yamin once more drew attention to the 
draft that he had already put before the Committee on May 29th. 
FinalIy the members were divided into three sub-committees: one to 
draft the Constitution (19 members ; chairman Soekarno), one to 
deliberate questions of defence (22 members; chairman Abikusno Tjo-
krosu joso) and one to discuss economie problems (22 members ; chair-
man Hatta). It is remarkable that the chairman, Radjiman, refused to 
appoint Yamin to the committee on the Constitution, without giving 
his reasons, at least if we can rely on the minutes in Yamin's work. 
The Committee for the Constitution met under the chairmanship of 
Soekarno on the evening of July 11 th for a preliminary discussion of the 
main problems in connection with the Constitution: the structure of 
the state (unitary or federal?) , the character of the Constitution (simple, 
provisional?) and the draft preamble as it lay before them in the shape 
of the Djakarta Charter of June 22nd. 
On the side of the Protestants, Latuharhary expressed objections to 
the words "with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practise Islamic 
law" , as this could have considerable consequences regarding other 
religions, and moreover could lead to difficulties in connection with the 
adat-istiadat (customary law). Agus Salim answered that the problem 
of adat-Iaw and Islamic law was an old one and, generalIy speaking, 
CHAPTER I: 1945·1955 29 
had already been solved; the adherents of other religions did not need 
to worry: "Their safety is not dependent on the power of the state, but 
on the tradition (Ind. adat, here: traditional tolerance?) of the Islamic 
community, which includes 90 % of the population". 
Soekarno, as chairman, reminded them that the preamble had been 
arrived at with great difficulties and was the result of an agreement 
between the so-caIled Islamic and nationalist factions; the omission of 
this one sentence would he unacceptable to Muslims. Wongsonegoro (a 
liberal Javanese) and Hoesein Djajadiningrat (the first Indonesian 
head of the Office for Religious Affairs) also objected to these words, 
saying: "They may weIl create fanaticism, because it seems that Muslims 
would be forced to keep the sharica". Wahid Hasjim denied the possi-
bility of compulsion by pointing to the principle of mutual deliberation 
(permusjawaratan), adding that according to some people this sentence 
did perhaps go too far, but according to others did not go far enough. 
Soekarno repeated that this sentence was a compromise reached with 
great difficulty and, seeing that no other objections were raised, he 
concluded that the preamble might be taken as accepted. 
Soekarno then appointed a working-committee which was to meet 
on July 12th to prepare a draft Constitution. To what extent Soekarno 
busied himself with the drafting of this Constitution is not clear. The 
chairman of this working-committee was Supomo; further members were 
Wongsonegoro, Subardjo, Maramis, Singgih, Agus Salim and Sukiman. 
Neither Wahid Hasjim, perhaps the most radical Muslim, nor Latuhar-
hary who might he considered as the representative of the Christians, 
was included. 
The draft presented by this working-committee on July 13th, 1945, 
is almost the same as Yamin's draft of May 29th. 62 One noticeable 
difference is that in this new draft, immediately af ter article 1 ( the 
Indonesian state is a republic, with sovereignty of the people which is 
exercised by the People's Congress ), the position of the President is dealt 
with, and only af ter that the position and task of the People's Congress. 
In Yamin's draft - as in the final Constitution of 1945 - the order 
is reversed, so that the People's Congress is clearly placed above the 
President. The article on religion is somewhat shorter and vaguer in 
th is draft of July 13th; af ter the proposed preamble (= Djakarta 
Charter) it was apparently considered enough to put here: "The State 
62 The text of this draft of July 13th, 1945, is to be found in Yamin, Naskah, I, 
pp. 264-270. 
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shall guarantee freedom for every inhabitant to adhere to whatever 
religion he wants and to worship according to his own religion". 
At this meeting of the Committee for the Constitution (the Committee 
of 19) it became obvious that a crisis was threatening. It turned out th at 
Wahid Hasjim had indeed taken the proposed preamble as a point of 
departure for further provisions in the direction of an Islamic State. 
He suggested stipulating th at only Muslims could be elected as President 
or Vice-President of the Republic, and that the article on religion should 
run as follows: "The religion of the state is Islam, with the guarantee 
of freedom for adherents of other religions to profess their own reli-
gion ... " etc. He argued as follows: "H the President is a Muslim, the 
regulations wiII bear the mark of Islam and that wiII have great 
influence". As for Islam as the state religion, this would be important 
with regard to the defence of the country: "Generally a defence based on 
religious belief is very vigorous, for according to the teachings of Islam 
one may only give one's life for the ideology of religion". 
Agus Salim opposed the suggestions of his co-religionist, because they 
would undermine the compromise between the nationalist and Islamic 
factions, and "if the President has to be a Muslim, then what about the 
Vice-President, the ambassadors, etc., and what then was the point of 
our promise to protect other religions?" Sukiman (who later became 
leader of the Masjumi), however, supported the proposals of Wahid 
Hasjim, saying that "it would please the peopie and in fact have no 
further consequences". Djajadiningrat and Wongsonegoro once more 
objected to these suggestions, as they had done earl ier in the case of the 
"seven words"; the Iatter on ce again expressed his fear of an inter-
pretation which would enable the state to force Muslims to keep Islamic 
law. Oto Iskandardinata made an intermediary suggestion: on the one 
hand, no stipulation concerning the President, but on the other hand a 
repetition of the "seven words" from the preamble in the constitutional 
article on religion. Supomo as chairman of the working-committee 
declared that the committee would adopt th is suggestion, and would 
change the draft to cover this. A proposal by Mrs. Vifa Santoso to 
include more clearly human rights in the Constitution was swept aside 
by Supomo as unnecessary, as the Indonesian state was founded on the 
people's sovereignty. Latuharhary apparently feit it was unnecessary or 
inopportune to repeat his objections. Apart from small corrections, the 
draft Constitution was then laid before the Committee of 62, which 
met again in pleno on July 14th, 1945. 
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At this plenary session of July 14th, Soekarno immediately took the 
fIoor as chairman of the Committee for the Constitution. Af ter his report 
on the achievement of drafts for a declaration of independence, a 
preamble and a Constitution, the debate was opened by discussing the 
preamble (= Djakarta Charter). 
The Muhammadijah leader K. Bagus H. Hadikusumo wanted to do 
away with the words "for adherents of Islam" in the "seven words", so 
that the formula would read: "The state is founded on Belief in God, 
with the obligation to practise Islamic law". Initially he brought forward 
only stylistic considerations; later he mentioned another reason, namely 
that a dual legislation - one for Muslims and one for others - was 
unacceptahle. If th at was the intention of the words in question, he 
would prefer nothing to he stipulated. Soekarno answered that the 
deletion of these words could give the impression "that there is no 
question of Muslims and hence no duty to practise Islamic law". Hadi-
kusumo now replied that the sentence as it ran in the preamhle (that is 
to say, the "seven words") could not he upheld, for the government 
could not put Islamic law into operation: "The government cannot 
interfere in the way people practise their religion". 
From the minutes it is not dear what Hadikusumo's actual intentions 
were, and to what extent misunderstandings played a role. Did the 
drafters of the Djakarta Charter only intend to emphasize th at Muslims 
themselves had a religious and moral duty to keep Islamic law, or would 
the government he involved? Did Hadikusumo read the words as 
stipulating th at the government had to enforce Islamic law for Muslims? 
Was the formula capahle of many meanings, in particular the very 
imprecise verh mendjalankan (keep, maintain, carry out, make operative, 
apply, give effect to)? Was it even intentionally muIti-interpretable, as 
a compromise that would make it possihle for the various parties and 
individuals to have their own interpretation? 
Whatever the right answer may he, Hadikusumo was eventually 
silenced and gave in to Ahikusno's argument that the differences of 
opinion on th is point should not he exposed in public. 
At the meeting of July 15th, Supomo eXplained on ce again his inter-
pretation of the disputed "seven words": they did not mean th at the 
Indonesian state would exist only for one group (the Muslims), but 
simply that the state would he heedful of the special identity of the 
largest section of the population. He repeated that these "seven words" 
from the preamhle and from the Constitutional artide on religion formed 
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a compromise, and he gave the impression th at the Committee for the 
Constitution (the Committee of 19) had unanimously accepted this 
compromise. In this connection he mentioncd on the one hand the names 
of Wahid Hasjim and Agus Salim, and on the other the non-Muslims 
Latuharhary and Maramis, thus consciously or unconsciously shifting 
the contrast from Muslims and Nationalists to Muslims and Christians. 
Af ter speeches and discussions on other problems (citizenship, 
ministerial responsibility, and so on), the debate on religion flared up 
once again at the evening meeting of July 15th. This happened because 
Hadikusumo repeated his somewhat crypt ic questions concerning the 
vexed "seven words". K. H. Masjkur aggravated the problem, saying 
that if Indonesian citizens had the duty to keep Islamic law, this could 
in fact only he carried out provided the President was a Muslim and 
Islam was acknowledged as the official religion of the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
Soekarno tried to hush up the business by saying that in fact it would 
turn out weIl: the President would obviously be someone who was a 
Muslim. But Masjkur continued demanding clarity, not only for himself 
but for the whole people, he said. Finally feelings became so heated that 
Kahar Muzakkir, thumping the table with his fist, suggested a wholly 
new compromise, as he himself called it. Speaking for the Islamic 
faction, he demanded that everything, from the first words of the 
Declaration of Independence up to and including the Constitutional 
article in question, wherever God's Name or Islam was mentioned, 
should be struck out without further ado, so that nothing of this nature 
should remain. 
The suggestion of the chairman to put the proposed preamble to the 
vote was sharply answered with: "Impossible, that cannot be voted on, 
you cannot vote about religion!" Kahar Muzakkir repeated even more 
explicitly his proposal that everything concerned with God's Name and 
with religion should be omitted. Tension became palpable - it is 
palpable even when reading the minutes - when Hadikusumo took 
the floor and began his speech with the well-known formula, "I seek 
refuge in God from Satan who bringeth destruction". 63 He continued 
as follows: "More than once it has been eXplained here that Islam also 
includes a state ideology. Hence the state cannot be divorced from 
Islam ... If the [Islamic] proposal is rejected ... then I am in agreement 
with the proposal of Abdul Kahar Muzakkir. If the ideology of Islam 
63 Usually: "I seek refuge in God from Satan the outcast" (or: "from the 
accursed/stoned Satan") ; cf. Sura 16:98. 
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is not accepted, all right then! Then it is clear that this state is not 
based on Islam and therefore will be neutra!. That at least is clear. 
Let us not accept a sort of compromise, as Mr. Soekamo calls it. As far 
as justice and religious duties are concemed, there is no compromise, 
it does not exist. Let us be clear about it - if there are objections to 
accepting the ideology of the Islamic community, it comes down to 
this: those who agree with an Islamic basis want it to be an Islamic 
State, but if this is not accepted, then there must be neutrality as far as 
religion is concerned." 
The meeting was closed at midnight at the suggestion of Achmad 
Sanusi, who hoped "that the atmosphere of these deliberations might 
first cool down somewhat". 
The next day, July 16th, 1945, immediately af ter the opening of the 
meeting, Soekarno took the floor. He said he was sure that many of those 
present, like himself, had not been able to get to sleep that night. But 
everyone who truly asks for directions from God receives them. And last 
night those directions had already begun to come. Af ter the meeting 
some of the leaders of both factions - the so-called Nationalists and the 
so-called Islamic group - had met to look for a solution. As a result of 
this discussion Soekamo now wanted to appeal to everyone, especially 
the so-called nationalist faction, to make a sacrifice, remembering that 
(in Dutch) "greatness lies in sacrificing". This sacrifice would be to 
include in the Constitution the articles that "the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia must be a bom Indonesian who is a Muslim", 
and that "the State is founded on Belief in God, with the obligation for 
adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law". Soekarno said he realized 
that he was asking a very great sacrifice from such patriots as Latuhar-
hary and Maramis who were not Muslims. But as if in tears - again, 
as if in tears - he begged them to make this sacrifice for country 
and people. 
Af ter Supomo had made a number of proposals concerning minor 
editorial changes in the draft Constitution, the meeting ended in an 
anti-climax. Probably no-one was satisfied, yet everyone acquiesced. 
At the request of the chairman, everyone stood up to show that th ere 
was unanimous acceptance of the draft Constitution. Only Yamin 
apparently needed special encouragement to stand up too ... 64 
64 Yamin, Naskah, I, p. 396. 
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4. The Decision 
At the beginning of August 1945, developments began to move 
faster and faster. On August 7th, the day af ter Hiroshima, the japanese 
High Command in Saigon agreed that a committee should be formed in 
Indonesia "to make preparations for transfer of governmental authority 
from the japanese armed forces to it".65 Soekarno, Hatta and Radjiman 
were called to Saigon where it was agreed on August 11 th that a con-
stitutional assembly would meet in Djakarta on August 19th. On 
August 24th Indonesia would receive its independence from japan. 
This development was not at all to the liking of Sjahrir, the leader 
of an anti-japanese underground movement in Indonesia, and some 
other left-wing leaders and students. Sjahrir, of course, had not been 
a member of the Committee of 62 or its sub-committees. From August 
10th onward he had tried to persuade Soekarno and Hatta that the 
japanese were on the point of capitulation, and that they themselves 
should take the initiative to proclaim independence immediately. But 
Soekarno and Hatta hesitated out of fear of a massacre, as long as the 
capitulation of japan was not a fact. Until August 16th they were not 
convinced of the correctness of the rumours that japan had capitulated 
on the 14th. Meanwhile on August 14th or 15th the Preparatory Com-
mittee, as agreed in Saigon, was set up in Djakarta. But the question 
arose of whether it was right to proclaim the independence of Indonesia 
in thc name of a committee "made in japan". Moreover some leaders 
preferred an anti-japanese national leader to declare independence, in 
a clearly anti-japanese formulation. But in the end Soekarno and Hatta 
had to take the responsibility. So on August 17th, 1945, they declared 
the Independence of Indonesia. 
As has already been said, the new Preparatory Committee (Ind. 
Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) was set up on August 14th 
or 15th. Besides the chairman, Soekarno, and vice-chairman, Hatta, 
the CommÎttee consisted of 19 members, among whom were many well-
known names such as Supomo, Radjiman, Sutardjo, Wahid Hasjim, 
65 See for this and the following information Kahin, Nationalism, p. 127; 
compare Benda, The Crescent, p. 194. Recently Moh. Hatta tried on ce more 
to separate the truth from the myth surrounding the proclamation of 
Independence, in Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945, Djakarta 1969; part 
of this was already puhlished in an article of Hatta's in Mimbar Indonesia, 
no. 32/33, August 17th, 1951, which is also to he found in Osman Ralihy, 
Documenta, pp. 655-659. 
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K. Bagus H. Hadikusumo, Oto Iskandardinata and Latuharhary.66 
Af ter the declaration of independence on August 17th, the members of 
this Committee were called together for an emergency meeting to be held 
the next mom ing. 67 
The minutes given by Yamin inform us that the opening was delayed 
for about two hours, so that the meeting only began at 11.30 in the 
mom ing. Other sources and aral information confirm this delay and 
explain it. 68 The point was that before the meeting could begin some 
members wanted to solve the difficulties which once again could lead 
to a clash between the Islamic leaders and the others ("secular" 
nationalists and non-Muslims). Af ter the second session of the former 
Committee of 62 (July lOth-16th), a number of proposals for alterations 
to the provisional Constitution had been received. Furthermore, various 
influential people from outside Java had meanwhile arrived in Djakarta. 
Apparently the leaders in Djakarta now fully realized how difficult it 
would be to unite into one state the enormous area of Indonesia, with 
its great diversity of ethnic groups and religions. It seems that even the 
Japanese in Djakarta had wamed Hatta that Nationalists and non-
Muslims did object to certain Islamic formulas in the provisional 
Constitution. 
On the moming of August 18th informal discussions and lobbying 
therefore took pI ace between Hatta (in whom people on the Muslim 
side certainly had more confidence than in Soekamo) and representatives 
of the Islamic faction. Sajuti Melik mentions the names of Teuku Mo-
hamad Hassan (from Atjeh) and K. Bagus H. Hadikusumo. According 
to first-hand oral information Wahid Hasjim was also present. These 
informal talks took some hours, even though people were aware that 
a decision had to be reached quickly and speedyaction was called for. 
They finally came to the conclusion th at in fact Indonesia only could 
66 A complete list of names is to be found in Kahin, Nationalism, p. 127. This 
list is the same as that of Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 399, 427, wh ere it is said 
that at the meeting of August 18th, 1945, there were 6 additional members, 
namely Wiranatakusuma, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, Kasman, Sajuti Melik, 
Kusuma Sumantri and Subardjo. The list of an additional 5 or 6 members 
given in Kahin, Nationalism, p. 138 seems incorrect. 
67 The minutes of these meetings of August 18th-19th, 1945 can be found in 
Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 399-473. 
68 Sajuti Melik, Undang2 Dasar '45 & "Piagam Djakarta", in Mahasiswa 
Indonesia, no. 98, Bandung, April 1968. Sajuti Melik was a member of the 
Preparatory Committee and apparently foJlowed the developments which 
preceded it at close quarters; a possible publication of his memoirs based 
on notes taken then could be of importanee, as additional or correctivil 
evidence to other sourees, as for example Yamin. 
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hecome and remain a unity if the Constitution contained nothing that 
was directly connected with Islam. Therefore articles on Islam as the 
official religion of the state, the condition that the President must be a 
Muslim and "the obligation for adherents of Islam to practise Islamic 
law" had to be removed. 
Thanks to these informal talks led by Hatta, the question of the 
Constitution could quickly be dealt with at the official meeting which 
followed. In his opening speech Soekarno urged setting aside any minor 
wishes, in order to get the Constitution ready that very day, and more-
over to elect a President and Vice-President. He informed them that 
propos als had been received advocating alterations to the Constitution 
made by the former Committee of 62 and that, thanks be to God, due 
to informal talks agreement had been reached on several points. 
Then Hatta was called upon to explain these proposed alterations. 
They concerned first and foremost the vexed "seven words" of the 
preamble (the former Djakarta Charter) which were to be deleted, while 
the expression "Belief in God" (ke-T uhanan) would be amplified to 
"Belief in the One and Only God" (ke-Tuhanan Jang Maha Esa). The 
same changes would be made in the Constitutional artide on religion 
(artide 29). Further, the condition th at the President had to be a 
Muslim would he omitted. As reason for these changes Hatta reminded 
his audience repeatedly that they had to be mindful of the unity of the 
whole Indonesian population. According to Hatta, representatives of 
the various factions had already agreed on these changes. For the rest 
there were only propos als for minor adjustments. Therefore it was now 
possible to finish hammering out the Constitution. 
Af ter this speech of Hatta's a short discussion followed, first of all 
on the preamble. No-one returned to the abovementioned changes, so 
these could be taken as accepted. A few minor changes were made, as 
follows. The Arabic muqaddima for "preamble" was replaced by the 
Indonesian equivalent, pembukaan, meaning "opening". At the sug-
gestion of Hadikusumo a small change was made in the formula 
concerning the basis of the state. The sentence ran as follows: the state 
should be based on Belief in the One and Only God (no longer: with 
the obligation for adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law), "in 
accordance with the principle of a righteous and moral humanitarian-
ism". Now that the vexed dause had been done away with, the words 
"in accordance with the principle of" had to be deleted also. Hence 
the sentence came to run as follows: th at the Indonesian State is founded 
on Belief in God, a righteous and moral humanitarianism, etc. According 
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to oral information the first formula ("in accordance with") had initially 
come into being in order to prevent the possibility of a too rigorous 
application of Islamic law. For instance, in view of a precept such as 
the cutting off of a thief's hand (cf. Sura 5 : 38) it had to be laid down 
that Islamic law would be practised "in accordance with the principle 
of a righteous and moral humanitarianism".&9 
At the proposal of a representative from Bali, the name Allah (in the 
expression "the Grace of Almighty God") was exchanged for the 
common Indonesian word Tuhan, originally meaning "Lord" but now 
felt to be the widest definition of the Supreme Being, not His specific 
name.70 
Af ter these alterations had been accepted, discussion followed on the 
Constitution itself. Soekarno stressed once again that this Constitution 
was only a "temporary Constitution", a "lightning Constitution", a 
"revolutionary Constitution", which in due time could be perfected by 
the elected representatives of the people. The discussion which followed 
did not produce anything of importance for the question in hand. It is 
only worth mentioning that at this meeting of the "Preparatory Com-
mittee" on August 18th, Soekarno was elected President of the Republic 
of Indonesia, and Hatta Vice-President. 
At the meeting of the following day, August 19th, one of the questions 
to be solved was the number of Departments which were to be formed 
and their tasks. It was prepared by a memorandum from a sub-committee 
consisting of Subardjo, Sutardjo and Kasman Singodimedjo (later a 
well-known Masjumi leader). In this discussion Latuharhary objected 
to the setting up of a separate Ministry of Religious Affairs. H, for 
instance, a Christian became Minister of Religion, he said, the Muslims 
would consider it unpleasant, and vice versa. From the Muslim side, 
Abdul Abbas suggested that religious affairs should be part of the 
Ministry of Education. This proposal was accepted, af ter the idea of 
a separate Ministry of Religious Affairs had gained only 6 votes. 
On August 29th, 1945, the "Preparatory Committee" was dissolved. 
lts members were absorbed into the larger Central Indonesian National 
Committee (Ind. Komité Nasional lndonesia Pusat, in short K.N.I.P.), 
a provisional parliament with an advisory task. On August 31st, 1945, 
69 This illustration once more strengthens the impression that some people 
did not take the Djakarta Charter only as a religious stimulus but in deed 
as a legal principle to be followed in civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
70 It is very odd that finally, by mistake, the word Allah did remain in the 
press publication which is regarded as the official publication of the 1945 
Constitution, namely Berita Republik Indonesia, 1946, no. 7. 
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the first presidential cabinet came into being, succeeded by the first 
parliamentary Sjahrir cabinet on November 14th, 1945. 
Thus the new Indonesia came into being neither as an Islamic State 
according to orthodox Islamic conceptions, nor as a sec uI ar state which 
would consider religion merely a private matter. The discussions had 
eventually resulted in a compromise, that is to say, in the idea of a state 
that wanted to recognize a religious principle, and wanted to be positive 
about religion in general and its various manifestations, or, according to 
a later slogan, a state that wanted to consider religion an indispensabie 
contribution to "nation-building and character-building". So the Indo-
nes ion solution was not a Constitution using Islamic terms without really 
accepting their Islamic content, but the acceptance of common spiritual 
values as expressed in the Pantjasila, with its first principle of Belief 
in the One and Only God (Ketuhanan Jang Maha Esa). 
This last conception has been subjected to a profound analysis by 
Van Nieuwenhuijze.71 It could, however, cause misunderstanding when 
he calls this formula "a basically Muslim concept", that has been enlarged 
into a "de-confessionalized concept" to make it acceptable for non-
Muslims as weIl. Of course, some Muslims afterwards tended to interpret 
this concept in an Islamic way (which is right and proper), and even 
wanted to make their interpretation the only possible one (which is 
wrong and not permissible, if one is seriously prepared to acknowledge 
the multi-religious character of Indonesian society). In my opinion 
Sidjabat was right, when he maintained, in opposition to Van Nieuwen-
huijze, th at the first principle of the Pantjasila "is not necessarily a 
'de-confessionalized concept of Islamic God', but rather a general and 
neutral concept of God that gives room for everyone who worships God, 
without becoming indifferent in matters of religion".72 
In other words, the first principle of the Pantjasila is neither a 
syncretistic compromise based on the opinion that in the end all religions 
are alike, nor is it a concept with only one interpretation, so th at 
adherents of one religion could prescribe to others what their belief in 
71 Cf. Van Nieuwenhuijze on 'Deconfessionalized' Muslim Concepts, in Aspects, 
p. 208 ff. 
72 W. B. Sidjabat, Religious Toleranee, p. 74. The author translated "Ketu-
hanan Jang Maha Esa" with "the Divine Omnipotence". Another Indonesian 
Christian theologian suggested "The Absolute Lordship" (Harun Hadi-
wijono, Man in the Present Javanese Mysticism, Baarn, the Netherlands, 
1967). I myseif would prefer to maintain the translation "Belief in the One 
and Only God". 
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God and their worship should be like, in order to be in accordance with 
the basis of the state. This first principle must be understood as a multi-
interpretable formula and must be appreciated as providing a real 
possibility for pcople to agree while disagreeing. 
5. The Fight for Freedom (1945-1950) 
The Republic of Indonesia th us became a fact on August 17th, 1945. 
Some months later, however, the colonial government returned to 
Djakarta under the name of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration 
(N.l.C.A.). The Dutch wanted a return to "Iawand order"; only af ter 
that would they be prepared to talk about a certain form of independence 
or home rule for Indonesia. Between J uly and December 1946 the 
N.l.C.A. began to set up a number of "federal states" in co-operation 
with certain Indonesian leaders and parts of the population in the 
newly occupied areas. These states then would be prepared to co-opera te 
with the Netherlands. In this way the young Republic would be isolated 
in Java and some parts of Sumatra. During the so-called physical 
revolution (1945-1950), the existence of the Republic in Java was twice 
endangered by a Dutch military offensive (July 1947 and December 
1948). The government of the Republic was forced to retire from 
Djakarta to Jogjakarta (or "Jogja") in Central Java. 
The Dutch "federal states policy", together with the impossibility of 
destroying the Republic of Indonesia, finally resulted in the setting up 
of the federal "United Indonesian Republic" (Ind. Republik lndonesia 
Serikat, abbreviated to R.LS.; in American publications usually called 
the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, or RU.S.L). Thus the 
Independence of Indonesia was officially recognized by the Dutch on 
December 27th, 1949. As early as August 1950, however, this RLS. was 
reorganized into a unitary state, again called the Republic of Indonesia 
(RL). In th is way the Republic which was proclaimed on August 17th, 
1945 determined the charactcr of the new Indonesian state which was 
to include the whole territory of the former Dutch East Indies (until 
1962 with the exception of West lrian, then Dutch New Guinea). 
For a sketch of the modern history of Indonesia - and thus for the 
recent history of Islam in Indonesia - we can turn our attention in 
particular to Java. It was there that the new Indoncsia took shape, in 
the Republic proclaimed on August 17th, 1945. Wh at happened in and 
around this Republic was dccisive for the new Indonesia, and not the 
momentary restoration of Dutch authority or the activities of the 
N.LC.A. 
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The political developments during the first 5 years of the Republic 
of Indonesia ("Jogja") are dealt with at length in Kahin's standard 
work.73 Naturally Kahin deals again and again with the role of Islam 
as organized in' the Masjumi, a political party from the end of 1945. 
It is this side of the developments to which we want to give special 
attention here. 
Looking back, the period of the physical revolution (1945-1950) can 
be characterized as the period of relative unity-in-the-struggle, a unity 
among Muslim leaders and factions themselves as much as between 
"the Muslims" and the "secular" factions. Of course there occurred a 
great number of incidents, and on occasion an intense rivalry and 
struggle for power raged behind the scenes. One of the first conflicts 
was that between the democratie, anti-fascist group of Sjahrir and the 
Indonesian National Party as had been formed during the last months 
of the Japanese occupation by Subardjo. The "national communist" 
Tan Malaka too had great aspirations for leadership. Af ter the RenviIIe 
Agreement with the Netherlands at the beginning of 1948 the govern-
ment of the Republic came into conflict with the Darul Islam movement 
in West Java. At the end of 1948 an extremely dangerous situation 
arose, due to the Communist revolt in Madiun (East Java). 
Vet in spite of all these tensions, the period of 1945-1950 can be 
characterized as the period of relative unity-in-the-struggle. The chief 
aim for everyone, also for the Muslim faction, was the defence of free-
dom and independenee against the. common enemy from abroad. For 
the feeling of Muslims this fight for political freedom was at the same 
time a struggle for the freedom of Islam. We have already quoted how 
in October 1944 the leadership of the Masjumi had urged its members 
"to prepare Muslims for the liberation of their country and their 
religion".74 Likewise the fight for freedom between 1945 and 1950 was 
feit by Muslims to be a struggle for their country and their religion. 
Already on October 22nd, 1945, the Nahdatul Ulama had produced 
a resolution concerning the Holy War (resolusi djihad) to be regarded 
as an authoritative fatwä (a considered legal opinion) of the ulamas, as 
the N.U. was at that time the association of kiyais and ulamas within 
the then Masjumi. In this resolution the "djihad for the defence of the 
Indonesian fatherland" was declared to be the individual duty of every 
Muslim, wherever he might beo The outbreak of fighting between 
73 Kahin, Nationalism. 
74 Benda, The Crescent, p. 176. 
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Indonesians and the British troops in Surabaja on November lOth, 1945 
may to some extent have been provoked by th is resolution.75 
According to a publication of the Indonesian Information Service, the 
government of the young Republic declared on November 3rd, 1945 
"that the government would be pleased to see the setting up of political 
parties, because political parties are capable of channelling along 
organized routes ideals which arise in society".76 Kahin concluded that 
the real background of this development was Sjahrir's struggle against 
the national unitary party under Subardjo, which wanted to be the only 
political party. At the end of October 1945, Soekarno, Hatta and other 
prominent leaders had also agreed on a multi-party system. "Desirous 
as they all were for unity in the face of the struggle for independence, 
this was seen as the only way to undermine Subardjo's power and what 
many saw as an ominously authoritarian prospect inherent in the growth 
of his party." 77 
The abovementioned Indonesian publication goes on to say that in 
this way powers of democracy came to the fore in the form of political 
parties "which soon began to crystallize around three philosophies of 
life which were present in Indonesian society. First on November 7th, 
1945, we saw the rise of the Masjumi, as the embodiment of the religious 
way of life, in this case, that of Islam. On December 17th, 1945, the 
Socialist Party was bom, crystallizing the Marxist philosophy of life. On 
January 29th, 1946, at Kediri we could observe a fusion which af ter-
wards resulted in the present Indonesian National(ist) Party (Partai 
Nasional Indonesia, P.N.!.), embodying the third way of life, namely 
nationalism." 78 
It can be said that all later parties or splinter-groups originated from 
the abovementioned parties or ideologies. Afterwards Soekarno's NASA-
KOM formula was intended to bridge the growing gap between these 
three pillars of Indonesian politicallife. NASAKOM stood for the unity 
of the Nationalists (NAS), the religious groups (A for Agama, meaning 
religion) and the Communists (KOM for Komunis). Af ter the revolt 
of September 30th, 1965, Soekamo was prepared to speak of NASASOS 
(SOS for Socialists instead of Communists). 
75 Wahid Hasjim, p. 478. 
76 Indonesisch Bulletin, publication of the Indonesian Infonnation Service, 
The Hague, March 1953 (IV, 3, p. 7). 
77 Kahin, Nationalism, p. 148. 
78 Indonesisch Bulletin, p. 7 ff. 
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"During the last months of 1945 there also occurred a rapid burgeon-
ing of smaIl parties" , as, for example, the Catholic Party (in addition 
to the Protestant Party), the rapidly growing Communist Party and 
other left-wing groups.79 
Turning to the political role of Islam, we may concentrate our 
attention on the Masjumi, created in the Japanese period and transform-
ed into a political party on November 7th, 1945 in Jogjakarta. This 
Masjumi was intended as the Islamic unitary party. For the time being 
the Masjumi retained its dualistic structure dating from the Japanese 
period, when certain organizations as weIl as individuals could join it. 
Now, however, the emphasis shifted: the Masjumi became a political 
party consisting of individual members, but including also a number of 
non-political organizations as "extraordinary members" (Nahdatul Ula-
ma, Muhammadijah and some regional organizations in West Java set 
up at Madjalengka and Sukabumi).80 
The composition of the first Party Council (Madjlis Sjuro) and the 
first Party Executive (Pengurus Besar) shows th at the Masjumi did 
include various Islamic groups. The chairman of the Madjlis Sjuro 
was Hasjim Asj'ari; one of the vice-chairmen was his son Wahid Hasjim 
(bath from N.U. circles); H. Agus Salim (P.S.!.!.), but also Sjech 
Djamil Djambek (one of the "Sumatran reformers"), "and dozens of 
kiyais and other Islamic leaders" were members. The Executive consisted 
of career politicians of the later Masjumi such as Sukiman, but also 
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (P.S.I.!.), and furthermore Muh. Natsir and 
Mohamad Roem as weIl as Kartosuwirjo, the later rebellious leader of 
the Darul Islam. 
Kahin characterizes the progressive leaders of the Masjumi as Religious 
Socialists, who "drew much of their inspiration from the teachings of 
Mu~ammad cAbduh"; he mentions by name Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawira-
negara, Mohamad Roem, Jusuf Wibisono and Abu Hanifah. On the 
other hand, "the conservative older-generation religious leaders" formed 
its right wing, "based on the Nahdatul Ulama and the more conservative 
elements of the Muhammadijah". As intermediaries, he mentions Suki-
man and later on Prawoto Mangkusasmito.81 This distinction is usabie 
79 Kahin, Nationalism, p. 158 ff. An analysis of the later political parties can 
be found in Feith, The Decline, pp. 122-145. 
80 This information and much of what follows can be found in Wahid Hasjim, 
p. 349 ff. 
81 Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 157-158. 
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with regard to "the interpretation of what Islamic social principles were 
and how they should be applied in Indonesia". But with regard to other 
problems - for example, the relationship between state and religion -
the term "religious socialists" may cause misunderstanding. On such 
probleIns there may have been different opinions within the so-caIled 
left wing as weIl (for example, between Muh. Natsir and Abu Hanifah). 
Throughout the years of struggle for freedom, the Masjumi sometimes 
co-operated with "secular" parties in a coalition cabinet.82 Here too a 
certain dualism could not be avoided. On the one hand, the Masjumi 
had to agree to general, muiti-interpretable formulas such as those of 
the Pantjasila. On the other hand, the party clearly wanted to fight for 
the realization of Islamic principles in state and society. However, 
Masjumi leaders always maintained that they wanted to fight for these 
principles in a democratie way, unlike the Darul Islam movement. 
To get an impression of the opinions and ideas of Islamic leaders 
during the period 1945-1950, we can examine the emergeney programmes 
and other resolutions which were passed by the annual General Assem-
blies of the Masjumi. S3 
At its foundation on November 7th, 1945, the Muslims were encour-
aged "to fight in the way of God" (berdjihad fisabilillah) ; this emergency 
programme was, of course, determined by the fight for independence. 
The programme of 1946 emphasized "the realization of the ideals of 
Islam in state affairs, sa that a form of state can be ereated which is 
founded on the sovereignty of the people, and a society which is based 
on justiee, in accordance with the teaehings of Islam". Therefore it was 
necessary to strengthen and perfect the principles of the Constitution 
(i.e. the Pantjasila principles) "in order to realize an Islamie society 
and an Islamic State" (mewudjudkan masjarakat dan Negara Islam).84 
All the strength of the Islamic community had to be coneentrated in the 
82 Apart from the hooks of Kahin and Feith, a list of all Indonesian cabinets 
between 1945 and 1956 and their composition can be found in the Ensiklo-
pedia Indonesia, published under the editorship of T. S. G. Mulia and 
K. A. H. Hidding, with help from Muh. Natsir as far as Islam is concerned, 
3 VoL, Bandung, no date. 
83 A resumé of the Assemblies between 1945 and 1954 is given by Wahid 
Hasjim, pp. 349-377. Cf. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 305-311. 
84 Wahid Hasjim, p. 357. According to oral information received from some 
ex-Masjumi leaders the Masjumi as a party fought for an Islamic society 
but not for an Islamic State. The quotation seerns to be in conflict with this 
information ; we should, however, take into account the possibility that the 
quotation is not correct, at least as far as the use of capital letters (" Islamic; 
State") is concerned. 
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Masjumi, "to defend the freedom of religion, country and people". The 
religion meant in this formula is, of course, Islam, which people feIt to 
be attacked in the attacks on the Republic. Specific wishes in the social 
field were first and foremost the ancient prohibitions on gambling, the 
sale of strong drink and opium, prostitution and riba (interest or usury? 
This question will be dealt with later). 
In this programme of 1946 a number of progressive demands were 
also mentioned: a minimum wage for labourers, the limitation of work-
ing hours, social insurance, an agricultural law to protect small farmers, 
and improvement of agricultural methods. The economy should be 
directed toward the welfare of the people, so th at "the capitalist system 
with its obvious elements of purely individual interest would be com-
batted". Kahin draws attention to the fact that the Masjumi did not 
merely use fine words in a party-programme, but did in deed have 
achievements in the social field. For instance, part of the ;:akät (alms-
tax) collected by the party was applied to social reforms for the benefit 
of farmers and financial aid to small traders. 85 
The "Political Manifesto" of June 6th, 1947, stated: "The Republic 
of Indonesia, the people of which are largely adherents of Islam, shall 
be a state with a Constitution based on principles which are in agreement 
with this Religion or not in conflict with the teachings of Islam ... " 
The Masjumi strove for "the spread of the ideology of Islam within 
Indonesian society, without hindering others who likewise strengthen the 
foundations of Belief in the One and Only God". As far as foreign 
policy was concerned, contact and co-operation with Islamic com-
munities in other countries had to be increased. 86 
In the General Assembly at the end of March 1948 it was decided 
th at the government should be urged to make religious instruction 
compulsory in elementary and secondary schools. A telegram was sent 
to the Great Muf ti AmÏn al-J;Iusainï, supporting him in the Palestine 
conflict. Kahin gives a summary of the programme drafted by the 
Masjumi's Party Council at the end of 1948, particularly its socio-
economie aspects. He comments that "the conservative minority of the 
Council would put more emphasis upon Moslem education and formal 
religious practice than upon the socio-economie aspect of the Masjumi 
program".87 
85 Cf. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 307-309. 
86 One can assume that among the Masjumi leaders Muh. Natsir in particular 
would have continuously stressed this "ecumenieal" or pan-Islamic ideal. 
87 Kahin, Nationalism, p. 311, n. 4. 
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The General Assembly of December 1949 took place in the shadow 
of the coming recognition of Independence by the Dutch and the 
unification of the "Jogja Republic" with the (federal) "United Indo-
nesian Republic" (R.I.S.). Probably as a result of these circumstances, 
the resolutions of this meeting breathed a quite different spirit. It is 
likely th at the withdrawal of the Nahdatul Ulama in 1952 was caused 
partly by this shift. During ·the years from 1945 to 1950 the Masjumi 
apparently came to be more and more dominated by the so-called 
religious socialists. This meant that a clash with the conservative right 
wing was bound to come. 
6. Strife between the Parties (1950-1955) 
The first split in the Masjumi had already taken pi ace in July 1947. 
A number of members under the leadership of W ondoamiseno and 
Arudji Kartawinata re-established the old Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia 
(P.S.I.I.) in order to take part in the left-wing cabinet of Amir Sjarif-
uddin, while the Masjumi went into opposition.88 
More serious, however, were the tensions between the progressive 
left wing of the Masjumi consisting of "religious socialists" and its 
conservative group of kiyais and ulamas. These tensions would lead to 
a break which put its mark on the struggle within the Islamic community 
in the new Indonesia. 
The difficulties began to come into the open about the time of the 
recognition of Independence and the formation of the federal R.I.S. 
As has been said, the Masjumi programme of December 1949 breathed 
a somewhat different spirit.89 The emphasis had apparently shifted from 
formulations concerning religious principles to a number of practical 
questions concerning the transition from the Republic of Indonesia 
("Jogja") to the R.I.S., which would include the whole territory of the 
former Dutch East Indies. Such questions included, for instance, member-
ship of the United Nations, the setting up of a Diplomatic Service, the 
formation of a Constituent Assembly and preparations for general 
elections. The program me also contained a number of socio-economic 
demands concerning, for example, the transformation of the colonial 
economy into a national economy and the care of victims of the fighting. 
With regard to the Constitution of theR.I.S. - a product of the 
negotiations with the Dutch - it was stipulated (even before this new 
88 Cf. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 209 ff. 
89 The text of this programme is to he found in Wahid Hasjim, pp. 365-367. 
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Constitution took effect!) th at its contents would have to be studied, and 
that a new Constitution would be drafted in agreement with the ideals 
of the people. I t is a fair guess that a number of Islamic leaders genuinely 
believed th at these "ideals of the people" would result in a more or less 
Islamic state. Furthermore, the position of the various "states" within 
the R.I.S. would have to be reconsidered. Another contribution of the 
Republic to the R.I.S. would be compulsory religious instruction in state 
schools, and the equalization of teachers of religion with other teachers. 
One point probably also originating from kiyai and ulama circles, con-
cerned the "protection of the rights of wo men in marriages to be 
contracted in accordance with their own religion" (read: separate 
marriage laws for the Muslims as weIl as for the Christians and others?). 
Apart from these points, the programme of 1949 did not include any 
formal demand to carry out the teachings of Islam in state and society. 
Did some Masjumi leaders realize that Indonesia included important 
non-Muslim areas, so that they could no longer put forward all sorts 
of formulas and slogans originating from conservative kiyais and ulamas? 
In this Assembly at any rate the Party Council (Madjlis Sjuro) - with 
its many religious leaders - was degraded to being merely an advisory 
body, while the Party Executive (the "politicians") took the lead. 
A revealing comment from an important Indonesian souree runs as 
follows: "This change meant that the ulamas withdrew and no longer 
developed their activities in the struggle, because every problem was 
henceforth considered only from a political point of view, without the 
guidance of religion".90 
This comment expressed the formal reason for the withdrawal of the 
Nahdatul Ulama (N.U.) from the Masjumi in April 1952, and the 
reshaping of the N.U. into a political party. The book on Wahid Hasjim 
- originating from N.U. circles, like Wahid Hasjim himself - admits 
that th is split was also influenced by injured feelings and tactical con-
siderations.91 The immediate cause was certainly the struggle for the 
post of Minister of Religion in the Wilopo cabinet (April 1952). 
Criticism of Wahid Hasjim's policy led to the choice of the Muham-
madijah leader Fakih Usman, whereas N.U. circles continued to claim 
this post for Wahid Hasjim.92 
Together with the P.S.I.I. and some smaller parties the N.U. set up 
a co-ordinating organization, the Liga Muslimin lndonesia (League of 
90 Wahid Hasjim, p. 478. 
91 Wahid Hasjim, p. 563. 
92 Cf. Feith, The Decline, pp. 233-237. 
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Indonesian Muslims), which, however, did not amount to much, pro-
bably because of the coming elections, which were frequently announced 
and then postponed, finally to be held at the end of 1955. 
Just as the period of the fight for freedom (1945-1950) can be 
typified as the period of relative unity-in-the-struggle, so the years 
1950-1955 can be characterized as the period of strife between the 
parties. The real issues of th is struggle were as much positions, jobs and 
commercial interests (e.g. import and export permits for friends of the 
parties in power) as ideological questions. As far as the latter aspect is 
concerned, the Muslims clashed with the "secular" parties, in particular 
the Nationalists (P.N.I.) and Communists (P.K.I.). But at the same 
time a hidden struggle, or at least competition, arose between the Islamic 
parties themselves. In July 1955 the four most important Islamic parties 
- Masjumi, N.U., P.S.!.1. and the Sumatran Pergerakan Tarbijah 
Islamijah (Perti, the "Movement for Islamic Education") - apparently 
agreed to suspend all attacks on each other until the elections.93 The 
P.K.1. had made a similar sort of agreement with the P.S.1.1. in April! 
1955, probably to prevent itself from being regarded as anti-religious.94 
The election campaign is described in detail by Herbert Feith.95 He 
concludes that "the Great Debate was between the P.N.1. and the 
Masjumi" ... while "the Communist Party did in a way constitutc a 
third main party". 
This "Great Debate" has of ten been simplified into the choice between 
a state based on the Pantjasila or a state based on Islam. Actually the 
Islamic parties did not succeed in convincing people that their opinions 
were not in conflict with the Pantjasila ideals. Both the Masjumi and the 
N.U. gave the impression that they we re aiming at an Islamic State, 
whatever that might beo From the beginning of 1953 the conflict became 
sharper, because President Soekarno openly threw himself into the arena. 
In a speech on January 27th, 1953, at Amuntai (South Kalimantanj 
Borneo) he said: "The state we want is a national state consisting of all 
Indonesia. If we establish a state based on Islam, many areas whose 
population is not Islamic, such as the Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, the 
Kai Islands and Sulawesi, will secede. And West Irian, which has not 
yet become part of the territory of Indonesia, will not want to be part 
93 According to J. W. M. Bakker S.L in Het Missiewerk, 1956, 4, p. 228. 
94 Feith, The Decline, p. 359. 
96 Feith, The Decline, pp. 353-366. 
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of the Republic." 96 For months this speech of Soekarno's was talked 
about. It may fairly be concluded that the definite break between the 
Masjumi and President Soekarno dates from this moment. The chief 
spokesman for the Masjumi in this matter was Isa Anshary. 
Looking back, some Muslim informants are prepared to admit that 
the struggle for a so-called Islamic State was largely an empty, emotional 
battle of ~ords for the label of the state. This certainly applied to a 
number of kiyais and ulamas who were used to thinking and speaking in 
a religious terminology, but who were too little at home in politics to 
grasp the problems of modern statecraft. This type of leader played a 
great role in the N.U., though the Masjumi too included important 
spokesmen and writers who advocated a realization of Islamic principles 
in polities. 
The difference between the Masjumi and the N.U. developed into 
a conflict which dominated (and probably still dominates) to a large 
extent the struggle within the Islamic community in Indonesia. For this 
reason special attention must be given to these two parties. 
With regard to the Masjumi it can be said on the one hand that many 
of its members and leaders were modern Muslirns who took Islam 
seriously as a religio-politieal and social entity. The ideals of an Islamic 
State or the realization of Islamie principles in polities clearly flourished 
within this circle. And these ideals were quite clearly formulated by some 
Masjumi adherents. On the other hand, however, many Masjumi leaders 
were modern intellectuals with a realistic view of polities as "the art of 
the possible". I t can be concluded that under the leadership of the 
"religious socialists" (as Kahin called them) the Masjumi "was the 
Islamic party considered best able to deal with the seeular problems 
usually associated with socioeconomie development". In order to prevent 
a misunderstanding of the word "secular", it must be added "that both 
modern and traditional Muslirns believe that Islamic doctrine provides 
the basis for all human action".97 
Viewed sociologically, the adherents of the Masjumi were originally 
to be found in partieular among the urban traders and independent 
employers and among intellectuals deseended from them. Their religion 
has sometimes been described as an urbanized Islam, or an Islam of 
areas with "a cosmopolitan, urban and commercial eharacter developed 
96 Quoted by Feith, The Decline, p. 281. 
97 Allan A. Samson, Islam in Indonesian Polities, in Asian Survey, December 
1968, Vol. VIII, no. 12, pp. 1002-1003. 
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through centuries of cultural contact and trade".os It was the same 
circle of "middle-class people - merchants, tradesmen, landowners, 
small manufacturers, school-teachers, clerks, etc." - in which reformist 
ideas coming from Egypt (MuJ:!. cAbduh, Rashïd Riçlä) first met with 
a response. 09 Thereforc many adherents of the reformist Muhammadijah 
movement would be politically organized in the Masjumi. 
According to the Statutes of the Masjumi, applying af ter August 1952, 
the party was based on Islam and its goal was "the realization of the 
doctrine and law of Islam in the life of the individual, in society and in 
the Republic of Indonesia as a State, directed toward that which pleases 
God",l00 The concrete meaning of such formulas is, however, difficult 
to gauge. To what extent are these formulas intentionally vague, and 
therefore multi-interpretable within the Islamic community itself? In how 
far were these phrases used in order to win over potential supporters, 
such as, for instance, sympathizers with Darul Islam ideas? On the 
other hand, in how far did some Masjumi leaders have in mind modern 
ideas of dcmocracy and social justice - in other words, principles which 
are not specifically and exclusively Islamic - when they talked of 
"Islamie principles" as being the basis of the state? 
The Nahdatul Ulama (N.U.) was of old the association (later the 
political party) of teachers of religion and "scribes" (kiyais and ulamas) 
who had close connections with the countryside and the religious schools 
(pesantrèns) established there. Set up in 1926, the N.U. can be consider-
ed the successor of the Nahdatul Wathan (= wa!an), the "Awakening 
of the Fatherland", founded in 1916 in Surabaja by Abdul Wahab (in 
1945 a member of the Party Council of the Masjumi) and K. H. M. 
Mansur. The aim of th is older organization was to defend the authority 
of the four orthodox schools of law (madhähib, sing. madhhab) against 
the reformer Soorkati. It is remarkable that Mansur (who had studied 
in Cairo) afterwards went over to the Muhammadijah, while Abdul 
Wahab (who had spent some years in Mecca) played a great part in 
the N.U. 
According to article 2 of the N.U. Statutes of 1926, the aim of this asso-
ciation was: "To uphold one of the schools of law of the four Imäms --
Imam Muh. bin Idris Asj-Sjafi'i, Imam Malik bin Anas, Imam Abu Hani-
fah An-Nu'man or Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal - and to do everything 
98 Samson, Islam, p. 1002. 
1/9 Cf. Drewes in Unity, ed. by Von Grunebaum, p. 301. 
wo Wahid Hasjim, p. 405. 
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which would be beneficial to Islam".1 01 Over against the modernists 
(ahli bid'ah) , they liked to call themselves the ahli sunnah wal djama'ah, 
that is, the people who keep to the sunna (usage) of the Prophet, in 
community with the one great umma or djamäCa, in short the orthodox 
(in the sense of "orthoprax" 102). Beside this official, theological char-
acterization, the N.U. can be typified as being more moderate towards 
the Javanese way of life and Javanese religious practices than the 
"puritan" reformers. Partly for this reason the N.U. became a typically 
Javanese party, whereas many Javanese considered the Masjumi "too 
fanaticaI", that is to say, too rigorously Islamic. 
When the N.U. entered politics in 1952, article 2 of the Statutes was 
formulated as follows: 
"The Nahdatul-'Ulama is based on Islam and its aim is: 
a. to uphold the law of Islam, in accordance with one of the four 
schools of law: Sjafi'i, Maliki, Hanafi and Hanbali; 
b. to bring about the application of the precepts of Islam in society".1 03 
Also according to article 1 of the by-Iaws of the N.U., membership was 
dependent on recognition of the authority of one of the four schools of 
law.104 This meant that reformists or modernists who advocated a return 
to the Qur'an and Tradition in order to study these sources in an 
independent way as required in modern times (the so-called "new 
idjtihäd") could strictly speaking not become members of the N.U., and 
therefore remained or became members of the Masjumi. 
Probably the Masjumi tried to nullify the possible results of this N.U. 
propaganda for the orthodox schools of law. In December 1954 the 
Masjumi declared that it respected these schools of law completely, 
but wanted to be a political party uniting people of various opinions 
and schools of law. 105 Nevertheless the success of the N.U. in the 1955 
elections is probably partly due to the aroma of orthodoxy spread by 
its defence of the four schools of law. For many voters the N.U. was 
emotionally the truly Islamic party, with leaders whom they could trust 
to maintain Islamic principles unabridged. Were not many of these 
leaders the teacher (Ind. guru) of many voters, who followed their 
101 Wahid Hasjim, p. 505. 
102 Cf. Smith, Islam, p. 20: "The word usually translated 'orthodox', sunni, 
actually means rather 'orthoprax', if we may use the term. A good Muslim 
is . .. one whose commitment may be expressed in practical terms that 
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teachers as thankful pupils (Ind. murid)? On the other hand, many 
voters might have considered the Masjumi a dubious party in many 
ways, as its leaders of ten used an intellectual language and a modern 
terminology which made too little contact with the traditional pious. 
The resolutions and the action programme of the N.U. drawn up in 
1952 give the impression that its religio-political formulations were less 
clearly Islamic than those of the Masjumi. Probably it was easier simply 
to quote available formulas, for example, those of the Pantjasila and the 
1945 Constitution. For instance, the N.U. wanted "to press the govern-
ment to intensify instruction in thc Pantjasila to be given in an orderly 
and fundamental way, in particular instruction concerning the (first) 
pillar of Belief in God, to which clearly too little attention is being 
paid".1°6 
According to the Action Programme of 1952, the N.U. would strive 
for the application of religious precepts, as interpreted according to one 
of the four schools of law. The N.U. wanted "a National State based 
on Islam, a State which guarantees and protects the fundamental rights 
of man, that is, the freedom to adhere to a sound religion (agama jang 
sehat) and the freedom to have and to express ideas and opinions which 
do not cause harm to others ... " The political course of the N.U. was 
aimed at As-Shulchu (Ar. ~-,çullJ = peace, reconciliation, solidarity, 
settlement, accommodation, compromise; cf. Sura 4: 128), as "the 
normal basis of contact with every kind of group as long as this is 
not detrimental to Islam and its struggle". Furthermore it was stated 
- obviously an adoption from the preamble of the 1945 Constitution -
that the N.U. desired "a state upholding the rule of law (Ind. negara 
hukum) and based on the sovereignty of the people in the sense of 
mutual deliberation, led by wise policy executed in the representative 
bodies of the people ... " 107 
The N.U. has sometimes been characterized as a typically government-
minded party. Because of its extreme readiness to join any cabinet, it 
was of ten accused of opportunism. "The NU leaders were 'solidarity 
makers', wielders of symbols, both traditional and nationalistic." 108 The 
colour and atmosphere of the N.U. were certainly conservative when it 
became a political party. It gave the impression of being dominated by 
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leadership included virtually no one with modern-state-type skills" .1 09 
It is worth recalling how Wahid Hasjim, in November 1953, explained 
his choice for the N_U. He admitted that originally the N.U. did not 
satisfy his desire to join a radical party; nor was the N.U. a party with 
many intellectuals - "looking for graduates within the N.U. is like 
looking for an ice-cream seller at one o'clock in the morning!" -- but 
from the beginning the N.U. somehow turned out to have an appeal for 
the people. "While in the course of ten years a youth movement of 
another Islamic group only made gains in 20 places, all close together, 
that of the Nahdatul Ulama came to cover 60 % of the whole territory 
of Indonesia." Contemplating such results, Wahid Hasjim decided to 
choose the N.U., because it was clear "that the Nahdatul Ulama offered 
great possibilities for the uplift of the Islamic community in Indo-
nesia" .11 0 
The elections - in September 1955 for Parliament and in December 
1955 for the Constituent Assembly - resulted in a great disappointment 
for the Islamic parties. Both in the spoken and written word, Islamic 
leaders had continuously stressed that Indonesia was a Muslim country. 
At least 80 %, and according to others 90 % or even 95 %, of the 
population were considered Muslims since they called themselves Muslims 
and wanted to be Muslims. Moreover, ulama conferences in Java and 
elsewhere had declared - through tatwa-like resolutions - that for a 
Muslim it was forbidden (f;taräm) to vote for a non-Muslim or for a 
Muslim who did not have the intention of putting Islamic law into 
practice.1 11 
In spite of all this, the four Islamic parties - Masjumi, N.U., 
P.S.!.!. and Perti - obtained together only 43.5 % of the total number 
of votes at the elections for Parliament. A disinterested observer might 
conclude that in a country such as Indonesia it is no mean achievement 
if 43.5 % of the population consciously vote for an expressly Islamic 
party, that is, a party which "has the intention of putting Islamic law 
109 Feith, The Decline, p. 234. 
110 Wahid Hasjim, pp. 740-741. The successful youth movement referred to is 
the present-day ANSOR, founded in 1934. "Ansor" is the Indonesian 
pronunciation of the Arabic an$ltr (al-an$är were the Medinan helpers of 
the Prophet when he arrived at Medina in A.D. 622). The basis and aim 
of this ANSOR are to be found in Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah 
Tangga Gerakan Pemuda ANSOR, Djakarta 1964. The history of ANSOR 
and its predecessors is sketched in Wahid Hasjim, pp. 547-559. 
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into practice". Muslim leaders, however, seem to have taken it for 
granted that everyone who wanted to be called a Muslim would vote 
for an Islamic party. 
At the elections of September 1955 the nationalist P.N.I. was returned 
as the biggest party, with 22.3 %. The fourth party was the Communist 
P.K.I. with 16.4 %, a success which many had not expected af ter the 
Communist set-back in the Madiun revolt of 1948. Numbers 2 and 3 
were the Masjumi and the N.U. with respectively 20.9 % and 18.4 %. 
The P.S.I.I. turned out to have hecome a small party (2.9 %); the 
Perti was hardly of any importance (1.3 %). The elections of December 
1955 "showed great similarity with the result of the parliamentary 
elections, with an over-all trend for all medium- and small-sized parties 
to lose votes, and for the four largest parties to gain them".1l2 The 
numbers of votes for Parliament and Constituent Assembly, as weIl as 
an analysis of the election campaign and of its results, are given by 
Feith.113 Some interesting conclusions are, for example, that the 
Masjumi, apart from West Java, got the greatest numbers of votes from 
the is lands outside Java, whereas the N.U. turned out to he a typically 
Javanese party. Further, beside the Socialist Party, not the N.U. but 
the Masjumi appeared to have many adherents in the army. And as 
far as Java was concerned, the N.U. in East Java obtained roughly 
three times as many votes as the Masjumi and in Central Java twice 
as many, whereas in West Java (with its Sundanese, not Javanese, 
population) the Masjumi got three times as many adherents as the N.U. 
Contrary to the expectation of many inside and outside the Islamic 
parties, the Masjumi support turned out to be not much bigger than 
that of the N.U. The explanation heard immediately af ter the elections 
was that the Masjumi had acted too much as an urban party of the bet ter 
educated, with a centralized election campaign, and had certainly under-
estimated the personal influence of N.U. leaders (kiyais and ulamas) in 
the kampungs and the désas. That was probably what Wahid Hasjim 
had understood better! And to explain the success of the N.U., it has 
to be said that the Indonesian feeling about the relationship between 
teacher and pupil (guru-murid) was perhaps still more important than 
112 Feith, The Decline, pp. 449-450. 
113 Herbert Feith, The lndonesian Elections of 1955, Interim Reports Series, 
Cornell University, 1957. 
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the general connection of the N.U. with orthodoxy and peasantry that 
has usually been stressed.114 
Through this election result it became apparent that the political 
struggle of Islam in Indonesia for the time being had failed. In the 
representative badies the necessary majority had not been obtained, 
so that it would not be possible to realize certain Islamic principles in 
state and society by democratic means. Hence the year 1955 may be 
considered the end of the first period in the modern history of Islam 
in Indonesia. The attention and energy of Islamic leaders during these 
first ten years had in particular been directed towards poli tics. The 
struggle had been feit as a struggle for a free Indonesia which was 
hoped would become at least a clearly Muslim country, if not an official 
Islamic State. In other words, the Islamic daCwa (the call to men to walk 
in God's ways) had been carried out especially in the field of polities. 
But from now this dacwa would have to be more or less transferred to 
other fields, as free Indonesia had turned out to be not yet a truly 
Muslim country - let alone an Islamic State! 
7. The Darul Islam Revolts 
Besides the party-strife mentioned above, special attention must be 
paid to the revolts of the so-called Darul Islam movement (abbreviated 
D.I.). These revolts formed one of the greatest worries for the govern-
ment of the Republic of Indonesia, particularly in the period af ter 1950. 
Difficulties had already begun in 1948 in West Java, due to the 
reaction of Kartosuwirjo to the Renville Agreement between the Republic 
and the Netherlands. In 1950, in South Sulawesi (Celebes) a clash 
between the army and some guerilla leaders resulted in a similar rising, 
under the leadership of Kahar Muzakkar. At the same time tensions 
increased between the government in Djakarta and the province of 
Atjeh (North Sumatra), culminating in a rising in 1953 under the 
leadership of Daud Beureu'éh. 
The rising in West Java came to an end on June 4th, 1962, when 
Kartosuwirjo was taken prisoner. On February 3rd, 1965, 'Kahar Muzak-
kar was surrounded and shot in South-East Sulawesi. The central govern-
ment came to an agreement with Atjeh on May 26th, 1959, and the 
reconciliation was solemnly celebrated on August 17th, 1961. 
114 Compare W. F. Wertheim, lndonesian Society in Transition, The Hague 
19692 , p. 345. 
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This whole history, its background and the connection between the 
individu al risings, could in fact form the subject for a special piece of 
research. Here a provisional sketch wiU be attempted, in as far as this 
is possible, as our information is still far from complete.u5 
With regard to West Java, the beginning of the history of the "Darul 
Islam" under Kartosuwirjo has been described by Van Nieuwenhuijze. 
But his abovementioned essay and some of its data can be supplemented 
and corrected by more recent information from Indonesian sources, in 
particular from Pinardi's book and the documents of the case against 
Kartosuwirjo. 
Kartosuwirjo (fuU name Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo) was a 
Javanese, bom on February 7th, 1905, at Tjepu (Central Java). He 
received a Western education at Dutch-Ianguage elementary and secon-
dary schools. So he was not a santri from a pesantrèn. It has even been 
said th at he never gained a real knowledge of Arabic and Islam. u6 
From 1923 to 1926 he attended the preparatory course at the "Nether-
lands Indies Medical School" (N.l.A.S.) in Surabaja. There he met 
H. Omar Said Tjokroaminoto, later a leader of the P.S.I.I., who became 
his fosterfather. According to Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo succeeded in be-
ginning his medical studies in 1926, but one year afterwards he was 
expeUed because of his political activities.117 From 1927 to 1929 he was 
private secretary of Tjokroaminoto. Probably it was from this P.S.1.1. 
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Af ter asenous illness he moved to Malangbong, near Garut, in the 
(Sundanese) eastern part of West Java, as his wife came from there. 
Together with his Sundanese father-in-Iaw, from 1929 onward he exerted 
himself for the development of the P.S.I.1. in this area. When only 
26 years old, he was elected genera! secretary of the P.S.!.!. in 1931. 
Af ter the death of Tjokroaminoto (1934), the Party Congress held in 
1936 elected Wondoamiseno president of the P.S.!.!., while Kartosuwirjo 
became vice-president. 
When, during the following years, the conflict flared up within the 
P.S.!.!. as to whether or not they should co-operate with the colonia! 
government, Kartosuwirjo stood on the si de of non-cooperation. He 
wanted to carry out th is so-called hidjra policy of non-cooperation and 
self-help so radically th at in 1939 he was expelled from the party, and 
on March 24th, 1940 he founded a counter-P.S.!.!. in Malangbong 
with, among others, the later D.1. commander Kamran. "The Islamic 
ideas of theocracy which later were to fonn the background to Kartosu-
wirjo's Darul Islam had to some extent already been expressed in this 
group", says Pluvier cautiously.118 
At that time Kartosuwirjo founded a kind of pesantrèn in Malang-
bong, called Institut Supah or "Suffah Institute".119 Initially this in-
stitution was aimed at leadership training for the religio-political field. 
During the Japanese occupation, however, the activities of politica! 
parties were frozen. Therefore Kartosuwirjo's institution changed its 
character, eventually becoming a centre for the training of his later 
guerillas (Hizbu'lIah, Sabili'lIah). 
118 
119 
J. M. Pluvier, Overzicht van de ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging 
in Indonesië in de jaren 1930 tot 1942, 's-Gravenhage/Bandung 1953, p. 117 
(compare also pp. 70-75). According to Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 168, 
it could be said that Kartosuwirjo already "overtly preached the ideaIs of 
the där ul-Isläm, the Islamic state", between 1935 and 1940 in Malangbong. 
A~-.$utta (rendered "bench", "banquette", "estrade", etc.) was probably a 
long covered portico in the court yard of the prophet's house and temporary 
mosque at Medina. According to later traditions, in particular from ascetic 
and mystical circles, the "people of the .$uffa" were a group of poor and 
pious Muslirns who lived there, spending their time in study and worship 
(cf. W. Montgomery Watt's article Ahl al-.$utta in The Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, new edition, Leiden 1960, and his book on Muhammad at Medina, 
Oxford 1966, pp. 305-306). The word .$uffa was sometimes considered the 
origin of the term ta.$awwuf (sufism, mysticism) . Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, 
p. 26, translates the word as meaning inner purification, thus perhaps 
following the Indonesian interpretation also intended by Kartosuwirjo, who 
was not a kiyai or ulama interested in Islamic law, but was drawn towards 
mysticism and magical ideas on invulnerability, etc. 
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According to AI ers, on August 14th, 1945 Kartosuwirjo had aIready 
proclaimed an independent Darul Islam state.1 20 But af ter August 17th 
he sided with the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed by Soekamo and 
Hatta. When the Masjumi transformed itself into a political party on 
November 7th, 1945, Kartosuwirjo became a member of the Party 
Executive. When a cabinet was formed by Amir Sjarifuddin on July 3rd, 
1947, he was even offered the (nominal) post of second vice-minister of 
Defence, which he refused, however. Af ter the Dutch had begun their 
first military offensive against the Republic on J uly 21st, 1947, Kartosu-
wirjo called for a Holy War against the Dutch on August 14th.121 
Thus it was taken that Kartosuwirjo and his D.l. movement supported 
the Republic in its fight against the Dutch, as did the units of the 
Hizbu'I1ah and Sabili'I1ah, which in West Java were under the leadership 
of his friends Kamran and Oni. As a matter of course the govemment of 
the Republic, and in particular the leaders of the Masjumi, behaved as 
long as possible as if Kartosuwirjo's D.l. was the regional embodiment 
of the Indonesian fight for frcedom in West Java. Moreover, rumour 
originally had it th at the initials "D.I." stood for the Indonesian 
"Daérah I", that is to say, Daérah Satu or "Region One", and its 
significance was certainly not generally known. According to Alers it 
meant something like a "unitary state".1 22 Pinardi, however, explains 
that its background was a differentiation made between the various areas 
of the Islamic State: "Region I" was the central area of the state, 
completely controlled by an Islamic govemment and organized in 
agreement with Islamic law; "Region lI" consisted of are as in West 
Java which were only partly controlled by this Islamic State, whereas 
in "Region lIl" the Islamic community could for the time being not 
make its power felt.1 23 
As Kartosuwirjo consistently tumed down every sort of compromise 
with the Dutch, he also refused to accept the RenviIIe Agreement made 
between the Republic and the Netheriands in January 1948. Because of 
this he refused to pull back the groups of the Hizbu'I1ah and Sabili'I1ah 
behind the agreed demarcation line. In this way he c1ashed with the 
leaders of the Republic and also with the leaders of the Masjumi, which 
had officially accepted the RenviIIe Agreement, albeit grudgingly. Via 
the creation of a Madjlis Ummat Islam and the appointment of Karto-
120 Cf. Alers, Rode of Groene, p. 73 and p. 240 ff. 
121 Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 170. 
122 Alers, Rode of Groene, p. 243. 
123 Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, p. 59. 
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suwlrJo as Imäm of a provisional Islamic State, the Islamic State of 
Indonesia (Ind. Negara Islam Indonesia, abbreviated N.LL) was 
apparently proclaimed a few months later. In March 1948 the Dutch 
federal states policy had led to the formation of the State of Pasundan 
in the Dutch-controIled areas (in particular in the towns) of West Java. 
Kartosuwirjo's troops, now "the Indonesian Islamic Army" (Ind. Ten-
tara Islam Indonesia, abbreviated T.LL), however, controIled the larger 
part of the countryside, and in particular the mountainous areas of 
West Java. 
I t seems that even then the government of the Republic did not wish 
to consider Kartosuwirjo's action a rising against the Republic, but only 
a regional counter-move against the Dutch-made "State of Pasundan". 
Indeed Kahin notes that only by late December 1948 did the Darul 
Islam become openly anti-Republican.124 It is understandable th at the 
Republic as long as possible aIlowed the D.L with its armed troops to 
go its own way in West Java in the Muslim struggle against the Dutch. 
There were many members of the Masjumi who feIt an affinity for the 
Darul Islam ideology - that is to say, the idea that Indonesia was part 
of the "territory of Islam" (diJr al-isliim), and therefore should be an 
Islamic State - even though they rejected the Darul Islam methods. 
As far as the ordinary people of West Java were concerned, it may weIl 
be concluded that their co-operation stemmed more from fear of D.L 
terrorism than from sympathy with the way in which the D.L carried 
out the "fight for freedom" .125 
The day af ter the beginning of the second military action by the 
Dutch (December 19th, 1948) Kartosuwirjo renewed his caIl to a Holy 
War. However, this military action meant that the Republic was no 
longer committed to the Renville Agreement. Thus the Siliwangi 
Division, always one of the best regiments of the Republic, began its 
1~4 Kahin, Nationalism, p. 330. 
125 Compare also Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 173. The sociological approach 
to the background of the D.1. in West Java as given by Kahin, Nationalism, 
pp. 327-328 - viz. that the dissatisfaction among the peasantry in West 
Java came about because many small farmers had lost their land to 
Indonesian landlords in the towns during the first years af ter 1945 - seems 
somewhat far-fetched and at least in conflict with the small true following 
and sympathy which Kartosuwirjo apparently enjoyed even from this part 
of the population. Perhaps more important were other factors, mentioned 
by Pinardi (Kartosuwirjo, p. 152 ff.), for instance the disappointment and 
uneasiness of the population in West Java caused by the withdrawal of the 
national army and Kartosuwirjo's ability to make use of religious, mystical 
and magical beliefs among the common people of the countryside. 
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famous "Long March" from Central Java back to West Java, from 
which it had had to retire af ter the Renville Agreement. On J anuary 
25th, 1949 the Siliwangi Division happened to come across some of 
Kartosuwirjo's troops and the first incident between them occurred. 
Af ter that an open clash between the government of the Republic and 
Kartosuwirjo's D.L could no longer be avoided, though for some years 
to come a solution "in the Indonesian way" rather than by an open fight 
was sought. 
The Masjumi leader Muh. Natsir, Minister of Information in the 
Hatta cabinet of January 29th till the beginning of August 1949, tried 
to contact Kartosuwirjo by letter on August 5th, 1949, to prevent a 
definite break. But it was already too late: on August 7th, 1949, 
Kartosuwirjo once more officially proclaimed the existence of the Islamic 
State of Indonesia, this time clearly as the alternative to the Republic 
of Indonesia ("Jogja"). It was this action and this date which later in 
the case against Kartosuwirjo were mentioned as the prirnary points in 
the prosecution. According to the documents of the case this proclamation 
ran as follows: "In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful, we 
- the Islamic U mma of the people of Indonesia - proclaim the found-
ing of the Islamic State of Indonesia. The Law to which this Islamic 
State of Indonesia is subjected is the Islamic Law. Allähu akbar, Allähu 
akbar, Allähu akbar" (God is great). 
The Constitution promulgated by Kartosuwirjo (the so-called Kanun 
Azasy, Arabic al-lfanün al-asasï) stipulated that Islamic law would be 
applied to Muslims, while adherents of other religions would be free 
to perform their own religious duties (art. 1). The highest authority in 
the Islamic State would be Parliament (Madjlis Sjuro, that is, the 
Council for Mutual Deliheration), but in case of emergency the ultimate 
power would be in the hands of the lmäm (art. 3). He would have 
to be a born Indonesian, a Muslim and obedient to God and His Prophet 
(art. 12). In matters of principle he would be supported by a Déwan 
Fatwa (a council for giving considered legal opinions), consisting of at 
most 7 muftis under the leadership of a "Great Muf ti" (art. 21), while 
for matters of daily administration a Déwan lmamah (Imamate Council) 
would be appointed by the lmilm to help him (art. 22). According to 
art. 24 taxes would disappear and be replaced by infaq (compare 
al-infalf, the "spending of contribution" in Sura 17 : 100). Important 
and responsible civil and military posts would be given only to Muslims 
(art. 28). As a Parliament could not yet he elected, obviously all power 
lay from the beginning in the hands of the lmilm, Kartosuwirjo himself, 
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who was moreover Commander-in-Chief of the T.I.1. 125" 
In September 1949 a govemment committee under the leadership of 
Muh. Natsir was formed to look for a solution to the D.1. problem. This 
cornmittee, however, could do very little.1 26 Probablyas chairman of this 
committee Natsir made a new attempt in June 1950 to get in touch with 
Kartosuwirjo by sending Wali Alfatah, an old friend of Kartosuwirjo's, 
to meet him. 127 The latter, however, let it be known th at he would only 
receive one of the highest authorities of the Republic, and not this 
envoy.1 28 
But Kartosuwirjo may have been hoping for an understanding with 
the Republic during the Natsir cabinet (September 1950 to March 
1951). On October 22nd, 1950, Kartosuwirjo approached President 
Soekarno in a secret letter, with a copy to Prime Minister Natsir, to 
express his pleasure that the Republic of Indonesia had decided to 
become a member of the United Nations. Through this decision a choice 
would have to be made between the American and Russian bloes. 
Indonesia's policy of neutrality, then, would have to be abandoned and 
exchanged for an anti-Communist course. So he urged that as soon as 
possible a definite end should be put to Communist influence in Indo-
nesia. On the other hand, nationalism, he said, was not an ideology 
comparable with Islam and Cornmunism, and this would not be capable 
of saving Indonesia. Therefore they would now have to choose: either 
Islam or Cornmunism! And according to Kartosuwirjo Indonesia could, 
of course, only be saved if Islam became the basis of govemment and 
state; in other words, if the Republic of Indonesia changed its character 
from a "national state" to an Islamic State.129 
On November 14th, 1950, Prime Minister Natsir broadcast a moving 
speech to "the freedom fighters who have not yet retumed to normal 
life", because they "do not yet feel satisfied with the results of the 
struggle for freedom, or are still standing aloof as a result of mutual 
confliets during the past years of the fight for freedom". He called 
1250 For the Indonesian text of the Kanun Azasy see Appendix IV. 
120 Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 173. 
127 According to Alers, Rode of Groene, p. 251, Wali Alfatah left on June 8th, 
was taken prisoner by the Darul Islam, and on J une 20th was released by 
Republican soldiers. Feith, The Decline, p. 172, gives the impression that it 
occurred during the Natsir cabinet, that is to say, af ter September 6th, 1950; 
likewise Anne Marie Thé, Darah, p. 9. 
128 According to Anne Marie Thé, Darah, p. 10. 
129 I have considered the text of this letter curious enough to warrant putting 
it in full in Indonesian at the end of this book (see Appendix 11). 
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on them to abandon their guerilla methods and to devote themselves 
to the development of the new Indonesian state. In doing so, they would 
have every opportunity to fight for their ideals in an orderly manner.130 
I do not know whether there was any reaction to this caU. But on 
February 17th, 1951 a second "secret letter" was sent by Kartosuwirjo 
to President Soekarno, again with a copy to Prime Minister Natsir. Was 
this Kartosuwirjo's reaction to Natsir's efforts? Kartosuwirjo wanted to 
clarify and make additions to some points made in his first letter. 
As far as the choice between America and Russia was concerned, he was 
convineed that a Third World War was inevitabie and imminent (he 
was thinking of Korea). Therefore he caUed once again for the exter-
mination of Communism in Indonesia. Concerning his proclamation of 
the Islamic State of Indonesia on August 7th, 1949, Kartosuwirjo now 
eXplained that this proclamation was basicaUy a holy right of the Islamic 
Umma of Indonesia, but that talks could be opened on practical 
questions concerning the area and borders of this state. H the govern-
ment of the Republic of Indonesia was prepared to recognize officially 
the proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia (N.I.I.) as legitimate, 
then he could guarantee th at the Republic would have a friend in life 
and death (that is, the N.I.I.) , against every sort of danger from abroad 
or from within her borders. This applied in particular to Communism, 
which more and more endangered the country and people of Indonesia, 
as weU as the whole democratic world. H, however, this was not agreed, 
then Kartosuwirjo could no longer hold himself responsibie for the fate 
of the country and people of Indonesia, neither before the Judgement 
Seat of history nor before the Judgement Seat of God.13l 
One month later Natsir's cabinet feIl. Af ter a vigorous tug-of-war 
between the parties, a Masjumi-P.N.1. cabinet under the leadership of 
Sukiman (Masjumi) came into being. This cabinet promised a harder 
military line against the rebels until safe conditions had been restored, 
as had been demanded by army officers again and again.132 Meanwhile, 
however, new difficulties had arisen in the South Moluccas, in South 
Sulawesi and in Atjeh, so that Ka:tosuwirjo's D.I. could for the time 
being continue its activities in West Java. 
In the foUowing years the Darul Islam in West Java seemed more and 
more to degenerate into terrorizing and plundering gangs which could 
130 Cf. M. Natsir, Capita Selecta, Bandung/Djakarta 1954/1957, Vol. 11, 
pp. 8-10. 
131 For the text of this letter see Appendix 111. 
13.2 Cf. Feith, The Decline, p. 211. 
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not return to normal life in society. The rise of Kartosuwirjo's D.I. can 
be explained from a mixture of religious and non-religious factors, an 
ideological background plus all sorts of political circumstances and 
personal interests. Some time around 1950 there may even have been 
co-operation between the D.1. and colonial diehards such as the Dutch 
Captain Westerling.133 So in its later development this movement can 
certainly be counted among the quasi-ideological guerilla organizations 
which endangered the life of the Republic,134 
Anticipating the historical sequence of this survey, the story of Karto-
suwirjo can be completed here. From about 1960, Kartosuwirjo's 
following clearly began to decrease; many of his followers deserted or 
were taken prisoner. Some lost their belief in their leader when he was 
wounded by a bullet on April 24th, 1962, and appeared to be not 
invulnerable at all. 135 Finally, on June 4th, 1962 Kartosuwirjo was 
himself captured, having been discovered by an army patrol in a hut 
on the hill Geber in the district Pat jet between Bogor and Tjiandjur. 
According to the story by Anne Marie Thé - written for the Forces -
Kartosuwirjo was found seriously ill and exhausted, but he recovered 
when weIl looked af ter for several months. On August 16th, 1962, he 
was sentenced to death, on a charge of attempting to overthrow the 
Republic of Indonesia and having ordered the attempt to assassinate 
President Soekarno on May 14th, 1962. As a request for a reprieve was 
refused by the President, the death-sentence was carried out "some-
where in Indonesia one day in September 1962". Thus the history of 
the Darul Islam in West Java ended, and safety returned to the area. 
To quote the rather highflown phrases of Anne Marie Thé, the moral 
of the story is this: "No mountain is too high, no ravine too deep, no 
river too rapid, no forest too dense to form an obstacle for the soldiers 
of our army ... defending the Proclamation, the Revolution and the 
Pantjasila ... He who deviates will experience total destruction." 136 
Concerning the history of Kahar Muzakkar and his revolt in South 
Sulawesi (Celebes), there is less, and less trustworthy, evidence available. 
Nevertheless an at tempt will be made to draw a preliminary sketch, 
indicating the questions which demand further research. 
Kahar Muzakkar - his original name was La Domeng - probably 
came of the Buginese aristocracy and was born about 1920 in Luwu' 
133 Cf. Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, pp. 103-150. 
134 Feith, The Decline, p. 81. 
135 Cf. Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, p. 48. 
136 Cf. Anne Marie Thé, Darah, p. 16. 
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(South Sulawesi). For his secondary school education (which he did 
not finish) he was sent to a Muhammadijah school in Solo (Central 
Java). Married to a Javanese girl from Solo, he retumed to his birth-
pi ace during the Japanese occupation. Here, however, he was ripaoppa-
ngi-tana, a Buginese word which apparently means that a person is 
ostracized and banned from the country forever by the Datu' (rad ja or 
adat-chief) of Luwu'. Why? Perhaps because it was in conflict with 
the adat for him to have married a Javanese woman? 
Back in Java, Kahar Muzakkar became a trader. During the fight 
for freedom (1945-1950) he played a leading part in the K.R.LS. 
(Kebaktian Rakjat lndonesia Sulawesi, the Service of the Indonesian 
People of Sulawesi). From the middle of 1946 he organized guerilla 
bands consisting of young men originating from South Sulawesi who 
sailed over in proas (Ind. perahu) in successive batches to fight for 
freedom there. According to Bahar Mattalioe, these troops of Kahar's 
included many ex-prisoners from Nusakambangan and Tjilatjap, well-
known places of detention on the south coast of Central Java. As an 
answer to these guerilla activities organized by Kahar Muzakkar from 
Java, the notorious Captain Westerling with his colonial troops adopted 
a policy of revenge which - according to a generally held Indonesian 
opinion - resulted in about 40,000 victims in South Sulawesi. 1 37 Kahar 
himself meanwhile remained in Java, where he was involved in the 
battle for Malang (East Java) in July 1947, together with Bahar 
Mattalioe. On that occasion he insulted his later "biographer" by calling 
him "Bah ar the Coward", an insult that the lat ter obviously never forgot 
or forgave! 
Af ter the recognition of Independence and the formation of the 
federal R.LS. (December 1949) all kinds of tensions emerged in South 
Sulawesi, especially around Makassar, the former capitalof the "State 
of East Indonesia". Behind these tensions lay contrasts between federalists 
and unionists, between regional aristocracy and Indonesian-thinking 
nationalists, between the former colonial army (K.N.LL.) and the 
Republican T.N.L, and even between the T.N.1. and the ex-guerillas. 
The ex-guerillas demanded that they should be incorporated en bloc 
137 On December 19th, 1947 a representative of the Republic of Indonesia 
informed the United Nations that the number of victims in South Sulawesi 
could be estimated at 20,000-40,000. In an official Dutch report (Rapport 
Enthoven) dating from 1948, the total number of victims was said to be 
3,114 (see Nota betreffende het Archievenonderzoek naar gegevens omtrent 
excessen in Indonesië begaan door Nederlandse militairen in de periode 
1945-1950, 's-Gravenhage 1969, Bijlage 2, p. 17). 
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into the national anny, and should remain together as a separate unit. 
The military commander for East Indonesia, Colonel Kawilarang, how-
ever, only wanted a number of selected guerillas accepted into the TN.I. 
and the rest discharged. Bahar Mattalioe says that he himself wrote a 
letter to Headquarters in Djakarta and to President Soekarno, asking 
Kahar Muzakkar to be sent immediately to South Sulawesi, "because 
only he is able to find a solution, as he himself has created the guerilla 
troops and has become a symbol to them".1 38 Indeed, Kahar was 
promptly sent to Makassar with the rank of Lieutenant-ColoneL 
Did Kahar - who certainly had both the desire and the abilities 
for leadership - hope to play the role of "the strong man of South 
Sulawesi", who could now return to his area as a kind of "messianic 
king" in order to take the helm? Unfortunately, his coming immediately 
led to a clash between him and Colon el Kawilarang, as Kahar also 
demanded that his ex-guerillas should farm a separate army unit, be-
coming a brigade under himself. When Kawilarang refused, Kahar Ie ft 
Makassar on July 5th, 1950, to join the guerillas in the jungle. This was 
the beginning of a long guerilla struggle, which afterwards spread from 
South Sulawesi to South-East Sulawesi (the area north of Kendari). 
In October 1950, Prime Minister Natsir said that "there are not 10,000 
guerillas in South Sulawesi but a multiple of th is number"; Feith speaks 
of 20,000 men "controlling sizable are as of the mountainous sou th-
western peninsuia of Sulawesi and apparcntly cnjoying a significant 
amount of popular support".1 39 
Throughout the months of October 1950 to March 1951, the central 
government seemed to be arriving at a compromise with Kahar Muzak-
kar, thanks to Prime Minister Natsir. On August 17th, 1951, preparations 
had been made in Makassar for a great ceremony to incorporate Kahar 
and 4,000 of his men into the nat ion al army, but it turned out that at 
the eleventh hour they had left the city, taking with them trucks, 
weapons, ammunition, unifonns and money. A letter was left behind 
saying that the army authorities had not kept their word and had not 
released Kahar's followers who had been imprisoned, and not transferred 
certain reactionary officers from Makassar.1 40 Did perhaps the replace-
ment of the Natsir cabinet by that of Sukiman (April 26th, 1951) play 
a role here too? 
138 Bahar Mattalioe, Kahar, p. 33. 
139 Feith, The Decline, p. 212. 
140 Feith, The Decline, p. 213. 
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However that may be, it seems clear that the rising in South Sulawesi 
initiaIly had little to do with Darul Islam ideals. One important back-
ground factor could weIl be questions of prestige and resentment among 
Buginese-Makassarese patriots over against army authorities who came 
to this area from outside. The pamphlet by Zainabun Harahap makes a 
passing reference to the psychological factor of the differences between 
various ethnic groups (suku) as the background for this rising, for "the 
suku-feelings which were instilled by Kahar's bands had deep roots in 
the soul of the people".1 41 
Only af ter the break with the central government did Kahar Muzakkar 
try to make contact with Kartosuwirjo, and did the rising get the 
ideological background of the D.I. Nevertheless, according to oral 
information, even then there were still Christian guerillas among Kahar's 
foIlowing, e.g. from North Sulawesi and the Sou th Moluccas, who did 
not want to accept the unitary state forced by "Djakarta". 
On January 20th, 1952, Kahar wrote a letter to Kartosuwirjo "accept-
ing an appointment as Sulawesi commander of Kartosuwirjo's Islamic 
Army of Indonesia".1 42 Bahar Mattalioe notes that probably on August 
7th, 1953 - th us on the anniversary of Kartosuwirjo's Islamic State -. 
Kahar's troops got the name of Tentara Islam Indonesia (T.I.I.), the 
Islamic Army of Indonesia, "preceded by the proclamation of the Darul 
Islam which was declared to be a part of Kartosuwirjo's Islamic State 
of Indonesia in West Java".143 
This proclamation was perhaps made at a meeting in Makalua (South 
Sulawesi). Unfortunately Bahar Mattalioe does not mention the date 
and year of this meeting. And from the "Makalua Charter" which 
resulted he quotes only 19 of the more than 50 articles. l44 From these 
stipulations one could perhaps conclude that Kahar Muzakkar was a 
radical revolutionary, who meant weIl and held certain high Islamic 
ideals. In th is Charter, Nationalist and Communist parties (P.N.I., 
Murba, P.K.I.) were said to be hypocritical and godless, and therefore 
had to be exterminated (art. 12). Islamic parties such as the Masjumi, 
N.U. and P.S.I.I. were considered counter-revolutionary, and had to 
disappear (art. 13). All feudalists who liked using titles and words such 
as opu, karaeng, andi, daeng, hadji, gede-bagus, sajjid, teuku or raden, 
141 Zainabun Harahap, Operasi, p. 6. 
1412 Feith, The Decline, p. 214. 
143 Bahar MattaJioe, Kahar, p. 37. 
14~ Bahar Mattalioe, Kahar, p. 38 and pp. 82-89; it may be possible to collect 
more complete material on this question. 
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had to be combatted (art. 16). Several articles were devoted to the care 
of victims of the revolution (widows, orphans, invalids). 
As far as marriage regulations were concerned, it was stipulated, for 
example, that "he who opposes polygamy must be brought to trial" 
(art. 45). Bahar Mattalioe seizes upon this regulation to blacken Kahar's 
moral life and to express his pity for Kahar's second wife, a Eurasian 
girl named Corry van Stenus, who was a tremendous support to Kahar 
in his struggles between 1947 and 1965. This regulation concerning 
"compulsory polygamy", however, turns out to have been intended as 
a solution to the social problem of the widows of the war dead, and 
may therefore be considered an authentic Islamic solution.1 45 
Finally the Charter stipulated th at during the revolution the regula-
tions concerning property would be strictly enforced; the purchase of 
land, factories and other capital possessions was forbidden (art. 49) -
so too the use of all luxury articles and jewellery: gold, precious stones, 
silk materiais, hair-oil, lip-stick, face-powder, and food coming from 
cities in the hands of the enemy, such as chocola te, butter, cheese and 
biscuits (art. 50). 
Similar questions seem to have been broached in a pamphlet by 
Kahar Muzakkar, perhaps entitled "Remarks on Spiritual Questions" 
(Tjatatan Bathin), and apparently intended to combat the evils which 
had arisen among his following.1 46 Stating that extern al conditions could 
not be improved without considering internal, spiritual ones, Kahar 
commanded that within 6 months, beginning on March 1st, 1955, a 
spiritual revolution must take place among his people and their families. 
To this end, all luxuries (gold rings and other jewellery, wrist-watches 
for private use, etc.) had immediately to be sold for the bene fit of the 
general funds. Pressure lamps (Petromax) and radios for private use 
were also forbidden. A list of men's and women's clothing stipulated 
exactly what one person might own; the rest had to be given away for 
the benefit of those with less. Similar restrictions for a sober life were 
laid down with regard to the use of foreign cigarettes and luxury food-
stuffs such as chocolate, butter and cheese. 
Apparently Kahar acted rigorouslyon occasion, for example, by 
ordering the punishment of cutting off the hand of a thief (Sura 5 : 38) 
to take place in public, as a horrifying deterrent. 147 Orally obtained 
146 Cf. Bahar Mattalioe, Kahar, p. 63. 
140 Cf. Bahar Mattalioe, Kahar, pp. 50-57; it may not be impossible to get a 
copy of this pamphlet by Kahar (entitled "Tjatatan Bathin" or "Revolusi 
Bathin" ?), although the authorities ordered all copies to be destroyed. 
147 Bahar Mattalioe, Kahar, p. 80. 
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infonnation confirmed the fact that Kahar personally was wont to act 
harshly against evils and abuses. According to some informants, however, 
many bad elements from the urban rabble in Makassar sought refuge in 
joining Kahar Muzakkar's bands. It might have been these people who 
gave his movement a bad name by murdering, plundering and burning, 
while Kahar himself is said to have been of a most noble character. 
I received similar information with regard to the persecution of 
Christians in South Sulawesi, which got much publicity outside Indonesia. 
In 1953, for example, it was stated th at "lately alarming news came 
from southern Celebes, where partisans of a rebellious faction led by 
Kahar Muzakkar committed atrocities against Christian Toraja and 
attempted to convert them to Islam by violent means".148 Muslim 
infonnants in South Sulawesi assured me that Kahar himself condemned 
this sort of behaviour. One Christian informant said that he could have 
met leaders of Kahar's movement without any trouble whatsoever, at 
least in the early years.1 49 
From Bahar Mattalioe's story it appears th at in 1955 Kahar received 
a letter from someone resident in Singapore who called himself the 
"Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Darul Islam (Atjeh)", asking for 
doser contact with the movement in South Sulawesi.1 5o Some months 
later Kahar was able to receive an authorized person from this D.l. 
Minister at a conference of commanders in Wanua Waru (South Sula-
wesi) .151 
A few years later contacts and agreements were made between Kahar's 
movement and the Permesta ("Common Struggle Movement" ) in North 
Sulawesi, one of the so-called Christian areas of Indonesia. Likewise 
contact existed between Kahar and the Revolutionary Government in 





Drewes in Unity, ed. by Von Grunebaum, p. 308. 
Perhaps we should also ask to what ex tent such conflicts between Muslims 
and Christians were in fact caused by differences between certain ethnic 
groups of the population (suku) and, for example, are partly to be explained 
as a reaction of (Muslim) Buginese and Makassarese people against the 
constantly increasing influence of the (Christian) Toradja people in South 
Sulawesi and in the city of Makassar. To what extent did th is background 
even play a role in the incidents of October !st, 1967? 
Who was this person? Could it by chance be a certain Hassan Tiro? If not, 
who then was or is Hassan Tiro? According to vague information, a certain 
Hassan Tiro, an Atjehnese, acted as representative of the D.1. movement 
abroad, later on lived in the U.S.A. and acted there as "representative" of 
the prohibited Egyptian organization of the "Muslim Brethren". 
Bahar Mattalioe, Kahar, p. 57 ff. 
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claimed in February 1958.1 52 New weapons and ammumtlOn were 
obtained from the Permesta. This contact also strengthens the impression 
that Kahar's revolt was not in the first pI ace a matter of principle, based 
on the Darul Islam ideology, but a rebeIlion of ex-guerillas against army 
authorities, combined with regional patriotism. 
Af ter 1960 troops of the national army (T.N.I.) were able to intensify 
their campaign against Kahar Muzakkar, who by th at time had moved 
his headquarters to South-East Sulawesi, to the north of Kendari.1 53 
However, it was not until the beginning of 1965 that the T.N.I. could 
push on with a decisive campaign, which on February 3rd, 1965 resulted 
in Kahar and his bodyguard's being surrounded at a place in South-East 
Sulawesi ne ar the village of Lawali on the Lasoio River. Kahar himself 
was shot before he could throw his hand grenade. This brought the 
rising in South Sulawesi to a definite end. 
It seems, however, that the name of Kahar Muzakkar is still kept 
alive in South Sulawesi, not only among those who remember the 
murders, plundering and burning with horror, but also among people 
who are still wont to speak with deep reverence of "Pak Kahar" 
(Father Kahar). Even now in Sou th Sulawesi one can meet people of 
good intentions who still seem to live and work in a way inspired by 
their contact with "Pak Kahar". Does not this reverence highlight the 
contrast with public opinion on Kartosuwirjo, whose memory is apparent-
ly no longer cherished in West Java? 
Developments in Atjeh which in 1953 resulted in a rising against 
"Djakarta" were perhaps less a product of chance circumstances than 
the revolts in West Java and South Sulawesi. Atjeh was - and to a 
considerable extent still is - a closed society. The Atjehnese proudly 
caIl their area sramàë Meukah (Ind. serambi Mekkah), the "verandah 
of Mecca". OriginaIly this may have been a geographical conception: 
the coasters with prospective hadjis from other parts of Indonesia caIled 
at Atjeh as last port of caIl in the Archipelago. Later this epithet took 
on the symbolic meaning of a truly Islamic area. 
At the end of 1945 a kind of social revolution had taken pI ace in 
Atjeh when the people, led by the ulamas, had settled accounts with the 
former "lords of the country", the ulèëbalangs. These were the two 
152 Bahar Mattalioe, Kahar, p. 89 H.; exact information on these contacts 
cannot be culled from this source, as the author is obviously confused as to 
the historical order of events. 
153 Cf. Zainabun Harahap, Operasi, p. 9 Cf. 
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leading groups in Atjeh. A third group, such as the "secular" nationalists 
in Java, hardly existed in Atjeh. Owing to the regional patriotism of 
Atjeh, organizations from outside - political parties as weIl as, for 
instance, the Muhammadijah - had little following there. 
According to Atjehnese opinion, temporal and spiritual power origin-
ally formed a dual unity there. Temporal or worldly power lay officially 
in the hands of the Sultan, with the title Tuanku, but in fact was 
exercised by roughly 100 district chiefs, the ulèëbalangs (Ind. hulu-
balang, originally "war-lord"). The ulèëbalang-ship was an inherited 
position held by the T eukus (abbr. T.), the Atjehnese aristocracy. 
Spiritual authority was in the hands of the ulamas, in Atjeh with the 
general title of T eungku (abbr. Tgk.). Corresponding to th is was the 
dual unity of adat-Iaw (embodied in the Sultan and the ulèëbalangs) 
and Islamic law (represented by the ulamas), which according to 
Atjehnese opinion could not be divorced from each other and did not 
conflict with each other. 
The dual unity of worldly and spiritual authority was broken by the 
arrival of the Dutch, which was the reason for the outbreak of the 
Atjehnese struggle for the defence of their freedom, beginning on 
March 26th, 1873. At the outset the Sultan, the ulèëbalangs and the 
ulamas stood together against the Dutch. But on January lOth, 1903, 
the Sultan was captured and from then on played no role.154 Colonial 
authority was established by making use of the disunity among the 
ulèëbalangs, and by fitting them into thc colonial civil administration. 
From that time stemmed the opposition and conflict between the ulèë-
balangs and the ulamas, and it was this conflict which would be decisive 
for further developments in Atjeh. In 1939 the ulamas were united in 
the P.U.S.A. (Persatuan Ulama-ulama Seluruh Atjeh, All-Atjeh Ulama 
Union). At the end of 1945 these initials came to be used for the slogan 
Pembasmian Ulèëbalang-ulèëbalang Seluruh Atjeh, that is, the exter-
mination of the ulèëbalangs of all Atjeh! 
Concerning developments in Atjeh during the Japanese occupation, 
we may refer to A. J. Piekaar's hook on Atjeh and the war with 
154 According to Atjehnese records, however, the Sultan continued to be active 
in secret, even in captivity, and Atjeh never capitulated to the colonial 
powers. For example, see T. Alibasjah Talsya (beside Ali Hasjmy one of the 
modem Atjehnese writers and poets), Atjeh tidak pernah menjerahkan 
kedaulatan kepada Belanda, in Sinar Darussalam, Madjallah Pengetahuan 
dan Kebudajaan (an Atjehnese monthly), no. 12, March-April 1969, pp. 
59-65. 
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Japan.1 55 Regarding Atjeh he arrived at the same conclusion as did 
Aziz and Benda later when writing about Indonesia as a whoIe, namely 
that the period of the Japanese occupation resulted in a strengthening 
of the position of the ulamas (in Atjeh by undermining the power of the 
ulèëbalangs in the political and legal fields, for instance). According to 
Piek aar, this meant that Snouck Hurgronje's statement was no longer 
valid, namely that "the adat assumes the part of the mistress and the 
hukäm [Ind. hukum, Islamic law] that of her obedient slave".156 Now 
a balance was created which could only end in conflict. And "as aresult 
of the course of events af ter the Japanese capitulation, it seems that 
for the time being the ulamas have emerged from this conflict as the 
winners", said Piekaar in 1949.157 Piekaar adds that it would be an 
over-simplification to imply that the clash was a religious conflict 
between adat and hukum, as political, economic and cultural factors 
also played a part. In any case, the ulèëbalangs had compromised them-
selves as accomplices of the colonial authorities; they were the land-
owners, and because they could afford to send their children to schools 
where they were taught in Dutch, they obtained a cultural monopoly 
and blocked the way of young people educated at other schools. Accord-
ing to Atjehnese informants, only these factors were of importance, so 
that it was in fact in no way a religious conflict, merely a political and 
social one. It is therefore understandable that the majority of the people 
chose the side of the ulamas when the conflict with the ulèëbalangs 
erupted. 
Af ter the Japanese had promised independence for Indonesia (Sep-
tember 7th, 1944), people in Atjeh grew more interested in what was 
happening in Java. "All eyes were turned to the nationalist movement 
in the main island, the appeasement of which was the chief reason for 
the Japanese premier's declaration. Java, under the leadership of Soe-
155 A. J. Piekaar, Atjèh en de oorlog met Japan, 's-Gravenhage/Bandung 1949. 
Atjehnese sourees with scattered information concerning the developments 
in Atjeh during the Japanese period and af ter are the following books and 
pantphlets: Modal Revolusi 45, ed. by Seksi Penerangan/Dokumentasi 
Komité Musjawarah Angkatan 45 Daerah Istimewa Atjeh, 1961; Atjeh 
Membangun, ed. by Pemerintah Daerah Istimewa Atjeh, 1961; Darussalam, 
ed. by Jajasan Dana Kesedjahteraan Atjeh, 1963; and finally the stencilled 
publication Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Atjeh (Dalam sedjarah pembentukan 
dan perkembangan Pemerintahan di Atjeh sedjak Prokla17UlSi 1945 sampai 
awal tahun 1968) dan Produk-produk Legislatif, ed. by Sekretariat D.P.R.D.-
G.R. Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Atjeh, 1968. 
156 C. Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehnese, Leiden 1906, Vol. I, p. 153. 
157 Piekaar, Atjèh, p. 330. 
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karno, set the pace ... "; hence "during th at last year in Atjeh too the 
seed was sown for a growing national lndonesian awareness".1 58 
When at the end of August 1945 the proclamation of the Republic 
of lndonesia (August 17th) began to be known in Atjeh, the people, 
led by the ulamas (and a few ulèëbalangs who could understand the 
coming changes) made their stand for the new Republic. British and 
Dutch troops occupied the island of Sabang off the coast of Atjeh. They 
did not intend landing in Atjeh itself. Neither was Atjeh invaded from 
North Sumatra (where Medan was occupied by the Dutch and later on 
the "State of East Sumatra" was created). So it was in Atjeh that the 
colonial administration was not established anew af ter 1945. For this 
reason Atjeh afterwards got another honorific title: the daérah modal 
of the Republic of Indonesia, the "region of capitai", that is, the area 
which spiritually and materially remained an untouched capital for the 
Republic during the years 1945-1950. 
However, in August 1945 the Atjehnese had to face the possibility 
of a Dutch attempt to re-occupy their country. Allied aircraft had 
already dropped pamphlets with a naïve message about the liberation 
of Indonesia, ending with "Long live the Queen! Long live Indone-
sia!" 159 Apparently preparations had already been made by some 
ulèëbalangs to receive the Allied forces. Of course they hoped that their 
old position of power would soon be restored, so that the changes which 
had taken pi ace in favour of the ulamas during the japanese period 
would be reversed. 160 But on October 15th, 1945, the ulamas began to 
distribute a pamphlet in which the fight for the Republic of lndonesia 
under President Soekarno against the Dutch was declared a Holy War 
(Perang Sabil) .1 61 This declaration was made "in the name of the 
ulamas of all Atjeh" and was signed by four of them, including 
Tgk. Muhammad Daud Beureu'éh, who had held a leading position 
in the P.U.S.A. from the beginning. 
By order of the Allies the japanese troops remained to keep order 
in Atjeh till December 1945. Af ter some incidents they were removed, 
but according to Piekaar a significant number remained behind and 
afterwards acted as instructors for the lndonesian troops.1 62 Af ter the 
japanese had left, civil war broke out in earnest. Under the leadership 
158 Piekaar, Atjèh, pp. 234-235. 
159 A copy of this propaganda pamphlet has been printed from a blo ck in the 
abovementioned booklet Modal Revolusi, p. 28. 
160 Cf. Piekaar, Atjèh, p. 247. 
161 Printed in Modal Revolusi from a bloek, p. 61. 
162 Piekaar, Atjèh, p. 250. 
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of the ulamas - in particular Daud Beureu'éh - an end was put to the 
ulèëbalangs' power. Between December 1945 and February 1946, the 
ulèëbalangs and their families were for the most part massacred; others 
were interned.1 63 
Naturally the young people took an important part in this conflict. 
In the Japanese period they had been organized into the A.P.I. (Angkat-
an Pemuda Indonesia, Brigade of Indonesian Youth) set up by the 
Japanese, and into the illegal I.P.I. (lkatan Pemuda Indonesia, Associa-
tion of Indonesian Youth) under the leadership of Ali Hasjmy, who later 
became governor of Atjeh. The latter group was transformed into an 
army group, comparable with the Hizbu'llah in Java. 
From 1947 Daud Beureu'éh was military governor of the province of 
North Sumatra on behalf of the Republic of Indonesia (in fact governor 
of Atjeh, as the other areas of North Sumatra were occupied by the 
Dutch). In the provisional parliament in Jogja (K.N.I.P.) there were 
four members representing Atjeh. But in 1948 Atjeh got its own regional 
administrative organization, so that it could develop independently. 
Financial and economic problems could for the time being be solved 
by barter with Malaya. As a result of the second Dutch military 
campaign (December 19th, 1948) a Republican emergency government, 
formed under Sjafruddin Prawiranegara in West Sumatra, took over 
the authority of "Jogja". In 1949 this government accepted Atjeh's 
demand to become, de jure, an autonomous province of the Republic, 
with Daud Beureu'éh as governor. 164 Af ter the central government in 
Jogja had recovered its position, thanks to United Nations' mediation, 
it attempted to reverse th is development. A sharp reaction in Atjeh, 
however, forced the central government to agree that Atjeh should 
continue to exist de facto as a province. 
According to information gathered in Atjeh, from the beginning of 
1950 left-wing factions in the pusat (the central government in Djakarta) 
carried on a campaign against Atjeh as a separate province, while left-
wing papers such as Harian Rakjat (Medan) spread the rumour th at 
Atjeh was preparing a rising in order to secede from the Republic. These 
rumours were said to have inspired the central government to appoint 
the Atjehnese Nazir as military commander of Atjeh. Some people in 
Atjeh knew th is Nazir to have had Communist sympathies for a long 
163 See also Kahin, Nationalism, p. 179, n. 51. 
1114 Cf. Alers, Rode of Groene, p. 265 ff. 
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time. However, a warning from Atjeh against this appointment was 
disregarded by "Djakarta".1 65 
At the end of 1950 the problem flared up in earnest, af ter the govern-
ment in Djakarta had decided th at Atjeh should be united with Tapanuli 
and East Sumatra into one province of North Sumatra.166 Governor 
Daud Beureu'éh then became redundant and was appointed to a post in 
Djakarta. But he refused to accept this and resigned from government 
service. The situation remained tense until 1952, without matters coming 
to a head. It is understandable that Daud Beureu'éh tried to prevent 
an open rupture as long as possible. "We must not consider him an 
irresponsible person who used Islam only as a political cover, while 
luxuriating in his own power." 167 Daud Beureu'éh may have adopted 
a moderate attitude for as long as the Republic was led by a Muslim 
or by the Masjumi, but the situation clearly changed af ter the cabinet of 
Ali Sastroamidjojo (P.N.I.) came to office on August Ist, 1953.1 68 
According to information acquired in Atjeh, left-wing politicians in 
Djakarta had earl ier in 1953 begun to spread the rumour th at Atjeh 
was indeed organizing a rising. As a result of th is rumour "Djakarta" 
listed 190 prominent Atjehnese who were to be arrested. In July 1953 
th is became known in Atjeh; later on it turned out that this list of names 
had probably been leaked on purpose. As these leading Atjehnese had 
the feeling that they might be arrested, they decided to take to the 
mountains on September 19th, 1953. This was the official break with 
"Djakarta", and the beginning of the so-called Darul Islam revolt in 
Atjeh. 
165 Piekaar, Atjèh, pp. 238 and 257, mentioned this Nazir, appointed by the 
Japanese as ulèëbalang of Tapa'tuan and later officer in the "people's army". 
Piekaar supposed that Nazir did not come from an ulèëbalang family. 
Information which I got in Atjeh supports this guess. I was told that Nazir, 
as an ordinary boy from South Atjeh, had had a secondary modem school 
education and came under Communist influence at that time; later on it was 
clear that he had connections with the Politburo. Via the A.P.1. youth 
movement of Japanese origin, he became an officer in the national army. 
Af ter the unsuccessful coup d'etat of September 30th, 1965, Nazir was 
arrested. His family and relatives in Atjeh were for the most part murdered, 
although - according to an Atjehnese informant - they were probably 
not Communists at all. Nazir himself was senteneed to death by a military 
court in Medan in 1968, because he was considered to have been involved 
in the attempted coup d'etat in 1965. 
166 Feith, The Decline, p. 345. 
167 Alers, Rode of Groene, p. 269. 
108 Alers, Rode of Groene, pp. 269-270, supposes that Daud Beureu'éh still 
had confidence in the Wilopo cabinet (March 1952) but he makes the 
mistake of calling this P.N.1. leader Wilopo a Masjumi member. 
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Indeed, contact was made with Kartosuwirjo in West Java, even 
though Atjeh was certainly not thinking of being absorbed into Karto-
suwirjo's Islamic State. In the years which followed, in Atjeh too - as 
in West Java - the central government and the national army were 
present in some towns and in the capital (Kutaradja, now called Banda 
Atjeh), whereas the countryside was largely controlled by the "rebels" 
under Daud Beureu'éh, certainly supported by the people. 
Anticipating our chronological scheme here too, it can be said that 
in the years 1954-1956 "Djakarta" came to realize that a military solution 
to the difficulties with Atjeh was not possible. According to Atjehnese 
information, all the advice which the central government gathered 
from Atjehnese living outside Atjeh indicated that Atjeh should remain 
a separate province and not become just part of a province. Probably 
many people in the central government did not sufficiently realize how 
difficult it was for the population of Atjeh to form one community with 
the other ethnic groups of Northern Sumatra.169 
Pressed by Parliament, Minister Sunarjo (Home Affairs in the 2nd 
cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo) visited Atjeh in October 1956. He agreed 
that Atjeh should he recognized as a separate province; moreover, Ali 
Hasjmy was appointed governor and Sjamaun Gaharu military com-
mand er. On January 27th, 1957, Ali Hasjmy was installed during 
another visit by Minister Sunarjo. Talks between the new governor and 
Daud Beureu'éh led to a cease-fire agreement in March 1957, but the 
announcement and enforcement of the cease-fire took a long time. In 
May 1959 representatives of the central government once again came to 
Atjeh, led hy Minister Hardi. Three-cornered negotiations were opened 
hetween "Djakarta" (Hardi), the province of Atjeh (Ali Hasjmy) and 
the Darul Islam (Daud Beureu'éh). The outcome was that on May 26th, 
1959, an agreement was signed by which Atjeh was recognized as 
daérah istiméwa (a special administrative district) with autonomy 
particularly in religious affairs, in questions of adat and in matters of 
education, on the understanding that this autonomy should not come 
into conflict with the Constitution. 
It is obvious th at these conditions were made by Daud Beureu'éh, 
and that the central government had to satisfy these demands in order 
to reach an agreement with Atjeh. Indeed, from the time of this 
169 What reactions the Bataks, as dog and pig-keeping Christians, provoke in 
their northerly neighbours, the strictly Islamic Atjehnese, is told in a way 
hardly fiattering to the Bataks by M. P. M. Muskens, Indonesië, Een strijd 
om nationale identiteit, thesis Nijmegen 1969, p. 325 ff. 
CHAPTER I: 1945·1955 75 
agreement peace returned to Atjeh. The Darul Islam troops came down 
from the mountains at the end of 1959 and were largely incorporated 
into the national army. Daud Beureu'éh, now an ordinary citizen - with 
a government pension as ex-governor - has devoted himself to the 
development of his home land by playing a leading part in projects for 
the improvement of roads and irrigation. Under the leadership of Ali 
Hasjmy, on December 2nd, 1959, a start was made on the building 
of a university and students' city about four miles outside the capital, 
Banda Atjeh, with the significant name Darussalam (the Abode of 
Peace), another old epithet for this region. 
In 1962 Kartosuwirjo was executed, and the memory of his activities 
in West Java now seerns almost obliterated. In 1965 Kahar Muzakkar 
was shot, but in Sou th Sulawesi his name seems to live on, among some 
people in thankful remembrance. Daud Beureu'éh, the chief man of 
Atjeh, survived the rising and to an important extent was able to impose 
his conditions for peace between Atjeh and "Djakarta". Does this mean 
that the problems of Atjeh have really been solved? To what extent has 
autonomy in Atjeh itself in fact been realized? To what extent does this 
solution, too, threaten to create new problems? These questions will be 
dealt with in the conciuding chapter of th is book, although even then 
many of them will have to be left open. 
8. Religio-Political Publications 
The attention and energies of Islamic leaders in the years 1945-1955 
were concentrated on the political field. It can be taken that a large 
proportion of Muslim publications written during this time in Indonesian 
were also connected with this struggle. Probably it will prove impossible 
to recover and collect all the pamphlets and books dating from th is 
period. The samples which follow here, however, look sufficiently 
important and representative to justify a brief characterization of their 
content. 
One of the first publications from this period is probably the "Guide 
for the Holy War", written at the end of 1945 by Mohd. Arsjad Thalib 
Lubis in Medan.170 The writer belonged to the strictly orthodox Shäficï 
association Djam'ijatul Waslijah (more or less "Society for the Further-
170 Mohd. Arsjad Thalib Lubis, Tuntunan Perang Sabil, Medan 1946; the 
second, unaltered edition is called Penuntun PeTang Sabil, Medan 1957. 
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anee of U nity"), and is said to be "one of the ulamas and leaders of 
eonsiderable ealibre in Medan".171 As a professor at the AI-Waslijah 
University in Medan, founded in 1958, he reeently published a book on 
"The Unity of God aeeording to the Teachings of Christianity and 
Islam", one of a whole array of publications opposing the Christian 
dogma of the Trinity.1 72 
In the abovementioned pamphlet he first of all argues that the fight 
against the Dutch satisfied the conditions required for a Holy War, as 
( 1) the (igh t could serve to promote Islam in Indonesia, (2) was in 
accordance with God's will, and (3) was directed against God's foes. 
In support of this claim he adduces pronouncements and fatwas deliver-
ed by various Islamic organizations and ulamas. He goes on to explain 
the Islamic law with regard to the Holy War (pure intention, obedience 
to the leaders, prohibition on flight and cruelty, etc.), and the way in 
which during the Holy War one should observe one's religious duties 
(ablution, prayer, etc.). In solemn piety he depicts wh at happens to the 
believer who is killed in action (mati sjahzd), and the reward he will 
receive. Various prayers and encouraging words are offered to the 
combatant. This booklet ends by pointing to the comfort of faith in 
God's deeree (taqdir), which means that no-one dies before his time 
(Ind. sebelum adjal berpantang mati). 
The hook on "Islam and Polities" by Aziz Thaib, probably a collection 
of articles and speeches, seems to date from the latter part of 1946.173 
The au thor wants to show that Islam is not only acultic religion, but 
that it offers clear-eut and practicabie political principles for building 
a democratic, socialist welfare-state. The reader is roused to "fight in 
the way of God" against the N.l.C.A. heathen.1 74 To stimulate his 
Muslim readers, the au thor reminds them of the hundreds of youths 
who have already died in this Holy War. The book ends with a chapter 
on training for leadership and a paper from the Department of 
Information on democracy according to the ConstÏtution of 1945. Thus 
it offers an example of the rende ring of Islamic principles in a modem 
politica 1 terminology. 
171 Wahid Hasjim, p. 210. 
172 (Mohd.) Arsjad ThaJib Lubis, Keesaan TUHAN menu rut adjaran Kristen 
dan Islam, Medan 1968. 
173 Aziz Thaib, Islam dengan Politik, Boekit Tinggi, no date; perhaps this 
writer, who is unknown to me, lived at that time in Central Sumatra and 
had something to do with the Republican Ministry of Information. 
174 N.l.C.A. = the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, the provisional 
Dutch East Indies administration which retumed at that time. 
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Much broader in conception and approach is the book by the well-
known Indonesian writer RAMKA (abbreviation of Hadji Abdul Malik 
Karim Amrullah) on "Religious Revolution", dating from 1946 but 
only known to me in the second (improved and enlarged) edition of 
1949.175 The au thor places the Indonesian revolution within the frame-
work of the revolution or awakening of mankind, which in essence is a 
religious revolution or awakening, because religion creates real freedom, 
that is to say, the freedom -of the spirit and soul (Ind. djiwa). 
The first liberation of mankind was from "nature worship" for the 
service of God who sent Ris prophets and messengers to th is end. When-
ever the representatives of religion repressed the freedom of man, new 
revolutions occurred again and again, for example - a widespread idea 
in the Islamic world - the liberation from the domination of the Pope 
due to Luther. In the same way the French revolution meant liberation 
from the power of the clergy, and the Russian revolution meant 
liberation from the power of the Russian Orthodox Church. Even within 
Islam a revolution took pi ace, thanks to such people as MuJ:tammad bin 
cAbd al-Wahhäb, Djamäl al-Dïn al-Afghänï, MuJ:tammad cAbduh and 
AJ:tmad Khän,176 
This religious revolution within Islam was the distinctive force behind 
the Indonesian fight for freedom, because the Indonesian revolution 
too was carried forward by the religious awakening: Muslims under-
stood that they could only re ach their aim through self-confidence and 
awareness of their own strength,177 
The new, free Indonesia will take its pi ace among the peoples of the 
world, and be conscious of its responsibility, as a people maintaining the 
Pantjasila ideals. Ultimately all these ideals can be reduced to the first 
175 HAMKA, Reuolusi Agama, Djakarta 19492 ; the author, originally a writer, 
is now an influential publisher in the religious field, editor-in-chief of the 
magazine Pandji Masjarakat, imäm of the Al-Azhar Mosque in Kebajoran 
Barn (Djakarta), and professor at the Al-Azhar University recently 
established there. 
176 This political awareness, linked to the reform movement in Islam, is a much 
loved theme in the publications of HAMKA, wn of a West Sumatran teacher 
of religion and himself a passionate adherent of the Muhammadijah and 
Masjumi. 
177 Compare Sura 13:11, which modern Muslims like to quote and comment 
on as follows: God does not change the conditions of a people as long as 
that people does not itself make changes in the causes for its backwardness 
(Cf. Al Quräan dan Terdjemahnja, ed. by the Ministry of Religion, Djakarta 
1965-1969, Vol. 11, p. 370, n. 768). 
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"pillar": the Belief in the One and Only God (Ketuhanan Jang Maha 
Esa), although in fact this belief is not to be found in one religion 
(Islam) only. 
We must also mention here the very authoritative Islamic leader, 
writer and orator, the militant Muh. Isa Anshary (died 1969), according 
to Herbert Feith "an important political figure of radical fundamentalist 
conviction",178 Bom in 1916 in Central Sumatra, he lived since 1935 
in Bandung (West Java), where he met and at first admired the student 
Soekarno. But being a devout Muslim and co-founder of a Muham-
madijah branch in Bandung, he soon joined young men such as 
Muh. Natsir, "who had radical and modern opinions on religion",179 
In 1949 he published his Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam (philosophy of 
the Islamic struggle), written in a compelling style.180 He appealed for 
a spiritual fight against materialism, individualism, rationalism, egoism, 
capitalism, imperialism, etc. as essential for the fight for freedom. The 
true Holy War (djihad) meant more than the fight for freedom against 
the Dutch, which was merely a "little djihad". The "great djihad", 
however, was the fight of mankind against all sorts of passions as 
embodied in the list of -isms mentioned above. 
Just as his friend HAM KA, the au thor traced the revolutionary élan 
to Islamic leaders on the reformist side, such as al-Afghäni and others. 
Here too the struggle of Islam is compared to the fight for freedom of 
the Protestants against the Pope and the Roman Catholic Church. The 
writer tries to explain the origin of the separation between Church and 
State in Europe, as weIl as the separation between religion and state in 
modern Turkey (where religion had decayed and was unsuitable for the 
development of the country). The au thor, however, does not advocate 
such a separation. On the contrary, he wants to call Muslims to renew 
Islam, to he active and to create astrong Islamic political party which 
will fight for the foundation of an Islamic State where people obey 
God's directives and strive for the well-being of society. This aim does 
not rest on the "negative factor" that 95 % of the Indonesian population 
adheres to Islam, but on the inner conviction of all Muslims that only 
with the help of Islam can this world be organized and improved. 
178 Feith, The Decline, p. 137. 
179 Wahid Hasjim, pp. 219-225, gives a short biography of Isa Anshary. 
180 M.!sa Anshary, Falsa/ah Perdjuangan Islam, Bandung 1949. 
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In an Appendix, the last chapter of the abovementioned book, the 
unity of religion and state is on ce more emphasized, because (1) Islam 
is not a private matter and (2) the state is the instrument to see that 
divine laws are put into operation, for the good of man. According to 
the heading, however, this last chapter was written by A. Muchlis, a 
pseudonym for Muh. Natsir. lts contents are the same as contained in 
the pamphlet on "Islam as an Ideology" which Muh. Natsir published 
under his own name, probably in 1950.181 In his foreword, the author 
reminds the reader of Gibb's formula, which is very of ten quoted in 
Indonesian publications on Islam and given here as follows: "Islam is 
more than a religious system. It is a complete civilization." 182 In 
Indonesian publications this quotation is usually interpreted as support-
ing the unity of religion and polities in Islam, contrary to Christianity, 
which is usually characterized by Muslims as areligion only of the soul 
and the world to come,183 
In this connection, the reader may be reminded of the two volumes 
entitled "Capita Selecta" by Muh. Natsir; part one contains articles 
from before 1941, and the second speeches and articles from the period 
1950-1955.184 We should also mention here Natsir's contribution in pu-
blishing and distributing an Indonesian version of a pamphlet by Leopold 






Moh. Natsir, Islam sebagai Ideologi, with a short sketch of Natsir's life by 
Tamar Djaja, Djakarta, no date. 
This should be: "Islam is in deed much more than a system of theology; it is 
a complete civilization" ; H. A. R. Gibb, Whither Islam?, p. 12. In this 
correct form it was quoted and translated by Natsir in 1936, perhaps for the 
first time in an Indonesian publication ; cf. Capita Selecta, I, p. 3. As to the 
exact meaning of Gibb's words, we have to return to C. H. Becker, who 
stated th at originally Islam was purely a religion, then af ter 622 (in Medina) 
also became a political power and during the next centuries developed into 
a complete civilization (especially during the cAbbäsids). Afterwards, how-
ever, Islam lost its political power and in th is way has continued to exist 
only as a religion and civilization. See his Islamstudien, I, Leipzig 1924, 
pp. 1-23. 
More correct and, I believe, worth considering, is Von Grunebaum's 
definition: "The principal difference between Islam and Christianity as 
sociologica! entities is that Islam can, but Christianity cannot, he viewed as 
a community of the 'nation' type" (G. E. von Grunebaum, Modern Islam, 
p. 181). 
M. Natsir, Capita Selecta, Vol. I, Bandung-'s-Gravenhage 1954; Vol. Il, 
Djakarta 1957. Although Natsir does not have any politica! function at this 
moment, he is still an influential leader and he probably still has a part 
to play. 
Muhanlffiad Asad (Leopold Weiss) , Undang-undang Politik Islam, Djakarta 
1954. 
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An interesting and important booklet concerning religious freedom 
within the new Republic was written in the middle of 1949 by Dr. Abu 
Hanifah, a well-known Masjumi member from 1945, afterwards Minister 
of Education in the first R.LS. cabinet (1950) .1 86 In this pamphlet the 
writer criticizes the fears and meddling of foreigners abroad with regard 
to the freedom of religion in Indonesia, as had become evident from the 
Dutch press and the negotiations with the Netherlands on the indepen-
dence of Indonesia. 
The au thor advises these foreigners to remove the beam from their 
own eyes, pointing to the aII-embracing power of the Church in the 
Middle Ages, articles in the Constitution of Scandinavian countries in 
favour of a certain religion or church, the existence of Christian political 
parties in the Netherlands and their influence in Indonesia (e.g. via the 
Missions ), and the impossibility of a government's being really neutral 
towards religion. He stresses that the Indonesians are a deeply religious 
people with a great awareness of tolerance, and insists that Indonesia 
should be aIIowed to settIe this problem itself. In the new Indonesia, 
then, the government wiII turn out to have a positive attitude towards 
religion in general and to the various religions. Thus freedom of religion 
wiII be upheld completely, as indeed can be proved by looking at the 
situation within the Republic since 1945. 
About the time of the recognition of Independence, on the other hand, 
publications appeared in favour of an Islamic State. Even before the 
end of 1949 Zainal Abidin Ahmad published his book on the L;lamic 
ideas concerning the structure of an Islamic State.1 87 The starting-point 
of his exposition is twofold: the Caliphate as a definition of the character 
of an Islamic government, and the "darul Islam" as a definition of the 
Islamic community. These concepts are elaborated by connecting them 
with four principles which are considered basic to Islam: (1) the au thor-
ity entrusted to the government (amäna, an ambiguous term used in 
Sura 4 : 58), (2) justice, (3) belief in the One and Only God (Ketu-
hanan Jang Malta Esa) "as implied in the command to obey God and 
186 Abu Hanifah, Soal Agama dalam Negara Modern, Djakarta 1949. The 
author c1ashed later on with the leaders of the Masjumi, in particular with 
Natsir, who according to him - if I am weil informed - seemed sometimes 
more interested in Islamic and pan-Islamic questions than in political and 
Indonesian national problems. 
t87 Z. A. Ahmad, Konsepsi Tatanegara Islam, Djakarta 1949; the writer seems 
to come from Medan, but afterwards lived in Java and was known as a 
friend of Natsir, lsa Anshary and other Masjumi leaders. 
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His Messenger" , and (4) the sovereignty of the people or demoeracy 
(kedaulatan rakjat ). 
That is to say, an Islamic State would be a sovereign state, a religious 
state, a state upholding the rule of law, a constitutional state, a demo-
cratie state, a parliamentary state (with the ülü 'l-amri, Sura 4 : 59, 
as the elected representatives of the people), a republican state, and a 
tolerant and peace-loving state (Negara Perdamaian). 
Somewhat later there appeared a pamphlet written by an author who 
calls himself M. Sj. Ibnu Amatillah (a pseudonym? Ibn amatillah = 
the son of a handmaid of God), entitled "Analysis: Is it possible to base 
the Indonesian State on Islam?" 188 This writer reealls the book of the 
abovementioned Z. A. Ahmad, "who did not give a detailed design for 
an Islamie State, but nevertheless laid an important basis for the further 
unfolding of this idea". In his preface of January 1950 - immediately 
af ter the reeognition of Independence - the writer asserts flatly: "Now 
that our national aspirations have been fulfilled and we have become 
free and independent, a new question arises, the question of the form 
of our state; and it is not impossible that here the beginning of mutual 
dis agreement will be found". 
Against those who want to introduee the (Western) forms of democ-
raey, soeialism or communism, the au thor makes a plea for Islam and 
wh at Islam ean offer for the development of the state: the democracy 
of Islam rests on mutual deliberation (Sura 42 : 38); Islam recognizes 
the rights of man, provides valuable stipulations in the field of eeonomics 
(prohibition of extortion and luxury, regulations coneerning the zakät), 
and so on. 
From Atjeh, in April 1950, the well-known and still very productive 
Mohd. Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy published a brief summary and explanation 
of "The Principles of Islamie Government".1 89 In the first part, he 
diseusses various terms from the Qur'än and Tradition relevant to the 
Muslim idea of a state in accordance with Islam (chalifat, ulul amri, 
darul Islam, darul harb, ete.). In the second part, an attempt is made 
to show that some data of Islamie law can be used for the building of 
188 M. Sj. Ibnu Amatillah, Analyse: Mungkinkah Negara Indonesia bersendikan 
Islam?, Semarang 1950. 
18t1 Mohd. Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy, Dasar-dasar Pemerintahan Islam, Medan 1950. 
Soon aft er this publication the writer was appointed professor in Jogjakarta 
We shall very of ten come across his name again in connection with other 
publications. 
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a modern Islamic nation, in particular those concerning Finance: the 
bait al-mäl, "treasury", from the earliest period of Islam (based on 
Sura 12 : 55), is basically a "Ministry of Finance" which gets its income 
from all sorts of taxes, e.g. the charädj (land tax) , various forms of 
zakät, and the djizja as poll-tax from the subject non-Muslims. As far as 
th is last tax is concerned, it is emphatically eXplained (as an apology?) 
th at this kind of tax is not exclusively an Islamic one, but was also 
imposed by the Greeks and Romans on subjugated peoples.1 90 
Thus it turned out th at by the time of the recognition of Independence 
on December 27th, 1949, some people were searching for a more clearly 
delineated idea of an Islamic State to fight for. The common struggle 
against the enemy from abroad could not prevent various contrasts from 
living on within the new state. These tendencies are reflected in religio-
political publications of th is period. 
Meanwhile the first General Elections drew near. Hence this survey 
of Muslim publications during the period 1945-1955 may be concluded 
with a few selected election pamphlets. 
First of all, there is Abikusno Tjokrosujoso's pamphlet entitled "The 
Islamic Umma of Indonesia facing the General Elections".191 The 
au thor has already been mentioned frequently, for instance as a signatory 
of the Djakarta Charter. This pamphlet was written for the Liga 
Muslimin lndonesia (P.S.I.I., N.U., Perti) ; it does not support any one 
of the affiliated parties, nor does it attack the Masjumi which was not 
affiliated with this League. 
The Djakarta Charter of June 22nd, 1945, is printed on the first 
page of this pamphlet as the ideal to be striven af ter. The au thor points 
out how much Muslims had hoped that one of the basic principles of 
the state would be "Belief in God, with the obligation for adherents of 
Islam to practise Islamic law". Unfortunately this dause was later 
eliminated, as were all words pertaining to Islam. 
Then the pamphlet criticizes changes which had taken place in Indo-
nesia due to foreign influence. For example, the changeover from the 
first presidential cabinet at the end of 1945 to the parliamentary cabinet 
of Sjahrir, which was enforced by Van Mook, representing the Dutch 
government, and similarly the Round Table Conference, which brought 
the R.I.S. into being. 
190 In 1968 the same writer published a separate pamphlet on Baital Mal which 
wil! be mentioned again in the last chapter of this hook. 
191 Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Ummat Islam Indonesia Menghadapi Pemilihan 
Umum, Djakarta 1953. 
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The conclusion is that no stability would be achieved in Indonesia 
as long as the Constitution was not based on God's decrees. The 
pamphlet furthermore points out the suffering of the people and the 
lukewarm attitude of many Muslims, and expresses the hope th at now, 
through the elections, the building of a Baldatun Tojibatun (baida 
tayyiba, a good, prosperous land; Sura 34 : 15) would be taken in hand. 
A declaration of the P.S.l.l. on the basis of the state and a fatwa of 
the ulama conference held in Medan in April 1953 (with the names of 
207 members present) followas an Appendix. In both it is emphasized 
th at the state has to be based on Islam, th at the head of state has to be 
a Muslim, and that the laws being enacted have to be in agreement with 
the Qur'än and Tradition. 
A pamphlet with almost the same title, "The Islamic Umma facing 
the General Elections", apparently appeared at the same time from the 
hand of Isa Anshary. I have not succeeded in finding a copy of it. 
According to Sidjabat,192 Isa Anshary now stated - somewhat different-
ly from his abovementioned theme - that the coming elections would be 
the "great djihad", as opposed to the carlier fight against the Dutch 
which was only a "little djihad". This "great djihad" would consist in 
the fight for the sharïCa (Islamic law) as basis for the Indonesian state, 
ins te ad of the vague Pantjasila. 
Finally I refer to a pamphlet by the Action Committee of the 
Masjumi entitled "The Masjumi, prop and mainstay of the Indonesian 
Republic".1 93 Compared to the pamphlets by Abikusno (P.S.l.l., N.U. 
and Perti) and the Masjumi member Isa Anshary, th is official Masjumi 
publication is more politically down-to-earth in its formulations. On the 
one hand, th is could be characteristic of the difference in approach, 
atmosphere and language between the N.U. and the Masjumi as already 
discussed. On the other hand, this pamphlet could show th at the Masjumi 
itself did intend to fight for an Islamic society, but not explicitly for an 
Islamic State, as did some of its members personally (for instance, Isa 
Anshary). 
However this may be, in th is last pamphlet a bit of world history, 
centering on thc Second World War, is given in order to illustrate the 
struggle between dictatorship and democracy. Then the Indonesian fight 
192 W. B. Sidjabat, Religious Toleranee, p. 66. 
193 Masjumi, pendukung Republik Indonesia, ed. by Pusat Komité Aksi Pemilihan 
Umum Masjumi, no date. 
84 CHAPTER I: 1945·1955 
for independence is sketched and the reader is reminded of the role 
of the Masjumi and several of its prominent leaders during the period 
1945-1950. The transformation of the federal R.I.S. into the unitary 
state is primarily ascribed to the parliamentary motion submitted by 
Muh. Natsir, genera! chairman of the Masjumi and the first Prime 
Minister of the unitary Republic. 
In a concluding chapter mud-sI inging of all sorts on the part of the 
Communists is repudiated and the reader is assured that Islam is as 
much anti-capitalist as anti-communist. In this pamphlet too no other 
Islamic party is mentioned or attacked. But it is already clear that even 
then the Masjumi considered the Communist Party as its greatest enemy 
and the greatest danger for Indonesia.194 Ten years af ter the first 
general elections, this enmity was to lead to an explosion of proportions 
that no-one would have thought possible beforehand. 
194 To illustrate this conflict, one could recall an example taken from the election 
campaign: the Communist Party promised land-refonn by the redistribution 
of land among the peasantry; the Masjumi propaganda answered: "The 
Communists promise us all a bit of land, but what they will give us will be 
too little and too late - a grave!" 
CHAPTER 11 
THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY AMID 
INCREASING TENSIONS 
(1955-1965) 
1. Political Developments up to 1959 
Af ter 1955 the political situation in Indonesia soon became very 
complicated and obscure. For details of the developments the reader 
should consult Herbert Feith's publications. 1 There follow here the most 
important facts and the ma in outlines of the events which are important 
for understanding the modern history of Islam in Indonesia. 
The elections of 1955 had not brought victory to any one of the main 
streams in Indonesian society.2 A balance of power had come about 
which was to make a political compromise necessary, both in Parliament 
and in the Constituent Assembly. The Islamic parties now tried to 
continue their fight for Islam in this Assembly. On a regional and local 
level Islamic groups managed to keep a considerable amount of influence 
through appointed or elected Muslim civil servants. But it can be said 
that on the national level, as a result of the elections of 1955, the 
political progress of Islam was in fact blocked. Hence from this time 
the attention and energy of many Islamic leaders were turned to the 
internal strengthening of the Islamic community and questions such as 
education, the publication of books and the development of the work of 
the Ministry of Religion. 
The balance of the political parties made possible the later intervention 
of Soekarno. From a political point of view, the second decade of the 
Indonesian Republic can be characterized as the Soekarno period, th at 
is, the period in which Soekarno gathered more and more power into 
his own hands, under the guise of a "guided democracy". In the course 
1 Herbert Feith, The Decline; idem, The lndonesian Elections ; idem, Dynamics 
of Guided Democracy in Ruth T. McVey, lndonesia (Survey of World 
Cultures), New Haven 1963. 
2 See Feith's analysis in The lndonesian Elections. 
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of these ten years the public role of the Islamic factions was more and 
more curtailed, in particular through the banning of the Masjumi in 
1960. On the other hand, the Communist Party expanded to become 
the best organized party and developed its influence in such a way that 
it became "a state within the state". 
In particular two concentrations of power came more and more into 
the public eye, th at of Soekarno and his followers (acquiring the 
character of a pal ace clique), and that of the army under General 
Nasution. Concerning the years 1958-1961, Feith says of these two 
groups: "There was close co-operation between them on a large number 
of matters, a good deal of complimentarity of functions, and some 
division of governmental areas into spheres of influence of one or an-
other partner. But the two remained fairly sharply distinct, and there 
was considerable competition and conflict between them. I t was in many 
ways a tug-of-war relationship ... " 3 In their conflict with Soekarno 
and the Communists over the years some Islamic groups (particularly 
adherents of the Masjumi) put their hopes on the army, especially on 
General Nasution. 
In order to sketch in the developments which occurred during this 
second decade, we must first of all iternize a number of political facts 
from the period 1955-1959. Af ter that, special attention will be paid 
to developments in the ideological or quasi-ideological field, culminating 
in the Assembly meetings of 1959. 
The first cabinet crisis af ter the general elections ended on March 20th, 
1956, with the formation of the second cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo 
(P.N.!.). The Masjumi and N.U. also participated in it, and so the 
cabinet was very broadly based. But co-operation between all the factions 
and people concerned did not last long. 
From October 1956 Soekarno had begun to toy with his "conception" 
(Ind. konsèpsi) , which was to become "guided democracy". At the 
opening of the Constituent Assembly on November lOth, 1956, Soekarno 
said that he personally was alive to the necessity of protecting the weaker 
group against the power of the stronger. "This means that for the time 
being our democracy must be a guided democracy (Ind. and Dutch: 
demokrasi terbimbing, demokrasi terpimpin - geleide democratie), 
not founded on the ideas of liberalism". 4 
3 Feith, The Decline, p. 591. 
4 Yamin, Naskah, I, p. 640; Soekarno's speech is here published in its entirety, 
pp. 631-648. 
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On December lst, 1956 Hatta resigned from the vice-presidency, 
saying th at he had originally accepted this post "on the understanding 
that it would be for a period of one to two years".5 In fact, th is was the 
end of the so-called Dwitunggal (Dual-Unity), which had had more 
symbolical meaning than foundation in real congeniality and co-
operation. It is obvious that from the beginning Hatta had difficulty 
in working with Soekarno, as the latter had the vanity typical of a leader 
who cannot abide anyone by his side. Soekarno was the popular leader, 
who was of great importance for the period of revolution and conflict. 
But with his "cowboy romanticism" he wanted to carry on a permanent 
revolution, always warning (right up to May, 1966) that the revolution 
was not yet finished (Ind. revolusi belum selesai). Hatta, however, on 
November 27th, 1956, was already warning that a revolution must be 
canalized at the right moment. According to him, the problem was not 
one of ending or continuing the revolution, but the issue at stake was 
winning the revolution (by beginning constructive development), or 
losing it (by drifting into anarchy and adventurism).6 
Hatta's resignation occasioned much uneasiness and protest, partic-
ularly in is lands outside Java and in anti-Communist circles. The 
sympathy for Hatta strengthened the anti-Djakarta and anti-Soekarno 
tendencies. 
At the end of 1956 the Masjumi ministers withdrew from the cabinet. 
The N.U. continued to hold its seats. This development intensified the 
tension between the Masjumi and the N.U. at the level of daily govem-
mental responsibility. When fundamental questions came under discussion 
in the Constituent Assembly, however, the two parties were later going 
to form an Islamic bloc. 
In a speech on February 21st, 1957, Soekarno eXplained his "con-
ception to save the Indonesian Republic", that is to say, his way to 
"guided democracy".7 He suggested the formation of a gotong rojong 
cabinet (a cabinet of "mutual help") in which every party, including 
the Communists, would be represented. A National Council would act 
5 Feith, The Decline, p. 524. 
6 See Hatta's speech to students in Bogor, printed in the Djakarta newspaper 
Kompas of June 30th, 1966, where Hatta replied to a remark of Soekarno's 
made at the installation of Air-Cornrnander Rusrnin Nurjadin at the end of 
May 1966. In th is speech Soekarno had cautioned against someone (Hatta) 
who even ten years ago believed th at the revolution was finished and who 
thus obviously did not have a revolutionary spirit. 
7 Yarnin, Naskah, I, p. 666. 
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as advisory body to the cabinet. This council would be led by Soekarno 
himself and would be set up more by unanimity than by ballot, in 
particular by appointing representatives of the "functional groups" 
(farmers, workers, intellectuals, army, police, religious groups, etc.). The 
political parties had to make known their answer to this "conception" 
of the President's within a week. Of the larger parties, the Nationalists 
(P.N.!.) and the Communists (P.K.!.) declared themselves for; the 
Masjumi and the Catholic Party declared themselves against. Other 
parties gave a hesitant answer or put conditions ; for example, the N.u. 
was against the participation of the P.K.!. 
While the debate on the President's "conception" was going on, the 
territorial commander in Makassar, Lt. Col. Sumual, declared the 
State of War and Siege for East Indonesia on March 2nd, 1957. 
Simultaneously the so-called Charter of Common Struggle (Ind. Piagam 
Perdjuangan Semesta) was enacted there. The chief aim of th is regional 
campaign was to see that the economic output of this area (e.g. from 
the export of copra) was used for the development of the area itself 
and not swallowed by "Djakarta" and Java. Similar solutions had been 
striven for in Sumatra too. 
The President consolidated his position, when, following a cabinet 
crisis (March 14th, 1957) he declared the whole of Indonesia to be in 
a State of War and Siege. Between April 4th and 8th, 1957, playing 
the role of "citizen Soekarno" - yet at the same time being Commander-
in-Chief of all Armed Forces in the State of War and Siege - he 
pushed through the formation of the Djuanda cabinet. I was told that 
he had called a nu mb er of politicians from different parties to a meeting 
which was clearly designed to intimidate those invited. Arriving at the 
meeting, they found that they had to sit opposite Soekarno and a number 
of high army officers. Af ter Soekarno had eXplained things, they got a 
stencilled form on which to write down the words "yes" or "no", in 
answer to the question wh ether they were willing to take part in the 
cabinet which Soekarno was going to form. Two parties, the Masjumi 
and the Catholic Party, flatly refused. According to my information, 
the spokesman for the Socialist Party (P.S.I.) was prepared to co-operate; 
but Soekarno passed this party by and in due time pushed all the 
Socialists aside. Other parties sympathized with Soekarno's initiative or 
left the decision to those of their members who would be approached 
to accept ministerial office. 
This intervention of Soekarno's in fact heralded the period of "guided 
democracy", although its beginning was officially announced only some 
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two years later. 8 The Djuanda cabinet was largely composed of P.N.1. 
and N.U. members, while the P.K.1. used to give its support. This 
attitude of the N.U. according to some informants may be considered 
as "flexible", according to others "opportunistic" or springing from 
political inexperience. However that may be, the participation of the 
N.U. certainly brought it new adherents and nominal followers, but it 
also brought it discredit and widened the split with the Masjumi. 
The period between April and November 1957 was typified by in-
creasing tensions and incidents between "Djakarta" and the leaders of 
regional movements, particularly in Sumatra and Sulawesi. From 
regional elections in Java (June-August, 1957) it appeared th at the 
Communist Party, with 27.4 % of the votes, had become the largest 
party there. At the end of 1957 political developments were accelerated 
by the conflict with the N etherlands over West Irian (N ew Guinea), 
and the take-over of Dutch concerns by "the workers" (first of all in 
Djakarta, on December 3rd, 1957). As a reaction to the chaotic situation, 
which seemed ripe for a Communist coup, some Masjumi leaders 
left Djakarta for Padang in Sumatra (Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawira-
negara, Burhanuddin Harahap). In spite of this situation Soekarno left 
for an overseas trip of six weeks on January 6th, 1958. On February 15th, 
a counter-government was formed in Sumatra, the "Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia" (Ind. Pemerintah Revolu-
sionèr Republik Indonesia, P.R.R.I.). Two days later, the Permesta 
movement in North Sulawesi joined this revolt. 
In spite of the sympathy which these risings enjoyed from many in 
Java too - from anti-Communists, opponents of Soekarno and people 
coming from the areas concerned - General Nasution refused to make 
any compromise with the rebels. The fighting in Sumatra, however, was 
not too serious.9 At the beginning of May the central government was 
again in con trol there. Af ter that it was possible to stamp out the rising 
in North Sulawesi; at the end of July the troops of the central govern-
ment held all the larger towns, although this did not put an end to 
guerilla activities. 
8 Compare the remark by S. M. Abidin in the Constituent Assembly on April 
29th, 1959, that Guided Democracy, proposed by Soekarno in relation to 
the return to the 1945 Constitution, had in fact already been in operation for 
two years, that is to say, from the very day that the President took upon 
himself the formation of the Djuanda cabinet (Yamin, Naskah, 11, p. 275). 
8 Cf. James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise, lndonesÛl's Ciuil War, London 1961. 
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In this way the situation throughout the greater part of 1958 was 
determined by the P.R.R.L and Permesta risings. The involvement of 
some Masjumi leaders and prominent Socialists (Sumitro Djojohadi-
kusumo) in these risings was later going to be used as an argument 
against the rehabilitation of these parties, even up to the post-Soekarno 
period of 1968. 
2. T he Ideological Struggle (1959) 
The year 1959 was characterized by the struggle on a more funda-
mental level, resulting in the deadlock of the debates in the Constituent 
Assembly. Elected in 1955, th is Assembly began its sessions on Novem-
ber lOth, 1956 in Bandung. lts task was to draft and approve the 
definitive Constitution for the Republic of Indonesia. The Constitution 
of 1945 had at the end of 1949 made room for the Constitution of the 
federal R.LS., a product of the Round Table Conference between the 
Netherlands and Indonesia. Then th is R.LS. Constitution was hastily 
exchanged for a temporary Constitution when the unitary state was 
formed in August 1950. 
The debates in the Constituent Assembly did not proceed from a 
draft Constitution, but in the first place fundamental principles were 
discussed which later on could be incorporated into the Constitution. 
Points at issue concerned, for instance, the form of the state (federal or 
unitary), parliament (one House or two) and the power of the head 
of the state. 
Af ter some years the Assembly had reached agreement on many 
details. One question, however, had developed into a main issue that 
caused two blocs to be formed which could not arrive at any compromise. 
This was the formula concerning the basis of the state, roughly speaking 
the old problem of a so-caIIed Pantjasila State or something like an 
Islamic State (that is to say, "a state based on Islam", or "a state in 
which the laws are in agreement with, or not in conflict with, the 
Qur'än and Tradition" ). Looking back, we can ask to what extent th is 
discussion was only a verbal combat, or in other words a struggle for the 
label of the state. How far did the Assembly come to a clear exposition 
concerning the essential content of these ideas? How much was antagon-
ism based merely on suppositions concerning the other's intentions, and 
on fear of these presumed intentions ? 
At the beginning there were still tensions between the various Islamic 
parties, as from the end of 1956 the Masjumi and the N.U. opposed 
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each other with regard to the Ali cabinet. But the Islamic parties 
presented a united front when faced with the non-Islamic and anti-
Islamic parties, which had combined into a Pantjasila bloc. The tendency 
which Feith believed he could trace back even to the election campaign 
now became an open fact: "The Pantja Sila, previously accepted by 
Moslem political leaders as a symbol to which they could give at least 
tentative assent, now became anti-Moslem property; President Soekarno, 
as a vigorous defender of the Pantja Sila ... came to be seen as a spokes-
man for one side in the struggle, instead of a non-partisan head of 
state".10 
A compromise between these two blocs proved less and less possible. 
The problem became insoluble. It was impossible to get a majority for 
the concepts along "Islamic State" lines. But for the "Pantjasila State" 
idea, even with Communist support, the two-thirds majority laid down 
as necessary for the making of the Constitution was also unobtainable. 
For almost two and a half years many meetings were held to deal with 
this question, without coming any nearer to a solution. 
As has been said, from 1957 Soekarno was busily working towards his 
"guided democracy", in both what he said and did. One may suppose 
that at a certain moment he had co me to the conclusion that the 1945 
Constitution gave the President more power than the later Constitutions, 
or the one which the Assembly was preparing. The 1945 Constitution 
could open the way to his "guided democracy", and could thus legalize 
his "conception". So he decided to enforce a "return to the Constitution 
of 1945", passing over those of 1949 and 1950 and setting aside the work 
of the Assembly. If this interpretation is correct, it must be concluded 
that Soekarno's real aim was to bring about "guided democracy" via 
a "return to the Constitution of 1945", and not that he was looking for 
a way out of the deadlock in which the Assembly found itself and then 
decided to force the issue by a "return to the Constitution of 1945" 
which then ended up in "guided democracy".l1 
The cabinet was the first body which Soekarno asked to sanction his 
idea. From December 5th, 1958, an "exchange of ideas" took place 
between the President and the cabinet. On February 19th, 1959, the 
10 Feith, Dynamics, p. 317. 
11 The way in which Prime Minister Djuanda denied the truth of th is inter-
pretation given by S. M. Abidin (Yan~in, Naskah, 11, p. 275) and Dahlan 
Lukman (Yamin, Naskah, 11, p. 460) is not convincing (Yamin, Naskah, 111, 
p. 287). 
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cabinet unanimously passed a resolution for "the realization of guided 
democracy within the framework of a return to the Constitution of 
1945".1 2 
In the 24 points covered by this resolution, among other things the 
opinion is expressed that the 1945 Constitution was a better guarantee 
for putting the principle of guided democracy into practice, and that 
guided democracy certainly meant democracy; furthermore, th at the 
1945 Constitution could guarantee a stabie government for at least five 
years (i.e. the term of office of the President, who would appoint and 
dismiss the ministers). This 1945 Constitution also left a possibility for 
the appointment of representatives from the "functional groups" to the 
various Councils. 
Point 9 of this resolution is particularly important for our subject. 
It runs as follows: "In order to meet the desires of the Islamic groups, 
in connection with the restoration and assurance of public safety, the 
existence of the Djakarta Charter of June 22nd, 1945 is recognized ... " 
In the "Explanation" it is added that "the intention of the return to 
the Constitution of 1945 is the restitution of the total national potential, 
including the lslamic groups, in order to he able to concentrate on the 
restoration of public safety and on development in all fields". In other 
words, the Djakarta Charter was mentioned here as a friendly gesture 
towards Darul Islam leaders in West Java, South Sulawesi and Atjeh, 
and other Islamic politicians, both in Parliament and the Constituent 
Assembly, who sympathized with the ideology behind the Darul Islam. 
As to the procedure for the "return to the 1945 Constitution", it was 
decided that af ter agreement hetween the President and the cabinet 
(sic!) the President would address a meeting of the Constituent Assembly 
in Bandung, urging them to accept the 1945 Constitution as the definitive 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The decision of the Assembly 
would be laid down in a "Charter of Bandung", in which stipulations 
would also have to be made "concerning the existence of the Djakarta 
Charter of June 22nd, 1945". 
On March 3rd and 4th, 1959, Parliament was given the opportunity 
to ask questions about this resolution by the cabinet; these questions 
would be answered in writing by the government.13 There was no 
question of Parliament's either passing or rejecting this resolution of the 
cabinet (re ad: the President). Besides expressions of agreement wi th the 
12 The text of this resolution by the cabinet and the explanation added to it 
can he found in Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 487-508. 
13 For the minutes of these meetings see Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 511-571. 
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opinion of President and cabinet (for example from the P.N.I. and 
P.K.I.), critical questions were also put. For example: will "guided 
democracy" still be real democracy? Has all the work of the Constituent 
Assembly been in vain, though its chairman had just said, on February 
18th, th at (1) the difficult, fundamental questions were al ready solved, 
and (2) that the content for a draft Constitution had already for 90 % 
been fixed? (Anwar Harjono of the Masjumi). A number of represen-
tatives of the Islamic parties asked for elucidation of the sentence about 
the Djakarta Charter. Did it mean th at th is document would possess 
the same legal force as the Constitution, or was it only a historical 
document, the existence of which was only recognized in order to use it 
incidentally in connection with public safety? (Anwar Harjono). Did 
the recognition of the Djakarta Charter carry legal weight, so that the 
expression "Belief in God" (Ketuhanan) in the preamble of the 1945 
Constitution might be eXplained by adding the famous "seven words" 
from the original Djakarta Charter, so that it would read thus: Belief 
in God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practise Islamic 
law? And would it he possible to create on this basis a legislation which 
would be in agreement with Islamic law? (Achmad Sjaichu, N.U.). 
As far as the written answer from the government is concerned, let us 
concentrate on the remarks concerning the Djakarta Charter.14 In 
answer to Anwar Harjono's questions came the reply that, although the 
Djakarta Charter was not a part of the Constitution of 1945, it was 
nevertheless a historical document which possessed considerable signifi-
cance for the struggle for freedom of the Indonesian people and for the 
drafting of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, which was indeed 
a part of the Constitution.1 5 
The answer to Achmad Sjaichu's questions went somewhat further. 
"The recognition of the existence of the Djakarta Charter as a historical 
document means for the government also the recognition of its influence 
on the 1945 Constitution. This influence therefore not only concerns 
the preamble of the Constitution of 1945, but also article 29 of that 
Constitution, which must be the basis for further legislation in the 
religious field." 16 "That is to say, the words 'Belief in God' in the 
preamble of the 1945 Constitution can be eXplained as 'Belief in God, 
14 Cf. Yamin, Naskah, I, pp. 573-623. 
15 Yamin, Naskah, I, p. 587. 
16 Article 29 runs as follows: (1) The State is founded on Belief in the One 
and Only God; (2) The State guarantees the freedom of every inhabitant 
to profess his own religion and to worship according to his own religion and 
belief. 
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with the obligation for the Islamic community to maintain its religious 
law', so th at on these grounds a legislation for the adherents of Islam 
can be cr~ated which can be brought into agreement with Islamic 
law." 17 • 
On April 22nd, 1959, just before he left for a journey abroad of more 
than two months, President Soekarno made his speech in the Constituent 
Assembly in Bandung, in which he appealed for a return to the Con-
stitution of 1945.1 8 Af ter an introduction in which he stressed that the 
Assembly had already been meeting for 2 years, 5 months and 12 days, 
th at is almost two and a half years, his speech followed closely the 
24 points of the resolution by the cabinet of February 19th mentioned 
above. 
With regard to the Djakarta Charter, Soekamo said first that it was 
a historical document which preceded, and had had influence upon, the 
1945 Constitution, and therefore he would still officially send the text of 
the Djakarta Charter to the Assembly. Coming to point 9 on the 
recognition of the existence of the Djakarta Charter for the sake of the 
restoration and assurance of public safety, Soekarno repeated almost 
literally the answer the government had given to Achmad Sjaichu's 
questions in Parliament, namely th at the Djakarta Charter had not only 
influenced the preamble of the Constitution, but the whole Constitution, 
and therefore also the article on religion and religious freedom (article 
29), which had to be the basis for further regulations in the field of 
religion. But the sentence which th en followed in the earlier answer 
- that th is influence meant that "Belief in God" could he eXplained 
with the addition of the "seven words" and for this reason special laws 
could be made for the Islamic part of the population - it was just this 
sentence which now was not included in Soekamo's speech! 
Once again the Djakarta Charter became one of the most important 
issues on which some Islamic leaders brought discussions to a head at 
the following meetings of the Assembly, held between April 22nd and 
June 2nd, 1959.19 At first only some members did so. The speech of 
the well-known Masjumi leader Prawoto Mangkusasmito, for example, 
17 Yamin, Naskah, I, p. 621. 
18 This extremely long speech is known under the ti tie of Res Publica, se kali 
lagi Res Publica! ("RE'S Publica, once again Res Publica!") ; cf. Yamin, 
Naskah, I, pp. 653-702; in English, 11, pp. 199-244. 
19 A great deal of Yamin's work covers the minutes of these Assembly meetings; 
cf. Naskah, 11, pp. 187-848 and 111, pp. 115-625. 
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held on May 4th, was mainly an attack on Soekarno's idea concerning 
"guided democracy" and an appeal for the restoration of the Dwitunggal, 
Soekarno-Hatta, as a better way of achieving stability.2o This "restora-
tion" was, of course, intended to restore Hatta's influence in the govern-
ment of the country, as a counterweight to Soekarno. But, for example, 
H. Saifuddin Zuhri (N.U., later Minister of Religious Affairs) gave 
special attention to the problem of the Djakarta Charter. He asked the 
government to stipulate that the Djakarta Charter of 1945 had legal 
significance for the present day and could be used as a source of law 
for the realization of Islamic legislation for Muslims. 
It is worth mentioning th at on May 5th, the representative of the 
Catholic Party, B. Mang Reng Say, stressed that for his party the 
Djakarta Charter was nothing more than "one of the historical docu-
ments from Indonesian soil which have occurred in the course of the 
history of the Indonesian people moving toward the proclamation of 
their independence", so that the Djakarta Charter "may not and cannot 
be a source of law" but may only be considered as a precursor, a draft, 
for the preamble of the Constitution.21 The same point of view was 
taken by the spokesman for the Protestant Party (Parkindo ), J. C. T. 
Simorangkir, in his speech of May 11 th, 1959.22 
A spokesman for the small Islamic party Per ti requested straight out 
th at the Djakarta Charter should be made the preamble of the 1945 
Constitution and that ot her articles of the Constitution should be 
brought into agreement with it. 23 H. Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah 
(HAMKA) 24 launched a vehement attack on the way Soekarno had 
organized his campaign to put pressure on the Assembly by means of 
mass demonstrations. He foresaw that "guided democracy" would be 
the way to dictatorship. Although he was an authoritative religious 
leader and writer, he did not enter into the question of the Djakarta 
Charter. This, however, was done explicitly by Kahar Muzakkir, a 
Muhammadijah leader from Jogja, one of the nine signatories of the 
Djakarta Charter on June 22nd, 1945. He voiced the disappointment of 
the Islamic community, which had accepted the Constitution on August 
18th, 1945, because Soekarno had promised that th is Constitution could 
2() Yamin, Naskah, 11, pp. 362-376. 
21 Yamin, Naskah, 11, p. 476. 
22 Yamin, Naskah, 11, p. 664. 
23 Yamin, Naskah, 11, p. 537; what is meant is a return to the draft Con-
stitution as it was on July 16th, 1945 (see Chapter I, par. 3). 
24 Mentioned in Chapter I, par. 8; Cor his speech, see Yamin., Naskah, 11, 
pp. 544-554. 
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later on be perfected and brought into accordance with the ideals of 
the Muslims. It was, af ter all, from this Constitution that the important 
"seven words" of the Djakarta Charter had been struck out. Now the 
existence of the Djakarta Charter was being recalled, but alas, once 
again not to give it legal force, but only to appease the Islamic com-
munity. He proposed that the Assembly should go on with its work 
until a result was achieved that the Muslims also could accept and take 
responsibility for. 25 Tbe spokesman for the P.S.!.!. also criticized the 
government for intending to set aside the work of the Assembly without 
further ado, by taking the Constitution of 1945 out of cold storage, 
but leaving the Djakarta Charter there as just a historical document. 26 
The climax of this debate was perhaps reached in a speech by the 
N.U. leader H. Zainul Arifin on May 12th, 1959.27 According to his 
line of argument, the Djakarta Charter had cleared the way for the 
proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia, so that, strictly speaking, this 
Charter was the true basis of the Republic, not the altered form of it as 
embodied in the preamble of the Constitution of August 18th, 1945. 
To the many speculations concerning the famous "Light Verse" from 
the Qur'an (Sura 24: 35) he added this one: that the Djakarta Charter 
could be compared to the light of the lamp which, as a shining star, 
formed an eternal source of light for the Constitution of 1945, to illumine 
the dark road which the Indonesian people had already walked and 
would still have to follow. So he proposed that the original Djakarta 
Charter should be recognized as the fundamental norm for the state and 
for its legislation. 
On May 21st, 1959, Prime Minister Djuanda replied to what until 
then had been brought forward in the Constituent Assembly.28 With 
re gard to the criticism of some members who had said that the lack of 
public safety and the risings were engendered not only by Islamic groups, 
the government declared itself prepared to omit the sentence about 
public safety when mentioning the Djakarta Charter. As far as the 
meaning of the Charter and its relation to the Constitution of 1945 were 
concerned, the government believed that this question had already been 
sufficiently eXplained in earl ier statements by the President and in the 
answer in Parliament to Achmad Sjaichu, which had been handed to 
25 Yamin, Naskah, 11, pp. 701-707. 
26 Yamin, Naskah, 11, p. 836. 
27 Yamin, Naskah, 111, pp. 149-164. 
28 Yamin, Naskah, 111, pp. 285-329. 
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the Assembly. According to the government, the Djakarta Charter was 
a historical document that inspired (Ind. mendjiwai) the 1945 Con-
stitution, especially the preamble and article 29, although the original 
Charter did not have legal effect in a direct way. 
The fundamental norm for the state and its legislation - this in 
answer to H. Zainul Arifin - was, however, already laid down in the 
preamble of the Constitution. (In other words, the government did not 
intend to acknowledge the Djakarta Charter in its original setting as 
that nonn). Moreover, the government was of the opinion that, consider-
ing the composition of the Indonesian population, the coming Parliament 
and People's Congress would for the greater part consist of Muslims, 
so that people need not fear the enactment of decisions and laws at 
variance with Islamic law. (This was a typical Soekarno argument from 
1945 on). 
In order to mould the governmental proposal into a more definite 
fonn, the Prime Minister presented a draft for a "Charter of Bandung", 
which would sanction the return to the Constitution of 1945. With 
regard to the Djakarta Charter it was laid down in this draft "that we 
recognize the existence of the Djakarta Charter of June 22nd, 1945, as 
a historical document that inspired the formulation of the preamble of 
the 1945 Constitution, which preamble is indeed part of this Con-
stitution". 
We may comment th at the significance of the Djakarta Charter here, 
more cIearly than before, is related to a moment in the past, that is to 
say the moment when the formulation of the preamble of the Con-
stitution took pI ace ; for the present this Charter has only indirect 
significance, inasmuch as, in an altered form without the vexed "seven 
words", it was accepted as the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. 
From May 25th to 29th, 1959, further discussions followed in the 
Assembly. Various speakers for the Islamic faction declared themselves 
dissatisfied with the answer from the government. HAMKA and Prawoto 
Mangkusasmito (both Masjumi) on ce again warned their listeners against 
the dangers of "guided democracy", which would surely end in a 
totalitarian state or a police state. They pleaded anew for the restoration 
of the Dwitunggal Soekarno-Hatta.29 
29 Yamin, Naskah, 111, pp. 367, 447; both found that their fear was weil 
grounded, as during the last years of the Soekarno regime they were im-
prisoned and only released af ter Soekarno's fall. 
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Others repeated their suggestion to give the Djakarta Charter alegal 
significanee for the present day. The spokesman for the P.S.I.I., for 
example, wanted to replace the preamble of the Constitution with the 
original Djakarta Charter, as did K. H. Masjkur (N.U.) and the spokes-
man for the Perti, who, moreover, wanted to see the "seven words" of 
the njakarta Charter repeated in article 29 of the 1945 Constitution.30 
Af ter all kinds of amendments had been suggested concerning the 
governmental draft for the proposed "Charter of Bandung", on May 
27th, the Prime Minister once again made a speech to clarify the 
government's point of view. 3l This speech, however, did not reveal any 
new policies ; the problem of the Djakarta Charter was not even 
mentioned. 
The following day it appeared that within the Islamic bloc mutual 
agreement had been reached for a last effort to give legal force to the 
disputed "seven words" of the Djakarta Charter. At the eleventh hour 
the representatives of the Islamic parties - N.U., Masjumi, P.S.!.I., 
Perti and four small groups - moved an amendment, apparently 
originating from N.U. circles, to insert the "seven words" both in the 
preamble and in article 29 of the 1945 Constitution. 32 
Af ter this the meeting was adjourned several times, partly in order 
to reach a compromise between the Islamic and other groups by lobby-
ing.33 These attempts, however, were of no avail. When, on May 29th, 
it was at last possible to vote on the amendment of the Islamic parties, 
it was rejected by 268 votes to 210 on the first vote. When the vote was 
taken again, because of an apparent mis take, the numbers against were 
265 to 201 for. 34 
A day later the spokesmen for the various parties got the opportunity 
to give reasons for their answer to the government's proposal for the 
return to the 1945 Constitution, before voting. In the name of all the 
abovementioned Islamic parties, W. A. Rachman informed the Assembly 
that, although some differences in nuance were to be found among them, 
the Islamic parties were in agreement th at they could only accept the 
government's propos al on the conditions formulated in their rejected 
amendment, and for this reason the Islamic parties would vote against 
the proposa1.35 
30 Yamin, Naskah, 111, p. 392, pp. 477-480 and p. 483. 
31 Yamin, Naskah, 111, pp. 511-522. 
32 Yamin, Naskah, 111, pp. 527-528 and p. 569. 
33 Yamin, Naskah, 111, pp. 531-537. 
34 Yamin, Naskah, 111, pp. 571-573. 
35 Yamin, Naskah, 111, p. 586. 
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Thus the propos al for a return to the 1945 Constitution would get 
the support of two large parties, the P.N.I. and P.K.I., as weIl as the 
Catholics, Protestants and other small parties, but not th at of the Islamic 
parties. In accordance with standing orders, three different kinds of 
voting were carried out, on May 30th, June 1st and June 2nd.36 The 
result was that the government's proposal obtained successively 269, 264 
and 263 votes, whereas 199, 204 and 203 votes were returned against. 
As a two-thirds majority was necessary for such a decision, that was, 
312 votes in the last poll, the propos al was not accepted. 
Now it was perfectly clear that a two-thirds majority in the Assembly 
was not attainable, either for a so-called "Pantjasila State" based on the 
Constitution of August 18th, 1945, or for something tending towards 
an "Islamic State" based on the "seven words" of the Djakarta Charter 
of June 22nd, 1945. 
During a short final discussion, the speaker for one of the nationalist 
parties (lkatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, I. P.K. I., the 
"League of U pholders of Indonesian Independence" ) proposed th at the 
Assembly now dissolve itself and leave the decision concerning the Con-
stitution in the hands of the President (outcry from the Islamic groups). 
A Communist representative also proposed that the Assembly dissolve 
itself. In this absolute deadlock, the meeting and the session of the 
Constituent Assembly ended on June 2nd, 1959. 
3. "Guided Democracy" (1959-1965) 
The abovementioned proposal made by the I.P.K.I. representative 
met with a response. On June 18th, 1959, the chairman of the P.N.I., 
Suwirjo, sent a telegram to Soekarno, who was at that moment in Japan, 
asking him for a Presidential decree proclaiming a return to the 1945 
Constitution and to dissolve the Constituent Assembly.37 They would 
have to wait until the President returned from abroad on June 30th. 
Meanwhile the P.N.I., P.K.I. and like-minded groups had made a new 
session of the Assembly impossible by simply refusing to attend. In this 
way the necessary quorum could not be achieved, so that the Assembly 
could not carry out its work. 
Af ter his return the President officially informed the cabinet on 
July 3rd th at he would intervene. This took pi ace on July 5th, 1959, 
36 Cf. Yamin, Naskah, 111, pp. 591-625. 
37 Duta Masjarakat (Djakarta newspaper), June 19th, 1959; Keesings Histo-
risch Archief, Amsterdam-Antwerpen, 1959, no. 1460, p. 14,956. 
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by means of the "Decree of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, with regard to the Return 
to the Constitution of 1945".38 
The first part of th is Decree consists of five considerations. Firstly, 
that the Assembly had not been able to achieve the necessary decision 
(i.e. a two-thirds majority) concerning the proposal to return to the 
1945 Constitution. Secondly, th at the majority of the members of the 
Assembly refused to attend the meetings any longer, so that the Assembly 
would not be able to complete its work. Thirdly, that because of this a 
dangerous situation for the unity and well-being of the state, the country 
and the people had arisen (so that, according to a later explanation, 
the President as Commander-in-Chief could intervene on the grounds 
of a state of emergency). Fourthly, that the President, supported by the 
majority of the people and impelled by his own conviction, now had to 
act in order to save the country. Fifthly, that the President was convinced 
that the Djakarta Charter of June 22nd, 1945 inspired the 1945 Con-
stitution and formed a unity with that Constitution (or: "is linked in 
unity with that Constitution").39 
Based on these considerations, the President decreed (1) that the 
Constituent Assembly was dissolved, and (2) th at the return to the 
Constitution of 1945 had taken place. Added to this Decree was the 
announcement that, as soon as possible, a provisional People's Congress 
would be brought into being, consisting of the members of Parliament 
doubled hy the appointment of representatives from various parts of 
lndonesia and representatives of certain groups of the population; 
furthermore a Supreme Advisory Council would be set up (both bodies 
were mentioned in the 1945 Constitution). 
The Decree was signed "in the name of the people of Indonesia" by 
Soekarno as President of lndonesia and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces. 
For our subject the most important of the abovementioned "consider-
ations" is the fifth and last one, which states that the 1945 Constitution 
is inspired by the Djakarta Charter and that these two are linked together 
in unity. Once more this was a compromise formula and its interpretation 
38 The Indonesian text of this frequently quoted Decree is to be found in 
Yamin, Naskah, 111, p. 661, followed by an English translation probably 
originating from the Indonesian Ministry of Information. 
39 According to Yamin, the translation "is linked in unity" is too explicit an 
interpretation; cf. Yamin, Pembahasan, p. 289. 
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would be a subject of discussion for many years. Wh at Soekarno himself 
meant has become perfectly clear from his earlier speeches, namely that 
the Djakarta Charter was no more than a "historical document" that 
had played an influential part in the formulation of the 1945 Con-
stitution, in particular the preamble (which was the Djakarta Charter 
without the "seven words"). From 1959 onward the same interpretation 
was given by the Nationalists and other non-Islamic or anti-Islamic 
parties. Moreover it was their wont to stress th at the relationship between 
the Djakarta Charter and the Constitution of 1945 was only mentioned 
as one of the five "considerations", which therefore did not have the 
legal force of the Decree itself. On the other hand, the interpretation 
which arose among Islamic groups was as follows: that by this Decree 
of July 5th, 1959, the Djakarta Charter (including the "seven words" 
concerning "the obligation for adherents of Islam to practise Islamic 
law") obtained legal significance for the present day; in other words, 
that the law of the land stipulated the duty of Muslims to practise 
Islamic law, and that, based on the Djakarta Charter, special Islamic 
laws could be made for the Muslim inhabitants of Indonesia. 
In this conflict both supporters and opponents of Soekarno, from 
extreme left-wing to extreme right-wing, again and again appealed to 
those words and deeds of the President which agreed with their own 
opinions and desires. This way of arguing even continued into the post-
Soekarno period, as if the fall of Soekarno was of no significance for the 
validity of his former words and deeds. Nationalists and friends of 
Soekarno liked to stress Point 4 of these considerations (that the President 
was right to intervene ), while they interpreted Point 5 as having no legal 
consequences for the present day. Muslims, however, preferred to ignore 
Point 4 (to which they could not agree), but they clung to Point 5 and 
its Islamic interpretation. Thus from 1959 onward the Djakarta Charter 
became once more a divisive issue between two ma in streams within 
Indonesian society. 
Soekarno's speech made on Independence Day, August 17th, 1959, 
was named his "Political Manifesto" (Ind. Manifesto Politik, abbreviated 
to M anipol) . At the beginning of 1960 its ideas were condensed into the 
slogan USDEK, composed from the initial letters of: 
a. Undang-undang Dasar 1945, the 1945 Constitution; 
b. Sosialisme (à la) Indonesia, Indonesian Socialism; 
c. Demokrasi Terpimpin, Guided Democracy; 
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d. Ekonomi Terpimpin, Guided Economy; 
e. Kepribadian Indonesia, the Indonesian Identity. 
At the end of 1960 Soekarno completed the state ideology of Indonesia 
with the NASAKOM slogan, the doctrine of the unity of the three 
component parts of Indonesian society, the N ationalists (N ASionalis) , 
the religious groups (Agama = religion) and the Communists (KOM-
unis). Herbert Feith said with regard to these years that "the President 
repeatedly fashioned new symbols of state, new formulations of the 
meaning of the present and the goals to be sought in the future, and 
these immediately dominated virtually all mass communication".40 
Apart from those already mentioned, Feith gave also the foUowing 
slogans: Gotong Rojong (Mutual Help), Building the World Anew, 
and the Message of the Suffe ring of the People. "Their negative counter-
parts were 'free fight liberalism', 'Dutch thinking', 'textbook thinking', 
individualism, cosmopolitanism, conservatism, and reformism." 41 
Feith continues that "one other way in which the governments of the 
1958-1961 period legitimized themselves was by acquiring the insignia 
of national power and prestige. They began the building of a steel plant. 
They acquired an atomie reactor. They bought a cruiser and destroyers 
and TU-16 long range bombers. They devoted great resources to building 
the stadia and hotels which would enable them to be host to the Asian 
Games in 1962 ... " It can be added here that in Djakarta a beginning 
was made with the building of the Istiqlal Mosque (isti~läl = indepen-
denee ) which was to be "the greatest mosque in Asia". So arose the 
so-called Mertju Suar policy, which meant that the Indonesia of 
Soekarno was to be a lighthouse (Ind. mertju suar), the beams of which 
would shine far out into the world. 
It goes without saying that this policy of Soekarno devoured an 
enormous amount of money and was economically irresponsible. Some 
years af ter Soekarno's fall from power, the steel frames of unfinished 
sky-scrapers in Djakarta still stood rusting away as sad monuments to 
the mertju suar policy, a by-product of "Guided Democracy".42 
40 Feith, The Decline, p. 594. 
411 Feith, The Decline, p. 595. 
42 Concerning the enonnous buildings which were erected in Djakarta, it must 
be admitted that Soekarno was a capable architect who tried to give Djakarta 
the appearance of a city of world standing. As a matter of fact the capital 
of the former Dutch East Indies was not much more than a provincial 
Dutch garden-city. 
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However, at the beginning of 1960, a large part of Parliament still 
had the courage to express criticism of the financial policy of the cabinet. 
In March 1960 the debate on the budget ended in the President's dis-
solving Parliament. In its pI ace came an appointed body, composed in 
accordance with Soekamo's "conception" of February 21st, 1957, and 
including "functional groups". 
Previously the Masjumi, together with the Socialist Party (P.S.!.) 
and same smaller groups (the Catholic Party, some leaders of the 
Protestant Party and even one N.U. member) had tried to throw up 
a democratic bulwark by forming the "Democratic League" which 
seemed to grow swiftly. Hatta, too, supported this Democratic League 
and wrote his famous article on "Our Democracy" in the Islamic 
magazine Pandji Masjarakat, which thereafter was prohibited from 
appearing. 43 But this League became illegal when, on August 17th, 1960, 
Soekamo banned the Masjumi and P.S.I. Therefore no members of the 
Masjumi and P.S.I. were included in the new "parliament". The N.U., 
however, continued to be weIl represented, both in parliament and the 
cabinet. 
This disbanding of the Masjumi became a matter of bitter controversy 
in the post-Soekamo period. According to a statement made by Prawoto 
Mangkusasmito, who succeeded Natsir as chairman of the Masjumi in 
1958, the Masjumi was dissolved because the party did not sufficiently 
dissociate itself from those leaders who were involved in the P.R.R.I. 
rising in February 1958; on February 28th, 1958, Prime Minister 
Djuanda had declared in Parliament that the leaders who had been 
involved would be personally punished, but not their political party 
as such.44 
Herbert Feith remarked with regard to the situation af ter 1960 that 
Masjumi influence continued to be great in the Islamic community.45 
In January 1962 many former Masjumi and P.S.I. leaders were arrested. 
One of the greatest scandals of Soekamo's regime in its decline was 
perhaps the revenge on the Socialist leader Sjahrir, who from the very 
beginning had been criticalof Soekamo's methods. His arrest and 
imprisonment in 1962 on political charges resulted in terrible suffering ; 
af ter a stroke, and too late to save him, he was allowed in 1965 to go 
abroad for medical treatment. He died in Zürich on April 9th, 1966. 
43 Cf. Hatta, Demokrasi kita, reprinted as a pamphlet, Djakarta 1966. 
H This statement of December 27th, 1966, is to be found in Pandji Masjarakat, 
no. 7, January 1967, p. 7. 
45 Feith, Dynamics, p. 348. 
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In March 1962 the Communist leaders Aidit and Lukman were 
included in the cabinet as ministers without portfolio. It is said that 
they made use of this position to travel all over the country at the 
expense of the state, preparing the party to assume power when the 
time was ripe. Also in the following years, until September 30th, 1965, 
many Islamic leaders were held in prison for longer or shorter periods. 
Between 1960 and the end of 1965 they included, for instance, the 
Masjumi leaders who had been involved in the P.R.R.l. rising, such as 
Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap, but 
also Asaat, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Mohamad Roem, Isa Anshary, 
E. Z. Muttaqin, Junan Nasution, Kasman SingOOimedjo, HAMKA and 
others.46 For many Islamic leaders and others who had been openly 
criticalof Soekarno, these were dark years of defamation, night terrors 
and lawlessness. 
In 1963 Feith stated: "Masjumi Moslems are politically incapacitated 
now, or almost so, but they are actively resentful of the present state 
of political affairs and have an ideological basis for opposition to it, 
and their incapacitation could th us weIl be short-lived ... " It did not 
escape the au thor how the tensions were growing towards an apocalyptic 
climax, because "there are many in almost all social groups who see the 
1945 constitution and Manipol-VSDEK as nostrums which have failed 
and gone sta Ie. This together with the droughts, flooos, earthquakes, 
and volcanic eruptions of 1961 and 1962, all traditional evil omens, 
has brought many to believe that the present djaman (era) may he 
approaching its end." 47 It is not clear whether Herbert Feith was 
expecting the tensions to erupt in the form of a conflict dominated by 
the hostility between Islam and Communism (in which the antagonism 
between army leaders and Communist Party would be decisive). 
Others clearly pointed out the imminent clash between Islam and 
Communism. In July 1965, some months before the explosion, a Dutch 
theologian working in Indonesia wrote as follows: "V nder cover of the 
Nasakom unity ... great tensions exist, in particular between Islam and 
Communism. These tensions are increasing because in recent years the 
Communist Party has won victory af ter victory, and month by month 
has strengthened its position. No-one can foretell what explosions th is 
sort of tension may lead to in the future." 48 
46 See Pandji Masjarakat, no. 1, October 1966, p. 11. 
'" Feith, Dynamics, p. 407 ff. 
48 D. C. Mulder, De Islam, in Theologische Etherleergang der N.C.R.V., no. 4, 
September 1965, p. 165. 
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The truth of this last sentence became de ar af ter the unsuccessful 
coup d'état of September 30th, 1965, a date which marks the beginning 
of a third period in the modern history of Islam in Indonesia. 
4. The Ministry of Religious Affairs 
Many Muslims and non-Muslims believe that "religion" and 
"politics" are indissolubly linked in Islam. We have already quoted 
Rashïd Riçlä's opinion "that Islam is not fully in being so long as there 
does not exist astrong and independent Muslim state that is able to put 
into operation the laws of Islam".49 
Some Indonesian Muslims (for example, some members of Nationalist 
parties such as the P.N.I. and I.P.KJ.) seemed to prefer "the way of 
Turkey" (the so-called secular state) or at least a de ar distinction 
between religion and politics, or else they advocated a state with a 
general religious basis, where the government would recognize the 
positive value of religion and would therefore promo te religious activities. 
But a larger proportion of devout Muslims (for instance, those within 
the Islamic parties) hoped for something like an "Islamic State", how-
ever that ideal was to be realized. As opposed to "the way of Turkey" 
- of ten considered as a betrayal of Islam - Pakistan's attempt to be 
an Islamic State was taken as a shining example. 
In fact, however, Indonesia is obviously a multi-religious state. It has 
a relatively large number of Christians (probably between 7 % and 
10 %), who of ten hold quite important positions in Indonesian society. 
It is impossible to put the doek back and make these people second-
dass citizens (as was intended in the lslamic State of Kartosuwirjo in 
West Java). Therefore it is just such a country as Indonesia that could 
he a testcase for the possibility of adherents of various religions and 
philosophies of life coming to a good understanding and fruitful co-
operation, for the good of their country and people. 
Against the background of these problems it may be said that the 
Republic of Indonesia, a state with a predominantly Muslim population, 
has aptly evaded this embarrassing alternative by creating a Ministry of 
Religion, which, as it is organized in Indonesia, is probably a unique 
phenomenon in our world, and because of this weIl worth our special 
attention. 
49 Von Grunebaum, Modern Islam, p. 207. 
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As has been said, the creation of an Office for Religious Affairs was 
one of the benefits which Islam gained during the ]apanese occupation. 
Starting from this Office, it was possible to develop later a Ministry of 
Religion (or "Ministry of Religious Affairs") with regional offices spread 
all over Indonesia. On August 19th, 1945, the creation of such a ministry 
had been rejected (Chapter I, par. 4). This increased the dissatisfaction 
of those Muslims who had already been disappointed by the decision 
concerning the basis of the state, namely the Pantjasila, and not Islam 
or even the Djakarta Charter. So the danger grew that part of the 
Muslim population would consider this new Republic of Indonesia too 
little their own concern. It was the fairly left-wing cabinet of Sjahrir 
(with the important influence of Amir Sjarifuddin) which decided on 
]anuary 3rd, 1946, to make a concession to the Muslims by setting up 
a special Ministry of Religion. The then youthful H. Rasjidi - now a 
well-known professor in Djakarta and at that time minister without 
portfolio in Sjahrir's cabinet - became the first Minister of Religion 
on March 12th, 1946. 
According to some informants, initially there had been some discussions 
on whether this Ministry would be a "Ministry for Islam" (Ind. Kemen-
terian Agama Islam) or a "Ministry of Religion" (Ind. Kementerian 
Agama). It became a Ministry of Religion, first with three and af ter-
wards with four sections, for the Muslims, the Protestants, the Roman 
Catholics and the Hindu-Buddhists (formerly called the Hindu-Balinese 
religion). At present each of the four sections is run by a Director Genera] 
who is directly responsible to the Minister. Until now the Minister has 
always been a Muslim, and naturally the Islamic section is far and away 
the largest. Vet in my opinion it is somewhat too strongly worded to say, 
with Clifford Geertz, that in spite of its various sections "the Ministry 
of Religion is for all intents and purposes a santri affair from top to 
bottom".50 
It must, of course, he admitted th at this Ministry was primarily set up 
on behalf of Islam, which was little acquainted with forms of organization 
for its religious affairs. Certainly many Muslims considered th is com-
promise of creating a Ministry of Religion "too little", while others 
(e.g. the Christians) thought it "toa much" or "unnecessary". One very 
sharp judgement was made by a Roman Catholic writer who said that 
right from the beginning this Ministry had turned out to be "a bulwark 
of Islam and an outpost for an Islamic State". The author continued: 
riO Geertz, The Religion, p. 200. 
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"At the beginning the Ministry was on the defensive, but soon it became 
aware of its power and began to develop a propaganda far beyand the 
possibilities foreseen in Sjahrir's compromise. When later on the Nation-
alist Party became permanently entrenched behind the Ministry of 
Information, the propaganda service of the Ministry of Religion became 
as powerful as that of the state." 51 
A more moderate opinion was th at this Ministry would mainly be 
concerned with preventing or resolving difficulties bctween the various 
religions and their adherents. This more or less negative evaluation was 
at one time heard in Christian circles. However, I believe that gradually 
the positive significance of this Ministry ca me to the fore. That was, 
( 1) that it offered the possibility for religion, in particular for Islam, 
to function as effectively as possible in state and society, and (2) th at in 
a preponderantly Muslim country this Ministry formed a useful middle 
way between a secular state and an Islamic State. If 1 am not mistaken, 
over the years many Muslims and non-Muslims have moved nearer each 
other, in the direction of th is positive appreciation. Such an appreciation 
in any case applies to the principle of the existence of such a Ministry, 
though much criticism may be levelled at how its work is carried out. 52 
It must be admitted that even af ter the setting up of this Ministry 
same Muslim groups continued the struggle for an Islamic State, in the 
hope that the general elections would bring a change in the position. 
But the elections of 1955 made it clear th at the political struggle of 
Islam in Indonesia for the moment had reached astalemate. It was at 
that time, however, that the value of the Ministry of Religion became 
apparent. For, although many people still refused to face the fact, it 
had now become clear th at Indonesia would have to develop further as 
a multi-religious state. It was in this situation that the Muslim part of 
the population needed a central body which would take to heart the 
interests of the Muslim community. 
According to Wahid Hasjim, for the Ministry of Religion the year 
1955 might be considered as "the starting point or beginning of a clearer 
realization of its task",53 the years preceding being the years of formation 
51 J. W. M. Bakker S.J., De Godsdienstvrijheid in de Indonesische Grondwetten, 
in Het Missiewerk, 1956, no. 4, p. 215. 
52 Compare Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, pp. 217-243, who shows a positive 
appreciation, in spite of criticism of the way in which the work is sometimes 
carried out. In contrast to th is, see Muskens, Indonesië, p. 288. 
53 Wahid Hasjim, p. 610 (probably taken from a speech by R. Moh. Kafrawi. 
for many years Chief Secretary of the Ministry of Religious Affairs ). . 
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and organization of the Ministry and its regional offices. I t was, 
indeed, af ter 1955 - when it had hecome clear that the general elections 
brought no change - that many Muslims began to concentrate their 
attention and energy on the intemal strengthening of the Muslim com-
munity and the spread of Islam. Politically speaking, the period between 
1955 and 1965 could be characterÎzed as the "Soekamo period", which 
in spite of "guided democracy" led to great confusion, increasing tensions 
and economic collapse. Also for Muslims these were, on the one hand, 
years of disappointment and frustration. But on the other hand, this 
second decade in the recent history of Islam in Indonesia can be described 
as a period of positive development within the Muslim community. To 
a certain extent interest switched from the political scene to the problems 
of education, religious teaching, the spread of Islam, training for leader-
ship and the production of reading-matter. To put it in a more Muslim 
way, it can be said that during this second decade the Islamic daCwa 
(of ten translated by Muslims themselves as "the Islamic mission" ) was 
not only concemed with political activities, but began to con centra te 
on the strengthening of the Muslim community. Hence the Ministry of 
Religion began to fulfil an important role. 
Over the years many govemment regulations defined the work and 
scope of the Ministry of Religious Mfairs.54 Here follows the list as 
given in Wahid Hasjim's work.55 
a. To make Belief in the One and Only God (Ketuhanan Jang Maha 
Esa) an operative principle in public life. 
b. To he watchful that every inhabitant is free to adhere to his own 
religion and to worship (beribadat) according to his own religion 
and belief.56 
c. To assist, support, protect and promote all sound religious move-
ments.57 
d. To provide for, give guidance to and to supervise religious instruction 
in state schools. 
54 Cf. Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, pp. 222-231, and Muskens, Indonesië, 
pp. 282-284. 
55 Wahid Hasjim, pp. 600-601, dating from the end of 1949, when Wahid 
Hasjim acted as Minister of Religion. Cf. Sidjabat, Religious Tolerance, 
p. 58, probably a variant of the same list. 
56 Compare artic1e 29, second c1ause, of the 1945 Constitution. 
57 The "repressive controls over new religious sects" mentioned by Feith, 
Dynamics, p. 407, were applied, for example, to the "Javanese-Sundanese 
Religion" in West Java, which was considered "unsound", that is to say, 
subversive to orthodox religion. 
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e. To guide, support and inspect education and teaching given In 
madrasas and other religious institutions.58 
t. To found training-colleges for teachers of religion and for officials 
of religious courts. 
g. To take care of everything connected with religious instruction in 
the army, in hostels, prisons and wherever else it may be necessary. 
h. To regulate, put into practice and supervise everything that has to 
do with the registration of Muslim marriages, the revocation of 
repudiation of a wife (rudjuk) , and divorce through final repudiation 
(taZaq) . 
z. To grant material help for the restoration and upkeep of pI aces of 
worship (mosques, churches, etc.). 
J. To provide for, to organize and to supervise everything connected 
with regional Religious Courts and the Islamic High Court of Justice. 
k. To inspect, recognize, register and supervise religious foundations 
(waqaf). 
Z. To increase the discernment of the people with regard to social and 
religious life. 
It appears from several of these points that the Indonesian state, by 
means of the Ministry of Religion, wanted to promote religion and 
religious activities in a positive way. To some extent it can be said that 
this programme of work was determined by the typically Muslim idea 
that the government of a state is concerned with the spiritual as weIl as 
the material welfare of its people - with their condition in this world 
and the world to come. Two formulas generally known among Indonesian 
Muslims are that Islam is din wa dawZa (religion and government/ 
polities), and that Islam comprises dunyä wa äkhira (this world and 
the world to come). On the other hand, however, the first point of this 
programme is concerned with religious life in general, not only with 
Islam; and the second point is intended to he a guarantee for religious 
freedom and presupposes the co-existence of various religions, in other 
words, a multi-religious society, not an Islamic State. 
In these two points the direction of Indonesian religious policy is 
traced out. It is a difficult path, which in a country such as Indonesia 
can only be found by trial and error. The ideal is to promote religious 
life in general, recognizing the existence of the various religions, and to 
do that through a positive stimulation of religious activities, without 
58 These madrasas and other institutions are dealt with in the following 
paragraph. 
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intervening in their internal affairs, and without favouring one or 
discriminating against another. These ideals were to be maintained by 
the Indonesian government through the Ministry of Religion. Indonesian 
society was to be inculcated with these ideals so that they would become 
the common property of everyone. 
Instead of regarding this Ministry as an "outpost for an Islamic State", 
it may be possible, with a bit more goodwill, to reach an opposite con-
clusion. Is it not likely that the existence of the Ministry of Religion 
tends to promote the idea of a multi-religious state rather than the idea 
of an Islamic State? In my opinion the existence of this Ministry can 
in due course result in an adjustment of the Indonesian population to 
the fact of a multi-religious society, where the adherents of the various 
religions have to respect each other and each other's beliefs. It should 
be realized what it means for some narrow-minded or closed-minded 
pious people (among both Muslims and Christians) to he confronted 
with th is multi-religious situation and to have to accept it. 
The positive value of having a Ministry of Religion cannot be cancelled 
out hy all the shortcomings and mis takes, mismanagement and waste of 
money which in practice sometimes happen and form the dehit-side to 
this Ministry, its regional offices and some of its officials. 
As far as the other points from the ahovementioned programme are 
conccrned, th at concerning religious education in state schools (point d) 
is certainly one of the most important. As has al ready heen said, the 
Masjumi in 194-8 urged that religious instruction he made compulsory 
at these schools. This point on the programme of the Ministry of Religion 
was due to the influence of "Jogja" in the federal R.I.S. at the end 
of 194-9. 
The Education By-Law no. 4- of April 4-th, 1950, article 20, stipulated 
as follows: "( 1) Religious instruction is givcn in all state schools; parents 
who have ohjections can decide whether their child will follow the 
lessons or not. (2) Tbe way in which religious instruction is given in 
state schools will he eXplained in a regulation of the Ministry of 
Education together with the Ministry of Religion." 59 In a further 
regulation of July 16th, 1951, this religious instruction was fixed at two 
hours per week, heginning in the fourth form of the elementary school 
and continuing throughout secondary school. No instruction would be 
59 The texts of this by-law and other regulations were obtained thanks to help 
from the Ministry of Religion, in stencilled or typed copy. 
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given, however, unless a form could muster at least 10 children belonging 
to the same religious group. 
Over the years a great number of changes and modifications were 
made, among others concerning religious instruction in state universities 
and concerning adjustments in teaching civics and morals to bring it 
into agreement with new explanations of the state ideology (e.g. Manipol-
USDEK in 1959). Anticipating what will be said in the following 
chapter, it may be noted here that in the June-July 1966 session of the 
People's Congress various developments from the Soekarno period were 
jettisoned. Thus, for example, the tolerance dause about "objections" 
was expunged, so th at religious instruction became compulsory for all, 
by simply providing "that religious instruction is a school subject for 
pupils of elementary schools up to and induding state universities" . 60 
In the course of the years the Ministry of Religion also stimulated 
or undertook the publication of textbooks for religious instruction, 
especially for Islamic instruction. For Protestant and Roman Catholic 
schools th is task was left to their own religious bodies, though it took 
some trouble to convince the Ministry that its help was not needed. 
(It was likewise incomprehensible for Muslims in the Ministry of 
Religion that the Protestants, for instance, did not appreciate help from 
the Ministry to cover the cost of translating and printing the Bibie). 
In connection with the first point on the abovementioned programme, 
one should also think of the publications of the Ministry of Religion 
intended for a larger public. It may be admitted that these publications 
tended to propagate religion by propagating only Islam. 
The substance of religious instruction and the content of its reading-
matter will he dealt with in the conduding chapter of th is book. 
A very important and comprehensive task of the Ministry of Religion 
is the training of teachers of religion and officials for the Religious 
Courts. Further there can he mentioned the religious ministration to 
the army, later on the creation of a special service for religious minis-
tration to the police. Particularly af ter the 1960 session of the People's 
Congress a great number of training colleges for teachers of religion 
were founded (for the various religious groups) and many teachers 
were appointed. All this was paid for by the state, through the Ministry 
of Religion. 
60 The resolutions of the People's Congress held in 1966 are collected, for 
example, in the pamphlet ABRI Pengemban Suara Hati Nurani Rakjat, ed. 
by Brig. Djen. Sutjipto, Djakarta 1966, two volumes. 
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It is not possible to describe here all the activities b~ed on the blue-
print of 1950 and its later additions, as for instance the arrangements 
for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and the organization of the Afro-
Asian Islamic Conference of March 1965 in Bandung.61 The work, 
methods and significance of the Ministry could be made a separate 
subject of study. Some of its activities and the tendencies produced by 
its existence will be dealt with further in the final chapter of this book. 
For the time being we may conclude th at the Ministry of Religion 
has been of great significance for the new Indonesia, in particular in the 
period af ter 1955. This applies directly for Islam, but indirectly for all 
the religions and for their mutual relationship. As a "Pantjasila State 
with a Ministry of Religion", Indonesia chose a middle way between 
"the way of Turkey" and the founding of an "Islamic State". A "secular 
state" would perhaps not suit the Indonesian situation; an "Islamic 
State", as attempted elsewhere, would indeed tend "to create rather 
than to solve problems".62 For this reason the Indonesian experiment 
deserves a positive evaluation. Of course one may criticize the way in 
which the principle of "a Pantjasila State with a Ministry of Religion" 
works in practice. But this critical attitude is primarily the affair of the 
adherents of the various religions in Indonesia itself. 
5. Islamic Educational Institutions 
Af ter a general orientation concerning the actIVIties stimulated by 
the Ministry of Religion, special attention must be paid to specifically 
Islamic education. For sketching these developments it is necessary to 
return to the period before 1955. But it was in the period from 1955 to 
1965 that an intense interest arose in questions of education, in order to 
strengthen the Islamic community (just as occasionally happened in the 
colonial period, as a result of the political frustration of that time). 
It can be said that af ter all sorts of changes and experiments a number 
of organizational forms became crystallized by 1965. Before sketching 
the confusing historical developments, let us focus on these last, fixed 
forms. The blueprint which government bodies and in particular the 
Ministry of Religion and its offices are trying to carry out shows the 
following types of Islamic education and instruction in Islam: 63 
61 The resolutions of this A.A.I.C. are published in Al-Djami'ah, no. 3, 
May 1965. 
82 Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 162. 
63 Cf. Petundjuk dalam Membina Madrasah, Vol. 11, ed. by Pen. MULJA, 
Djakarta 1966. 
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Firstly: the classic Indonesian pesantrèn, a sart of private religious 
boarding-school, where as far as possible an individual education is given, 
fonnerly limited to religious instruction and the observance of religious 
duties. Teachers and pupils fonn a living and working community, 
cultivating the land of the pesantrèn in order to he self-supporting. 
There are pesantrèns of an elementary, secondary and higher level, 
though there are only a few of the last type. 
Secondly: madrasa dïnïya ("religious school"), that is to say, schools 
which give additional religious instruction to pupils of state schools 
between the ages of 7 and 20. This takes place in class, about 10 hours 
a week, in the afternoon, at elementary and secondary levels (4 years 
for the fonner, and 3 or 6 years for the latter ). Af ter completion of a 
state secondary schooling, these pupils would be admitted to religious 
studies at an academie level. 
Thirdly: private madrasas, i.e. modernized pesantrèns, where as well 
as religious instruction general subjects are offered. Usually the aim is 
to spend 60-65 % of the time-table on general subjects and about 
35-40 % on religious ones. These schools are divided into madrasas for 
elementary and further education, named as follows: 
a. the six-year madrasa ibtida'îya ("primary school"), 
b. the three-year madrasa thanaufiya (Ind. tsanawijah, "secondary 
school") , 
c. the three-year madrasa Calïya ("high school"). 
Fourthly: madrasa ibtida'îya negeri (M.I.N.), the six-year elementary 
state madrasa, where the ratio of religious instruction to general subjects 
is about 1 : 2. Further education can be pursued at a madrasa thanawïya 
negeri, or (af ter an extra seventh year) pupils can go to a vocational 
school, for example, a four-year training college for teachers of religion 
at state primary schools, af ter which a further two years' training com-
pletes the course for teachers of religion at secondary schools. 
Fifthly: a recent experiment has been to add to the six-year M.I.N. 
a two-year course in which a simple vocational training is given (trade, 
agriculture, poultry-raising and so on). This eight-year M.I.N. would 
form a complete whole for pupils who normally would return to their 
villages. 
Sixthly: the highest theological training, at university level, has been 
given since 1960 at State Islamic Institutes. More will be said below 
about these training colleges for religious teachers at the highest level, 
imams for ministration to the army and police, higher civil servants for 
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the Ministry and Offices of Religious Affairs, certain positions In the 
Diplomatic Service and so on. 
Seventhly: the minimum religious education, which every Indonesian 
must receive, is the religious instruction in state schools, already mention-
ed in connection with the activities of the Ministry of Religion. 
Af ter this official blueprint, attention must be paid to the confusing 
reality of the educational developments which took pI ace in modern 
Indonesia. The institutions which will be discussed in succes sion are the 
Qur'än School, Pesantrèn, Madrasa, an Islamic University and the 
Academic Theological Training Course. 
a. Qur'än School and Pesantrèn 
Writers on education within Indonesian Islam generally begin with 
the simplest form of the so-called Qur'än School with its training in 
reciting the Qur'än, or rather in learning by heart short passages from 
the Qur'än, first of all those suras which are used in performing the 
saWt. Generally the performance of the sawt and the elements of other 
religious duties are also taught. This old-fashioned type of school still 
exists. Lessons are usually given in the aftemoons. But this type of 
education has hardly any future, although at present good recitation of 
the Qur'än is being increasingly stimulated, for instance by con tests 
for children. 
A less gloomy yet far from bright future awaits the classic pesantrèns. 
Comparing them with the Qur'än Schools, Zoetmulder says: "More 
important for shaping an lslamir: philosophy of life and a way of life 
determined by Islam are those teaching institutions which formerly were 
to be found all over Indonesia and today still exist, albeit less flourishing, 
under different names ... in Menangkabau surau, in Atjeh rangkang, 
in Java pesantrèn (i.e. the place of the santris, "pupils of a religious 
school"). They are boarding-schools, usually to be found a little way 
outside a village or town and forming their own settlement . .. Pupils 
may enter and leave whenever they like ... " 64 
At a special conference on the problem of these pesantrèns, Muslim 
critics said about pupils entering and leaving that "many of those who 
64 Waldemar Stöhr and Piet Zoetrnulder, Die Religionen Indonesiens, Stuttgart 
1965, p. 292 ff. (my translation) . 
CHAPTER 11: 1955·1965 115 
enter a pesantrèn only do so in order to share in the benefice nt influence 
(Ind. berkat, literally "blessing") of the leader, the Kiyai".65 
Zoetrnulder ends his remarks on the pesantrèn system by stressing 
that these institutions are in deed less flourishing nowadays. "Although 
these schools still exist, they have largely lost their appeal in this time"; 
trying to adapt themselves in the present day, "the question is not 
whether the methods of teaching will be changed and whether also 
secular subjects will be introduced, but to what extent they want to do 
this in these schools, originally intended for religious education". 66 
It can be added here that the teaching of non-religious subjects even 
in many modernized pesantrèns or madrasas is still too little to he able 
to compete with modern state and private schools. 
One may then, as Indonesian Muslims themselves do, speak of a 
"crisis of the pesantrèns". In the abovementioned conference or seminar 
there was much discussion on the question of whether the pesantrèn 
idea should he given up, and if not, how the pesantrèn should be 
reorganized so as to meet with modern requirements. An emotional 
defence of this classic institution was that during the colonial period it 
produced a great number of freedom-fighters who refused all com-
promise with the colonial government. 
b. From Pesantrèn to Madrasa 
The Indonesian manual which contains much information on the 
history and development of Islamic education in Indonesia up to about 
1960 is the work of the well-known Mahmud Junus. 67 The au thor 
attempts to give a survey of the types and institutions of Islamic teaching 
since the coming of Islam to Indonesia, a survey of the subjects given 
and the methods used, the textbooks, famous teachers, etc. The first 
part of his book deals with Sumatra, the second with Java, the third 
with the other islands, while the fourth deals with the unity in this 
great diversity which has been achieved thanks to the work of the 
Ministry of Religion. 
65 Seminar Pondok Pesantrèn Seluruh Indonesia, in Al-Djami'ah, no. 5-6, p. 83. 
Compare what Clifford Geertz says about the African marabout and his 
baraka (Islam Observed, p. 43 ff.). 
66 Srohr-Zoetmulder, Die Religionen, p. 294 (my translation ). 
61 Mahmud Junus, Sedjarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia, Djakarta 1960 
(1379H.). 
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According to Mahmud Junus, it can be said that in about 1900 
education in the pesantrèns was given in a very old-fashioned way.68 
The Qur'än and other religious books were read out by a teacher and 
memorÏzed by the pupils. From 1900 onward the influence of famous 
Indonesian teachers (Sjèchs) in Mecca became noticeable in Indonesia, 
as many hadjis from Indonesia had gone to study for years in Mecca, 
in order to be able to pass on their knowledge as a kiyai in their 
pesantrèn in Indonesia. Originally a subject was usually taught with 
the help of only one book (for example, the "Tafsir Djalalain" as a 
Qur'än commentary). Af ter 1900 it became usual for teachers and pupils 
to use more than one book (for instance also the commentary of al-
Baiçläwi) . 
From 1900 onward all sorts of renovations began to take pI ace, first 
of all in outward appearance, by the founding of a new type of pesantrèn, 
built as a school and therefore called madrasa. In these madrasas 
instruction was given in classes, using benches, tables and a black-board. 
These changes may seem to be unimportant, but their significance 
becomes clear if we rememher that they were part of the conflict which 
had arisen in Menangkabau (West Sumatra) between the kaum tua 
(old guard) and the kaum muda (younger generation ). The debates 
started on questions such as whether it was allowable or not to wear 
Western trousers, shirts with collar and tie, and so on; later, for instance, 
the use of a motorcycle became a point of fierce controversy. In the new 
madrasas the curriculum broadened, but for the time heing instruction 
was still restricted to religious subjects and orientated toward Mecca. 
Little by little, but accelerating af ter 1930, the modernization of the 
madrasas won ground, in particular through the use of books from 
Egypt (Cairo) and by the addition of secular subjects (or, to use the 
Indonesian word, "general knowiedge") . Even today the ratio between 
the religious and general subjects in these madrasas is still the object of 
much discussion and differs considerably in the various institutions. 
The critical attitude of government bodies toward these pesantrèns/ 
madrasas is based on two objections. One objection is that these in-
stitutions still offer too little of the general subjects, so th at it is very 
difficult for their pupils to pass on to state schools for a secondary or 
higher education. The second objection, more cautiously expressed, is 
68 Cf. Mahmud Junus, Sedjarah, p. 45 ff.; according to Mahmud Junus the 
names surau and rangkang still occur, but the word pesantrèn has already 
become a common Indonesian word. Officially the term pondok pesantrèn 
(santri hostel) is used. 
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that these institutions are still strongly orientated toward the Arab 
centres (Cairo, Mecca) at the cost of an orientation toward Indanesian 
problems, which is necessary in these times. This second criticism is to 
be heard not only in Ministry of Education circles (as this Ministry in 
Indonesia is of ten led by "secular" nationalists), but is also made by 
modern-minded officials of the Ministry of Religion. 69 
I t is impossible to give here a survey of all the various types and names 
of these pesantrènsjmadrasas, their time-tables and textbooks, the asso-
ciations and foundations sponsoring these institutions (among others, 
Nahdatul Ulama, Muhammadijah and the "Persuatan Islam Bandung-
Bangil", founded by the late Ahmad Hassan and now led by his son 
A. Qadir Hassan). All this can he found in Mahmud Junus' manua!. 
One of the most famous madrasas at this time is perhaps the so-called 
"Modern Pesantrèn" (Pondok Modèrn) at Contor ne ar Ponorogo (East 
Java).70 As far as I can see, the word "modern", however, seems mainly 
to be used because of the modern buildings and same modern methods 
of teaching. A booklet on Islamic doctrine written by one of the leaders 
does not reveal a renewal in theological thinking.71 The aim of this 
institution is to develop "a high character, a broad knowiedge, a sound 
body and independent thinking". With the help of visiting teachers from 
Al-Azhar in Cairo, pupiIs are taught to speak Arabic in such a way that 
some of them could continue their study in Cairo without difficulty. 
Former pupils of this madrasa are, for instance, Idham Chalid (once 
Minister of Religion and Chairman of the N.U.) and Nurcholis Madjid, 
chairman of the Islamic Student Association (H.M.I.), whose name 
we shall have to mention again in the final chapter of this hook. 
The Indonesian government is, of course, concerned with these 
madrasas by gTanting subsidies which depend on certain conditions. 
Nevertheless, trustworthy statistical information concerning the whole 
of Indonesia is difficult to obtain. According to Mahmud Junus, the 
statistics for 1954 revealed that at that time the government subsidized 
more than 13,000 primary, 776 secondary and 16 higher madrasas. 
Including non-subsidized institutions, the total number of pesantrèns 
and madrasas in 1965 was estimated at about 22,000.72 
G9 Concerning the contrast between these two Ministries, cf. Muskens, Indonesië, 
p. 291 ff. 
70 See Mahmud Junus, Sedjarah, p. 216, and Pandji Masjarakat, no. 26 
(March 1968?), pp. 27-29. 
71 I. Zarkasji, Usuluddin ('ala madzhab Ahli-ssunna wal Djama'ah), Gontorj 
Ponorogo, no date 9. 
72 AI-Djami'ah, no. 5-6, September-November 1965, p. 46. 
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c. An Islamic University 
Muslims in Indonesia have always looked for ways of building up 
a complete system of Islamic education, from the simp Ie pesantrèn up to 
an Islamic university. According to Mahmud Junus, under his guidance 
the first Islamic College was opened on December 9th, 1940, in Padang 
(West Sumatra).73 It comprised two faculties, of Theology (Sjari'atj 
Agama) and of Education and Arabic studies (Pendidikan dan Bahasa 
Arab). The aim of this institution was the training of ulamas. Probably 
on a higher level, an Islamic University was founded in 1951 in 
Djakarta (Perguruan Tinggi Islam Djakarta, later Universitas Islam 
Djakarta or U.LD.), led by Professor Hazairin. 
The story of the Islamic University of Jogjakarta offers a good 
example of the development of Islamic universities in genera!. For the 
description which follows, information culled from Mahmud Junus' 
manual could he supplemented from the commemorative volume 
published in celebration of the first ten years of the Islamic university 
concerned, and from oral information acquired on the spot. 
Jogja(karta) is one of the most important university cities of Indo-
nesia. Students come to this city from all over Indonesia, partly because 
living costs are lower and student lodgings better than in Djakarta or 
other cities. The history of the Islamic University, at present situated in 
Jogja, goes back to the beginning of 1945, when the Masjumi decided 
to set up an Islamic University (Sekolah Tinggi Islam) in Djakarta. 
A preparatory committee under the leadership of Hatta, later to become 
Vice-President, worked out the plans. Originally the purpose of th is 
institution was the training of well-educated ulamas, "that is to say, 
people who have made a broad and thorough study of Islam and have 
achieved an adequate standard of general education, as demanded by 
present-day society".74 The study would take two years, leading up to 
a bachelor's degree, and another two years for a sort of master's degree, 
qualifying for a doctor's degree af ter having written a thesis. The curri-
culum was largely taken from the Faculty of Theology (Higher Section) 
of AI-Azhar University in Cairo, as drawn up in 1936, before AI-Azhar 
founded faculties of medicine, engineering, agriculture and commerce.75 
Matriculation was open to holders of a certificate from a former 
Netherlands Indies secondary school, but also to those who had finished 
a madrasa Calïya. Both categories generally needed a preparatory course 
7a Mahmud Junus, Sedjarah, p. 103. 
B Mahmud Junus, Sedjarah, p. 251. 
75 A. M. Mohiaddin Alwaye, Al-Azhar University, Cairo 1966, pp. 8-11. 
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of one or two years, the former to supplement a knowledge of Arabic 
and religious subjects, the latter to reach a higher standard in general 
subjects. As a future career for graduates, the following posts were 
mentioned: teachers of religion at every sort of school, officials at 
religious courts, in the Civil Service and in the offices of religious affairs. 
With the co-operation of the Japanese it was possible to open this 
institution on Radjab 27th (Micrädj) , 1364 H., i.e. July 8th, 1945, in 
Djakarta. In December 1945, however, the buildings in Djakarta were 
requisitioned by the Allied Forces under General Christison, so that 
for the time being the university had to be closed. On April lOth, 1946 
the re-opening took pI ace in Jogjakarta, in the presence of President 
Soekarno, with a speech by Hatta as president of the board of 
governors. 76 
At the beginning there were two courses of study offered, Theology 
(Ilmu Agama) and Social Studies (Ilmu Masjarakat). But in November 
1947 it was decided to transform this institution into the Islamic 
University of Indonesia with four faculties, Theology, Law, Education 
and Economics (later also Technology). Thus the same development as 
in AI-Azhar, Cairo, took place here; for centuries a theological training 
college, in recent times AI-Azhar had added other faculties, with the 
intention of teaching these other sciences on the basis of religious 
principles and in a religious spirit. 
On January 22nd, 1950 a number of Islamic leaders and ulamas 
also founded an Islamic University in Solo, about 40 miles from Jogja, 
with a similar preparatory course, explicitly on behalf of pesantrèn and 
madrasa pupils. On February 20th, 1951 these institutions in Jogja and 
Solo were united under the name "University (later Universitas) Islam 
Indonesia" or U.I.I., which from then on had branches in both cities. 
The original aim, then, was to give prospective ulamas a good 
education, but eventually the emphasis shifted to the non-religious or 
"secular" faculties (technology, economics, medicine, etc.). This develop-
ment, however, meant that the Islamic University would have to compete 
with the state universities as, for instance, was the case in Jogja, where 
a private non-Islamic college, founded in March 1948, developed into 
Gadjah Mada University, which from December 19th, 1949 took on a 
national character as a state university. This Gadjah Mada University 
certainly became a serious "rival" to the U.1.1. 
70 This speech and more information about th is University is to be found in 
Buku Peringatan University Islam Indonesia, published on the occasion of its 
tenth anniversary, celebrated on 27 Radjab 1374 H. (= March 22nd, 1955). 
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The establishment of "secular" faculties within the U.I.I. also meant 
that in the end the preparatory course for pupils of the madrasas had to 
be closed, due to the state regulations conceming the standard of 
education required for matriculation. This was a new blow to the future 
of the pesantrèns and madrasas and a great disappointment to the 
Muslim community, which wanted to stick to this ideal. In an attempt 
to find a solution, various pesantrèns later founded their own "uni-
versity", as a continuation of their highest classes (calïya). As an example 
of this type of college the "Universitas Hasjim Asj'ari" in Tebu-ireng 
(Djombang, East Java) can be mentioned. Founding such a (private) 
university is, however, easier than achieving an acceptable standard of 
education and getting recognition from the government based on satis-
factory standards. As far as I know, the aim of this kind of private 
"Pesantrèn University", however, is in fact restricted to the training of 
ulamas. 
For a proper understanding of the Indonesian situation and atmos-
phere, it may be recorded that generally some dozen Christians are to be 
found among the students of the Islamic Universities of Jogja and Solo. 
According to some informants, the professors are helpful and show 
understanding for their difficulties in studying typically Islamic material 
with its Arabic terminology. 
d. Academic Theological Training 
Meanwhile a remarkable development threatened this Islamic Uni-
versity in Jogja from quite a different direction. On August 12th, 1950 
the Faculty of Theology (the original reason for its foundation) had 
been separated from the U.I.I., taken over by the govemment and on 
September 26th, 1951 officially re-opened under the name Perguruan 
Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (P.T.A.I.N.), the "State Islamic College", 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Religion. Seen in a wider context 
and from a Muslim point of view, this curtailing of the U.I.I. can he 
considered as something positive, because in this way the govemment 
could do more for the promotion of Islam than a private Islamic Uni-
versity. Furthermore in Jogja a kind of college for Muslim jurisprudents 
was founded (Perguruan Hakim Islam Negerij P.H.I.N.). In 1957 in 
Djakarta yet another new type of training was created, an Akademi 
Dinas Ilmu Agama (A.D.I.A.), that is, a "Govemment Academy for 
Religious Studies", intended to be a training college for officials of 
religion in govemment service (e.g. the Ministry of Religion) and for 
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religious instruction at state schools. 
In 1960 the final form for a theological training on an academic level 
seemed to have been found. The P.T.A.LN. and A.D.LA. were united 
to form an Institut Agama Islam Negeri (LA.LN.), i.e. a State Islamic 
Institute, also under the supervision of the Ministry of Religion. This 
development may turn out to be of great importance for the future of 
Islam in Indonesia. Probably this LA.LN. offers a possibility for training 
in religious leadershÎp such as the Muslim community in Indonesia has 
never possessed hefore. 
The LA.LN. started with two divisions or "faculties" in Jogjakarta 
and two in Djakarta. In both pI aces th is LA.LN. quickly expanded into 
an institution with four faculties ; within each faculty the three-year 
course can he supplemented by a specialization of two years. The four 
faculties are the following. Firstly, U ~uluddin (or "Ushuluddin", 
Doctrine or Systematic Theology), comprising the more speculative 
aspects of Islamic studies, such as philosophy, mysticism, comparative 
religion and missionary work (dacwa). Secondly, the SjariCa faculty, 
emphasizing the more practical aspects of religion, such as jurisprudence, 
exegesis, knowledge of Tradition, etc. Thirdly, Tarbija, the faculty of 
education, i.e. the training for teachers of religion. Lastly, the Adab 
or Humanities, for specialization in the history of Islam and particularly 
Arabic (this language is, of course, also taught in the other faculties ). 
From the beginning the LA.LN. in Jogjakarta also started a prepar-
atory course of two years. In 1968 it was decided to substitute for this 
preparatory course the fin al three-year course of a six-year secondary 
school. So now pupils from a three-year secondary (state) school 
continue their preparation with a three-year course at the LA.LN. in 
order to he admitted to the "theological studies" at this institution. 
This new type of Islamic theological training at university level has 
made great advances. From Djakarta and Jogjakarta associated colleges 
were soon established in other cities. Starting from one or two faculties, 
they expanded into a complete LA.LN. with four faculties. Now cities 
such as Surabaja, Makassar and Banda Atjeh each have an I.A.LN. 
with more than 1,000 students, while the LA.LN. in Jogja has even 
more than 3,000 students. The majority of them only finish the three-
year course, without the two years' specialization. Through contact with 
AI-Azhar in Cairo, the LA.LN. in Jogja had from the beginning a 
number of visiting professors from Egypt at its disposal. During recent 
years there has also heen co-operation between AI-Azhar and other 
LA.LNs in Indonesia. 
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As is the case in Indonesian universities in general, quite a number of 
women students also study at these 1.A.I.Ns. In some faculties they form 
30-40 % of the student number. Social contact between male and female 
students is easy, even on the campus of the I.A.I.N. in Atjeh, which may 
be considered a strictly Islamic area. With this progressive attitude 
towards co-education, Indonesia is probably weIl ahead in the world of 
Islam. Yet it is typical for the style of life at these 1.A.I.Ns that female 
students we ar Indonesian dress and thus clearly - perhaps too osten-
tatiously - set themselves apart from their colleagues at other uni-
versities, who generally wear "Western" clothes. 
It is impossible to describe all the forms of Islamic education and the 
institutions concerned, for example the training for officials at the 
religious courts and the training for teachers of religion at an inter-
mediate level. The subjects and books for several types of these religious 
institutions will be dealt with in the final chapter of this book. The 
intention here has been to delineate recent developments which have 
taken place in the field of Islamic education. 
As far as the programme of this education is concerned the develop-
ments can he summarized as follows: 
a. Originally all the emphasis feIl on religious education, given in 
pesantrèns at an elementary level, later on also at secondary and 
higher level. 
b. The first Islamic Colleges also stressed the study of religion and the 
training of ulamas. 
c. These Islamic Colleges expanded into Islamic Universities, including 
also "secular" faculties. with the intention of studying non-religious 
subjects on a religious basis. 
d. In the end, it was the study of religion which was separated from 
these Islamic Universities and concentrated in the I.A.I.Ns.77 
With regard to organizational problems, the following summary can 
be made: 
Firstly: The pesantrèns, including those in the form of modernized 
madrasas, are in difficulties because the parents of the pupils want them 
to link up with institutions of further education. It is easier for children 
to move up the educational ladder if they begin in state schools or 
private schools of a similar standard. Af ter 1945 state education in 
77 With the exception of the last stage, a similar development occurred at 
Al-Azhar in Cairo. 
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Indonesia assumed enormous proportions, but there is still a shortage of 
schools and teachers. The more the government is able to fulfil 
educational commitments (new school buildings, teacher-training col-
leges, etc.) the more the interest in pesantrèn and madrasa education 
will decrease, unless these institutions are radically reformed. 
Secondly: Partly because the pupils of pesantrèns and madrasas we re 
not sufficiently qualified for entrance to state universities, private Islamic 
universities were founded. This did not prove to be a solution, because 
these Islamic universities are also committed to various regulations in 
order to get their diplomas recognized by the government. Because of 
this, an attempt is being made to keep to the principle of pesantrèn 
education either by supplementing it with vocational training, in order 
to create a course which is complete in itself, or by founding a private 
"Pesantrèn University". 
Thirdly: Islamic universities also have many difficulties, on the one 
hand due to the transfer of the course in theology to the I.A.LN., on 
the other hand caused by the state universities, which in general have 
better equipment than the far smaller private Islamic universities. 
Reasons of principle play but a small part in the decision of parents to 
send their children to Islamic universities. It is of ten overcrowding at 
the state universities th at turns the scale in favour of an Islamic 
education. 
In an anecdotic way - hence distorted, yet with a grain of truth 
- one informant sketched the present-day developments as follows: 
"Some pious villagers still send their children to an old-fashioned 
pesantrèn. The head of the pesantrèn sends his children to a modern 
madrasa. The teachers there have their children attend a state secondary 
school in order to continue at an Islamic university. The professors at 
an Islamic university try to get a pI ace for their children at a state 
university. And the professors at a state university send their children 
to study - abroad." 
6. Soekarno and Islam 
At the end of this chapter, which covers the "Soekarno period", we 
have to realize that a study on the recent history of Islam in Indonesia 
will have to answer the question: what role did Soekarno play in th is 
history? In how far was it he who determined the future of the new 
Indonesia as a multi-religious state, based on the Pantjasila, with a 
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posItlVe policy of freedom of religion and the promotion of religion? 
Or was Soekarno only the embodiment of the religious feelings of a great 
part of the Indonesian people, in particular in Java? Did he not voice 
the feelings of many others, who were not able, or had not the courage, 
to express all sorts of probably "heretical" opinions in such a candid 
or bold way as Soekarno used to? To what extent may "Soekarno's 
Islam" be considered also to be a manifestation of Islam, i.e. a form of 
abangan-Islam, in this case the Islam of a mystical, artistic intellectual, 
yet a typically J avanese abangan? Some Islamic theologians said that 
Soekarno was a typical Javanese syncretist, and that "syncretism is the 
archenemy of religion". However, all agreed that Soekarno had a deeply 
religious nature. 
Insofar as Soekarno is a representative of a sort of Indonesian or 
Javanese religiosity, it is certainly useful to attempt to understand more 
about his opinions. It is not my concern to make any judgement on 
Soekarno's personal belief. It is a good Muslim rule to abstain from 
making a judgement on someone's inner intentions: wa'llähu aClam, 
God knows best! But we must listen to Soekarno in order to understand 
his Javanese interpretation of Islam and his attitude towards the opinions 
of more orthodox and traditional Muslims. 
For a contemporary of Soekarno's who has heard and seen him 
speaking, it is easy to understand that even during his life all kinds of 
interpretations of the Soekarno phenomenon had become current.78 
One got the impression that Soekarno himself enjoyed, with a certain 
vanity, playing the elusive figure, for example when he said of himself, 
"There are those who say: Soekarno is a Nationalist; others say: he is 
not a Nationalist any more, he is a Muslim now. And there are yet others 
who say: he is neither a Nationalist nor a Muslim, but a Marxist. 
There are even a few who say: he is neither Nationalist, nor Muslim, 
nor Marxist, he's a man with his own opinions ... What is this Soekarno? 
Is he a Nationalist, a Muslim, a Marxist? Dear readers, Soekarno is a 
mixture of all these 'isms'." 79 
In his speech on August 17th, 1960, Soekarno declared himself 
proudly to be "possessed (kerasukan) by the romanticism of the revo-
lution". It may turn out that these words are the best starting-point 
78 Cf. Bernhard Dahm, Sukarnos Kampf um lndonesiens Unabhängigkeit, 
Mannheim 1964; here taken from the Dutch translation, Soekarno en de 
strijd om lndonesië's onafhankelijkheid, Meppel, no date, p. 12 ff. 
79 Quoted by Dahm, Soekarno, p. 184. 
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for discussing "Soekamo and Islam". Conceming the period before 1934 
Dahm has pointed out that Soekamo did not really confess the Islamic 
faith. Soekarno had, indeed, even in that period "a basic sympathy 
toward religion", but "what he knew of Islam was acquired knowledge 
for the sake of convenience, largely taken from Lothrop Stoddard's 'The 
New World of Islam'; and he was more intrigued by 'the new world' 
than by Islam itself".80 
Probably this last sentence may be taken as a key to the problem. It 
appeared th at Soekamo was continuously searching for an explanation 
of the backwardness of Islam in the modem world. While in exile on 
the island of Flores, he once wrote that "the Islamic world became 
backward because so many people followed weak and false Traditions". 
These Traditions "were largely the origin of the decline of Islam, the 
old-fashioned features and impure elements of its doctrine". In order to 
prove his opinion, he wanted to study the Traditions, in particular the 
"$al],ï1)" of al-Bukhärï, because, on the authority of "an English Muslim" 
he assumed that even al-Bukhärï's collection contained unreliable Tra-
ditions. 81 This collection of al-Bukhärï was, however, at th at time not 
available in a language which Soekamo knew, so that this study could 
not be undertaken.82 
Some time later the ti~ h (Islamic jurisprudence) became the scape-
goat, because, according to Soekarno, the ti~h was concemed with a 
religious law which "for more than a thousand years had determined 
the day-to-day life of a Muslim"; this law, therefore, had become "a 
hangman of the spirit and soul of Islam". "Islam has remained a 
thousand years behind the times." Soekamo criticized the kiyais and 
ulamas, the casuistry of Muslim jurists. Not the letter, but the spirit! 
80 Dahm, Soekarno, p. 166. The first edition of Stoddard's hook appeared in 
New Vork in 1921. Stoddard's intention was to show that the world of Islam 
was awakening, thanks to leaders such as al-Afghäni and Mul:t. cAbduh. 
In this way he also opened the eyes of some Muslims to the condition of 
Islam and its possibilities for renewal. At Soekarno's insistence, just before 
his fall from power, this hook was translated into Indonesian and published 
under the title Dunia Baru Islam, with a foreword by Soekarno, dated 
January !st, 1966. The translation commiUee added a final chapter on 
modern Islam in Indonesia (pp. 295-332). 
81 Dahm, Soekarno, p. 169. 
82 According to the Indonesian Shahih Buchari, Djakarta Vol. I, 19646 and 
Vol. 11, 1966~, the translation and publication was begun in 1937 in 
instalments; the revision for a second edition (Vol. I, 1952) was apparently 
stimulated by the Ministry of Religion (Minister Wahid Hasjim). 
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AmÏr c Alï's book "The Spirit of Islam" (or at least its title) played a 
great role in Soekarno's attitude towards orthodox Islam. 83 
The formula which in the end was to carry the greatest weight and 
would continuously be repeated by Soekarno was that the backwardness 
of the Muslim world is the result of the ta~l'id mentality, that is to say, 
the acceptance of belief on the authority of others, without question 
or objection, in fact the acceptance of precepts that Muslim schol ars of 
the four orthodox schools of law had laid down a thousand years ago. 
In accordance with well-known Egyptian refonnist opinion, the decline 
of the Muslim world is thus ascribed to the c10sing of the Bäb al-Idjtihàd 
("the gate of personal effort"), i.e. the prohibition on individu al reason-
ing based on an inquiry into the Qur'an and Tradition by scholars of 
our own time. In Bencoolen (Bengkulu, Sumatra), where Soekarno had 
been taken by the colonial government in 1938, he came into contact 
with the refonn movement and became a member of the Muham-
madijah, where he found opinions at least partly acceptable to him. 
However, Soekarno probably wanted to give a more radical inter-
pretation of "the spirit of Islam" than many reformers. On the one 
hand, the point on the reformers' programme conceming the "purifica-
tion" of Islam from all superstition would not have interested him much. 
On the other hand, Soekamo could be called a true liberal. He was 
certainly more interested in the new world than in Islam. In his inter-
pretation of Islam, he always emphatically repeated the slogans of 
Muslim apologists, such as "Islam is progress", "no religion is more 
rational than Islam", "Islam insists on scientific research", "the science 
of Islam is knowledge of the Qur'an and Tradition plus general know-
ledge", "the Qur'an and Tradition must be interpreted with the help 
of general scholarship" , and so on. 84 
What Soekarno envisaged was certainly not a "return to the Qur'an 
and Tradition" in the way the salafïya refonners wanted to return to 
the pure belief of "the ancestors" (Ar. asla!, sing. salaf). For Soekarno, 
the revolutionary, there was no "return". Islam had to catch up its 
thousand years of backwardness. "Not back to the early glory of Islam, 
not back to the time of the caliphs, but run forward, catching up with 
time (chasing time), that is the only way to get glory again." 85 Does 
83 Cf. Dahm, Soekarno, pp. 170-178. 
84 A small collection of sayings by Soekarno is given in Solichin Salam, Bung 
Karno dan Kehidupan Berpikir Dalam Islam, Djakarta 1964. 
85 Salam, Bung Karno, p. 91. When speaking of "catching up with time", one 
must realize that the Indonesian expression ketinggalan zaman (obsolete, 
out of date) literally means that something is "left behind by time". 
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not Soekarno's cntlClsm sound like "Turkish" criticism of the Arab 
glorification of the past? 86 
This critical attitude toward a return to the past may weIl explain 
Soekarno's opposition to the idea of an Islamic State. He was afraid that 
in that case "one would continuously have to take into account a veto 
from a council of ulamas, who would always appeal to orthodox, 
traditional precepts". That was why he wanted, as he once said, "to 
accept the challenge of democracy" and "to accept the separation of 
religion and state". On that occasion he added (seriously or to soothe 
the Muslims?): "But we shall inflame the whole people with the fire 
of Islam, until every representative in Parliament is a Muslim, and 
every parliamentary dec is ion is imbued with the spirit and soul of 
Islam".87 Soekarno probably so feared the influence of conservative 
kiyais and ulamas that it is to be doubted whether he really hoped for 
such a strengthening of the position of Islam "that 60 %, 70 %, 80 %, 
90 % of the representatives will be Muslims, Islamic leaders, ulamas".88 
A conditio sine qua non for such a Muslim country - not to mention 
an Islamic State - would, for Soekarno, have been that Islam would 
have to be radically renewed, in agreement with his own idea of "the 
spirit of Islam". 
Wh at then was "Soekarno's Islam"? What was "the spirit of Islam" 
according to Soekarno's interpretation? Let us listen to Soekarno himself, 
by quoting extensively from two characteristic speeches from his later 
period. We shall have to be patient with Soekarno's verbosity, but in so 
doing one gets a better impression than by quoting only short passages 
which are supposed to contain the essence of his ideas (the method of 
Solichin Salam and more or less th at of Dahm). 
On the occasion of receiving his 24th honorary doctor's degree (from 
the I.A.I.N., Djakarta) on December 2nd, 1964, Soekarno made his 
famous speech entitled Tjilaka Negara jang tidak ber-Tuhan (Woe to 
the State without God) .89 The title was intended to emphasize th at not 
only the citizens ought to be personally religious -- turning to his 
audience, Soekarno addressed some of them by name: "( Su) Bandrio, 
you've got to be a believer, understand?", and in the same way he called 
86 Compare Smith, Islam, p. 164 ff. 
87 Quoted by Dahm, Soekarno, p. 191. 
88 Salam, Bung Karn 0, p. 69, from Soekarno's speech "The Birth of the 
Pantjasila", Yamin, Naskah, I, p. 61 ff. 
89 Tjilaka Negara jang tidak ber-Tuhan, published in Al-Djami'ah, special 
issue, January 1965. 
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to Leimena, Nasution and Arudji Kartawinata - no, not only the 
citizens, but the state as such must recognize God. In this speech 
Soekarno spoke as foIlows: 
"If you ask whether Bung Karno believes in God, then I will answer: 
Yes, I believe in God. . . From my boyhood, my very boyhood, I was 
brought up by my parents to believe in God. My father was a Muslim, 
or rather, as I once said, the Muslim-ness of my father, what shaIl I 
say - it was in fact half-and-half Islam (Ind. Islam-islamanlah). He 
certainly stood nearer to what people caIl the Javanese religion. 
And my mother, weIl, she came from Bali. She was a Balinese. When 
a young man, my father met a beautiful Balinese girl. Sukemi was my 
father's name. Sukemi met a Balinese girl caIled Njoman Rai, Ida Aju 
Njoman Rai. And when Sukemi met Ida Aju Njoman Rai, then, in 
accordance with God's will, these two feIl in love, as it's caIled. 
So they became husband and wife, and God made this Sukemi-Ida-
Aju-Njoman-Rai his instrument (Ind. dapuT, literaIly "kitchen") to 
bring Soekarno into the world. It was God who did it. Sukemi and Ida 
Aju Njoman Rai were used by God as instrurnents ("a kitchen") to give 
me birth. 
WeIl, as a young boy, I used to he ar from my father: Kusno - later 
Soekarno, as a boy I was caIled Kusno - Soekarno, as for me, I was 
only a sort of instrument, and your mother too, Soekarno, a sort of 
instrument, used by God to give you birth. So, don't forget, Karno, 
don't forget: The One who made you was God! Even though my father 
was reaIly only a half-and-half Muslim! 
Forgive me for talking like this. I say th is, foIlowing the norms of 
Islam. Indeed, measured by the norms of Islam, strictly speaking, he was 
only a half-and-half Muslim. So, certainly, his religion was Islam, but 
mixed with much Javanese religion. And my mother, her religion was 
Hinduism mixed with a lot of Buddhism. 
But both of them, my late father and my mother, considered them-
selves only as instruments. And it seems to me that this opinion is quite 
correct. An instrument - that was why from my boyhood onwards I 
was reminded by my father and mother: Don't forget that we, your 
father and your mother, were so to speak only instruments, but He who 
made you was God (Allah s.w.t.). My father caIled Him 'Gusti Kang 
Maha Sutji', my mother spoke of 'Hyang Widi'. In this way: Don't 
forget Gusti Kang Maha Sutji ... ; Karno, don't forget Hyang Widi ... 
When I was older and became the Leader of the people - that too 
by God's mercy - I of ten reflected on the condition of Islam. WeIl now, 
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Islam seems to have had an ebb and flow. 90 How did this happen? 
Before, there was a rising tide; Islam was like a lighthouse ; everybody 
looked at it, impressed, with pride, with admiration! Later, there came 
an ebb tide for the Muslim community - first aflood tide, then an ebb 
- when other peoples considered Muslims as a group of no importance, 
as 'inferior'. How did this happen? 
WeIl, in order to examine this, I freed myself from the ordinary way 
of thinking and rose into the higher sphere of history.91 ... And this is 
what I want to teIl you, students:92 if you reaIly want to understand the 
truth of Islam, if you want to understand why formerly Islam had a 
flood tide... but also an ebb... free your mind from obvious, con-
ventional thinking. If I may put it so - don't take exception to it, 
please, it's just to make it dear, to help you understand it, as an 
illustration! - if in a minute I use a certain word, don't take it as an 
insult, no, it's meant for you to understand it better - you, students of 
the I.A.I.N., you must not study Islam and try to make Islam flourish 
with, as it were, the spirit - sorry! - the spirit of the pesantrèn (Ind. 
djiwa-pesantrèn). Do you understand what I mean? Not, as it were, 
with the spirit of the pesantrèn! 93 
No, free your own mind from the sphere of thinking in the pesantrèn. 
Rise up in spa ce, as I did, and look outwards! And don't only look to 
Saudi Arabia, to Mecca and Medina, but look to Cairo, Spain, look 
around the whole world; look at history, at the past, the past history 
of the peoples of the world, not only that of the people of Indonesia 
and the Arabs, but the history of mankind ! 
Only then will you be able to make what are caIled comparative 
studies, in your case, the study of comparative religion, 'to compare', 
comparc the one to another. 
00 Cf. Smith, Islam, p. 166, on I:IäJi's poem "The Flow and Ebb of Islam". 
91 With regard to this metaphor of "rising up" and a little later that of 
micrädj (literally "ladder"), it must be remembered that this ceremony took 
place in connection with the celebration of Micrädj, the feast of the 
Prophet's "ascension" or "joumey into Heaven". Compare Sura 17:1, which, 
according to the translation by Moh. M. PickthaIl, "relates to the Prophet's 
vision, in which he was carried by night upon a heavenly steed to the Temple 
of Jerusalem, whence he was caught up through the seven heavens to the 
very presence of God". In each heaven the Prophet talked with one of the 
earlier messengers of God. Compare the way in which Soekamo is going to 
speak of his encounters with "the leaders of America" . 
92 I.e. of the I.A.I.N., the State Islamic Institute. 
93 That Sockarno shocked rnany kiyais with th is criticism of thc pesantrèns 
became apparent at the abovcmcntioned "Seminar" held in July 1965 in 
Jogjakarta ; cf. Al-Djami'ah, no. 5-6, Sept.-Nov. 1965, pp. 9, 53, 73, 81, 109. 
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Free yourself from the spirit or atmosphere or climate of the pesantrèn. 
Once more, my apologies, I do not mean to insult. I myself have released 
myself from this 'mate rial' world which gave me no satisfaction, no 
gratification, and have ascended the MiCrädj, the Micrädj of the mind, 
dear friends. The MiCrädj of the mind ... 'the world of the mind' ... 
That's to say, I used to read books written by people from all over the 
world ... There I met the thinkers, the thinkers of all peoples. 
I read that Islam is a universal religion, areligion which is under-
standabie for all people and to which all peoples of this world should 
adhere.94 But (I thought): is it really true th at Islam can be realized 
in America? It is said, Islam is the universal religion, isn't it? Therefore 
I wanted to get to know the American spirit, and so, 'in the world of the 
mind', I went to America ... Read books ... And in th is 'world of the 
mind' I spoke, as it were, with the Leader of America George Washing-
ton, with the Leader of America Thomas Jefferson, with the Leader of 
America Adam Smith, and so on . _ . So I began to understand: Aha, so 
this is the American people! And (I concluded): Yes, indeed! Islam 
can be brought to life among the American people ... " 
(In the same rhetorical vein, England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, 
Japan and India pass in revue. Af ter a repeated warning against the 
spirit of the pesantrèn, Soekarno reasserts his pet theme, that the dosing 
of the Bäb al-Idjtihäd was the cause of the decline of Islam. Finally he 
compares living in the pesantrèn spirit with a stay in a musty gudang 
(closed room), to wind up as follows:) 
"Open up! Open the door, open the window! Yes, more yet: on ce 
you're out of that stuffy place, rise up, rise up, up into space, and look 
at things from above, see what the history of earlier Muslim communities 
was like, and what is the way that we to-day must take - that's to say, 
'what is behind us, and what is before us' - in order to see what we 
should do to build a glorious future, a glorious time to come." 
On August 3rd, 1965 Soekarno received an honorary degree (his 26th) 
from the Muhammadijah University in Djakarta, with a speech entitled 
Tauhid adalah Djiwaku ("To deciare th at God is One, is my soul", or 
"I confess thc Oneness of God in the depths of my soul").95 So here 
Soekarno was among reformers, who want to free Islam from every sort 
94 I t should be borne in mind that Soekamo on th is occasion was being made 
honorary doctor in Ilmu Ushuluddin DjuTusan Dacwah, something like 
"Systematic Theology with a specialization in Missiology"! 
95 Tauhid adalah Djiwaku, Amanat P. J. M. Presiden, Djakarta 1965. 
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of superstition (for instance, visiting the graves of "saints" and asking 
for their intercession ), in consequence of the confession of God's 
Uniqueness. 
To begin with, Soekarno spoke of the new translation of the Qur'an 
which was to appear, because, Soekarno said, we ought to be able to 
understand our religion, "for religion is not only concerned with feelings, 
but also with reason, reason, understanding, (Latin) ratio, ratio and 
once again ratio!" Af ter this introduction he touched upon the adat, 
a risky subject in these circles, to go on to speak precisely about visiting 
graves! 
"Now then, ... it is indeed a superstitious cu stom to visit graves in 
order to ask for something. To teIl the truth, I do something like that 
also. But every time I visit my mother's grave at Blitar, or my father's 
grave at Karet here in Djakarta, to teIl the truth, I don't ask my father 
for something, I don't ask my mother at Blitar for something, I only 
ask my father and mother that they will help me when I ask something 
of God, the Praiseworthy and the Exalted. 
For example - I am going to do something important, Ie t's say, I am 
going to the second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers. Then I ask: 
father, I ask you to pray to God that I shall have success in Algiers. 
So, too, with my mother at Blitar ... For according to the teachings of 
our religion, the dead can hear you, the dead can listen. Therefore it is 
recommended, when we visit a grave, to utter the greeting: as-sawmu 
calaikum ("peace be with you"), you within the grave! ... 
WeIl, now, allow me to speak in the following way about how I 
confess God's Oneness ... I am someone whose mother used to follow 
the Hindu-Balinese religion ... My father, what shall I say? He was 
a Muslim, but his Islam was the Islam of Javanese mysticism ... I grew 
up and became the Leader of your movement. I was thrown into the 
prison of Sukamiskin by the Dutch government, and ended up in a cell 
2.50 meters .long by 1.50 meters wide. SmaIl, I can teIl you ... I was 
even put in a cell for 'solitary confinement'.96 
In these circumstances I began earnestly to meditate on the Divine 
Being ... Wh at is that 'God'? (Ind. Tuhan itu apa?). Wh at is He 
like? .. Thank God (Sjukur alhamdulillah) , although in prison I was 
not allowed to read any political hooks, I could always ask for religious 
hooks to he sent: the Qur'an and a translation of the Hadith (Tradi-
tions ), and the Bihle... and as has just heen said hy the promotor, 
96 That is to say, without neighbours. 
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Professor Baroroh, books by Becker and Hartmann and Isaq Bey and 
Snouck Hurgronje.97 ••• I read and compared, read and compared, 
everything with a view to the question: who is God or what is He 
like? ... 
So, is God a Being (zat) on a throne up there? A Being in space, 
what people call 'a personal God'? If He lives only up there, God is 
limited. Isn't th at so? .. Just as if God had only twenty attributes, 
then this God would be limited ... The Bhagavad-Gïtä says - I'm not 
concemed with whether th at song is true or not - the Bhagavad-Gïtä 
says: 'I am in the fire, I am in the heat of the fire; I am in the moon, 
I am in the rays of the moon' ... Yes, even 'I am in the smile of a girl'. 
'I am in the clouds, I am in the procession of clouds which proceed 
together. I am in the darkness. I am in the light. I am without beginning 
and without end'. 
This agrees with my opinion. So then, where is God? Is God up there 
only, only, only there, in the seventh heaven, only in the seventh 
heaven? ... I am a monotheist. But I am a pantheistic monotheist. 
Pantheism means: I feel- feel! - th is God everywhere. He is up there, 
and also over there, in the moon too, and in the sun, also in the stars, 
in the mountains too, and in the fire, and also in the heat of the fire, 
in the ants, too, yes, in everything, everything ... but He's One, One. 
Like, in a rough example, like ether. Penetrating everything. 
I believe that nothing happens in this world without God's knowing. 
But I do not accept that God, weIl - sits somewhere up there and looks 
down below, so to speak, thinking: 'I can see you, Chairul Saleh, what 
are you doing there? I can see you, Jo Leimena, what are you doing 
there?' 98 ..• I repeat, if God sits only up there, then He is limited. But 
God is 'without end, limitless, without any limit'. But He's One, One! ... 
And so, Professor Baroroh, that's my opinion of God's Oneness. 
Whether it is right or not, I must leave to your judgement. Perhaps my 
opinion of God's Uniqueness is different from that of other people. 
Whether it is right or not, God knows best (wa'llähu aClam) ... I leave 
it to God, the Praiseworthy and the Exalted, the Creator of the Universe, 
Allah, Praiseworthy and Exalted, who is One, the Only." 
97 The speech by Prof. Baroroh Baried ("the first Indonesian woman who 
conferred an honorary degree on President Soekarno") is also published 
in the booklet mentioned above, under the English heading "For a fighting 
Moslem Hero, there is no journey's end". 
98 The ministers mentioned were apparently present at this ceremony. 
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Such are Soekamo's words. He could chat in such an informal, friendly 
way - presenting sometimes un-orthodox religious views - that many 
who saw and listened to him feIl under his spell. I t is evident that he 
had a good grasp of the art of choosing the right words to appeal to as 
many as possible. It is not surprising that in the heyday of Soekamo's 
regime all the various groups and parties attempted to annex him or his 
words. Both Muslims and Communists could make use of certain 
opinions and slogans of Soekamo, that "mixture of all 'isms'''. People 
were of ten prepared to trim their opinions to fit Soekamo's wishes, for 
example the Communists in their "acceptance" of the first pillar of the 
Pantjasila (Belief in the One and Only God), the Muslims in the 
"acceptance" of Soekamo's Guided Democracy (by translating the term 
fûu 'l-amri from Sura 4 : 59 with "your leaders" and interpreting it by 
using the singular, "our leader"). 99 
Much honour was bestowed on Soekamo by Muslims too, not only by 
giving him honorary degrees, but also, for example, titles such as "Faith-
ful Member and Great Support of the Muhammadijah", or, much 
earlier, WaIï al-Amri Darurï bis-Sjauka, probably to be rendered: "the 
mIer who at present is in power (and has to be obeyed according to 
Sura 4: 59)",100 How seriously should all this be taken? Af ter Soekamo's 
fall, several of these honours were withdrawn by the Muslims. Perhaps, 
looking back, it could be regarded as a mutual flirtation which was 
carried out with a smile, in the sense of tahu sama tahu (like knows 
like) . 
Soekamo will live on in history as the leader of the Indonesian 
revolution. His grave at Blitar may become a kind of place of pilgrimage 
for many Indonesians, especially in Java. In the future, Indonesian 
Muslims too will probably again acknowledge Soekamo as one of the 
creators of Indonesia. For the time being, however, one of the Muslim 
99 Cf. the speech by the Minister of Religion, K. H. M. Wahib Wahab on 
January lOth, 1962, who gave this Qur'anic support for the Muslims' 
obedience to Soekamo's order for the liberation of West Irian; the necessity 
of obedience for the Christians was shown by quoting Matthew 22:21 (see 
Mutiara Hikmah, published by the Ministry of Religion, no. 330-1962, 
100 
p. 41 ff.). 
According to Father Bakker, this "recognition" was a decision made by a 
number of N.U. kiyais and ulamas at a conference in March 1954 (J. W. M. 
Bakker S.L Godsdienstvrijheid, p. 226); the author rendered the meaning of 
the title concerned as follows: the head of an Islamic State which for the 
time being has to be recognized and obeyed. The Arabic shauka occurs in 
Sura 8:7 in the meaning of armed force. 
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poets of the "Generation of 1966", Taufiq 1smail (pseudonym Nur 
Fadjar), has denounced the Soekamo cult in the following "Prayer" :101 
Our Lord, 
We have been disgraced by collective sm; 
For years we built up this cult, 
With various motives, 






Have we used Your Name, 
For years in this country. 
May You be willing to receive us again 




101 Taufiq Ismail, Doa, in rus collection Tirani, Djakarta 1966, p. 25; see also 
Pandji Masjarakat, no. 2, October 1966, p. 3, where part of th is poem is 
used as a motto for an editorial under the heading Taubat Nashuha ("Sincere 
Repentence", cf. Sura 66:8). 
CHAPTER III 
ISLAM AND THE "NEW ORDER" 
(1965 and af ter ) 
1. The Thirtieth of September and its Aftermath 
In 1963 Herbert Feith pointed out that thc intern al tensions 10 
Indonesia were coming to a head; another observer indicated 10 
particular the increasing tensions between Islam and Communism. 1 
Part of the Islamic community was put out of action by the proscription 
of the Masjumi and the arrest of important Islamic leaders. But even 
without astrong organization, the Muslim community formed a latent 
power which could move into action at any moment. On the other hand, 
the Communist Party (P.K.!.) was certainly the only well-organized 
party, and as su eh was a "state within the state". 
The army has to be mentioned here as the most important third 
power. Within the army there was astrong Muslim influence (in 
particular from adherents of the Masjumi), while Christian influence 
was also relatively strong. The army officers had for years played the 
role of guardian of the Pantjasila ideals, as much against the left (Com-
munists) as the right (e.g. the Darul Islam movement ). Some army 
units - for instanee, within the Diponegoro Division in Central Java -
had certainly been considerably infiltrated by Communists. But the senior 
officers of the armed forces (at least those of the army) were fiercely 
anti-Communist. General Nasution in particular had for years been 
fighting Communist influence within the army. On certain occasions 
he appeared to be in agreement with Soekarno, but in fact there was 
a continuous tug-of-war between Nasution and the President, for instanee 
in appointing or dismissing left-wing army officers. 
Soekarno's Guided Democracy was in fact based on a policy of divide-
and-rule, in spi te of the official NASAKOM principle. This policy of 
Soekarno's certainly did not include any promise or solution for a future 
1 See the end of Chapter 1I, par. 3. 
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without Soekarno. However, 1 have the impression that it was hardly 
expected th at one of the power groups (e.g. the Communists) would 
attempt a coup d'état before Soekarno's death; similarly the growing 
number of Soekarno's opponents (e.g. among the military and the 
Muslims) could not risk an attempt to remove him from power, because 
of his remaining popular support. So everyone bided his time. It was, 
however, generally believed that when Soekarno died there would not 
only be a personal tussle for the succession, but also an open clash 
between the various power groups. Many years before 1965 it was even 
possible to he ar people in Indonesia saying that they hoped "the clash" 
would come soon, as otherwise the consequences would be even more 
catastrophic. Thus people anxiously awaited Soekarno's death. Sympto-
matic of the tension were the rumours about the President's illness which 
emerged again and again, sometimes with spicy details. Was not, af ter 
all, the tragedy of Soekarno's life that the great hero of the fight for 
freedom had outlived his reputation? 
In the night of September 30th, 1965, the storm broke, due to the 
action of Colon el Untung, the Commander of the Palace Guard in 
Djakarta. A number of generals were surprised in their sleep in the early 
morning of October Ist and horribly murdered. They were accused of 
belonging to a "Council of GeneraIs" preparing a military coup d'état. 
The "September 30th Movement" was said to have prevented this. On 
the morning of October Ist, the establishment of a "Revolutionary 
Council" was announced, which would safeguard the state and the life 
of the President. 
But a day later the action of Untung and whoever was behind him 
appeared to have failed, thanks to the swift intervention of General 
Soeharto, chief of the office for the "army's strategie reserve". This 
office was concerned with the stationing and movement of troops, but 
was not itself a fighting unit. Was this probably the reason why 
Soeharto's name did not occur on the list of generals to be arrested? 
A second mistake made by Untung's men was that they let General 
Nasution escape. Bis escape was of great importance, first of all psycho-
logically (perhaps even for Soekarno's wavering attitude), and later on 
also politically. 
1 do not consider myself either competent or obliged to attempt a 
complete analysis of the events and their background. Here follow only 
a few remarks, insofar as they are relevant to the subject of this book. 
To begin with, two strongly contrasting opinions may be put forward. 
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One simple explanation is that Untung's action was just an attempt at 
a coup d'état by the Communist Party (P.K.!.) under the leadership of 
Aidit and supported by sympathetic army officers. At the other end 
of the scale the "October Ist Movement" - as President Soekarno and 
his following liked to call it - is considered to have had very litde to 
do with Communism, let alone the leadership of the P.K.!., but "was 
essentially an internal Army affair, stemming from a small clique in the 
Diponegoro Division, which attempted to use both Soekarno and the 
PKI leadership for its own ends"; according to this analysis there were 
even certain "idealistic motivations" within this group (e.g. resistance to 
corrupt Djakarta circles and "a return to the spirit of Jogja", as it was 
in the first period of the Revolution), although these motives were "far 
less important than resentment, ambition, puritanism and unanchored 
radicalism' , . 
The first of these explanations is gene rally maintained in Indonesia 
among all anti-Communist groups, including religious circles. The second 
- eagerly accepted outside Indonesia by critics of this anti-Communism 
- was chiefly based on "A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, 
Coup in Indonesia", originating from a famous American university and 
dated January lOth, 1966.2 
In favour of the first explanation it has to be admitted that the 
Untung action was also considered a Communist action by Communist 
groups themselves, in particular in Central Java, and anyway the Com-
munists and their press relations had heavily compromised themselves 
by their initial reactions on the morning of October Ist. Moreover, the 
unsuccessful Untung action was clearly connected with conflicts of far 
wider dimensions: "The brief 'civil war' of late October, though 
precipitated by the events. of October 1st, represented the logical culmi-
nation of deeply-felt hostilities and hatreds between a far wider range of 
2 This document of about 160 pages was initially "strictly confidential", that 
is to say with regard to its origin, not its contents. lts preface says: "Feel 
free to use [the material in] it as you wish in publication, but please do not 
refer in any way to this document". By now, however, this document has 
become well-known enough, also in Indonesia, and it is quite generally 
admitted to he both one-sided and obsolete. In the Dutch weekly "Vrij 
Nederland" of April 25th, 1970, the formerly Indonesian Professor E. Utrecht 
mentioned this document as the "Cornell Report" written by two specialists 
on Indonesian affairs, B. R. O'G. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, and 
intended to he used only within Cornell University circles. 
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groups and ideologies - right and left, Islam and Communism, landlord 
and landless, santri and abangan, prijaji and peasant".3 
On the other hand, the opinion that the Untung act ion was simply 
an at tempt by the Communist Party to seize power has been modified 
by more subtle analyses. Some, for example, believe that it was a plot 
hatched by a number of individual Communists and fellow-travellers 
together with a number of officers from outside Djakarta, while the 
P.K.I. leaders themselves would have preferred to wait and see. Others 
believe that the P.K.I. had to join in at a certain moment, owing to 
particular circumstances. Vet others maintain that at any rate the 
Untung action, had it succeeded, would in the end have resulted in a 
Communist govemment. A recent Dutch publication concluded: "Who 
exactly it was who inspired the coup of the night of September 30th to 
October Ist... will probably always remain an unresolved question: 
a group of frustrated officers with the knowledge of the P.K.I., or the 
P.K.I. with the help of these officers".4 
For the time being John Hughes 5 arrived at the conclusion that the 
P.K.I. was indeed directly involved in the coup, although the question 
remains as to whether the P.K.I. took the initiative or only joined in 
when the sign was given by someone else, whoever that may have been. 
Moreover, the various groups took part in the coup for different motives: 
the Communists because they believed that circumstances forced them 
to, though it was probably a little toa soon for them, and the army 
officers concemed (Sujono, Supardjo, Omar Dhani) because some of 
them were fellow-travellers or joined in because of military ambitions 
or opportunism. Soekamo himself, according to Hughes, may at least 
have known that something was going to happen, and it would not have 
been displeasing to him to know that certain generals would be silenced. 
This does not mean th at Soekamo had given direct orders or that 
anyone had officially or straightforwardly asked for his assent. "In 
Indonesia, things are not done th at way." G 
3 See for this and the preceding quotations A Preliminary Analysis, pp. 8 and 
63. These contrruots are also dealt with in a Dutch publication by the 
Indonesian sociologist Bruouki Gunawan, Kudetá, Staatsgreep in Djakarta, 
Meppel 1968. 
4 Muskens, Indonesië, p. 250. 
5 John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, New Vork 1967. 
6 Hughes, U pheaval, p. 114. It could he useful to compare the events sur-
rounding September 30th, 1965 with the Madiun affair of 1948. According 
to Alers, even the Communist rising in Madiun wruo not ordered by the 
leaders of the party, but simply "broke out". Alers' conc1usions were as 
follows. The plans of the former P.K.I. leader Musso were not aimed at a 
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Recently Donaid Hindley gave a "tentative reconstruction", which can 
probably be considered a correction to the preliminary analysis contained 
in the abovementioned Cornell Report. 7 This reconstruction can be 
summarized as follows. It was obvious that Soekarno's death would lead 
to a clash between the Communists and their many enemies (army 
officers, Muslims, certain intellectuals, bureaucrats and even the majority 
of P.N.I. members). In the middle of 1965 the Communists realized 
that they would lose in such a clash. In August Soekarno's health 
suddenly seemed to be much worse. Subandrio, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, who apparently played an obscure role, recalled the P.K.I. leader 
Aidit from China, together with a team of Chinese doctors. "Aidit had 
to assume that if Sukarno was removed from effective leadership, then 
the army generals would at once launch an attack against the unprepared 
party. The September 30 Movement was conceived to avert this threat." 
Although "a definitive analysis of this movement may never been 
written", it may be concluded that "the September 30 Movement, as 
finally conceived, was not a coup to establish a communist government". 
Of the 45 members of the Revolutionary Council proclaimed by the 
insurgents on October 1st, 1965, "only about five would be communists 
or known communist associates, none of them PKI leaders". In this 
way "the general tenor of political life would have shifted to the left 
- without provoking a massive anti-communist reaction". In other 
words, the immediate aim of the coup was not to establish a Communist 
government, but to save the Communists from the destruction which 
would threaten them on the death of the President, and in this way the 
Communist Party could have continued to strengthen its position gra-
dually, also af ter the death of the President, until in due time the party 
was indeed ready to take over power. 
coup d'état but primarily at lirnited changes in the government, through 
forced changes in the cabinet, af ter which the assumption of power could 
be prepared in stages. Djokosujono broadcast at that time: "The Madiun 
affair is not a coup ... it is not an attempt to overthrow the Republic, but 
is merely an attempt to elirninate colonial and feudal elements" (Quoted 
by Kahin, Nationalism, p. 298). Musso, however, was a bad organizer, in 
spite of his training in Moscow, and did not have con trol over his friends 
(e.g. Djokosujono and Sumarsono). In the end the whole P.K.!. was involved 
in an affair which could only be regarded as an attempt at a coup d'état, 
and which was crushed as such. Cf. Alers, Rode of Groene, p. 15, n. 1 and 
pp. 185-197. 
7 Donaid Hindley, Alirans and the Fa/lof the aid Order, in Indonesia, 
Cornell 1970, no. 9 (April), pp. 23-66. 
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However that may be, inside lndonesia the Untung action was 
called Gerakan Tigapuluh September (September 30th Movement), 
abbreviated to G-30-S or (with an abbreviation intended to remind one 
of Hitler's Germany) indicated as Gestapu (from "Gerakan September 
Tigapuluh"), combined with the initials of the Communist Party, thus: 
"GestapujP.K.I.". All traditionally anti-Communist circles in lndonesia 
are in agreement that the rising, anyway, was in essence a Communist 
affair. The question of whether or not there really existed a "Council 
of Generais" (or at least a close contact between a number of anti-
Communist senior officers) is sometimes answered by pointing out 
that it would have been incomprehensible if the army - just as the 
Communists - had not made certain preparations in order to be ready 
when "the moment" came. That moment was generally expected to 
coincide with the death of the President. So it can be concluded that 
the "time-bomb", which for years had been ticking away in Indonesia, 
went off too early, whatever the reason for this may have been. 
This long awaited explosion took on proportions which no-one would 
have believed possible. To begin with, the events brought about an 
attempt to exterminate Communism and the Communists and probably 
anyone whom one could score off, thanks to this political label. The 
reports on the number of victims vary between 80,000 and 500,000; 
some even speak of one and a half miIIion. 8 A further result was that, 
de facto, power came into the hands of the army, while President 
Soekarno was gradually pushed aside. 
As far as the discussion on the number of victims is concerned, Hughes 
remarks that "it is tragically academic wh ether 100,000 or 200,000 or 
500,000 people lost their lives in the blood bath. For whichever of these 
figures is most nearly accurate, any one of them makes the lndonesian 
massacre one of the ghastliest and most concentrated bloodlettings of 
current times." 9 
The problem of how this slaughter, which in particular took place 
in November and December 1965, could have come about is almost as 
obscure as the number of victims. It has been said that the clashes in 
various areas occurred between varying groups: in Central and East 
Java, for instance, between on the one hand Muslims and the other 
hand Communists or every abangan and nominal Muslim who could be 
accused of having left-wing sympathies (e.g. the left wing within the 
8 Cf. J. Verkuyl, Momentopnamen van de huidige situatie in lndonesië, in 
Wending, June 1967, p. 217; also Hughes, Upheaval, p. 184ff. 
9 Hughes, U pheaval, p. 189. 
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P.N.I.) or having had connections with left-wing organizations (e.g. 
certain trade unions or artists' organizations); in Hinduistic Bali, 
members of the P.N.I. attacked P.K.I. members.1 0 In same pI aces 
soldiers apparently took the lead or incited the population to kill their 
enemies, in other pI aces they restrained the people; Soeharto himself 
is said to have urged restraint.ll In some districts of Java a complete 
vacuum in authority occurred, as it was not clear which army unit was 
on whose side. A situation of mass-hysteria arose, in which each took 
the law into his own hands, sometimes with the feeling that it was a 
question of kill or be killed (or, for instance, the feeling that one would 
have been killed, should the Communist coup have succeeded). 
To push all th is onto the responsibility of the Soeharto government 
- as is sometimes done outside Indonesia - is to make a simplification 
which does not sufficiently take into account the confused situation in 
Indonesia during those months. The authority of the new leaders -- in 
particular Soeharto and, more in the background, Nasution - was 
extremely unstable at that time. They had to grope their way very 
carefully to discover who was who and how sympathies and relationships 
lay among the population as weIl as within the army. They still had 
to behave as if they were acting on the authority of Soekarno, for 
Soekarno was still President and apparently made mischief and intrigued 
against the new leaders in every sort of way. As late as May 1966 
Soekarno installed a new air-commander and took the opportunity to 
fulminate against Hatta, who at th at moment seemed to be gaining 
authority again. Even some months later Soekarno's prestige and his 
opposition to the new leaders were still so great that I was able to see 
P.N.I. students in Jogja demonstrating and using as a chant, "Say what 
you will, the M arhaenists will win".1 2 
The change from the ORLA (= Orde Lama, the "old order" of 
before September 30th, 1965) to the ORBA (= Orde Baru, the "new 
order"), took place by means of close co-operation between the army and 
10 Cf. Verkuyl, Momentopnamen, p. 217. 
11 Hughes, Upheaval, p. 194. 
12 Even in the years before the Second World War marhaenis was a favourite 
name of Soekarno's for the proletarian peasants and other have-nots. 
Soekarno liked ealling his brand of Indonesian socialism "Marhaenism". 
"Marhaen" was apparently the name of a poor Sundanese peasant, whom 
Soekarno had onee met long ago. See Soekarno's Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 
Vol. I, 19632, p. 167 ff. and p. 253 ff.; cf. also Cindy Adams, Sukarno, An 
Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams, New York 1965, p. 62. 
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the youth movements of the so-called "Generation of 1966". These youths 
were united in the KAMI ("Komité Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia", the 
Action-Committee of Indonesian Students) and the KAPPI (Action-
Committee of the "Para Peladjar", secondary school pupils). Within the 
KAMI it was particularly the H.M.I. (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, the 
very strong Islamic Students' Association, with unofficial relations with 
the Masjumi and other modern Muslim organizations) and members 
of the Catholic Students' Association which played an important part. 
From the beginning of 1966 these students began to demonstrate in the 
streets, partly spontaneously, partly with the scene set by others, whoever 
they may have been. At first they protested against all sorts of abuses, 
rising prices, corruption, etc. Over the months the campaign developed 
into protests against Soekarno, with insults of a sort no-one would have 
believed possible before. The co-operation between the army and the 
students sometimes threatened to lead to a clash - e.g. with re gard to 
the position of Soekarno - as the young people wanted quicker and 
more rad ic al action than the new leaders considered possible. 
It was not until March 11 th, 1966, that the new leaders considered 
the time come to demand Soekarno's signature to a letter in which the 
President "commanded" General Soeharto to take all the steps necessary 
for the safety and stability of state and government, protecting Soekarno 
as "the President, Chief-of-Staff, Great Leader of the Revolution and 
Mandatory of the People's Congress". The interpretation of th is letter, 
too, led to a long tug-of-war between the President and the new leaders: 
was it only a temporary authorization of the President given to his 
subordinate, General Soeharto (since February 21st officially chief-of-
staff of the army) , or was it in fact a definite transfer of authority? 
Only a year later, on March 12th, 1967, did Soeharto become Acting-
President, and again a year later, on March 27th, 1968, officially become 
President for a term of five years. In Indonesia things are done that way! 
For the time being, the New Order was sanctioned in a session of the 
Provisional People's Congress (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Semen-
tara, M.P.R.S.) held in June-July 1966 (the use of the word "provi-
sional" originated from the 1945 Constitution, indicating pending 
regulations based on general elections ). According to the 1945 Con-
stitution the People's Congress embodied the sovereignty of the people 
and therefore the President officially was subordinated to this Congress. 
Af ter the period of Soekarno's Guided Democracy, this trump could now 
be played. This took place in the meeting of the People's Congress, first 
of all by authorizing Soekarno's letter of March 11 th to Soeharto, which 
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move was called "a wise policy". The next step was to elect General 
Nasution as chairman of the People's Congress. Further decisions in this 
session were concerned with the general elections, the position of Soe-
karno as "Mandatory" of the People's Congress (to stress that the 
President received his man date only from the Congress and was thus 
responsible to this body), the revision of all sorts of measures, regulations 
and political doctrines dating from the period of Soekarno's Guided 
Democracy, the proscription of the Communist Party, financial and 
economic reconstruction, the importance of education (with religious 
instruction as a normal subject), in short, the repudiation of the "old 
order" of the Soekarno period. This period was now considered as "lost 
years . .. in which no attempts were made to tackle the structural 
problems of lndonesia in arealistic way",13 or, in the bitter words of one 
of my Christian friends, "years which were like a bad dream". 
One of the most awkward problems for the new leaders - and a 
source of much criticism of their policy - must finally be mentioned 
here. I refer to the fact that as a result of the Communist witch hunt 
af ter September 30th, 1965, there are still a large number of people 
detained in camps and prisons. These detainees were divided into three 
groups. Category A were brought to trial. Of Category B many were 
deported to a distant island for "re-indoctrination", in order to be 
released in due time. Roughly two-thirds, however, belonged to Category 
C, that is, the "minor offenders". They are the people who had probably 
belonged to one or other Communist or left-wing organization. Over a 
period of time some of them were released, but some were again detained 
on suspicion of renewed activities. 
For many years it seemed that the government was not able to resolve 
this problem. To what extent was there a real danger of a resuscitation 
of Communism, which naturally could not have been completely 
exterminated? The chief reason, commonly heard, was that society, and 
in particular the Muslim community, was not prepared to receive these 
Communists again. A well-informed army officer told me: "Viewed in 
retrospect, it would have been better if we had released the majority of 
the prisoners straight away during the first months. But at th at moment 
we considered the time inopportune. Yet in fact we have got ourselves 
more and more entangled, because the longer we hold them, the more 
difficult it is to release them and integrate them into society". lndeed, 
this too is Indonesia! 
13 Cf. Verkuyl, Momentopnamen, p. 218. 
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All these years the government has seemed to be afraid of risking 
its authority by trying to persuade people that an end must be put to 
the "GestapujP.K.I." affair. Religious leaders - both Muslims and 
Christians - seemed to fear arousing the antipathy of people and the 
extremists within their own circles if they publicly demanded that this 
inhuman situation should be brought to an end. One of the few whom 
I heard advocating mercy was the well-known writer Bahrum Rangkuti, 
now imam in the Indonesian navy. In a Friday meditation (on Thursday 
evening) on television in July 1966 he said that one may hate and resist 
Communism as a system, but towards the people, the Communists, the 
prisoners, one must be merciful, for God is ar-Ral;tmän ar-Ral;tïm, the 
Beneficent, the Merciful. 
2. New Hope tor Muslims 
Once the army had overcome Colonel Untung and his supporters, 
the slogan became "total extermination of the GestapujP.K.I.". In this 
slogan an Indonesian verb was used which could be understood both 
literally and figuratively (viz. kikis habis, wipe out, sweep away, exter-
mina te, finalize). 
In Muslim circles the conflict was primarily feit as a struggle between 
the Islamic community and the "GestapujP.K.I.", or, even more simply, 
between Islam and Communism. This controversy had already arisen in 
the colonial period (in particular af ter 1921) and had af terwards become 
acute in the new Republic. On the part of the Communists there was 
always agitation against "religious capitalists". The ownership of land 
by a number of kiyai families (e.g. in East Java) was a useful theme to 
provoke poor peasants to turn against "the hadjis". Actually it has to be 
admitted th at every religion, Islam included, tends to defend the 
established order and to look askance at movements toward revolutionary 
changes in the structure of society. During the Communist rising in 
September 1948 in Madiun, a number of prominent Muslims were 
murdered, particularly civil servants and school-teachers.1 4 On the 
other hand, Muslims were wont to combat Communism as atheism and 
hence the archenemy of religion. In connection with the Madiun revoIt 
in 1948 even Soekarno said that the Communists had abandoned the 
Pantjasila principles; "and in particular they have deviated from the 
belief in God and carry out actions which are in conflict with this 
principle, because they no longer believe in God".1 5 
14 Cf. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 300; Muskens, Indonesië, p. 177. 
15 Quoted in Dutch by Gunawan, Kudetá, p. 42. 
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The fight against Communism and the Communists could therefore 
traditionally be considered an aspect of the djihäd, the "Holy War" 
against the enemies of Islam, God's foes. Referring to the murder of the 
generals on the morning of October 1st, 1965, a Muslim informant 
unconsciously recalled almost literally Soekarno's words of 1948, when 
he said: "On October 1st, 1965, we saw how far people can go who no 
longer have any religion!" One might also ask how far men sometimes 
go who do have areligion. Vet if a foreigner in Indonesia asks critical 
questions concerning the massacre of 1965, he will probably get the 
answer: "You foreigners don't realize the stress and lawlessness which 
we in Indonesia, especially the Muslims, had experienced in the years 
leading up to it". 
With regard to the conflict between Muslims and Communists, it is 
commonly said that in East Java it was chiefly the ANSOR youth 
movement which undertook the extermination of the "GestapujP.K.I.". 
Non-Muslim informants of ten added th at this occurred at the instigation 
of "the hadjis", who were usually anti-Communist not only as Muslims 
but in particular as landowners. This indictment may contain a grain of 
truth. It is, however, incorrect to speak in general terms of "the hadjis" 
as a social group. At best it can be said that among the landowners in 
East Java there are indeed a number of kiyais or kiyai families. More-
over, it is thanks to these kiyais from the pesantrèns and madrasas that 
the Nahdatul Ulama (N.U.) is far and away the largest Islamic party 
in East Java. Now the ANSOR can be considered the youth movement 
connected with this N.U. 16 So statistically it is obvious th at in East Java 
the ANSOR and N.U. members were in the forefront of the actions to 
exterminate the "Communists". This does not mean that they were more 
anti-Communist than other Muslim groups. 
An influential Muslim told me th at in Java (perhaps in Central Java) 
a fatwä of the Muhammadijah chairman had been of great significance 
in the extermination of the "GestapujP.K.I.", because in this fatwä 
it was stated th at their destruction ought to be considered a religious 
duty. This informant was probably referring to the statement issued at 
an emergency meeting of the Muhammadijah held on November 9th-
16 ANSOR (from the Arabic al-an$är, the Medinan helpers of the Prophet) 
is not a student organization as Muskens supposes (Indonesië, p. 251). The 
student association closely allied to the N.U. is the Perhimpunan Mahasiswa 
Islam Indonesia (P.M.l.I.), much smaller and of less significanee than the 
H.M.1. mentioned above. 
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1lth, 1965, in Djakarta.1 7 From th is period there are more statements 
known, made by Muslim leaders who declared this conflict to be a 
"Holy War". This Muhammadijah statement, however, can be taken 
as an authoritative example. 
Under the heading lbadah dan Djihad (Religious Duty and the 
Holy War), this statement explains that the action on September 30th, 
1965, is to be regarded as an extension of the Madiun Communist rising 
of 1948. Officers such as Untung, Latif, Supardjo, Bambang Supeno 
and others are said to have been involved in the Madiun Affair. There-
fore this time a decisive follow-up ought to be carried through in order 
to prevent a third Communist attempt at a coup in the future. Tbe 
statement continues as follows: 
"Therefore it was right for the Muhammadijah, together with [the 
leaders of] its youth movement, during an emergency meeting in 
Djakarta, November 9th-1lth, 1965, trusting in God (tawakkal) , to make 
this pronouncement: THE EXTERMINATION OF THE GESTAPU/ 
PKI AND THE NEKOLIM IS A RELIGIOUS DUTY.1 8 .•• Tbis 
religious duty is not (only) recommended (sunnat) but obligatory 
(wadjib) , even an individual obligation" (wadjib cain, i.e. an obligation 
which is not only to he fulfilled by the Muslim community in general, 
so that, for example, it can be carried out by a certain body on behalf 
of th is community, but an obligation for each Muslim personally) ... 
"And because this action and this struggle must be carried out by 
consolidating all our strength - mental, physical and material - there-
fore th is action and this struggle are nothing less than a HOL Y WAR 
(DJIHAD). This Holy War, according to religious law, is not (only) 
recommended, but obligatory, even an individu al obligation ... " Finally 
it is stated - in accordance with Islamic law - that when carrying out 
this djihad "destructive excesses, defamation, revenge, etc. must be 
prevented" . 
It is not explicitly stated what interpretation the (modern) Muham-
madijah at that moment gave to the term djihad. But the conclusion 
drawn by an average Muslim as weil as his enemy can easily be guessed. 
It is, however, hard to assess to what extent th is fatwä had aresuIt 
similar to th at which the earlier "djihad resolution" had on events 
in Surabaja in November 1945.19 
17 Published in Suara Muhammadijah, no. 9, November 1965. 
18 "NEKOLIM" is a Soekamo abbreviation for "neo-colonialist imperialists"; 
they, too, were not forgotten in th is statement! 
19 See Chapter I, par. 5. 
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Whatever the proper explanation may be of the events of September 
30th, 1965 and thereafter, to the Muslim way of thinking it was a 
"holy war" against atheistic Communism, the archenemy of religion. 
ane of my principal informants characterized the destruction of the 
"GestapujP.K.I." as "the great victory of Islam in Indonesia". It is 
not surprising th at afterwards many Muslims wanted to claim the victory 
wholly for Islam. 
The foreword which a translator wrote for the Indonesian edition of 
Mawdüdï's book "Towards Understanding Islam" may serve as an 
example of th is flush of victory.20 It runs as follows: "ance more the 
banners of the truth of Islam flutter in the procession of the Indonesian 
people marching on their way to complete the revolution. ance more the 
dynamic spirit of Islam has appeared amid a people who had been 
squabbling among themselves over the truth of each other's ideology. 
ance more the truth is proved of what God has said in His Holy Book, 
that what is true shall be true for eternity, and that what is va in shall 
perish. The doctrine of MarxismjCommunism is only a creation of the 
human mind... and evidently brings na harmony to life but breeds 
chaos and confusion in the life of society. The doctrine of Marxismj 
Communism and similar teachings, however, were forbidden in Indo-
nesia in 1966 by order of the People's Congress ... People are now 
constantly wondering: what and where is the real mainstay of our souIs? 
The answer is: to grasp and acknowledge again the streng th and glory 
of the metaphysical doctrine which cannot be called in question. This 
is Islam, which has shown the superiority and solidity of its point of view, 
not to be laid low by the power of the theories of all the theorists in 
the whole world ... " And so forth. 
It can perhaps be said of the translator, as has been said of Mawdüdï 
himself, that "He presents Islam as a system, one that long ago provided 
mankind with set answers to all its problems, rather than as a faith in 
which God provides mankind anew each morning the riches whereby 
it may answer them itself".21 
But the new government seemed to be less enthusiastic than this 
translator. lts caution is seen in the initial "freezing" of the activities of 
20 S. Abul Ala Maududi, Menudju Pengertian Islam, Djakarta 1967, translated 
by Amiruddin Djamil. For this Sayyid Abü 'l-cAlä' Mawdüdi and his group 
(in some ways comparable to the Egyptian Ikhwän and the Indonesian Darul 
Islam) see W. C. Smith, Islam, p. 233 ff. 
21 Smith, Islam, p. 235. 
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political parties. In the same cautious way, Islamic leaders such as 
HAMKA, Isa Anshary and Burhanuddin Harahap were only gradually 
released from prison. On August 14th, 1966, I was present at a service 
of thanksgiving (tasjakkur) held in and around the AI-Azhar mosque 
in Kebajoran-Baru (Djakarta) and led by HAMKA. Only then had the 
last Islamic leaders retumed from imprisonment. Great enthusiasm 
reigned, though even on this occasion vei led criticism of the govemment 
was not lacking. To a crowd of about 50,000 people the following leaders 
were successively presented: Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Asaat, Prawoto 
Mangkusasmito, Mohamad Roem, Kasman Singodimedjo and finally 
Muh. Natsir - cheered as formerly Soekamo had been - in other 
words, the entire top leadership of the former Masjumi. 
More than one speaker demanded the "rehabilitation of Islam" af ter 
its oppression in the times that had passed. Prawoto ended his speech 
by stressing that an "overall rehabilitation" (rehabilitasi multikompleks) 
would have to include the Muslim community's being given back the 
means for their struggle (alat perdjuangan).22 In a mosque it is con-
sidered improper to mention names of movements and parties within the 
one Muslim community, but this speaker was obviously referring to the 
rehabilitation of the M asjumi as a political party. The hope was not 
fulfilled. Developments af ter September 30th, 1965, also held disappoint-
ments for the Islamic community. 
It may nevertheless be concluded that the events of 1965 have resulted 
in a far stronger position for Islam in Indonesia, at least on the surface. 
Initially it seemed that the developments could be heralding the be-
ginning of a new phase in the modem history of Islam in Indonesia. 
"The clash" had come and appeared to have resulted in victory. 
Oppression and menace had gone. One could breathe again. One could 
say and write what one wanted to. Muslim newspapers and magazines 
were allowed to reappear. And religion was in favour as never before. 
Freedom of religion has also of ten been stressed since 1965, but with 
this restriction: that such freedom does not include the freedom to be 
non-religious, let alone anti-religious. A former Minister of Religion, 
Idham Chalid (N.U.) compared religious freedom to the freedom 
exercised in clothing, saying that th is did not include the freedom to be 
a nudist! 23 So it came about that af ter Soekamo's fall his slogan of 1964 
22 Cf. Pandji Masjarakat, no. 1, October 1966, pp. 11-13 and p. 30. 
23 Quoted in Suara Muhammadijah, Febr.-March 1966, p. 35. 
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once more became topical : the Indonesian people as weIl as the Indo-
nesian state "must have a God and areligion" (harus ber-Tuhan dan 
harus beragama). It is understandable that many religious leaders 
considered this development a reason for new hope. 
3. New Disappointments 
A considerable shift has taken pI ace in Indonesian poli tics since 1965. 
Af ter all, the most important left-wing groups have officially left the 
scene, due to the proscription of the P.K.I. and the elimination of former 
left-wing leaders within the P.N.I. The vacancy is said to have been filled 
by the army; and if an army is given an inch, it takes an elI. Vet Hughes 
was perhaps right when he concluded that Indonesian foreign policy 
had not simply switched from left to right. 24 Nor was it correct to 
regard the new government of Indonesia as just another of the present-
day right-wing dictatorships by a military junta. 
In situations like this there is, of course, a danger of sliding in that 
direction. In 1967 an observer wrote "that there are undoubtedly some 
military commanders who would prefer some kind of military junta".25 
The emergence of a new pressure-group (now a military one) trying 
to fence in the new leaders is an obvious danger in such a situation. 
Moreover, in out-of-the-way areas it is easy for the military to misuse 
their power. But, on the other hand, criticism of the government and 
military commanders is certainly still possible, in spite of some restrictions 
laid down in new press-Iaws. And this freedom is used with a mixture of 
sarcasm and humour which is proof that Indonesian democracy is not 
dead. 
Unfortunately, the political parties in Indonesia still lead a languishing 
existence. Af ter 1965 the new leadership of the P.N.I. had great 
difficulties in re-orientating the party. The former Socialist Party of 
Sjahrir did not get a successor. The replacement of the Masjumi by 
a new Islamic party remains problematical, as long as certain ex-Masjumi 
leaders have to remain onlookers. Soekarno's Guided Democracy hinder-
ed the emergence of a new generation of politicians. Among young 
intellectuals one meets people with a political education but lacking 
political experience. It is understandable th at the new government 
hesitated to welcome a resuscitation of all former political parties, 
because this could result in new strife between the parties, particularly 
24 Hughes, U pheaval, p. 291. 
25 Verkuyl, Momentopnamen, p. 219. 
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in view of the coming elections. Party politics would absorb the energy, 
time and money that should he used on national reconstruction. But 
there is a growing conviction th at political life and the activities of 
political parties will have to be stimulated if democracy is to function 
properly. 
In this connection it may be worth recalling a rumour which I 
remember was current during the October 17th affair in 1952, when 
the army (including Nasution) apparently wanted to dissolve Parliament. 
Some prominent leaders at th at time were said to have warned against 
military intervention, saying th at "it is easy to establish a military 
dictatorship, but there wil! be no way back to democracy". The Soeharto 
government now faces the difficult job of proving that, af ter the 
necessary seizure of power by the army in 1965, there is still a way 
back to genuine democracy. 
Let us now, within the framework of this survey, make a special 
examination of Islam in Indonesian poli tics during recent years. 26 Tbe 
burning question in Muslim circles during the years since 1965 has been 
that of the rehabilitation of the Masjumi. The proscription of this party 
in 1960 had caused some of its adherents to join other Islamic parties, 
although most of them continued to feel themselves members of the 
(temporarily) forbidden party. Some former Masjumi members and 
others seemed to have turned to the P.S.!.!., which in recent years may 
have got a fairly large following. The N.U., too, may have drawn many 
new members and, partly as a result of this, probably shifted to a more 
progressive policy. In some areas the Sumatran Perti may have 
strengthened its position at the cost of the former Masjumi. Other 
Masjurni members "immersed themselves in religious or cultural acti-
vities" (e.g. founding private universities), or "remained silent".27 It 
can be added that from about 1955, and in particular af ter 1960, some 
ex-Masjumi leaders entered the business world. For example, a Batik 
Co-operative Society and a match factory in Central Java and a number 
of printing-houses in Djakarta may be mentioned here. This, too, was 
considered to be part of the internal strengthening of the Islamic 
community, which Muslims hoped in good time would result in a 
stronger position for Islam. 
26 Islam in Indonesian Polities was the title of an important artic1e by Allan 
A. Samson, in Asian Survey, December 1968, Vol. VIII, pp. 1,001-1,017, 
from which a number of the following facts and data are taken. 
27 Samson, Islam, p. 1,004. 
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On December 16th, 1965, a "Co-ordinating Body of Muslim Activities" 
(Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin) was formed, uniting 16 Islamic 
organizations which wanted to work toward a rehabilitation of the 
Masjumi. Among the supporters were also a few :lrmy officers who, 
according to Samson, were hoping to see the power of the N.U. restricted, 
realizing that the more modern-minded Muslims could no longer be 
counted out. (Perhaps it should be noted, however, that some senior 
officers were modern Muslims who felt a sympathy for Muhammadijah 
and Masjumi ideas). 
Af ter the elimination of Soekarno from active poli tics (from the 
moment of the "command" to Soeharto in the letter of March 11 th, 
1966) the ex-Masjumi leaders expected that the Masjumi would soon 
be allowed to begin its activities again, on the assumption th at they 
were the very people who had resisted Soekarno's Guided Democracy. 
From June 1966 onwards, many Islamic organizations, and in the first 
place the Muhammadijah, openly began to advocate the return of the 
Masjumi. How this took place at the huge "thanksgiving service" of 
August 14th, 1966, has already been described. 
On December 21st, 1966, a statement from the army officers was 
issued which was largely directed against Soekarno, in order to prevent 
further activities and intrigues on his part. This statement, however, 
at the same time stressed that the army "would take firm steps against 
anyone, whichever side, whatever group which will deviate from Pan tja 
Sila and the 1945 Constitution as which has already been done by the 
Communist Party Revolt in Madiun, Gestapu, Darul Islam... and 
Masjumi-Socialist Party of Indonesia ... " 28 
Thus the fate of the old Masjumi was sealed. The fact that Masjumi 
leaders were involved in the P.R.R.I. rising of 1958 appeared to be used 
as an argument for continuing the proscription. Was that the real and 
only reason? Some believe that the government did not want to see the 
rehabilitation of the Masjumi because of this party's leanings toward an 
Islamic State.29 In my opinion, however, these leanings are not a specific 
characteristic of the Masjumi. Could it be that this indictment was 
spread by certain anti-Masjumi circles, while the real motives of these 
circles were not matters of principle at all? 30 
28 Quoted or translated by Samson, Islam, p. 1,005, from a souree which he 
does not mention. 
29 Cf. Verkuyl, Momentopnamen, p. 222. 
30 Samson quotes an anti-N.U. informant, according to whom the N.U. later 
on started a rumour campaign with a similar accusation directed at the new 
Islamic party which took the place of the Masjumi (Islam, p. 1,012). 
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However that may be, the Masjumi followers now had to choose 
another way. Thanks to the "Co-operative Body", it was decided on 
April 7th, 1967, to found the Partai Muslimin lndonesia (initially 
abbreviated P.M.I., afterwards also Parmusi or Partai Muslimin), the 
"Party of Indonesian Muslims". This new party was obviously intended 
to he the continuation of the Masjumi under another name. The govern-
ment agreed, but certain army officers objected to an active participation 
of important ex-Masjumi leaders in the new party. Samson believes that 
Acting-President Soeharto at th at time would have liked to meet the 
wishes of the new party, but did not want to have difficulties with the 
army officers. 
On October 24th, 1967, Natsir decided to resign from the leadership 
of the new party. The provisional executive at that moment consisted 
of 30 members, 9 of whom were adherents of the Muhammadijah. On 
February 5th, 1968, Soeharto let it he known that no single ex-Masjumi 
leader was allowed to hold a leading position in the new Partai 
Muslimin.31 They would have to wait till the general elections had taken 
pI ace (which one month later, in March 1968, were postponed to 1971). 
This decision was a very great disappointment to the former adherents 
of the Masjumi. Would this new party have a chance to win the 
sympathy of Muslims, without ex-Masjumi leaders such as Natsir and 
Prawoto taking part in its activities? 
, Tension reached a climax at the first Congress of the new party, held 
from November 4th to 7th, 1968, in Malang (East Java).32 It became 
clear that the well-known Mohamad Roem would become chairman 
of the party. But at th at very moment a telegram from the government 
in Djakarta reminded them that the attitude of the government toward 
this question was unchanged. In other words, even Mohamad Roem was 
unacceptable to the government as chairman of this new Islamic party. 
This interference of the government provoked stormy reactions in the 
Muslim newspapers and magazines. Hatta, too, expressed cautious 
criticism.33 In 1969 even some non-Masjumi informants called this 
attitude of Soeharto and the army officers towards Mohamad Roem 
inexplicable, because this ex-Masjumi politician, originating from Java, 
certainly had nothing to do with the P.R.R.I. rising in 1958. In him the 
31 In Pandji Masjarakat, no. 35, November 1968, Prawoto Mangkusasmito 
gave information on this meeting with Soeharto held on February 5th, 1968. 
32 See Pandji Masjarakat, no. 35, November 1968; Samson's article was 
apparently written before that Congress. 
33 Cf. Pandji Masjarakat, no. 35, p. 9. 
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new party would have had a capable and moderate leader. With his 
leadership this party would probably have attained a great following 
and, like the Masjumi in former times, would likely have become the 
largest Islamic party. Such a party would probably also appeal to 
modern-minded youth, e.g. from the cirdes of the Islamic Student 
Movement H.M.I. 
We shall have to wait and see whether the Partai Muslimin under its 
present leaders, and despite its many internal tensions, can prove 
attractive to the people. The Muhammadijah openly urged its members 
to support the new party. lts first chairman was Djarnawi Hadiku-
sumo.34 He was a teacher and chairman of the political study committee 
of the Muhammadijah. We shall co me across his name again as the 
au thor of theological pamphlets concerning Christianity. General Secret-
ary of the party became Anwar Harjono, who wrote a doctor's thesis in 
1968 on Islamic law as the all-embracing and righteous law.35 Both 
appear to have a great interest in Islam as a religio-political system, but 
unlike Mohamad Roem they have little political experience, let alone 
being able to look back on a political career. 
Apart from this conflict concerning the former Masjumi, other 
developments occurred which also ended in a feeling of disappointment 
among the Muslims; Samson even spoke of "a growing frustration in the 
Islamic community".36 
One example of these disappointing developments is the renewed but 
barren struggle to give the Djakarta Charter of June 22nd, 1945, an 
official status. According to Samson, N.U. members as weil as Partai 
Muslimin followers "pressed for legalization of the Djakarta Charter 
as the preamble to the 1945 Constitution" during the session of the 
People's Congress in March 1968,37 but without success. The Islamic 
parties, according to Samson, still seem unable to influence national 
political decisions; in their disappointment they ding to "the myth of 
the numerical majority", in "the belief that if only everyone in Indo-
nesian society could express his will, Islam would be in the majority", 
34 A son of K. Bagus H. Hadikusumo, ex-chairman of the Muhanunadijah, 
who took part in the discussions surrounding the proclamation of the 
Republic (see Chapter I, par. 3-4). 
85 Anwar Harjono, Hukum Islam, keluasan dan keadilannja, Djakarta 1968. 
One of the propositions in this thesis runs: "Polities is the art of the possible 
plus X (X = God's eternal Decree)". 
36 Samson, Islam, p. 1,014. 
37 Samson, Islam, p. 1,012. 
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for "it is only a minority th at is thwarting the will of the majority".3S 
In th is connection the question may be posed of whether Muslims 
once again (as in 1955) are putting their hopes on the coming elections 
for Parliament and the People's Congress. Af ter the upheaval of 1965-
1966 these elections were announced for 1968. But during 1967 govern-
ment and Parliament could not agree on regulations for these elections. 
Hence it was decided that they should be postponed, but were to be 
held hefore July 5th, 1971. At the end of 1969 the necessary agreement 
was reached. According to oral information, the most important con-
ditions would be the following. Firstly, the fundamental principles of the 
state will no longer be under discussion and therefore may not appear in 
party programmes or in the election campaign (in other words, a new 
discussion on a "Pantjasila State" or an "Islamic State" must be 
avoided). Secondly, the same number of representatives must come from 
outside Java as from Java (to prevent new regional difficulties). Thirdly, 
of the 460 members of Parliament 100 will be appointed by the govern-
ment; of the 920 members of the People's Congress 307 will be appointed 
(among whom will be the 100 appointed members of Parliament) ; these 
appointed members will represent the so-called functional groups (army, 
police, intellectuals, etc.); the most important of these is, of course, the 
army. Fourthly, participation in the elections is only allowed for political 
parties registered before the end of 1969 (th us, for example, a new 
Socialist Party, let alone the Communist Party, cannot participate). 
These elections certainly promise to be interesting, and it will he 
especially interesting to see where the votes go of those who once voted 
Socialist or Communist. As in 1955, it may be expected that the elections 
will take place in an orderly way, without much intimidation or other 
irregularities. But due to the restrictions mentioned above, the coming 
elections probably cannot bring radical changes. Supposing that the 
Islamic parties on ce again (as in 1955) hope for victory on the basis 
of a nominal majority of Muslims, then these elections too may end in 
disappointment. 
At the beginning of 1969 various Muslim acquaintances said that one 
of the most disheartening problems of recent years was the tension 
between Muslims and Christians. Unfortunately the provocative behav-
iour of sects such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Seventh Day 
Adventists is of ten considered typical for "the Christians" in genera!. 
38 Samson, Islam, p. 1,013. 
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The obvious apostasy of nominal Muslims to Christianity, particularly 
in Java, has probably added to the trouble. These questions will be dealt 
with in the final chapter of this book. 
Vet another problem can be mentioned, which is connected with the 
"Five-Year Plan for Development" (Ind. Rentjana Pcmbangunan Lima 
Tahun, abbreviated to REPELITA or PELITA), intended for the years 
1969-1973. This also includes paragraphs concerning the promotion of 
religious activities: grants for the building of mosques and churches, the 
printing of the Scriptures, facilities for religious instruction, and so on. 
But it is laid down that all th is will have to be carried out "within the 
limits of what is possible". This will probably mean that Soeharto's 
government will be forced to restriet various kinds of expenditure, e.g. 
on behalf of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, which has always been 
very much in favour with Indonesian Muslims but con su mes a great deal 
of foreign currency.39 
In connection with the Five-Year Plan the question can sometimes be 
heard of whether the Muslim community would not withdraw and 
dissociate itself from the present government and th is Plan, in particular 
those Islamic groups which feIt disappointed because of the new govern-
men t's attitude toward Islam. At the beginning of 1969 I twice heard 
a serrnon given on Friday in a mosque; both times the duty of Muslims 
to exert themselves for the realization of the Five-Year Plan was stressed. 
Did these sermons show enthusiasm to participate in the government's 
programme, or rather the existence of a tendeney toward apathy? Samson 
concludes his article as follows. "Developmental efforts in Indonesia 
make cooperation between all meaningful groups essential. Although 
Islam is not a powerful enough political force to exereise predominant 
influence, it is too powerful to be disregarded... Given modernist 
Islam's orientation to development, no sustained developmental effort 
ean succeed without its support. A governmental policy that disregards 
Islamic desires may result in a eonservative and rigid reaction from the 
Islamic community which will nullify the present Islamic adaptation to 
modernization. The Islamic eommunity possesses genuine interests which 
must be fairly considered. Anything less courts economie stagnation and 
religio-political calamity." 40 
30 Cf. the pamphlet REPELITA, Pendjelasan Presiden Soeharlo Didepan 
BP-MPRS 29 Pebruari 1968, Djakarta 1968, p. 30. Compare Muskens, Indo-
nesië, p. 288. 
40 Samson, Islam, p. 1,017. 
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More symptoms of hope as weIl as of disappointment could be 
mentioned, but they wiIl be reserved for the final chapter of this book. 
At the end of this historical survey it can be concluded that af ter 
September 30th, 1965, a "third period" in the recent history of Islam 
in Indonesia began - a period which seemed to hold great opportunities 
and possibilities for the spread of Islam and the expansion of its influence 
on Indonesian society. But alongside an initial optimism, a feeling of 
disappointment soon arose, because things did not go as had been hoped. 
CHAPTER IV 
A PRELIMINARY STOCKTAKING 
In the first three chapters a historical survey has been given of 
developments in Indonesia since 1945 and the role of Islam as a 
constituent of contemporary political life in Indonesia. Against this 
background a preliminary stocktaking can be made of the most important 
activities and problems of the Islamic community in present-day Indo-
nesia. This means that we shall be dealing with those activities and 
problems which nowadays are topics of discussion among Indonesian 
Muslims and in Muslim publications. Reflecting on those activities and 
problems, we may then be able to perceive some characteristic tendencies 
of Islam in modern Indonesia. 
1. Political Topics 
Af ter the suppression of the "September 30th Movement" of 1965, 
the contrast between Islam and Communism became one of the most 
topical subjects of discussion. On this question, the well-known Professor 
H. M. Rasjidi wrote a pamphlet which can be taken as a typical 
example.1 Af ter a historical introduction, the elements of Marxism are 
described and criticized: the dialetic philosophy, historical materialism, 
Marx's opinions on economics, the state, revolution, class warfare, 
religion and ethics. The au thor stresses that Communism was able to 
emerge in the materialist, capitalist Western world, which had not yet 
seen the light of Islam. That held for Marx and Engels too. They were 
atheists (Arabic mul[zid, apostate, unbelieving). What is written in 
Sura 45 : 23-26 applied to them exactly. They believed that the heaven 
of a classless society could be established on this earth. Islam, however, 
considers the life to come as the real life (Sura 29 : 64 and 93 : 4). That 
does not mean that we may turn away from th is world and be interested 
exclusively in the life to come (see Sura 28 : 77). 
1 H. M. Rasjidi, Islam Menentang Komunisme, Djakarta 1966, based on a 
lecture to ulamas in Djakarta, November 29th, 1965. 
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Communism did not anse as a mass-movement of poor workers, 
but as a philosophy which was made possible by three centuries of 
increasing secularization, i.e. the setting aside of religion. This philosophy 
can only be overcome by a doctrine radically opposed to it, the doctrine 
of Islam. The ex-premier of Syria, the late Faris al-Khouri, once chair-
man of the Security Council of the United Nations and himself a 
Christian, agreed that only Islam could stop Communism in Indonesia. 
The events of September 30th, 1965, showed the Communists in their 
true colours; they kiIIed a number of army officers and had already 
made preparations to massacre religious leaders. Af ter the victory over 
the Communists and the proscription of the Communist Party, the 
spiritual vacuum must be filled by Islam, the religion of 90 % of the 
Indonesian people. The precepts of Islam ought to be put into practice, 
especially those concerning social justice (e.g. by the zakät and other 
alms). Muslims must exert themselves by performing good works for the 
welfare of society, so that Communism wiII get no chance to revive. 
In an appendix to this pamphlet we find the text of Soekarno's letter 
of March 11 th, 1966, in which authority was handed over to General 
Soeharto as weIl as the text of Soeharto's order for the dissolution and 
proscription of the Communist Party (March 12th, 1966) and the text 
of the order to other parties and organizations not to receive ex-
Communists into their fold (March 14th, 1966). 
As has al ready been said, the extermination of the "GestapujP.K.I." 
was considered by Islamic leaders as the great victory of Islam in Indo-
nesia. To what extent did the hope revive that perhaps the ideal of an 
Islamic State could now be realized? It soon turned out, however, that 
the army would resist every group, including right-wing ones, which 
deviated from the Pantjasila as the basis of the Indonesian Republic. 
It was al ready becoming clear in 1966 that the army would not all ow 
any new discussion on the idea of an Islamic State. Moreover, Islamic 
leaders themselves were said to have become aware that the unity of 
Indonesia could only be ensured on the basis of the Pantjasila. In 
military circles it could be heard that certain Christian areas (Tapanuli 
and North Sulawesi) were "strategically dangerous", that is to say, they 
were so far-oH that a rebellious or separatist movement could easily 
arise, should an Islamic State be proclaimed. One of my most important 
informants put it this way: "The founding of an Islamic State is im-
possible; now we have really accepted the Pantjasila as the basis of the 
Republic; the problem which we are now facing is: how shall we imbue 
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the Pantjasila with the teachings of Islam?" 
In this situation Muslims turned on ce again to the Djakarta Charter 
of 1945 and its famous "seven words". In the years prior to September 
30th, 1965, this Charter was already being pushed forward in various 
publications. 2 Apparently a new discussion on the Djakarta Charter in 
the June-July session of the People's Congress of 1966 was prevented 
because it was spread about in the lobbies beforehand that the army 
would not allow such a debate. A new attempt was made during the 
session of February-March 1967, when the only point on the agenda 
was the deposition of President Soekarno and the appointment of 
General Soeharto as Acting-President. But the attempt to add some 
Muslim demands to the agenda - e.g. th at the President must be a 
Muslim and the state should be based on Islam - was rejected.3 As 
has been said, according to Samson, once again "legalization of the 
Djakarta Charter as the preamble to the 1945 Constitution" was pressed 
for in the session of March 1968.4 
Af ter 1965 it has of ten been stressed by Muslims th at the "seven 
words" of the Djakarta Charter hold good only for Muslims, so that 
non-Muslims do not have to worry about it. Furthermore, it is of ten 
said that a legalization of the Djakarta Charter would definitely not 
result in an Islamic State. One informant put it as follows: "Actually 
we do not talk any more about an Islamic State, but at best about an 
Islamic society; such an Islamic society can be attained by the realization 
of Islamic law or certain elements of it in Indonesian society, on the basis 
of the Djakarta Charter". 
The struggle to realize the shar'iCa (Islamic law) in Indonesia was 
originally regarded as a struggle for a formal proclamation of an Islamic 
State, by deciding first that "This is to be an Islamic State".5 It appeared 
mainly to be a dispute about formulas, words, a label, a banner. Sup-
posing such a proclamation had been carried through, then it would have 
turned out - as in Pakistan - that the real problems became manifest 
afterwards, i.e. when trying to make Islamic law operative in state and 
society. 
2 For example, Achmad Sanusi, Islam, Revolusi dan Masjarakat, Bandung 
1965; H. A. Notosoetardjo, Peranan Agama Islam dalam Revolusi Indonesia, 
Djakarta 1964; H. Aminuddin Aziz, Islam dan Tjetusan Revolusi Indonesia, 
Djakarta 1963 (on behalf of the Executive Board of the N.U.). 
3 Verkuyl, Momentopnamen, pp. 219-220. 
4 Cf. Chapter 111, par. 3. 
5 Cf. Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 162. 
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In recent years a shift has taken place in the opinion of many Muslims. 
They wanted to make a start from another angle, so to speak from below, 
not by the proclamation of a theoretical Islamic State but by striving for 
a practical application of certain precepts of the sharïCa in society, 
proceeding from the "seven words" of the Djakarta Charter. What 
these "seven words" would actually involve is usually not very clearly 
defined. According to some, the "obligation for adherents of Islam 
to practise Islamic law" would include religious duties in a narrower 
sense (ibädät, such as prayer, fasting, etc.). According to others, this 
clause has to result in the government's promulgating special laws for 
the Muslims (e.g. marriage laws) in agreement with the shar'iCa. 
Many Islamic leaders stress that actually it is no langer necessary to 
debate the question of the legalization of the Djakarta Charter. They 
argue that th is document was already sanctioned by President Soekarno's 
Decree of July 5th, 1959 concerning the return to the 1945 Constitution. 
In the "considerations" of this Decree it was laid down that the Djakarta 
Charter "inspired the 1945 Constitution and is linked in unity with that 
Constitution". In other words, according to many Muslims, the signifi-
cance of the Djakarta Charter was already officially recognized on 
July 5th, 1959. Thus it was indeed possible to make special laws for 
the Muslim part of the population on this legal basis. To this end 
Parliament could now pass further resolutions with a norm al majority 
of votes. The difficulty of obtaining a two-thirds majority, as occurred 
formerly in the Constituent Assembly, would thus be avoided. 
A more moderate comment was given by Mohamad Roem in a 
Commemoration Day Lecture at the Islamic University in Medan in 
February 1967.6 He stressed that Muslims are obliged to keep Islamic 
law, whether or not the Djakarta Charter was included in the preamble 
of the 1945 Constitution or in President Soekarno's Decree. "This 
obligation holds good for everyone who calls himself a Muslim." It is 
"an obligation not in a 'legal' sense, with legal consequences which could 
be enforced but an obligation in the religious sense. It depends on the 
person concerned, to what extent he keeps Islamic law. In th is respect 
he will have to answer to God ... The Djakarta Charter possesses 
permanent significance, not in alegal sense, but all the more so in a 
spiritual sense." In other words, according to Mohamad Roem, whether 
6 The text of this speech can be found in Pandji Masjarakat, nos. 11, 12, 13, 
March-April 1967; conceming the Djakarta Charter, see in particular no. 13, 
pp. 8-9. 
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Muslims keep Islamic law or not has actually nothing to do with the 
government; in this sense the Djakarta Charter is of no legal con se-
quence; but the permanent religious significance of the Djakarta 
Charter, mentioned in the Decree of 1959, is that Muslim citizens are 
explicitly reminded of their responsibility to God to keep Islamic law. 
Of course there are also Muslims now - particularly outside Islamic 
parties and organizations - who fear that an actual legalization of the 
Djakarta Charter could lead to the "fanaticism" against which Hoesein 
Djajadiningrat and Wongsonegoro had warned on July llth, 1945.7 
Many Muslims and nominal Muslims, especially in Java, eagerly quote 
in this connection the words la ikrahä lï 'd-dïn (there is no compulsion 
in religion; Sura 2 : 256) to justify their lukewarm attitude. Muslim 
theologians, however, are apt to point out that these words only concern 
the Muslim attitude toward non-Muslims. Islamic law, however, is 
incumbent on anyone who calls himself a Muslim; and according to 
many Islamic leaders th is would be applicable to 90 % of the Indonesian 
people. It may be this kind of "fanaticism" that nominal Muslims are 
afraid of. Moreover, "compulsion" may not officially be exerted by the 
authorities, but it might weil be carried out in the form of an inevitable 
social con trol from the Muslim community, especially in a strictly Islamic 
area. 
In any case it can be stated th at in the ideological dispute on the 
basis of the state - "Pantjasila" or "Islam" - a gradual shift has taken 
place insofar as Muslims no longer strive openly for the proclamation 
of an Islamic State (whatever that might be). The question is now being 
approached from a different angle, by trying to put into operation 
certain "elements" of Islamic law, partly through legal regulations by 
the government, proceeding from the "seven words" in the Djakarta 
Charter of 1945. 
In connection with these topics, attention should be paid to certain 
publications in Indonesian. For instance, the Indonesian translation of a 
pamphlet by M. F. Hoballah (Al-Azhar, Cairo) on Democracy and 
Islamic Law is of interest. 8 According to this author, the four fundamen-
tal sources of Islamic jurisprudence are the Qur'än, Tradition, ~iyiis 
(analogy, parity of reasoning) and I djtihäd (the use of individu al 
reasoning, based on one's own examination of the religious sources). 
7 Cf. Chapter I, par. 3. 
8 M. F. Hoballah, Demokrasi dan Hukum Islam, Surabaja 1966. 
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The Qur'än and Tradition only give some general principles for poli tics 
(e.g. the "mutual deliberation" from Sura 42 : 38). The third and 
fourth sourees are proof that much is Ie ft for man himself to decide. 
In other words, the democracy of Islam is extremely flexible; there 
are only a few fixed, eternal principles, but as far as the rest IS con-
cerned, the form of the state and questions of legislation are left to 
human reasoning. 
Before 1965 the Indonesian author Moh. Sjafaat had already written 
in a similar vein on Democracy and the Teachings of Islam.9 This 
writer, however, put more emphasis on the excellence of Islamic 
principles above all others for the construct ion of a democratic state. 
Moreover, he had to suit the "democracy of Islam" at that moment to 
Soekarno's Guided Democracy.!o 
The Egyptian professor, the late cAbd al-J}:ädir cOda, whose writings 
enjoy considerable authority in some Indonesian circles, was much more 
rigid. His book on Islam and Legislation has already been translated, 
while another, on the application of the shariCa to economics, is being 
prepared by Professor Kahar Muzakkir of the Islamic University in 
Jogjakarta. cOda, a follower of the Egyptian Ikhwän al-Muslimûn, 
objected strongly to all "human law-giving", as Islamic law provides 
precepts for every aspect of life and society.!1 
As regards earlier publications, there is apparently a new interest in 
Ibn Khaldün's writings. An anthology from his Mu~addima ("Prole-
gomena") has already been published in Indonesian, while a complete 
translation in six volumes is in course of preparation. l2 Osman Raliby 
translated special passages from Ibn Khaldün on society and state. l3 
This interest is apparently bound up with the convict ion th at one need 
not look to the West for a sociological approach to topical problems, 
9 Moh. Sjafaat, Demokrasi dan Adjaran Islam, Bandung 1963. 
10 Compare K. H. Idham Chalid, Islam dan Demokrasi Terpimpin, Surabaja 
(1961?), a Commemoration Day lecture at the N.U. University by the th en 
Minister of Religion. 
11 Abdulkadir Audah, Islam dan Perundang-undangan, Djakarta 19591, 19653• 
According to the foreword by the translator, the author took an active part 
in the revolution against King Farouk's regime (1952); he was then 
commissioned to draft a new Egyptian constitution, but as a result of 
defamation of character he was executed by hanging on December 8th, 1954. 
See, however, Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed., 111, p. 1069. 
12 Ibn Chaldun, Filsafat Islam Tentang Sedjarah, Pilihan dari Muqaddimah, 
Djakarta 1962. The complete Mu~addima edition is being prepared in an 
Indonesian translation by Mukti Ali. 
13 Osman Raliby, Ibnu Chaldun tentang Masjarakat dan Negara, Djakarta 
1963. 
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as relevant sources can also be found in Islamic history. Among these 
are the works of Ibn Khaldün (1332-1406), considered by Muslims as 
the "father of sociology",14 
In 1964 a translation of al-Färäbi's Al-M ad'ina al-F Q(j,ïla (the ideal 
state) appeared by Z. A. Ahmad, who himself had already published 
a book on the ideal of an Islamic State,15 Earlier publications which 
on ce more drew attention are, for instance, the English-Indonesian 
pamphlet "Pakistan, the Struggle of a Nation" and the translations of 
two booklets by Muhammad Asad, alias Leopold Weiss, "Islamic Con-
stitution Making" and "The Principles of State and Governmcnt in 
Islam".16 This au thor also tends to emphasize that Islam is very flexible 
with re gard to these questions and that many forms of an Islamic State 
are possible, each one adapted to a certain country, for, apart from a 
few principles and moral precepts, the details of an Islamic government 
can be left to the modern idjtihad of people in a certain age and area. 
When studying the content of some of these publications, the question 
can be put as to whether it might in fact be possiblc for Muslims, 
nominal Muslims and non-Muslims to agree on principles such as 
indicated by Hoballah and Muh. Asad. The discussion, however, 
frequently remains enmeshed in formal terms and slogans. Of course 
there are still traditional ulamas who believe that Islamic law offers a 
complete recipe which can be applied in our age without any difficulty 
(perhaps because in fact they themselves do not see the problerns of 
modern life). But is it not possible th at others, speaking of "Islamic 
principles" such as democracy and social justice, actually mean the same 
thing as certain nominal Muslims and non-l\-fuslims? In other words, to 
what extent is political discussion in Indonesia threatened by a sterile 
verbalism? 
It is perhaps useful to no te that in Indonesian Muslim publications -
in contrast to Western books on Islam - generally the term "theocracy" 
is not used for the Islamic idea of a state. The word theokrasi is mostly 
used in an unfavourable sense, that is to say, to rcfer to a government 
controlled by priests or a state in which the religious leaders dominate 
14 It may he noted that among the many private universities in Djakarta there 
is also an "Ibn Khaldun University" (furthermore, for example, a "Muham-
madijah University" and even a "Djojobojo University"). 
15 Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Negara Utama (al-Farabi), Djakarta 1964; Ahmad, 
Kansepsi. 
16 Pakistan, the Struggle af a Natian, by Roesli DMB, Solo 1956; Muhammad 
Asad, Undang-undang Palitik Islam, Djakarta 1954; idem, Azas2 Negara dan 
Pemerintahan didalam Islam, Djakarta 1964. 
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the ruler (as, for example, the Pope in the Middle Ages). I t is not this 
sort of "theocracy" which is considered characteristic of an Islamic 
State, but the realization of the sharïca, which according to modern 
Muslims first and foremost stresses the principle of "mutual deliberation". 
The Indonesian au thor T. M. Usman el-Muhammady is an exception 
to this rule; by piling up Western terms and formulas, which make his 
writings difficult to read, he does not hesitate to use the term theokrasi 
Islam as wel1.1 7 
2. Partial Realization of Islamic Law 
As was said in the above paragraph, many Islamic leaders no longer 
strive for an official Islamic State, but now want to begin from another 
angle, by infusing society with Islamic precepts and thus working toward 
a gradual Islamization of the country. Moreover, nowadays many of 
them no longer speak of "Islamic law" in general, but only of a partial 
realization of it, i.e. of certain "elements" (Ind. unsur-unsur) of Islamic 
law, through regulations made by the government. Traditionally priority 
is given to the area of family law, including regulations concerning 
marriage, divorce by repudiation and the law of inheritance. 
In a comparison between jurisprudence in Egypt and Indonesia, Noto-
susanto, professor in Jogja, suggested in 1953 that in Indonesia one 
Civil Code for all citizens, irrcspective of origin and religion, should be 
made, with the exception, however, of marriage law. In this field 
separate regulations for the various religious groups would have to be 
made, while a new law should also be made for groups who did not yet 
have their own marriage regulations (e.g. Buddhists),18 
But here too problems immediately arise when theory is to be put into 
practice; some examples are the position of adat law with regard to 
Islamic law 19 and the differences between the various traditional schools 
of law (madhähib, sing. madhhab). One of my informants, a Muslim 
scholar, said: "Of course we all want the realization of Islamic law, but 
17 T. M. Usman el-Muhammady, Pembangunan Djiwa-Negara dan Kebudajaan 
Islam (Kultuur, Politis dan Sociologis) , Djakarta 195 P, 19532 ; cf. pp. 
161-162. 
18 Notosoesanto, Sedikit tentang Peradilan Perdata di Mesir, Jogjakarta 1953 
(?), p. 13. 
19 See J. Prins, Adat en Islamietische Plichtenleer in Indonesië, Bandung 19604 
(thesis Leiden 1948) and no te the remark made by J. Schacht, An Intro-
duction to Islamic Law, Oxford 1964, p. 62: " ... custom and customary 
law have coexisted with the ideal theory of Islamic law, while remaining 
outside its system, in the whole of the Islamic world". 
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which one?" (i.e., according to which school of law?). With regard to 
the application of the sharïca, he mentioned five groups of scholars : 
a. Those who exclusively want to stick to the Shäficï school of law, 
probably a diminishing number of ol der ulamas, who, however, are 
still powerful, particularly in the religious courts; 
b. A group of schol ars who are also prepared to make use of the three 
other schools (I:Ianafi, Mälikï, I:Ianbalï) when their regulations are 
to be preferred to those of the Shäficï school; 
c. Those who, moreover, want to use certain opinions held by earlier 
(now extinct) schools of law, e.g. concerning a literal or symbolical 
interpretation of some verses of the Qur'än; 
d. Those who adhere to the "new idjtihäd", "as for example Hasbi 
Ash-Shiddiqy and Professor Hazairin and in fact most members of 
the Muhammadijah, although this association has never made an 
official pronouncement on the question"; 
e. Even more extreme is the group of those who want to go back to the 
Qur'än as the only source of religious law, and leave the decision to 
the individu al in all cases which are not provided for in the Qur'än. 
This informant was inclined to draw the negative conclusion : "If it is 
up to ourselves to arrive at solutions, the Muslim community will never 
reach an agreement". 
Af ter the questions of family law, regulations concerning the collection 
and use of the zakät (alms-tax) have to be mentioned. In 1969 a student 
of an Islamic university eXplained the matter in this way: "At present 
we do not talk about an Islamic State, but only about the realization of 
some elements of Islamic law, in accordance with the Djakarta Charter; 
the sequence of elements of Islamic law which we want to see regulated 
by the government depends on the situation and the tactics to be followed 
at a certain moment: first of all, for instance, marriage legislation, later 
on perhaps the zakät, then the extension of the cognizance of religious 
courts, e.g. with regard to questions of inheritance and wa~af (pious 
foundations), and so on". 
During the conferring of a doctor's degree on Anwar Harjono (the 
first General Secretary to the new Islamic political party) at the Islamic 
University of Djakarta, he complained th at in the colonial period 
Islamic regulations concerning marriage and inheritance could more or 
Iess be carried out, wh ere as at the moment it was not possible to agree 
even on a new marriage law. He had studied the Qur'än and Tradition, 
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in order to discover those Islamic precepts which could be realized in 
society at this time. He was prepared to consider the opinions of the 
four Imams of the official schools of law important material, but stressed 
that according to these Imams themselves it was not wrong to develop 
new ideas, based on the Qur'än and Tradition. One of the propositions 
in his thesis runs as follows: "The precepts concerning zakät, walfaf and 
hiba (donation) ought to get priority in legislation, as a contribution 
to achieving more quickly a just and prosperous Indonesian society".20 
As far as the zakàt is concerned, President Soeharto made a remark-
able move in 1968. On October 26th he urged his Muslim countrymen 
to show th at they were able to take concrete steps in the direction of 
progress, by making generous contributions when paying this religious 
tax. He declared himself prepared to see to the collection of zakilt and 
called on the Muslims to send him their money-orders for th is pur-
pose. The President himself opened the zakät account with a gift of 
100,000 Rp., and certainly many large sums flowed in. In order to 
prevent misunderstanding, it was afterwards eXplained that the sum 
collected would not be used to cover the national debt, but would be 
allotted to social and educational purposes (e.g. Islamic orphanages 
and educational institutions) .21 
With regard to other "elements" of Islamic law which Muslims want 
to see regulated by the government, the only concrete attempt was the 
draft of a new marriage law, on the preparation of which a government 
appointed committee had been working for many years. Until then there 
had been only marriage regulations dating from the colonial period. 
According to these regulations the marriage of Muslims had to take place 
under the supervision of the Penghulu (the head of the mosque per-
sonnel) in his position as state registrar of marriages. Problems connected 
with Muslim marriages and divorce by repudiation were solved by 
jurisprudence, based on the filfh books (i.e. on the doctrines) of certain 
Islamic scholars, in the case of Indonesia those belonging to the Shäfici 
school. A "secular" wedding at a registry-office was always rejected by 
the Islamic leaders. This meant in fact that everyone who was considered 
a Muslim had to marry in an Islamic way. Even those who considered 
themselves Hindus or Buddhists married this way; they accepted Muslim 
20 Anwar Harjono, /-Iukum Islam, p. 274; cf. Pandji Masjarakat, no. 24, pp. 
6-7, where a short biography of Anwar Harjono is also given. 
21 According to inforrnation in the lndonesian daily Djakarta Times of 26-10-
1968, 27-11-1968, 16-12-1968. 
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marriage ceremonies as a formality which simply could not be avoided, 
as other possibilities did not exist. Amongst the Communists in the years 
prior to September 30th, 1965, it had become usual to marry at one 
of the offices of the party. Thus within some mystical Javanese groups 
(the so-called aliran kebathinan) marriage also took place according to 
their own rules, even with the use of their own marriage certificates.22 
The draft laid before Parliament on September 7th, 1968 was not yet 
a complete marriage law, but only a "bill of the fundamental principles 
of marriage". These principles induded the age of the partners, rights 
and duties of husband and wife, rights and duties of parents and children, 
community of goods obtained af ter the wedding, and so on. The 
procedure proposed was to accept first these "fundamental principles" 
and then draft separate marriage laws for groups of people belonging to 
different faiths. The dosing articles of this bill were therefore the most 
important ones. "The marriage contract for Islamic, Catholic, Protestant, 
Hindu-Buddhist and other communities (umat-umat) and for mixed 
marriages will be regulated in separate laws" (art. 38). "Conditions 
in this law do not nullify what will be stipulated in the special marriage 
laws for the separate religious groups" (art. 39). 
The bill was debated in Parliament in October-November 1968, and 
defended by the Ministers of Justice and Religious Affairs. One of the 
points energetically discussed was the problem of polygamy. Artide 3 
of the bill ran as follows: "1. In principle marriage is monogamous; 
2. Exceptions can be made when permitted by the law which regulates 
marriage contracts for the group concerned". In other words, in the 
marriage law to be made for Muslims polygamy could be accepted, 
albeit with certain limitations and on certain conditions. In the debate 
on polygamy it was mainly the female members of Parliament who 
took part. 23 On the one hand th is principle was criticized as being out 
of place in a modern state. Many agree that polygamy will gradually 
disappear as a result of modernization, so that it would be better for 
the time being to stick to the aId regulatians than to make a new 
22 So, for example, within the "Original Javanese Religion of the Republic of 
Indonesia" (Ind. Agama Djawa Asli Republik Indonesia, abbreviated 
A.D.A.R.I.) and within the "Budha Djawi" sect, two of about 40 groups 
which forrned a subject of research for students of the I.A.I.N. at Jogja, 
under their lecturer K. Karnil Kartapradja. The results of this fieldwork 
were stencilled for private use: K. Kamil Kartapradja, Aliran-aliran Keba-
thinan di Indonesia, 2 Vol., Jogjakarta 1968. Cf. Vol. II, pp. 161 and 236. 
23 Djakarta Times cornrnented (28-10-1968): Only the women seem to be 
interested in a marriage law, the men probably only in marriage. 
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marriage law in which polygamy is still recognized. 24 On the other hand, 
however, it was just some fe male representatives of Islamic parties who 
defended polygamy, saying, for instance, that countless children would 
not know who their fathers were, should polygamy be prohibited.25 
One of the objections to the proposed principles - although less 
explicitly debated - may have been the remaining link of the wedding 
to a certain religious institution and the lack of an alternative possibility 
for a "secular" wedding. The Islamic marriage law, to be made later, 
would he applied to all those who statistically could be considered 
Muslims (90 % of the population?), and a Christian marriage law to 
the Christians; in both cases those who otherwise never entered a 
mosque or a church would have to be married with a religious ceremony. 
All things considered, it became cIear that in Parliament there was too 
much resistance to these fundamental principles which were to precede 
a new marriage law, so the propos al did not come to the vote, but was 
withdrawn by the Ministers concerned in order to be perfected. As far as 
I know, this means that it has been put into cold storage. This, then, 
was the disappointing result of one attempt to put into official practice 
just one element of Islamic law. 
In connection with farnily law, attention must be paid here to the 
work of Hazairin, professor of Adat law and Islamic law in the University 
24 Concerning the question of polygamy, an interesting hook was edited by 
Solichin Salam, Menindjau Masalah Polygami, Djakarta 1959, based on an 
inquiry in which 200 specialists were asked for their opinions. Articles by 
26 of them were included in the hook, as weil as some statistical material 
concerning marriage, divorce and polygamy in Indonesia during the years 
1951-1957. To give some impression of the figures I quote the following 
examples. During 1957 the mosque officials in West Java registered 302,506 
marriages, 172,472 divorces and 11,474 revocations of repudiation; this 
produeed registration-charges to an amount of 8,024,370 Rp. (at that time 
worth about 250,000 U.S. dollars, probably an important souree of income 
for the mosque staff). Figures for polygamy in the same year and eoneerning 
the same province are as follows: two wives, 20,796; three, 626; and four, 82. 
Statisties for the year 1956 and conceming the whole of Indonesia show a 
total number of 390,063 divorees; 123,734 oecurred at the instanee of the 
husband, 88,295 at the instanee of the wife and 178,034 at the instanee of 
both partners. Reasons given for these divorees were as follows: economie 
difficulties (118,020), dereliction of duty (87,378), incompatibility (84,809), 
physical reasons (51,741), taking a second wife (39,228), differenees of 
political opinion (7,951), other reasons (936). 
25 Djakarta Times, 26-10-1968. 
CHAPTER IV: STOCKTAKING 169 
of Indonesia in Djakarta.26 His opinions are a good illustration of the 
attempt to begin "from another angle", not by striving for a formal 
proclamation of an Islamic State but by aiming at a partial realization 
of Islamic law for Muslim citizens. 
Hazairin has specialized in family law, in particular the laws of 
inheritance. He has come to conclusions which are rejected by many 
conservatives but may nevertheless become of great significance through 
his pupils, among whom are many lawyers and judges. Summarized 
briefly, his opinions are as follows. 
Hazairin strongly criticizes the so-called "reception theory" (theorie 
receptie), "which was created by the Dutch colonial authorities to hinder 
the progress of Islam in Indonesia". What he means is the limitation 
of the competency of the religious judges to disputes which from of old 
were considered by the population as falling under religious jurisdiction. 
According to Hazairin, this policy of the colonial government meant 
that "Islamic law was not considercd law; Islamic law could only be 
recognized as law if it had already become adat law" (i.e. if a 
"reception" or assimilation had taken place of Islamic provisions into 
the social life of a certain ethnic group). "This diabolical theory meant 
th at people could sin against the precepts of the Qur'än and the Sunna 
(normative custom) of the Prophet (e.g. sexually), but went unpunished 
as long as their behaviour did not conflict with the adat. This is not 
acceptable for a Muslim. The Islamic law as such must be recognized as 
law." According to Hazairin, this was agreed by the signatories of the 
Djakarta Charter of 1945. 
To prevent misunderstanding, it must be added that Hazairin is one 
of the most radical adherents of the "new idjtihäd". According to him, 
Indonesian society differs sharply from Arab society within which 
Islamic jurisprudence developed. Since 1950 Hazairin has become more 
and more convinced that the Qur'än is adverse to any unilateral 
organized society, i.e. a society consisting of clans following a matrilineal 
or patrilineal system of kinship. He therefore felt free to advocate the 
2(1 Cf. the short rernark on Hazairin's work in Prins, Adat, pp. 89-90. Hazairin's 
most important publications on these questions are the foUowing: Ilmu 
Pengetahuan Islam dan Masjarakat, Djakarta 1951; Hukum Islam dan 
Masjarakat, Djakarta 19521, 19633 ; Hukum Kewarisan Bilateral menurut 
Qur'ltn dan ijadïth, Djakarta 19581, 19643 ; Hendak Kemana Hukum Islam?, 
Djakarta 1960; ij adïth Kewarisan dan Sistim Bilateral, Djakarta 1962; 
Hukum Kekeluargaan Nasional, Djakarta 19621, 19682 ; the lastmentioned 
publication, 2nd. edition, contains an extensive working paper with a draft 
for apossibie new Iaw of inheritance. 
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creation of a genuine Indonesian school of law (madhhab Indonesia) 
alongside the four mediaeval schools, an idea which has also been put 
forward by Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy. According to such an Indonesian 
madhhab, family law and in particular the law of inheritance could 
proceed from a "bilateral-parental system". This would not be in conflict 
with the Qur'än and Tradition. (With regard to religious duties in a 
narrower sense, i.e. duties to God or ibädät, the Shäfici school could be 
maintained). According to Hazairin, the significance of the Islamic 
universities and other institutions of advanced Islamic education is that 
they can produce the necessary mudjtahid-baru, i.e. the scholars who, 
using the "new idjtihäd", will come to a new interpretation of Islamic 
law as needed in modern Indonesia. 27 
In 1963 Hazairin defended his opinions in a public debate against 
Mahmud Junus and Toha Jahja Omar.28 Mahmud Junus in particular 
is a well-known adherent of the four orthodox schools or, in fact, the 
Shäficï school of law. 29 
As mentioned above, Hazairin also wants to stick to the clause in the 
Djakarta Charter concerning "the obligation for adherents of Islam to 
practise Islamic law". According to Hazairin, these "seven words" do 
not refer to acts of worship (ibädät) , let alone official supervision of their 
performance, but refer to questions with which every government always 
and everywhere is concerned, in particular marriage, divorce and in-
heritance. In these cases Indonesian legislation must proceed from 
Islamic family law, expounded by an Indonesian madhhab, and deciare 
those regulations to be valid for and to be maintained by Muslim citizens. 
If Christians wanted to, they could ask for ChrÏstian or Biblical precepts 
to be made law for the Christian community in Indonesia. According to 
Hazairin, these ideas have nothing to do with an Islamic State. An 
Islamic State can only be founded by Muslims. The Indonesian people 
does not consist only of Muslims, and even the Djakarta Charter was 
also signed by one non-Muslim. So Hazairin's aim is not an Islamic 
State but only a rejection of the so-called "reception theory" which 
hindered the development of Islamic jurisprudence. That theory now 
has to be replaced by the application of certain "elements" of Islamic 
law for Muslims, interpreted by an Indonesian madhhab and based on 
the "new idjtihäd". 
27 Quotations from Hazairin, Hukum Kekeluargaan, p. 4 ff. 
28 Perdebatan dalam Seminar Hukum Nasional tentang Faraid, Djakarta 1964. 
29 Cf. Mahmud Junus, Hukum Perkawinan dalam Islam,. menurut mazhab: 
Sjafici, Hanafi, Maliki dan Hanbali, Djakarta 19561, 19643 ; idem, Turutlah 
Hukum Warisan dalam Islam, Djakarta 19581, 19622• 
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Together with Hazairin, the name of Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy has been 
mentioned above. The latter recently published a booklet entitled 
Baital Mal (the "treasury" or "Ministry of Finance"). 30 The author 
wants to show that Islamic law contains all kinds of elements necessary 
for the organization of the revenue and expenditure of the state. Af ter 
a few words on the historical background of this bait al-mäl - created 
by Umar, the second Caliph, and based on Sura 12 : 55 - sixteen types 
of revenue or tax are listed. Moreover the flexibility of Islamic law is 
stressed by stating that the ülü 'l-amri (Sura 4: 59, read: "Parliament") 
is free to make the necessary fiscal laws, providing they do not conflict 
with the revealed law. Number 10 on the list is the djizja (poll-tax) 
which according to Islamic law is to be paid by "those who have been 
defeated in war and have surrendered, but who want to keep their old 
religion and refuse to accept Islam". 
When reading this pamphlet one wonders whether the author only 
wanted to make a historical contribution, or whether he believes that 
all these elements of Islamic law are still relevant to modern Indonesia. 
If even the djizja is considered of importance, should we not conclude 
that the au thor apparently advocates an Islamic State? 
In an interview I had with Professor Hasbi he vigorously denied such 
an interpretation, adding the following explanation. "You cannot turn 
the clock back! Non-Muslims in Indonesia are recognized as full citizens 
like any others. This cannot he ignored. As you know, I am a supporter 
of the "new idjtihäd" and even advocate the creation of our own 
madhhab. That is to say, in Indonesia we have to proceed from the 
Indonesian situation, and can only use those elements of Islamic law 
which are suited to modern Indonesia. Muslims who, for example, live 
in Holland ought to look there for an interpretation of Islamic precepts 
which suit the situation there. It is for this reason that I not only speak 
of an Indonesian madhhab - like Hazairin - but of national madhhabs, 
suited for us in Indonesia, for Muslims in Holland, and so on." 
These then are some ideas of Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy, who certainly enjoys 
considerable authority in Indonesia as an ulama, just as Hazairin does 
as a schol ar. 
This paragraph can be concluded with a few remarks on the religious 
courts, which are concerned with day-to-day questions of Islamic law 
(e.g. with regard to marriage and divorce or repudiation). The following 
30 Cf. Chapter I, par. 8. 
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data are chiefly based on publications and aral information from 
Professor Notosusanto of Gadjah Mada University in Jogjakarta. 31 
In comparison with the former millet system in Egypt, Indonesian 
jurisdiction was less complicated. Before 1956 there existed in Egypt 
an Islamic Court and separate millet councils for each religious com-
munity (millet or milla) alongside the ordinary courts of law. But along-
side the ordinary courts in Indonesia there were only separate courts 
for Muslim affairs, not for other religious communities. In the colonial 
period these so-called religious courts (= Islamic courts) were supervised 
by the Ministry of Justice. Af ter 1945 the Republic kept the old legal 
system and almost the whole content of the former legal codes. On 
March 25th, 1946, however, the religious courts were transferred to the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs. Looking back, it must probably be said 
that this change was a mixed blessing; the danger arose of the courts 
becoming controlled by conservative opinion when the Ministry was 
controlled by conservatives. 
On June 8th, 1948 the Republican government promulgated a law 
on the re-organization of jurisdiction in a direction similar to develop-
ments in Egypt af ter 1956.32 The proposal for this change apparently 
came from certain circles in the Islamic University of Indonesia (U.I.I.) 
in Jogjakarta. According to this bill, religious jurisdiction would become 
part of the ordinary courts of law. Within these courts a special "religious 
chamber" would be created for religious (= Islamic) questions. The 
chairman would be a qualified lawyer - obviously a Muslim - and he 
would be assisted by two ulamas. They would be appointed by the 
President, af ter being nominated by the Minister of Religion in agree-
ment with the Minister of Justice. 
Unfortunately, this law was never enforced, probably due to the 
political situation. Also af ter the recognition of Independence th is law 
remained shelved. lts aim was to free the religious courts from conser-
vatism and the exclusive influence of Shäficï ulamas, as religious judges 
were (and are still) not trained at universities, but at institutions of a 
lower standard (Pendidikan Hakim Islam Negeri, P.H.I.N., i.e. a 
"Government Course for Islamic Judges"). At this level students are at 
best able to examine only Shäficï fi~h books. Moreover, this training and 
31 Notosusanto, Peradilan Agama Islam di Djawa dan Madura, Jogjakarta 
1953; idem, Sedikit tentang Peradilan Perdata di Mesir (already mentioned) ; 
idem, Organisasi dan Jurisprudensi Peradilan Agama di Indonesia, Jogja-
karta 1963. 
32 Notosusanto, Peradilan, pp. 13-14. 
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the appointment of teachers fall under the authority of the Minister of 
Religion, who also appoints the judges of religious courts. This means 
th at everything depends on the progressive or conservative attitude of 
the Minister concerned. A Minister belonging to the Nahdatul Ulama 
(N.U.) might appoint exclusively so-called madhhab people, i.e. defend-
ers of the authority of the four traditional schools of law or, in fact, 
followers of the Shäficï school. • 
With regard to the organization as weIl as the jurisdiction of religious 
courts, little change has taken place in modem Indonesia. The former 
colonial regulations concerning the "religious councils" and the "Court 
for Islamic Affairs" - promulgated in 1882, 1909, 1926 and 1937 for 
Java and Madura, and in 1937 for Sou th Kalimantan - remained 
fundamentally unchanged. The regional "religious councils" are now 
called Pengadilan Agama (Religious Court) or Mahkamah SjariCah 
(Court of Islamic law); the former "Court for Islamic Affairs" is now 
called Mahkamah Islam Tinggi, the High Court of Islamic Justice. 
For the other islands religious jurisdiction was regulated by a new 
law in 1957. The list of matters falling under the jurisdiction of religious 
courts seems to include more than the old regulations for Java and 
Madura. But according to Notosusanto, the adat law still has priority 
over Islamic law in the new regulations, so there is in fact no question 
of an extension of the field of religious jurisdiction. The Indonesian 
High Court of Justice found in 1960 that "throughout Indonesia as far 
as inheritance is concemed priority has to be given to the adat law, 
which in are as where the influence of Islam is strong has already 
assimilated some elements of Islamic law to a greater or lesser extent ... " ; 
therefore, "as far as inheritance is concemed, the right to give verdicts 
belongs to the ordinary court of law".33 
One problem which may be touched upon here is that a religious 
court is only authorized to act when both the plaintiff and defendant 
are Muslims. Thus the question arises of who then is a Muslim or when 
someone is to be considered a Muslim. Notosusanto gives four successive-
ly stricter definitions.34 Firstly, anyone reckoned among the Muslims in 
the general opinion of his fellow-citizens, who himself says or does not 
deny th at he is a Muslim and, for instance, has contracted marriage and 
wants to be buried in the Islamic way can be considered a Muslim. 
Secondly, anyone who willingly and sincerely pronounces the two sen-
33 Notosusanto, Organisasi, p. 34. 
34 Notosusanto, Peradilan, p. 27 ff.; Organisasi, p. 28 H. 
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tences of the Islamic profession of faith, i.e. I confess that there is no 
god but God and that Muhammad is His Messenger, can be considered a 
Muslim. Thirdly, someone is only considered a Muslim if he not only 
pronounces the Islamic profession of faith but also appears to have some 
knowledge of the tenets of Islam. Fourthly, someone is only considered 
a Muslim if he has not only same knowledge of Islam but also performs 
his religious duties, in particular prayer and fasting. Religious courts in 
Indonesia generally rely on the first and second definitions. 
As a preliminary conclusion it can be said that Islamic leaders in 
Indonesia are striving for the realization of some elements of Islamic 
law in state and society, but that in fact not much progress has yet been 
made. The struggle for a formal proclamation of an Islamic State has 
failed. Likewise the attempt to start from a different angle and to put 
Islamic principles into practice in at least some sectors of social life has 
turned out to be more difficult than was cxpected. 
3. Regional Endeavours: Atjeh 
Oul:$ide Atjeh it is of ten said th at the people of Atjeh are in fact 
trying to create an Islamic State within the Republic of Indonesia. 
According to some informants, Atjeh could weIl become a "pilot project" 
for the realization of Islamic law in other parts of Indonesia as weIl. 
According to others - including some Atjehnese informants living in 
Java - the attempts being made in Atjeh can only be made in Atjeh, 
because for the time being Atjeh is still a closed society where the 
modern world has as yet hardly penetrated. 
Coming from Java, one gets the impression that Atjeh is indeed a 
"special area" or "special territory" (daérah istiméwa), as it is called 
administratively. Atjehnese are indeed Muslims. Among the almost two 
million inhabitants there are a small number of non-Atjehnese (for 
instance, among the civil servants and trad ers ), some of whom are 
Christians. Furthermore, according to oral information, there are roughly 
5,000 inhabitants of Chinese birth left in Atjeh, af ter the Chinese 
foreigners had to leave the area some years ago. Recently about 2,000 of 
them chose to become Muslims, while 1,000 wanted to become Christians. 
Atjehnese informants are wont to emphasize th at in Atjeh too a complete 
freedom of religion is maintained. But for an Atjehnese himself, being 
an Atjehnese is equivalent to being a Muslim; it is simply inconceivable 
that a real Atjehnese could adhere to a religion other than Islam. 
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Atjehnese society does possess an Islamic character. Atjeh is probably 
the only part of Indonesia where people normally greet each other with 
salàm calaikum (Arabic as-salämu calaikum, "peace be with you"). 
"Prayer is a part of the lives of most Atjehnese men; they seem actually 
to pray five times daily." 35 On Fridays at noon the noise of daily life 
in the town of Banda Atjeh is replaced by the praises of God and 
common prayer in the mosque. When discussing religion a visitor is 
struck by the fact that people in Atjeh are so to speak Muslims as a 
matter of course and in an unselfconscious way, whereas in Java one 
sometimes gets the impression that many Muslims are more or less on 
the defensive, probably on account of the struggle against the old 
Javanese religion, rising secularism and Christianity. Harmony of life, 
founded on religion, seems to be undisturbed in Atjeh. 
When asking the Atjehnese in Atjeh whether they intend making their 
area a kind of Islamic State on a provincial level, one receives roughly 
the same answer as one would elsewhere: "We do not intend to establish 
an Islamic State, but we want to expound Islamic law for Muslims 
here and make some elements of it practicabie for them". Here too 
these attempts are said to be based on the Djakarta Charter of 1945 
with its famous "seven words". Informants usually added that they were 
still studying general principles at the moment, and had not yet arrived 
at details for daily life. Moreover, they probably had to wait for 
approval from "Djakarta" before certain decisions could be put into 
practice. 
Vet it may be said that there is a difference between the way of 
thinking of Islamic leaders in Atjeh and in Java, or rather that there is 
a certain similarity between the former way of thinking among Muslims 
in Java and the way in which people still approach matters in Atjeh 
now. Some Islamic leaders in Java originally dreamed of a proclamation 
of an Islamic State, af ter which they would have to realize this ideal 
in daily life. In the same way apparently the Atjehnese first of all fought 
for a recognition of Atjeh as a "special area" and are still trying to 
consolidate the position of Atjeh as an autonomous province, in order 
to make this status of Atjeh a starting-point for defining afterwards what 
it actually means to be the "verandah of Mecca" where Islamic law is 
to be put into practice. 
35 James Siegel, The Rope of God, Berkeley & Los Angeles 1969, p. 104; 
compare the artic1e by the same author, entitled Prayer and Play in Atjeh, 
in Indonesia, Ithaca New Vork, April 1966, p. 6. 
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If one attempts to summarize the scattered information gleaned from 
Atjehnese sources and interviews with Atjehnese informants, develop-
ments can be sketched as follows. 
As a result of the compromise between Atjeh and "Djakarta", the 
province of Atjeh was recognized as a special administrative territory 
on May 26th, 1959. This took place in an announcement by Minister 
Hardi (Home Office), based on a decision by Prime Minister Djuanda, 
af ter a discussion in the cabinet in February 1959.36 This decision was 
taken "in order to obtain a greater guarantee for the improvement of 
safety and development" in Atjeh, and "as a stimulus for the realization 
of as great a degree of autonomy as possible"; this autonomy would in 
particular be realized in the fields of religion, adat and education. On 
August 17th, 1961 the return of peace to all Atjeh was solemnly marked, 
and Atjeh was declared to have been restored from darulharb ("area of 
war") to darussalam ("area of peace").37 
Some months later, from December 19th to 23rd, 1961, the regional 
government of Atjeh organized a public consultation (musjawarah) 
to discuss a programme for the reconstruction and development of Atjeh. 
This program me was probably drawn up by the energetic governor Ali 
Hasjmy. Af ter some corrections it was accepted and published in 
January 1962.38 
It may perhaps be concluded from article 5 of this programme that 
the formal status of Atjeh at th at time was still a point at issue between 
Atjeh and "Djakarta". According to th at article, the status of Atjeh 
as a "special administrative area" (as decided on May 26th, 1959) would 
still have to be authorized either by law or by a decree of the President. 
As far as I know, this authorization has never officially been given. 
In article 11 of the programme a list was given of the activities which 
ought to be transferred from the central government to the regional 
authorities in Atjeh; this summary was more precisely dealt with in 
articles 13 to 42. To begin with, regulations were mentioned concerning 
religious affairs, the supervision of religious instruction, the promotion 
of religious information and the organization of religious courts. For 
fundamental religious questions, the creation of a regional Madjlis Iftä' 
was announced in article 39. This was to be a council for giving expert 
36 See the stencilled publication Dewan Perwakilan, p. 33; the complete text 
of the resolution is published in Atjeh Membangun, p. 69 ff. and can also be 
found in Kehidupan Beragama di Daerah Istimewa Atjeh, ed. by "Secretariat 
DPRD-GR", Atjeh 1967, p. 85 ff. 
37 Dewan Perwakilan, p. 33. 
38 Cf. Atjeh Membangun, pp. 17-44. 
CHAPTER IV: STOCKT AKING 177 
advice (fatwas ) concerning questions on which differences of opinion 
might exist within society. With regard to education, Atjeh wanted the 
competency of the central government to be transferred to Atjehnese 
authorities, from the founding of kindergartens (Ind. ta man kanak-
kanak) to the management of secondary schools. In the exposltlOn of 
the details it was suggested th at one of the subjects to be taught in 
primary schools should be the Atjehnese language. 
Also with regard to ot her fields it was stipulated that real substance 
had to be given to the autonomy of Atjeh, e.g. with regard to decisions 
on questions of exports and imports, the use of foreign currency, 
admission of immigrants into Atjeh, the organization of co-operatives, 
regulations concerning ports, the intensification of agriculture, stock-
breeding and fisheries, the development of health services, the promotion 
of sport by improving equipment and training instructors, and the 
promotion of tourism by drawing attention to the history of Atjeh, its 
culture and its natural beauty.3D 
From 1962 onwards a number of decisions were made to bring about 
the realization of this Atjehnese development plan. In the field of 
religion some visible results are eagerly shown to the visitor. The great 
mosque in Banda Atjeh has been enlarged and beautified; it now has 
five dom es (formerly three), two minarets and a very large court yard. 
In the extensive grounds of the new university and students' city Darus-
salam, where the "Sjiah Kuala University" has been set up with faculties 
of economics, technology and agriculture, th ere has also been founded 
a State Islamic Institute (I.A.I.N.) called "Ar-Raniry".4.0 For the time 
being it is accommodated in a former secondary school, but a huge 
I.A.I.N. building is nearly finished. Half a mile further on, in a corner 
39 As far as history is concerned, it is worth mentioning that a search was made 
for the grave of the famous Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636). It is said 
that the Dutch either never discovered where it was or wanted to keep its 
place a secret, because the Atjehnese used to say: "Atjeh cannot remain 
subjected by someone as long as the bon es of Iskandar Muda remain in 
Atjeh". During the ]apanese occupation the exact place was given by the old 
Pot jut Meurah - mentioned in Piekaar, Atjèh, pp. 68 and 227 - who 
in her youth had participated in ceremonies at this grave, before the colonial 
government built its office on this site. Some years ago the building concerned 
was pulled down and a massive monument built on the supposed burial place 
of Iskandar Muda. 
40 The "Universitas Sjiah Kuala" is named aft er Abdur Rauf of Singkel, later 
called the "Sjaich of Kuala", a 17th century teacher of religion in Atjeh. 
The I.A.I.N. is called af ter Nuruddin ar-Raniri, a champion of "orthodox" 
mysticism in 17th century Atjeh. 
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of Darussalam, the pesantrèn "Pantekulu" has been built.41 It is a 
pesantrèn in the old style, which will produce ulamas for the countryside, 
where graduates of the I.A.I.N. may be considercd too modern. In 
another corner of Darussalam there stands a women's mosque. It is said 
th at in the countryside a great number of mosques and mushallas have 
also been built (the word mushalla = m!l$alla is now commonly used 
for a sm all building or room where people can perform the $alät). 
On April 7th, 1962, the military commander of Atjeh declared himself 
in agreement with the wish of Islamic leaders to make certain elements 
of Islamic law obligatory for Muslims in Atjeh. On August 15th, 1962, 
the regional representative body followed with a resolution to apply 
elements of Islamic law to the Muslims (akan melaksanakan unsur-unsur 
SjariCat Islam bagi pemeluk-pcmeluknja); a committee would be set up 
to draft regional regulations to carry out this resolution; the central 
government in Djakarta would be asked to make laws in which certain 
religious principles would be officially defined, in order to prevent 
deviations (that is to say, in order to make these deviations punish-
able?).42 
In the years following, various decisions were made to prepare for 
executing the abovementioned decisions. But for the time being not 
much more could be achieved than decisions and resolutions to prepare 
new regulations. In the capital Banda Atjeh a spacious building arose 
which was to be the "Office for the Realization of Elements of Islamic 
Law" (Biro Pelaksanaan Unsur-unsur SjariCat Islam). The suggestion 
of 1962 to create a Madjlis Iftä' apparently resulted in the foundation 
of a Madjlis Ulama in 1966. This "Council of Ulamas" was to advise 
the regional government on religious affairs, either at the request of the 
authorities or on its own initiative. Vice-chairman and one of the most 
important younger members of this Council is Ismail Muhammad Sjah 
(abbreviated Ismuha), principal of the I.A.I.N. 
Af ter September 30th, 1965, topical questions were, for example, the 
extermination of Communism and the revision of President Soekarno's 
41 Tgk. Tjhik Panté Kulu was a 19th century ulama, writer and poet, whose 
Atjehnese poem on the Holy War (in Indonesian, Hikajat Perang Sabil) 
is said to have inspired the Atjehnese to persevere in their fight for freedom 
against the Dutch for more than 50 years. Cf. Tgk. M. Hasballah Saleh, 
Tgk. Tjhik Pante Kulu, Tokoh Penjair Perang Terbesar Didunia, in Sinar 
Darussalam, no. 5, pp. 76-80. 
42 Dewan Perwakilan, pp. 129-131. 
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posItIon. In June 1963 the regional representative body had passed a 
resolution in which God was thanked for the decision of the People's 
Congress in Djakarta to appoint President Soekarno as president for 
life; but on September 28th, 1966, this resolution was withdrawn.43 
The composition of the regional representative body was of course 
reviewed, as af ter September 1965 the P.K.I. and P.N.I. delegates were 
dismissed. In December 1966 of the 43 members eight belonged to the 
Perti, seven to the P.S.I.I., six to the N.U., two to the I.P.K.I. (in 
Atjeh led by a member of Muhammadijah) and one to the Protestant 
Parkindo; the "functional groups" were represented by 16 members, 
and the young people (the so-called "Generation of 1966") by three.44 
On September 23rd, 1967, the regional representative body accepted 
a "Memorandum concerning Religious Life in Atjeh", in which measures 
were demanded against certain activities of Christian groups.45 This 
Memorandum opened with considerations such as the following. The 
people of Atjeh have for centuries been so deeply devoted to Islam that 
th is area was given the honorific name "verandah of Mecca". Islam 
inspired the people of Atjeh in the fight for independence against 
colonialism. Even Snouck Hurgronje advised the colonial government 
to realize that the people of Indonesia adhered to Islam and th at their 
social and cultural inadequacy could not be used as an argument to 
allow Christian missions to opera te in areas such as Atjeh (article 177 
of the Netherlands East Indies Statute Book). Article 29 of the Indo-
nesian Constitution of 1945 did indeed recognize the freedom of every 
inhabitant to practise his own religion. But according to th is Memo-
randum th is did not mean that religious propaganda of another religion 
within an Islamic community such as Atjeh ought to be allowed. Such 
propaganda would mean an attack on the principle of tolerance and 
would endanger law and order, as this sort of propaganda would hurt 
Muslim feelings. Since May 26th, 1959, autonomy in Religion (Islam), 
Adat and Education had been given to Atjeh. The authorities and the 
people of Atjeh proved to be tolerant toward adherents of other religions, 
as long as they did not behave in a demonstrative, provocative and 
aggressive way. It was, however, unacceptable that within an Islamic 
community such as Atjeh areligion other than Islam could be propa-
43 Dewan Perwakilan, p. 97. 
44 Dewan Perwakilan, p. 28. Before the banning of the Masjumi th is was 
probably the strongest party in Atjeh; it will be interesting to see how many 
votes the new Partai Muslimin gets in the coming elections. 
45 lts text can be found in Kehidupan Beragama, pp. 3-7. 
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gated and spread by public meetings, the distribution of books, pamphlets 
and leaflets, house to house visiting, the building of pI aces of worship 
in the very midst of Muslim villagers, let alone the use of verses from 
the Qur'än for the propagation of that religion. 46 
Based on all these considerations, the regional representative body of 
Atjeh concluded: (1) That for this area a policy should be followed as 
intended in article 177 of the old Statute Book; (2) That the propagation 
and spreading of areligion other than Islam by the distribution of books 
and the handing out of leaflets should be forbidden; (3) That it should 
be forbidden to propagate another religion by using verses from the 
Qur'än; (4) That the Islamic community should be urged not to send 
their children to schools which were based on areligion other than 
Islam; and (5) That the governor of Atjeh should be empowered to 
take the necessary steps to carry out these decisions. 
Another important meeting was that of the ulamas from all Atjeh on 
November 21st-26th, 1967.47 This congress decided that the Madjlis 
Ulama was to be a body to advise the regional government and to 
consult with it on questions concerning religion and society; that the 
M adjlis was to be an authoritative body for giving fatwas ; that the 
Madjlis was to be the instrument for promoting unity within the Islamic 
community, and th at the Islamic parties and organizations had to obey 
the decisions and fatwas of the A1adjlis. With regard to the zakät, the 
congress decided that the regional authorities should make regulations 
so that they themselves could organize the collection of the zakät. 
46 In connection with the remark about the building of places of worship amid 
the Muslims, reference must be made to the conflict conceming the building 
of a Methodist church in Meulaboh, West Atjeh, in April 1967. The questions 
put in Parliament by J. C. T. Simorangkir (Parkindo) conceming this 
conflict and the govemment's answer can be found in Kehidupan Beragama, 
pp. 33-41. As to the verses from the Qur'än used for propagating another 
religion, verses, of course, are meant which deal with Nabï clsä (Jesus) , 
sometimes misused as a starting-point for Christian propaganda. It is, how-
ever, difficuIt to believe that Christians in Atjeh would dare to do such a 
thing. Probably th is critici sm is based on information from Djakarta about 
the campaign of a certain C. E. Moseley, an American Adventist, held from 
August 27th to September Ist, 1967, in the Senajan Stadium in Djakarta. 
It is said that in preparation for this campaign leaflets we re distributed in 
which no less than 15 verses from the Qur'än were used. See Pandji 
Masjarakat, no. 18, September 1967, pp. 6-7. 
47 Minutes of this meeting seem to be unavailable; its final resolution has been 
published in Sin ar Darussalam, no. 3, pp. 117-125. Some of its resuIts can 
also be deduced from articles in Sinar Darussalam, no. 9, December 1968, 
pp. 46-63. 
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On October 7th, 1968, during a visit to Atjeh, the Minister of Religion 
gave his blessing to the existing Madjlis Ulama, eXplaining that he 
considered its organization, function and status to be right, and also 
approving the resolution concerning the collection of the zakät. 48 
Meanwhile President Soeharto had visited Atjeh from August 30th 
to September lst, 1968.49 This visit was to create the opportunity for 
both sides to get to know each other. According to some informants, 
however, th is visit was also intended to eliminate the fe ar that "Djakarta" 
and Atjeh would once again drift apart, for instance, because Atjeh 
might go too far in realizing its autonomy or taking decisions in conflict 
with the Indonesian Constitution. 
In his address af ter the Friday prayer in the great mosque of Banda 
Atjeh, the President emphasized th at Indonesia was a unitary state, 
based on the 1945 Constitution and the ideals of the Pantjasila. He 
asked whether Indonesia, especially the Islamic community which 
included 90 % of the population, exerted itself sufficiently for the 
maintenance of this unity. He warned against controversy as weil within 
the Islamic community itself as between the various religious groups. 
The President reminded his audience of his attempts to achieve genuine 
religious tolerance. 5o He warned them against whispering campaigns by 
those who (like the Communists) wanted to sow the seeds of dissension, 
for instance by making a problem of foreign support received by other 
religions; he assured them that the government would examine this 
question objectively.51 The President believed that the Islamic com-
munity in Indonesia, 90 % of the inhabitants, had no need to fear that 
another religion could destroy Islam. But the Islamic community ought 
to be aware of its responsibility to make good Muslims of those who, 
48 Sin ar Darussalam, no. 9, December 1968, pp. 62-63. 
49 For a report of this visit, inc1uding the text of speeches, etc., see the 
stenciJled publication entitled Presiden Soeharto Ditengah-tengah Rakjat 
Atjeh, ed. by the Reception Committee, dated Atjeh, September 2nd, 1968. 
50 Cf. the text of Soeharto's speech at the Inter-Religious Consultation held 
in Djakarta on November 30th, 1967, af ter incidents between Muslims and 
ChristÎans in Makassar. See Al-Djami'ah, May 1968. 
51 Reference is here made to the question put in Parliament by Lukman Harun 
on June lOth, 1967, in which the government was asked to make an inquiry 
into financial aid and staff given to the Indonesian churches by foreign 
Missions. The text of the question and the government's answer were 
published in Kehidupan Beragama, pp. 13-32. Cf. also Pandji Masjarakat, 
no. 18, September 1967, p. 6. 
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for example, were only Muslims in that they could recite the shahäda 
(the Islamic profession of faith), as is necessary at a marriage ceremony. 
In comparison with foreign aid to other religions, the President stressed 
the amount the Islamic community could do, if even half of them 
contributed areasonabie zakät. And so he urged self-correction instead 
of fear. 
At every opportunity during this visit to Atjeh the President stressed 
the unity of all Indonesia. In an explanation of the Five-Year Develop-
ment Plan, he called good contact between Atjeh and Djakarta an 
absolute condition for the success of the plan. People in Atjeh too had 
to realize that notwithstanding genuine autonomy the regional authorities 
had to carry out the policy of the central government. The President 
gave similar answers to written questions posed by delegates of the 
various political parties in the regional representative body. To the 
question of whether he gave credit to rumours that a rising was brewing 
in Atjeh, he answered that he could not believe that Atjeh would be tray 
the Pantjasila and the 1945 Constitution. When asked whether he agreed 
with the Atjehnese desire to be really Islamic, and if so, how th is should 
be brought about, he answered that in Indonesia any religion could 
develop without hindrance; this held good for Islam as weIl as for 
other religions. 
Soon af ter President Soeharto's visit to Atjeh, the fourth session of 
the regional representative body was held, from November 5th to llth, 
1968.52 The congress of ulamas, held in November 1967, may weIl be 
considered as a preparation for these meetings of the representative body. 
They were entirely devoted to the question of the realization of Islamic 
principles in Atjehnese society and resulted in the acceptance of 
Regulation No. 6/1968, concerning "The Realization of Elements of 
Islamic Law". 53 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, this Regulation was 
intended to give substance to the special character of Atjeh as the 
"verandah of Mecca". In its first article it is stated that the term 
"elements of the Religious Law" refers to "the teachings of Islam as God 
52 The complete minutes of this session are available in a stencilled publication, 
edited by "Secretariat DPRD-GR", entitled Sidang Ke-IV Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakjat Daerah Gotong-Rojong Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Atjeh 1968. 
53 The text of this Regulation and the Explanatory Memorandum are to be 
found in the abovementioned minutes, pp. 365-370 and in Sinar Darussalam, 
no. 9, December 1968, pp. 47-58. 
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has ordained for mankind, including both the area of belief and the 
area of behaviour". Af ter a summary of all the "elements" concerned 
(art. 2), articles 3 and 4 stress the duty of the regional authorities, the 
M adjlis Ulama and the population to practise Islamic law in personal 
life and in the life of family and society. Of those who adhere to a 
religion other than Islam it is expected that they will respect these 
endeavours for the realization of elements of Islamic law and will co-
operate in promoting them. 
In article 5, concerning spirituallife and doctrine (' aqidah/ keimanan) , 
it is stipulated that Muslims are obliged to strengthen the belief in God 
and the love of Islam in the life of the individu al, of the family and of 
society, while the authorities and the Madjlis Ulama are pledged to 
oppose unbelief and atheism. According to article 6, every Muslim is 
obliged to worship ('ibadah); the authorities and the Madjlis Ulama 
will try to see that every Muslim does in deed carry out th is duty. Further-
more, the authorities will see to the maintenance of Islamic precepts for 
various transactions, such as, for instance, trade, recovery of debts, 
pawning, terms of lease, power of attorney and family law (art. 7). 
Questions of ethics and morals (achlaq) are dealt with in article 8; in 
order to combat a decline in morals, supervision will be exercised over 
(women's) clothing, publications, art, dancing, and so on. According to 
article 9, education, art and culture must be in harmony with the spirit 
of Islam; Muslim children must be prevented from receiving an education 
in conflict with this spirit. 54 Every Muslim is free to work for the spread 
and development of Islam (dakwah I slamijah) , provided his work 
furthers the unity of the Islamic community (art. 10). As far as finance 
is concerned, it is stipulated in article 11 that the regional authorities 
together with the Madjlis Ulama will form and run a Bait al-Mal as a 
separate fund for the benefit of Islam and the Muslims. Article 12 deals 
with sociallife (kemasjarakatan) , stipulating that the authorities and the 
Madjlis Ulama will exert thernselves for the creation of real Islamic 
brotherhood (uchuwah Islamijah) in society. Under the heading Sji'ar 
Islam it is stipulated in article 13 that the authorities have to stimulate 
54 As far as education is concerned, the Atjehnese are striving for an integration 
of religious instruction (originally given in the pesantrèn) and general 
education as given in state schools. The Commemoration Day lecture which 
Ibrahim Husein gave on October 10th, 1965 at the I.A.I.N. in Banda Atjeh 
was devoted to the problem of "giving substance to the special character of 
education in Atjeh". It was published in Al-Djami'ah, no. 5-6, Sept.-Nov. 
1967. 
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the celebration of Islamic feasts and everything connected with the 
sublime sacred things or ceremonies of Islam.55 
From the closing articles it appears that th is Regulation will be 
followed by further directives for practical use, for example, concerning 
the infringement of this Regulation and its punishment (imprisonment 
for up to a maximum of six months or a fine of up to 10,000 Rp.). 
I t is not necessary to report the discussions held in the regional 
representative body before this Regulation was accepted. Once or twice 
a representative touched on the possibility of difficulties when tbe 
Regulation was put into operation (for instance, in connection with some 
differences between the four orthodox schools of law). But in general 
there was great unanimity concerning the aim and character of this 
Regulation. 
The only representative of the Protestant group, Sormin Siregar, 
declared for the Parkindo th at he would leave the decision to the Muslim 
representatives, as he did not feel it right or proper for a Christian 
to participate in discussions regarding the religious life of the Islamic 
community. Vet he wanted to appeal to the regional authorities not to 
forget the 45,000 Protestants and the 15,000 Roman Catholics living in 
Atjeh. He wanted to stress that this Regulation should not be misused 
in order to trouble the adherents of another religion. One amendment 
he wanted to suggest was the following. According to article 4, it was 
expected of non-Muslims that they respect these endeavours for the 
realization of elements of Islamic law and co-operate in promoting them. 
However, as this realization was entirely a matter for the adherents of 
Islam, he would like to suggest that it only be stipulated th at non-
Muslims be expected "to respect Islam and the Islamic community".56 
As far as I know, there was no reaction to this suggestion and so it was 
not adopted. 
55 The word sji'ar, assimilated into Indonesian from the Qur'än, is rarely used 
and is said to be almost untranslatable. Apparently the word reminds an 
Indonesian Muslim of all "sublime sacred things" or "ceremonies" of Islam 
in genera!. In the Qur'än the word shicär occurs four times in its plural form 
shacä'ir. The new Indonesian translation of the Qur'än uses the Indonesian 
plural sji'ar-sji'ar in 2: 158, with a note that Al-~afä and Al-Marwa belong 
to "the symbols and places which are concerned with obedience to God"; 
the same translation is used in 5 :2, where it is noted that the word is 
connected with ceremonies and places of the pilgrirnage; in 22 :30 the word 
is translated with "that which is sanctified by God"; in 22 :36 - referring 
to the sacrificial animals - sji'ar-sji'ar is used again, this time without 
further comment. 
50 Sormin Siregar's speech can be found in the minutes, Sidang Ke-IV, pp. 
117-118. 
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I do not know how much progress has so far been made in putting this 
Regulation into practice. Is perhaps the passing of the Regulation one 
of the points at issue between Atjeh and "Djakarta"? However that may 
be, this formal question is probably not of vital importance for daily 
life in Atjeh. With regard to the performance of religious duties by 
Atjehnese Muslims, the social controls within a society such as Atjeh 
in fact have the same effect as legal stipulations. Moreover, legal 
provisions can only sanction what al ready exists within a certain com-
munity and has met with a response there. Now it must simply be 
concluded th at Atjeh is indeed a special area - at least for the time 
being - and that it might be possible to carry out something there that 
is impossible elsewhere. On the other hand, it is understandable th at the 
central govemment is afraid that Atjeh could create a precedent. 
Apparently in some small districts elsewhere in Indonesia people tend 
to imitate the Atjehnese way. Permitting such regional endeavours could 
end in a disastrous dissolution of the Indonesian unitary state. 
As far as Atjeh itself is concemed, the future will show whether and 
for how long Atjeh will remain a closed society, where religion to a 
large extent keeps together and controls society. It may he supposed 
that great changes will also take pI ace in Atjeh within this generation, 
changes in the direction of further modemization and individualization. 
Various symptoms indicate that in Atjeh too these changes cannot be 
resisted. More and more young Atjehnese are going to study at a 
university, in Atjeh and elsewhere, even in foreign countries. On the 
campus of Darussalam there is easy social contact between male and 
female students; they are going to choose themselves their own boy-
friends and girl-friends, their husbands and wives. The cinema in Atjeh 
too attracts the people; censorship may restrict imported sex-films, but 
this means that the cinemas are dependent on films full of violence. In 
the course of time Atjeh will be included on the routes of world traffic; 
it will become part of the so-called modem world, and be penetrated 
by it. So the question may arise as to whether the future of religion 
does not depend primarily on defending its communal character as a 
cultural, social and political system, but on promoting the personal 
religious life of its individual adherents. 
4. Working toward an Islamic Society 
According to some informants, the Masjumi had never actually 
been striving for the creation of an official Islamic State, but at best 
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for an Islamic society. Be th at as it may, it can be concluded that with 
the passing of time the term "Islamic society" became more frequently 
used, as it became less opportune to talk of an "Islamic State". When 
I inquired of my informants what exactly the objectives of the struggle 
for an Islamic society were, the answers I collected were as follows. 
It means (1) the attempt to have Islamic principles imbue Indonesian 
society; (2) the promotion and strengthening of the uchuwah Islamijah, 
the Islamic brotherhood; (3) making visible the impact of Islam on 
public life; (4) spreading an Islamic style of life; in short (5) the 
furthering of everything that could give Indonesia the colour of a 
Muslim country, in accordance with the fact that far and away the 
majority of the inhabitants are Muslims. 
The problem faced by the Muslim community of Indonesia is, of 
course, that nominally 80-90 % of the population adhere to Islam, but 
that there is an enormous gap between theory and practice. The 
discrepancy between the number of nominal and the number of 
practising adherents of a religion is certainly not a specifically Muslim 
feature, but applies likewise to other religious communities. There is 
no point in foreign non-Muslims trying to fix the percentage of "real 
Muslims" in Indonesia, based on figures and guesses conccming the 
number of "practising Muslims". What criteria can be used? And how 
can one judge of another's intention? 
I t has been said, for example, that according to Wahab Wahib, 
Minister of Religion in 1960, no more than 10 % of the Indonesian 
population were practising Muslims; furthermore, research in Java had 
shown th at in villages where the inhabitants called themselves Muslims 
sometimes 0 %, at best 15 %, performed the duty of prayer (~alät); 
in 1967 the zakät was paid by 14 % of people in Jogjakarta, in Djakarta 
by 30 %; Ramatj,än (the month of fasting) was observed by 12 % in 
West Java and by only 2 % in Central Java. 57 For those reasons it was 
concluded that of people who seem to follow Islam only 10 % could 
be considered true Muslims. With regard to the Muslim view that 90 % 
of the Indonesian people adhere to Islam, the author of the paper quoted 
above added: "Actually this juggling with numbers is tu ming against 
57 According to Muskens, Indonesië, pp. 266-267, who quoted these and many 
other data from Herder Korrespondenz (or Herder Correspondence) and 
from unpublished writings by the Indonesian contributor to this Roman 
Catholic journal. 
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Islam itself, for it means that according to the Muslims all those who 
are known as former P.K.I.-members, corrupt people, etc. belong to 
their ranks. This view is not to the credit of the image of Islam." 
In answer to th is sort of criticism it may be argued that Indonesian 
Muslims too are weIl aware of the problem. The point is, however, that 
basically they want also to include the "nominal Muslims", or abangans 
or whatever they may be called, as members of the Muslim community 
(in the same way as Christian churches of ten assume that all baptized 
members are on ce and for all to be considered Christians). 
In March 1968 Moh. Hatta, the former Vice-President, shocked many 
Muslims when he said in a sermon in the mosque in Bandung th at the 
Islamic community in Indonesia probably comprised only 60 % of the 
population; what Hatta meant, however, was merely a result of the 
following subtraction: about 10 % of the Indonesians are said to be 
Christians, another 10 % can be considered Hindus, Buddhists and 
"Animists", and furthermore there are perhaps 20 % who are Commu-
nists and cannot be considered Muslims; so there remains 60%.58 
A more remarkable view was voiced by Rafik in an article published 
in the Islamic magazine Pandji Masjarakat, under the heading "Analysis 
of the Real Potentialof the present-day Islamic Community".59 In his 
opinion the general belief th at the Islamic community included 90 % 
of the Indonesian people ought to be corrected. He wanted to admit th at 
a great deal of the 90 % were only formal, passive Muslims. The existence 
of a nucleus of active Muslims would be far more important. A criterion 
could he whether or not one participates in the activities of Islamic 
parties or other Islamic organizations. The author criticized the dissension 
within the Islamic community, while referring to the situation within 
the Roman Catholic and Protestant parties, where supporters and 
opponents of Soekarno did not combat one another. GO He urged self-
examination and the purging of the Islamic community, and blamed 
the behaviour of some so-called leaders as being in complete defiance 
58 Cf. D. Bakker, Dacwah, Missionarische Mobilisierung des Islams in Indo-
nesien, in Evangelische Missions-Zeitschrift, August 1969, p. 128, n. 40. 
My interpretation of Hatta's remark is based on an interview with him on 
April 23rd, 1969. Cf. H. B. Jassin, Heboh Sastra 1968, Djakarta 1970, 
pp. 60 and 67, who apparently did not know how Hatta had arrived at his 
conclusion. 
59 Rafik, Ana/isa Tentang Potensi Ummat Islam Sekarang, in Pandji Masjara-
kat, no. 32, Sept. 1968 (?), pp. 15-16. 
GO Probably this refers to the conflict between adherents of the N.U. and the 
former Masjumi. 
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of Islam, hecause among them there were swindlers, corrupt people, 
gamblers and owners of nightclubs with striptease dancers. As long as 
the Islamic community was deceived by the figure of 90 %, and did not 
come to examine and purify itself, it would again and again have to 
suffer defeats. The au thor concluded that being a community of less 
than 90 % did not matter. It would be more realistic and more important 
to he involved in creating a nucleus of active Muslims, to whom God 
- as in the time of the Prophet - could grant victory. The au thor 
wanted to consider such a "small band", tiatan kalilah (= ti'atan 
~alïlatan, cf. Sura 2 : 249) as the real potentialof the Islamic community 
in present-day Indonesia. 
An important aspect of the creation of such a nucleus is, of course, 
leadership training, which will be further dealt with in the next para-
graph. The point here is, however, that at the same time Islamic leaders 
continue to look to the masses, the 90 %, in order to Islamize the nomina I 
Muslims and Indonesian society in genera!. 
To begin with, the importance of the Ministry of Religion may once 
again he stressed. The existence of this Ministry was to prove the positive 
attitude of the Indonesian state towards religion. lts first aim would be 
to make the Ketuhanan Jang Maha Esa (Belief in the One and Only 
God) an operative principle in the Indonesian state. According to the 
Muslim interpretation the furtherance of this "Belief in the One and 
Only God" meant, of course, the furtherance of Islam, in particular 
through the Islamic section of the Ministry of Religion (just as, accord-
ing to another interpretation, other sections of that Ministry could give 
support to the activities of Christian churches). 
The Ministry of Religion, then, stimulates and supports in various 
ways the activities of the Islamic community. This support consists, for 
example, of financial aid for building mosques and other Islamic places 
of worship all over the country. Furthermore, the Ministry stimulates 
obedience to precepts of Islamic law such as fasting; the beginning of 
Ramatf,än is in fact fixed by calculation (b-isäb) and there actually seems 
no longer to be discussion on the problem of b-isäb or ru'ya (the 
observance of the new moon) , al though some M uslims pri va tel y still 
keep to the method of observation in order to check the date officially 
fixed by the Ministry. 
The Ministry also regulates the religious feasts and promotes their 
celebration. For example, the celebration of al-cid al-kabïr (the "sac-
rificial feast" during the pilgrimage), to which formerly hardly any 
CHAPTER IV: STOCKTAKING 189 
attention had been paid in Indonesia,61 is now promoted by local com-
mittees formed by the authorities. According to my informants, during 
this feast in 1969 a number of buffaloes were publicly slaughtered in 
Jogjakarta in front of the great mosque, while families at home 
slaughtered more sheep than ever before, for thernselves and their 
neighbours. 
The Ministry with its offices spread all over Indonesia also promotes 
the payment of the zakät and assists in its collection. The rather high 
percentage of 30 % in Djakarta, as mentioned above, may partly be due 
to the influence of the authorities on the civil servants in the depart-
ments and government offices in Djakarta. It is rather difficult to 
abstain, if one is reminded of one's religious duties by one's superior. 
The fact that in particular at the centre of government, Djakarta, 
religion and religious duties are officially held in high es teem typifies 
one aspect of the Indonesian situation which has to be considered. There 
is not only a social con trol within the community of a Muslim kampung 
or désa, but also something like a "religious dirigism" by the government, 
that is to say, the government to some extent directs, regulates and 
promotes all kinds of religious activities from above, through its official 
bodies, with the Ministry of Religion at the top. This "religious dirigism" 
is not only founded on the Muslim view of the unity of religion and state, 
but also on Soekarno's doctrine that Indonesia and every Indonesian 
must have a God and areligion, while freedom of religion nowadays 
does not include the freedom to be non-religious, let alone anti-religious. 
Moreover, only those religions are recognized th at are represented in the 
Ministry of Religion (that is to say, not the remaining tribal religions ). 
Partly thanks to all these factors, religions in Indonesia seem to be 
flourishing more than ever before. To what extent may religious people 
be misled by th is flourishing state of affairs? Do they realize that beneath 
the surface, in Indonesia too, secularism, lack of interest and estrange-
ment from religion are perhaps slowly but surely increasing? 
For the furtherance of religion, in particular Islam, a great number 
of pamphlets aimed at the general public have been published and 
distributed by the Ministry of Religion. This applies, for example, to 
speeches by President Soekarno and the different Ministers of Religion, 
as weIl as to other authors. These publications cover the meaning of 
RamacJ.än; the place of woman in society; Islam as the universal religion ; 
the significance of the Qur'än for the renewal of man; religious 
61 Compare Th. W. Juynboll, Handleiding tot de kennis van de Mohamme-
daansche Wet, Leiden 19304 , p. 112. 
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mmIstration to people in prisons and hostels, to transmigrants, or the 
police; the importance of religion for "nation building and character 
building"; appeals for a return to the moral standards of Islam; and 
so on. 62 
Here toa an observer is inclined to ask a number of questions. For 
instanee, will not the religious communities, including Islam, rely too 
heavily on government aid, especially financial help, and that mainly 
for religious purposes in the narrower sense of the word? Could this 
policy not result in the religious communities - the Islamic as weil as 
the Christian - becoming more and more introverted, when religion 
seems to be promoted in th is way for the sake of religion itself? Even 
insofar as religious activities are directed at society in general, the in-
tention seems to be to make society more religious in the narrower sense 
of the word, i.e. to have people observe religious duties such as prayer 
and fasting. The question could, however, be put as to whether in 
present-day Indonesia it may not be even more important to stress that 
religion has to be a source of inspiration for changes and developments 
in the socio-economie field. In other words, does our world have to be 
made interested in the problems and development of religion, or does 
religion first and foremost have to be made interested in the problems 
and development of our world? Finally one could ask to what extent 
"religious dirigism" could form an obstruction to the development of 
initiative by the various religious communities themselves. 
With regard to the last question, however, we can also discern much 
private initiative within the Muslim community itself. Various observers 
have noticed that during the last decade the term dakwah (Ar. déwa, 
call, invitation) has become one of the most frequently used words in 
Muslim circles.H3 To give a short definition: "In the religious sense, the 
dacwa is the invitation, addressed to men by God and the prophets, to 
believe in the true religion, Islam"; cf. Sura 14 : 44.64 In Indonesian 
publications the term daCwa is sometimes eXplained with expressions 
such as "Islamie propaganda" or "Islamie Mission" (Ind. Missi) , some-
times even with the Dutch word for Mission, e.g. "Zending Islam Indo-
nesia".65 
62 See the List of Publications, under "Departemen Agama". 
63 Cf. the abovementioned artic1e by D. Bakker, Dacwah; also Jacob Vreden-
bregt, De Islam in het moderne Indonesië, in Oost en West, December 1968, 
pp. 6-10. 
64 The Encyclopaedia ol Islam, New Edition, Vol. 11, Leiden 1965, p. 168. 
os An organization in Medan (North Sumatra); see photo in the German 
mission magazine In die Welt lür die Welt, Aug.-Sept. 1969, p. 13. 
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Af ter 1965 Muslims have more and more realized that the Islamization 
of Indonesia would in fact mean the Islamization of Java, and th at this 
was a question of now or never. One of my principal informants said 
in 1966: "The question of wh ether we succeed in making the masses in 
Java true Muslims will be decisive for the future of Islam in Indonesia". 
To hope for succeeding in th is may sound rather optimistic or even naÏve 
to people in the West who believe th at they live in a post-religious era. 
Islamic leaders, however, stress that these millions in Java have not 
drifted away from Islam, nor have they become secularized or indifferent 
to religion, but rather have never really been Islamized or even become 
acquainted with real Islam. According to the Muslim point of view these 
millions still have Islam ahead of them, not behind them. It is only a 
smalI, though growing, elite of intellectuals who have in fact dissociated 
themselves from Islam or become secularized; part of the proletariat in 
the cities may have become indifferent to rcligion, and, of course, a much 
bigger group of people are lukewarm toward or ignorant of religion. -
It can be said that during the past centuries most of the Indonesian 
islands have nominally been incorporated into the worId of Islam, but 
that the problem of a more thorough Islamization has been tackled in 
a resolute and organized way only in the 20th century. The reformist 
movement in Indonesia took shape in the founding of the Muham-
madijah in 1912.66 It was this movement in particular that restored 
self-respect to a new generation of Muslims. "The Muhammadijah has 
brought the truth home to us that we may be proud of being Muslims"; 
"the Muhammadijah wanted to create a generation of Muslims with 
hearts full of belief and heads full of knowIedge." One of the main points 
of the reformist movement was the purification of Islam from all sorts 
of superstitious heliefs and practices, in other words, a real Islamization 
of people who nominally had already been incorporated into the world 
of Islam. Therefore education and information played a great part in 
the activities of Islamization. The slogan was, as it were: teach the people 
who want to be called Muslims what it means to be Muslims. -
Right up to recent publications the Islamic community has been urged 
"to Islamize the Muslims" (Ind. mengislamkan orang Islam). "It is not 
yet necessary to call non-Muslims to Islam (mendakwahi). First call the 
Muslims to Islam, so that they do not use the term 'Muslim' too lightly, 
but will become true Muslims." 67 By using all modern media, the press, 
66 A recent Indonesian study on this organization is Alfian, lslamie Modernism 
in lndonesian Polities: the Muhammadijah Movement during the Duteh 
Colonial Period (1912-1942), thesis Madison, Wisconsin 1969, 2 Volumes. 
67 Si di Gazalba, Integrasi Islam, Ilmu dan Kebudajaan, Djakarta 1967, p. 279. 
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radio, television, popular leaflets and where possible films, attempts 
are being made to bring Islam home to the people. During recent years 
mosque attendance has apparently increased considerably. Here and 
th ere attempts are being made to create ncw forms of rcligious, cultural 
and social education, e.g. by using the mosque for meetings with an 
address and discussions early in the morning, immediatcly af ter morning 
prayer. Such meetings are said to be attended "by army officers as weIl 
as bètjak drivers and also by women"; the lastmentioned are sometimcs 
segregated from the men only by a small aisIe. In this way an attempt 
is being made to add a new function to the mosque, so th at it is not 
only a place of prayer but also a centre for all kinds of other activities.68 
Originally the dacwa was chiefly performed through tablïgh 
(preaching). The Muhammadijah had a special Madjlis Tablïgh (a 
"Mission Council", so to speak) and had at its disposal many muballighs 
(Muslim "missionaries"). Although the Muhammadijah carried out 
important social and educational work, thc greatest emphasis was laid 
on preaching, i.e. the spread of Islam by the spoken and written word. 
Many other organizations were inspired by this kind of activity of the 
Muhammadijah. 
A great number of pamphlets of this kind, published by private 
initiative and aiming at the general public, could be listed. As a sample 
I refer to a pamphlet by the well-known ulama A. Hassan of Bangil 
(East Java) containing the report of a debate with an atheist, who 
finally had to acknowledge that Hassan had convinced him of the 
existence of God.69 When reading such a pamphlet one wonders, how-
ever, whether people in Indonesia could really be convinced by "proving" 
God's existence with a discussion ending in the question of which was 
first, the chicken or the egg. 
From the list of publications given at the end of th is book I want to 
mention here pamphlets concerning the cclebration of the birth of the 
Prophet (e.g. by Dja efar Amir) , the descent of the Qur'an (Moh. 
Hatta), the Prophet's "ascension" or "Journey into Heaven" (Muchtar 
Jahja, Moenawar Chalil) and a large numbcr of books on Muslim 
68 Cf. Sidi Gazalba, Mesdjid - Pusat Ibadat dan Kebudajaan Islam, thesis 
Djakarta 1962. The author is himself closely associated with activities in the 
AI-Azhar mosque in Kebajoran-Baru (Djakarta), where services are held on 
the first floor, while the ground floor is used for a medical centre, university 
lectures, an office for funeral arrangements, the offices of the magazine 
Pandji Masjarakat, and sa on. 
69 A. Hassan, Adakah Tuhan?, Surabaja 19561, 19652 • 
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etiquette (Ind. etikèt) or social behaviour (Aboebakar Atjeh, A. Hassan, 
Marzuki Imron, Nj. Nurlela). Pamphlets on marriage, family life and 
sexual instruction can also be classed in this category, as they are intended 
to promote an Islamic style of life (Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy, Kahruddin 
Yunus, and others). 
In all these ways the "Islamization of Muslims" has been carried out. 
Religious leaders, however, began to realize that the word tablïgh was 
too limited to cover all the activities needed for a true Islamization of 
the people. About 1960 the word dacwa (Ind. da'wah or dakwah) came 
into use and gradually this word is superseding the word tablïgh. In 
1965 the Madjlis Tabligh of the Muhammadijah was changed into a 
Madjlis Da'wah; one who practises dacwa is now of ten called a däCï 
instead of a mttballigh. 
Indeed it can be said that "dacwa has become the key word for 
promoting Islam in Indonesia and for the clarification of ideas concern-
ing Islam, particularly among those groups of the population who are 
generally indicated with the collective noun abangan . .. " 70 The same 
author points out that the dacwa is not only aimed at unsophisticated 
people, but also at the intellectuals. At a congress held in 1968 the aim 
of dacwa was formulated in the phrase meng-ulamakan sardjana dan 
men-sardjanakan ulama, i.e. to make ulamas of the intellectuals and 
intellectuals of the ulamas. 
In the course of time it came to be stressed more and more that dacwa 
meant the propagation of Islam not only by preaching and publications, 
but also by deeds and activities in all areas of social life, in other words 
that dacwa had to be a comprehensive Islamization of society. In 1963 
Mukti Ali stated that Islam had to follow the example of Christian 
dacwa, which consisted of "preaching, teaching and healing". 71 
An important publication on the meaning of dacwa was S. Sanusi's 
thesis, published in 1964, a book which may be called a modern Muslim 
missiology.72 The au thor wanted to use the term dacwa not only "in the 
general sense of a sermon, address, lecture, or for transmitting doctrines 
orally, but ... in the sense of bringing about wh at is good and fighting 
what is wrong"; in other words, dacwa means "ishlah (Ar. i~läl;), that 
is, the improvement and development of society". According to this 
Muslim missiology the essence of dacwa can be comprehended in the 
70 Vredenbregt, De Islam, p. 8. 
71 Quoted by D. Bakker, Dacwah, p. 122, n. 9. 
72 Shalahuddin Sanusi, Pembahasan Sekitar Prinsip Dacwah, Semarang 1964, 
pp. 8 and 75. 
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oft-quoted expression based on the Qur'än: al-amru bi 'l-mérftf wa 
'l-nahyu cani 'l-munkar, usually abbreviated in Indonesian publications 
to amar méruf, nahi munkar, that is, "urging what is reputable and 
restraining from what is disreputable" (cf. Sura 3: 104, 110, 114; 
7: 157; 9: 71,112; 22 :41).73 
Another recent publication, by Toha Jahja Omar, intended as a text-
book for dacwa, however, adhered mainly to dacwa as preaching. In a 
similar way Isa Anshary defined dacwa primarily as tablïgh and the däCï 
as a muballigh (rendered by the au thor with Tukang Seru). 74 
On May 9th, 1967 an Indonesian Islamic Dacwa Council (Dewan 
Dacwah Islamijah Indonesia) was founded by adherents of the Muham-
madijah and the former Masjumi, under the leadership of Muh. Natsir, 
formerly chairman of the Masjumi and Prime Minister. As the Masjumi 
continued to be prohibited, the close relationship between the Muham-
madijah and the Masjumi nearly resulted in the Muhammadijah's 
becoming a political party. But af ter all the leaders preferred to maintain 
a clear distinction between politics and dacwa, with the result that the 
new "Partai Muslimin Indonesia" took the place of the Masjumi, where-
as the Muhammadijah decided explicitly to remain an organization 
for dacwa. 
Muh. Natsir's opmlOns concerning the programme of the dacwa 
organization, as expounded in one of his speeches, can be summarized 
as follows. (1) Methods and techniques must be evolved to make the 
dacwa work more effectively, e.g. by improving the training of the 
däcïs. (2) Dacwa must be intensified with tangible contributions in the 
socio-economic field, particularly for the relief of poverty. (3) Close 
co-operation between traditional Islamic institutions such as pesantrèns 
and madrasas must be achieved in order to raise the level of education. 
(4) Co-operation must be stimulated between all kinds of Islamic 
institutions and organizations as well as between Muslims personally.75 
Among the many dacwa organizations which arose special attention 
should he paid to the Pendidikan Tinggi Dacwah Islam (P.T.D.I.), a 
kind of "extramural instruction for Islamic déwa", founded in 1963 
in Central Java, but transferred to Djakarta in July 1965. Among the 
73 Translation quoted from Richard Bell, The Qur'än, Edinburgh 1 96(}2. 
74 Toha Jahja Omar, Ilmu Dacwah, Djakarta 1967; K. H. M. Isa Anshary, 
Mud;ahid Dacwah, Bandung 1964. 
75 Cf. Vredenbregt, De Islam, p. 8. See also Muh. Natsir's stencilled publication 
Fungsi Dacwah dalam rangka Perd;uangan, Jogjakarta, (1968?). 
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leaders of this organization are semor officers of the army (General 
Sarbini and General Sudirman), of the police (General Sutjipto J udo-
dihardjo) and the navy (Commodore Sukmadi). In every province 
activities were to be led by a "Co-ordinating Body"; in every district 
of a province a "Senat P.T.D.I." would be established, while in the 
viIIages there would be "commissariats" and local "study groups".76 
In West Java the Co-ordinating Body publishes a monthly magazine.77 
There too an important pilot project has been started, in vol ving the 
development of the viIIage Tjiaro near Nagrek, in the eastem part of 
West Java. Af ter a solemnly ce\ebrated agreement with the viIIagers 
(about 5,000 people), from 1967 onwards 173 teams have been engaged 
in 23 projects such as education and information, founding a library, 
building a mosque, improvement of irrigation, agriculture and fishing, 
the laying out of an experimental garden plot, reafforestation of hilIs, etc. 
When asked why the military in particular are involved in these 
dacwa activities, informants said, (1) that initially these officers had 
wanted to concentrate their activities on ex-service men, because many 
of them had been influenced by left-wing leaders; (2) that these army 
officers were aware of the danger of Communism and wanted to fight it 
by means of dacwa (this argument does seem to have been used by 
General Sarbini when the P.T.D.I. was founded); and (3) th at af ter 
1965 some officers wanted to restrain militarism by interesting servicemen 
in the dacwa and socio-economic development of the country. 
A similar experiment to stimulate modemization in viIIage life was 
begun in Tjiampéa, about 8 miles sou th-west of Bogor. Muh. Natsir 
may be considered its most important supporter. lts centre is an 
"Agricultural Pesantrèn" called Daml Fallah (= där al-falliiJ:t, the 
"house of the farmer"). lts pupils, young men about 14-20 years old, 
receive the usual religious instruction as weil as a training in cattle-
breeding, poultry-keeping, the use of a small motor-plough, the use of 
a sickIe for cutting rice, and so on.78 
76 For extensive information concerning this P.T.D.I., see D. Bakker, Dacwah, 
p. 132 ff. 
77 Madjalah Bulanan Séri Dacwah Islam, Bandung, since 1968. 
78 As an example of a clash between popular belief and attempts at modern-
ization, I was told that initially the vilIagers protested against the use of a 
sickie instead of the traditional rice knife (ani-ani), which is connected 
with their belief in the rice goddess, Déwi Sri. Their objections were said 
to he overcome by arguing that Déwi Sri did not like to see the rice standing 
ripe in the saw ah for such a long time simply because of old-fashioned 
methods of harvesting; "You can't say that Déwi Sri doesn't exist, can you?" 
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Bakker concluded: "It is encouraging to see that the daCwa has not 
ended up in a flow of words, but intends tackling the whole of life in a 
practical way through a comprehensive approach which begins at the 
roots of village life, in order to make a positive contribution to the 
essential development of the Indonesian state at the present time".79 
It can therefore be said that modern dacwa plays an important part 
in working toward an Islamic society, and at the same time can make 
a useful contribution to the socio-economie development of the Indo-
nesian state. 
One might ask to what extent these two aspects can be separated. Is 
it possible that in the course of time a shift of emphasis will take place, 
for instanee from the first ideal (an Islamic society) to the second need 
(the socio-economie development)? Supposing the efforts to Islamize 
the Javanese masses do not in due time result in a truly Islamic Java, 
will Muslims continue to work for the development of their country 
without aiming at an Islamic society? In other words, will they continue 
to make these efforts, inspired by their religion and thus willing to serve 
their fellow-men, setting aside the question of whether or not these 
masses become truly converted ta Islam? 
5. Religious Instruction and T extbooks 
The Ministry of Religion is in charge of religious instruction in state 
schools, inclusive of the training, appointment and payment of religious 
teachers, setting the curriculum, and as far as necessary the preparation 
of manuals and textbooks. At state schools two hours of religious in-
struction per week have to be given, beginning in the fourth class of the 
primary school, continuing throughout secondary schools and including 
two years at the university. 
Af ter the changeover to thc "New Order", attendance at religious 
instruction became in fact compulsory, although some people warned 
against compulsion. An editorial in a newspaper stemming from army 
circles called it evidence of fanaticism to stipulate th at parents would be 
fined if they refused to let their children attend religious instruction ; the 
writer stressed that it would depend chiefly on the teacher and his 
way of teaching whether religious instruction was attractive and would 
have any result. 80 The then Minister of Elementary Education, Moh. 
79 D. Bakker, Dacwah, p. 136. 
80 Angkatan Bersendjflta (Djakarta), June 29th, 1966. 
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Said, also emphasized that religious instruction ought to be given in a 
way different from other subjects; if pupils regarded religion as some-
thing which had to be learned by heart (like other subjects) in order to 
go up into the next form, then they would sooner dislike religion than 
love it.8! 
Initially religious instruction at state schools met with great difficulties. 
In elementary schools, for example, children learned the basic elements 
of the Islamic faith and religious duties, but teachers at secondary schools 
of ten simply repeated the same themes in the same way. And it was, of 
course, still more difficult to find teachers capable of giving religious 
instruction to university students. Temporal)' solutions were, for example, 
that these lectures were given by a well-known writer who knew how to 
captivate tbe students (Djakarta) or by a lecturer from the faculty 
concerned, e.g. a lecturer in medicine for giving religious lectures to 
students of the medical faculty, and so on (Jogja) . Now it has become 
possible to appoint graduates from an I.A.I.N. to give religious lectures 
at universities. The problems connected with these religious lectures 
were dealt with in two "seminars", held in 1962 and 1965 under 
the leadership of I.A.I.N. professors. Representatives of all officially 
recognized groups (Muslims, Protestants, Roman Catholics and Hindu-
Buddhists) took part in the seminar of December 1965.82 
It is, of course, almost impossible to avoid superficiality in religious 
instruction, particularly in primary and secondary schools. In the case 
of doctrine, there is a danger of intellectualism, by presenting scholastic 
definitions as a set of truths to be accepted. In the case of religious 
duties (for instanee, prayer) instruction is threatened by formalism, as 
it is difficult to transmit more than external forms and formulas. It may 
be useful to recall aremark by Clifford Geertz, though made in a 
different context, that "formalism or intellectualism, it really comes 
down to about the same thing: holding religious views rather than being 
held by them".83 
81 Gotong Rojong (Djakarta), June 29th, 1966. 
82 The stencilled report in two volumes (133 and 235 pp.) was published by 
the Department of Higher Education, under the title Seminar Pentavipan 
Kurikulum Pendidikan Agama Pada Perguruan Tinggi. The origin of the 
term pentavipan is tavip, à' contraction of "Tahun Vivere Pericoloso" -
the year of living dangeroWily - which was the title of Soekarno's speech 
on August 17th, 1964. So pentavipan means that the educational curriculum 
had to be brought into accordance with that phase of the Indonesian 
revolution. 
83 Clifford Geertz, Islam, p. 17. 
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Several Muslim leaders do realize that religious instruction in schools 
does not automaticaIly create devout believers, but most informants 
seem to be rather optimistic about the results. Religious instruction is 
of ten considered the most effective way to Islamize the people of Java 
and to realize an Islamic society. Others hold that religious instruction 
will result in belief penetrating the individu al soul, in accordance with 
the Muhammadijah ideal of Muslims "with a heart fuIl of belief and 
a head fuIl of knowiedge". However that may be, with regard to religion 
one informant commented, "unknown, unloved"; and referring to the 
situation in Western countries, he added: "Here we want to prevent a 
generation from growing up without any knowledge of religion what-
soever". 
The curriculum for religious instruction in state schools, beginning in 
the fourth class of the primary school, includes four subjects: elements 
of belief (keimanan), morals (achlak ), religious duties (ibadat) and 
reciting the Qur'an. 
As far as the elements of belief are concerned, the manuals stipulate 
that religious instruction must begin by strengthening the conviction 
that God exists. In the first year furthermore God's attributes are dealt 
with, of ten in the classical way of eXplaining the "twenty attributes". 
Subjects for the foIlowing years are: belief in the Messengers, the Holy 
Books, the Angels, the Last Day and God's Decrce. It is noteworthy 
th at religious instruction in nursery schools (e.g. of Muhammadijah) 
as weIl as the university begins with providing the "proof" of God's 
existence. In its simplest form, the teacher starts from the fact that the 
table in the classroom must have been made by somebody; by way 
of the trees, nature, the world, sun, moon and stars, he arrives at the 
"cosmological proof" of God's existence as the basis for belief in God 
the Creator. In the seminar of December 1965 mentioned above, Muslim 
and Christian theologians obviously agreed on this starting-point. In 
religious circles I have met with hardly any doubt on the value of such 
a theological "proof" . 
The subject "Morals" includes matters su eh as obedience to parents, 
love of one's country, the feeling of responsibility, behaviour at home, in 
the street, in class, in the mosque, in a house of mourning, towards non-
Muslims, and so on. Some of the textbooks look rather sentimental, for 
example when a picture of a little boy reading a book is captioned with 
"The child who is thankful to God - his eyes he uses to read and his 
hands to hold a book". 
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Instruction in religious duties is concerned with the performance of 
prayer, including the necessary Arabic formulas, the meaning of Islamic 
feasts, precepts for Ramacf,än and the payment of zakät at its end, and 
finally the pilgrimage to Mecca. 
In the second half of the fifth class the Arabic alphabet is taught, 
followed by reading the Qur'än and learning a few passages by he art, 
particularly some well-known short suras. 
It is impossible to summarize and to describe all the manuals, text-
books and readers which are available for religious instruction. While 
referring to the List of Publications, the following examples may pass in 
reVIew. 
For elementary schools Mahmud Junus wrote one of the most popular 
series of textbooks on belief, morals and religious duties.Ho! The au thor 
is an elderly ulama and rather conservative. These books are attractively 
illustrated, though partly in the abovementioned style. The well-known 
Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy also wrote a simple book on Islamic belief.85 As far 
as their substance is concerned, these books do not differ much from the 
classic Muslim "catechism" by Tähir al-Djazä'iri, AI-Djawähir al-
Kalämïya (gems of doctrine), first published in Damascus in 1895.86 
Many editions of th is booklet have been published in Indonesia, in 
Arabic and in Indonesian, and it is still used in conservative circles. 
The Indonesian textbooks mentioned above try to offer this material in 
a more modern form. 
This applies also to some textbooks for secondary schools, e.g. a 
pamphlet on Islamic belief written by Munir Rusli and Nur Asjik.87 
A textbook by Muaz Ali shows a more modern approach. S8 This au thor 
starts with a short history of religion, leading up to Islam, followed by 
a discussion of the most important religious duties and some remarks 
on the present moral crisis and how to combat it. He concludes with 
discussing the meaning of terms such as belief ("to accept the truth in 
your heart"), Islam ("obvious surrender"), unbelief, apostasy, etc. The 
84 Mahmud Junus, Keimanan dan Achlak, Marilah Sembahjang, Puasa dan 
Zakat, Hadji ke Mekka, Djakarta, since about 1950. 
85 M. Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy, Peladjaran Tauhid, Medan 1954. 
Ril For a Dutch translation of this catechism, see G. F. Pijper, De Edelgesteenten 
der Geloofsleer, Leiden 1948. 
S7 A. Munir Rusli and H. M. Nur Asjik, Peladjaran Tauhid, Djakarta 1964; 
Nur Asjik is a son-in-law of the Atjehnese leader Daud Beureu'éh. 
8R Muaz Ali, Agama Islam, Djakarta 1964 (published by Tintamas, considered 
one of the more progressive publishing houses). 
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publications of Ustadh DjaCfar Amir, coming from Muhammadijah 
circles in Central Java, are probably popular in Muhammadijah second-
ary schools.89 As far as the history of Islam is concerned, an outstanding 
manual has been written by Latif Osman.90 
It may be more important to turn our attention to more scholarly 
Muslim publications, which have appeared in great numbers in modern 
Indonesia, especiaIly for the training of skilled ulamas and religious 
teachers.91 
The first book to he mentioned here, intended to be widely used, 
is the new, more or less official, publication of "The Qur'än and its 
Translation", Arabic and lndonesian in two columns. Af ter a resolution 
of the People's Congress in 1960, a foundation for "the translation of 
the Holy Book, the Qur'än" was set up by the Minister of Religion in 
1963. Two translation committees, mainly consisting of I.A.I.N. staff in 
Jogjakarta and Djakarta, have since then been working on this trans-
lation, exchanging their drafts. In August 1965 the first volume appeared, 
with a foreword by President Soekamo. It consists of an introduction 
of 148 pages (including a justification of "translating" the Qur'än, 
because understanding its content is more important than only reciting 
the text) and a translation of Djuz 1-10 (i.e. Sura 1 to Sura 9 : 93). 
Volume IJ appeared in 1967, with forewords by the Acting-President 
General Soeharto and the Chairman of the People's Congress, General 
Nasution; this volume contains Djuz 11-20, i.e. Sura 9 : 94 to Sura 
29 : 44. The third and last volume appeared in 1969, likewise with 
forewords by Soeharto, Nasution and some Ministers concerned. 
Within the circle of these Qur'än translators a new Qur'än com-
mentary is also being planned. Preliminary discussions seem to be con-
cerned with problems such as how to speak now of heaven, helI, djinns, 
89 For the books of Djacfar Amir, see the List of PublicatioIU. "Ustadh" or 
"Ustaz" is a titJe given to an authoritative scholar or teacher in the field of 
religion. So it is not a proper name, as one might conclude from Clifford 
Geertz, The Religion, p. 139. 
90 A. Latif Osman, Ringkasan Sedjarah Islam, Djakarta 195J1, 19651l1• 
91 In order to give an idea of the number of published works, one could mention 
that a catalogue of the Islamic bookshop Alaydrus (Djakarta) listed in 1966 
about 750 ti ties of books and pamphlets which were at that time on sale. 
Apart from scores of hooks and pamphlets on the Qur'àn, the following 
categories may he mentioned: Islamic history, culture and jurisprudence (49), 
the life of the Prophet (34), morals (39), doctrine (58), woman, marriage, 
the family (46), and philosophy and mysticism (39). 
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and so on (in other words, the problem of "demythologizing" old 
conceptions of religious tru ths) . 
Meanwhile about two-thirds of the Qur'än commentary An-Nur 
(The Light, cf. Sura 24) by Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy, planned to appear in 
30 volumes of about 200 pages each, has already been published. The 
au thor is considered a scholarly ulama with original ideas (remember 
his opinions on a national madhhab, instead of sticking to the four old 
schools of law). The character of th is commentary is sober and scholarly. 
A careful explanation is given of the meaning of words and sentences 
as weil as an explanation of the historical situation that caused certain 
revelations to be sent down (based, of course, on the Tradition and not 
to be confused with a Western critical approach to the history and 
text of Holy Books). Conclusions on its application to our present-day 
life are left to the reader to draw for himself. 
This sober character is one of the differences from another Qur'än 
commentary, written by H. Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (HAMKA), 
which is also in course of publication. It is called AI-Azhar af ter the 
mosque in Djakarta, which wishes to be a centre of modern Islam in 
Indonesia. This commentary was largely prepared during the years in 
which the au thor was imprisoned by the Soekarno regime. It too will be 
published in 30 volumes, three of which have already appeared. It is 
apparently intended to be more widely read than Hasbi's commentary. 
lts character is more edifying, occasionaIly with an apologetic and 
polemic trend (for instance against authors who are considered represen-
tatives of Christianity), just as the Islamic magazine Pandji Masjarakat 
edited by HAM KA. 
Besides these commentaries there are various introductions to the study 
of the Qur'än (Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy, Nur Idris and others) and several 
books dealing with favourite su ras, such as the first and the twelfth. 
A general introduction to the study of Islam is the voluminous manual 
Al-Islam by Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy. Equally lengthy works are the 
biography of the Prophet by Zainal Arifin Abbas (19381, 19593 ) and 
Munawar Chalil. Books on the culture and philosophy of Islam have 
been written by Oemar Amin Hoesin. 
Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy has also written a history of, and introduction t~, 
the study of the Tradition. A simpier manual for studying this subject 
has been published by H. M. Kasim Bakry. The latter also wrote a 
manual on Islamic criminal law as weIl as a manual on the history 
of Islamic jurisprudence, sharply criticizing the centuries of talflïd, when 
people had to "clothe with authority" the four mediaeval schools of law. 
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A promlsmg book on the "roots" of jurisprudence was Usul Fiqh, 
written by A. Hanafie (I.A.LN., Jogja) , who unfortunately died in the 
prime of life as a result of an accident in 1966. Beside the "roots" which 
are considered valid in the ShäfiCj school, he also referred to methods 
of reasoning used in other schools, such as for instance istil;zsän (Iiterally 
"approval", i.e. a discretionary opinion in breach of the usual ~iyäs or 
"deduction by analogy", cf. Sura 39: 18) and isti.#äh (taking the public 
interest or human welfare into account). From his cautious criticism 
of al-ShäfiCj's objections to istil;zsàn, it may be concluded that the author 
wanted to advocate the use of these controversial principles. Obviously 
he also urged the "new idjtihäd", even calling it a "duty" (not just a 
"right") of modem scholars to arrive at certain legal decisions based on 
their own studies of the Qur'än and Tradition. On the other hand he 
agreed that ordinary laymen could maintain the "right of ta~l'id", 
defined as "following the opinion of someone else, without knowing his 
source or his argumentation". It may be concluded th at Hanafie's book 
offered important starting-points for wide and modem development and 
interpretation of Islamic law in our time. 
One authoritative informant, however, did not consider a discussion 
on these "roots" or principles of jurisprudence so very important. In 
fact, he said, we do not first have to decide on the "roots" or sources 
of jurisprudence in order to achieve legal decisions which may lead to 
modernization. Jurisprudence and the making of laws do not create or 
stimulate new rules for human behaviour, but can only followand 
sanction new developments. All kinds of modernization are taking place, 
whether we want them or not, and we cannot turn the clock back. 
Therefore the only value of the "roots" of jurisprudence is th at they can 
officially legitimize these modernizations af ter they have already taken 
place. 
In the field of doctrine there seems to be almost as little new discussion 
in scholarly books as in popular publications. Dogmatics is of ten con-
sidered theological speculation and therefore a luxury in circumstances 
where the practical realization of Islam in the daily life of society is of 
primary importance. Moreover, dogmatics is usually dealt with as a set 
of doctrines which were definitely settled centuries ago. Therefore these 
doctrines have to be expounded and accepted without too much 
discussion and questioning. The principle of bi-là kai! (i.e. without asking 
"how" exactly things must be understood), first and foremost connected 
with belief in God, apparently tends to dominate the whole field of 
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doctrine. How difficult it is to speak in a non-traditional way about 
God and the Prophet without insulting pious people can be shown, for 
example, by the court case against H. B. Jassin, who had advocated 
freedom of imagination in literature in connection with a short story 
written by Kipandjikusmin. In this story the writer described the 
Prophet's descending again to our planet in order to examine the sinful 
condition of our world today, in particular Indonesia, which had resulted 
in so few people entering Heaven in recent years. 92 
Apart from some general introductions for a wider public (pamphlets 
by M. A. Badawy, T. M. Usman el-Muhammady and H. Abubakar 
Atjeh), perhaps the only important books on doctrine to be mentioned 
here are the publications of Taib Thahir Abdul Mu'in (I.A.I.N., Jogja) . 
As a textbook for students he initially published a short summary 
(Ichtisar Ilmu Tauhid). His later Systematic Theology (Ilmu Kalam) 
is more extensive, though not going beyond 300 pages. In its historical 
introduction, the "history of the growth of the belief in one God" is 
dealt with. The author touches upon nature worship, the ancient 
religions of Egypt, Persia, etc. and the revealed religions (Judaism and 
Christianity). These religions are mainly dealt with in the light of the 
Qur'än, as a "theology of religions" so to speak. Christianity is hence 
only treated as a pre-Islamic religion; its dogmatic development is only 
sketched up to the rise of Islam, giving the impression that Nestorius and 
the Syrian Jakobites are still relevant. However, compared to the average 
apologetic and polemic publications, this au thor shows a more serious 
attempt to understand the meaning of certain Christian doctrines and 
formulas, for instance the symbolical meaning of the title "Son of God". 
In the second part of his book the au thor explains the elements of the 
Islamic creed, largely with quotations from the Qur'än and Tradition. 
According to this book toa dogma tics is a summary of ageless doctrines 
rather than a topical discussion on the problems and belief of modern 
man. Only the problem of ~adar and ~a4tt (both concerned with God's 
eternal decrees and their realization in time) gets special attention in the 
third part of the book. But the au thor confines himself to offering a 
compromise between the opinions of the Djabrïya (who denied the free-
dom of will) and the MuCtazila (who emphasized human responsibility). 
As a manual for the study of mysticism the "Introduction to the Study 
92 See H. B. Jassin, Heboh Sast ra 1968, Suatu Pertanggunganjawab, Djakarta 
1970. An almost complete record of the court's sessions is to be found in the 
literary monthly Horison, August 1970 ff. 
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of Mysticism" by H. Abubakar Atjeh may be mentioned. His book offers 
a survey of the history of mysticism and mysticalorders as well as a 
discussion of the essence and phenomena of mysticism. 
The theological journalof a standard similar to the publications 
mentioned above is AI-Djami'ah, published by the I.A.I.N. at Jogjakarta 
since January 1962. This journal has apparently laboured under many 
difficulties, such as a lack of money and copy, but nevertheless it is worth 
while to pay attention to this attempt to publish a kind of academic 
Islamic journa1.93 
Finally it may be noticed once again that many Islamic publications 
by foreign authors, both classical and modern, are being translated into 
Indonesian and are published or in preparation. Some of them are 
specially intended for students of Islam, for instance the works of Ibn 
Khaldün, cOda and Mawdüdï already mentioned above. Here I add 
the names of al-Bukhärï (AI-.}' al;tï!t}, al-Ghazzälï (I I;tyä', in preparation), 
Mul). cAbduh (Risälat al-Tawl;tïd), Rashïd Riçlä (only a few passages 
from AI-Wal;tyu 'l-Muf:tammadï), Taha I;:Iusain (his autobiography and 
AI-Wacd Al-ij a~~) and publications from AI-Azhar circles in Cairo, 
such as writings by Mahmoud Shaltout, Muh. Ghallab and Ahmad 
Shalaby.94 
The above survey may suffice to illustrate that Islamic scholars in 
Indonesia have indeed produced a great quantity of reading-matter. 
This production is certainly only the first phase of what has to he done. 
At this first stage manuals and other textbooks had to be supplied for 
educational purposes. As a matter of course, in a developing country 
such as Indonesia religious studies - like others - consist largely of 
collecting what is known and what is considered to be established truth. 
The question may be put as to whether here too the next phase will be 
for research and study to be directed towards the unknown as well, and 
for critical questions to be asked concerning established truth. 
93 The Arabic al-djämica means a university or college; the name of th is 
journal is taken from the Arabic translation of Institut Agama Islam Negeri 
(I.A.I.N.), wed as a sub-title: Al-Djamicah Al-Islamijah Al-Hukumijah. 
94 The lastmentioned was for some years a Visiting Professor at the I.A.I.N. in 
Jogjakarta. His book on Christianity (Perbandingan Agama, bahagian Agama 
Maséhi) , more polemic than scholarly, did not prove an important con-
tribution to developments in Indonesia and must be considered out of date. 
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6. A Muslim "Theology ot Religions" 
According to some Christian theologians, Churches and Missions are 
at present in need of a new "theology of religions", that is to say, an 
evaluation of non-Christian religions from the Christian point of view, 
or in other words an evaluation based on the Gospel of Jesus Christ or 
on the Bible as the document of God's revelation. 
It could be said that Islam has had a kind of "theology of religions" 
from the very beginning. This Islamic "theology of religions" differs in 
one basic aspect from tendencies within Judaism and Christianity. The 
latter both tend to exclusiveness, either because of a nationalistic inter-
pretation of being the chosen people, or because of the doctrine concern-
ing Christ as the only way to salvation. Islam, however, began by thinking 
"inclusively": the Prophet was sent to confirm the message of his 
predecessors because these messengers also called people to belief in the 
One and Only God (cf. Sura 21 : 25). It is true that during the life of 
the Prophet a sharp antithesis began to arise between the Muslims and 
the Jews and Christians. This development resulted in a kind of ambiv-
alence towards "the people of the Book" (Jews and Christians). This 
ambivalence can be defined as a co-existence of feelings of agreement 
and of disagreement towards these religions and in particular towards 
Christianity; it of ten depends on circumstances whether the positive or 
the negative attitude becomes dominant. But all the conflicts, right up 
to the present day, have not done away with the basis of the Muslim 
"theology of religions", namely the conviction that Jews, Christians and 
Muslims are bound together by belief in the same God, who once spoke 
through Moses, later through Jesus and finally through Muhammad. 
In Indonesia, and in particular in Java, this "synthetical" way of 
thinking is strengthened by a genuine, indigenous tendency to tolerance. 
Moreover, the significance of the Ministry of Religion may once again 
be stressed in this connection. In spite of all practical shortcomings, the 
existence of this Ministry tends to stimulate the feeling that within 
Indonesian society various religions have to exist side by side. Western, 
non-Muslim scholars like to explain Indonesian tolerance as stemming 
from Javanese syncretism with its doctrine that fundamentally all 
religions are alike. Speaking of the principle of Islarnic tolerance, a 
Javanese informant on ce hastened to add th at he was, of course, not 
only a Muslim but also a Javanese, in other words a Javanese Muslim. 
With regard to modern developments in Indonesia the question could 
perhaps be put as to whether there is not an increasing influence of 
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Javanese Muslims within the Islamic community in Indonesia (through 
an increasing number of Javanese leaders and scholars), at the cost of 
the former non-Javanese leadership in Indonesian Islam. If indeed such 
a shift is taking pI ace, it could perhaps also have consequences for 
religious tolerance. 
Acknowledging the significance of a "Javanese tolerance", we should, 
however, not forget that Islam itself has a "theology of religions" which 
emphasizes not only the finality of Islam, but also to a certain extent 
respect for, and a positive attitude toward, other religions, or at least 
toward Judaism and Christianity. 
Such a "theology of religions" is, however, not the same thing as 
"comparative religion". The latter is the scientific study of the origin, 
development and interrelations of the different religious systems of 
mankind ; unlike a "theology of religions", it must try to understand 
another religion from its own sources, supplemented by a study of the 
living belief of its present adherents, while an evaluation of th at religion 
based on the observer's own religious tenets has to be suspended as far 
as possible. 
If I am not mistaken, there is one Indonesian publication which faUs 
somewhere between a Muslim "theology of religions" and "comparative 
religion". It is a pamphlet by A. Mukti Ali (I.A.I.N., Jogja), which 
could be considered basically a "theology of religions" as referred to 
above, but is entitled "Comparative Religion" (Ilmu Perbandingan 
Agama), and in fact shows some features of a comparative religion 
as indicated above. 95 It is worthwhile to review th is pamphlet at some 
length. 
In his introduction the author stresses that comparative religion does 
not have an apologetic character; on the contrary, it must be possible to 
have sympathy for the religion and belief of someone else. This does not 
mean that one has to put aside one's own conviction in order to arrive 
at "objectivity". In our study of religions as weU as in other sectors of 
social life our attitude has to be an attitude of agreeing to disagree. 
Comparative religion is a positive method to understand how God from 
the beginning has given directives to mankind and how man has reacted 
to God's revelations. Comparative religion is therefore concerned basicaUy 
with the rel at ion between God and history. It is not concerned with the 
question of truth. This question can be Ie ft to the philosophy of religion. 
95 A. Mukti Ali, Ilmu Perbandingan Agama, Jogjakarta 1965. 
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Af ter a survey of the methods of comparative religion, the author 
sketches its history, both in the West and in the world of Islam. He 
admits that among Muslims the study of religions has of ten been 
practised as apologetics. In a survey of authors who wrote on other 
religions, he first of all mentions eAU ibn Sahl Rabbän al-Tabarï 
(d. A.D. 854), who indeed attacked Christianity, but not too fiercely, 
and produced a list of verses from the Bible which predict the coming 
of the Prophet MuJ:!ammad. Then Ibn I:Iazm (d. 1064) is mentioned; 
having discovered 78 contradictions in the New Testament, he proved 
that the Bible must have been falsified by Jews and Christians and 
cannot be the original revelation. Furthermore the au thor refers to 
al-Shahrastänï (d. 1143), AJ:!mad al-$anhädjï ~arafi (d. 1235) and 
Ibn Taimïya (d. 1328) - the last two writing in answer to Paul al-
Rähib, the 12th century bishop of Sidon 96 - then Ibn ~ayyim (d. 
1350), followed by later Indian authors such as al-Hindi (19th century) 
and the great apologists of our age MuJ:!. eAbduh, al-Afghänï and finally 
Amïr eAlï, whose book "The Spirit of Islam" (1891) is still widely read 
and whose way of arguing is still popular with present-day Muslim 
apologists everywhere. The au thor concludes this survey by stating that 
among Muslims comparative religion has not yet actually been developed 
as it ought to be, but still has to find its way. 
In the third chapter the various schools of thought in Western 
comparative religion are dealt with. Special attention is given to evolu-
tionism and its rejection by Father Wilhelm Schmidt. Apparently the 
au thor feels attracted by Schmidt's idea of so-called "primitive mono-
theism" (Urmonotheismus) which could, of course, suit the starting-
point of Muslim "theology of religions", i.e. th at mankind from the very 
beginning believed in the One Supreme Being. The au thor stresses that 
Schmidt's ideas are not simply based on Roman Catholic doctrines or 
on the Bibie, but on anthropological research. With regard to Muslim 
authors he states that MuJ:!. eAbduh as weil as Rashïd Riçlä and MuJ:!. 
Iqbäl were indeed prepared to acknowledge evolution in the progress 
of God's revelation - from "national prophets" who spoke in such a 
way th at people of their own age and society could understand, up to 
the final and universal Prophet for all people and all ages - but did not 
apply the notion of evolutionism to man's concept ion of God and the 
rise of belief in the One and Only God. 
96 For a recent study on the writings of Bishop Paul of Sidon, see Paul Khoury, 
Paul d'Antioche, Év2que Melkite de Sidon (XII" s.), thesis Leiden 1965. 
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Chapter IV sketches the history of Oriental studies or Orientalism 
in the West, where interest in the world of Islam initially arose due to 
the Crusades and Turkish expansion. Afterwards these studies were 
closely connected with Western colonialism and imperialism. This 
connection is considered the greatest difficulty for Western schol ars to 
arrive at mature Orientalism (other shortcomings are, for instance, a too 
limited specialization either in Arabic or in sociology). Western scholars 
cannot be neutral or objective, as long as colonialism and imperialism 
are still alive. Even Gibb (one of the few Islamic schol ars respected 
among Muslims) according to Mukti Ali betrays the fact th at he is 
influenced by obsolete views when he quotes MacDonald's rem ark on the 
"precise pathology of Muhammad's psychology" in the foreword of his 
"Modern Trends in Islam". 
With regard to the attitude of Indonesians to the West, the au thor 
indicates the dualism caused by Dutch educational policy. This policy 
resulted in some Indonesians simply taking over everything from the 
West, while others rejected everything to do with Western civilization. 
Muslim intellectuals will have to overcome this dualism. Therefore the 
au thor advocates the development of Western studies or "Occidentalism" 
within the Muslim community in Indonesia, as a counterpart to Oriental-
ism in the West. In this way Indonesian Muslims will be able to enter 
into a dialogue (Ind. ber-"dialoog") with the Western world. This 
"Occidentalism" ought to be developed as soon as possible, the I.A.I.N. 
taking the initiative. 
Thereupon the author sums up wh at a Muslim should bear in mind 
when studying religions other than his own. (1) A Muslim must not 
forget that the source for his knowledge of other religions is primarily 
the Qur'än, though those religions' own sources must also be studied. 
(2) Various historical facts mentioned in the Qur'än, but for a long time 
denied by non-Muslim scholars, are now being confirmed by archeological 
research. (3) Many Scriptures of other religions do not give solutions for 
social life, but the teachings of the Qur'än are directly concerned with 
society. (4) The Qur'än shows a pure, ethical monotheism; for the under-
standing of other religions it is essential to study th is monotheism of the 
Qur'än. (5) Islam is - like Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity -
a missionary religion; adherents of other religions, however, must be 
approached in a spirit of respect and with a feeling of sympathy. 
(6) It is a great mis take to search only for the weaknesses of other 
religions; the strength of a religious system cannot be discovered by 
looking at its errors, but by studying that which is right and true or 
CHAPTER IV: STOCKT AKING 209 
at least partially true. The strength of Hinduism, for example, lies in the 
pantheistic "that art thou", of Buddhism in the extinction of man's 
desires, of Judaism in the conception of God's absolute holiness and the 
belief in God's covenant with Israel as His chosen people. The strength 
of Christianity lies in the belief that the etemal, transcendent God hecame 
immanent through His incarnation in Jesus, who through his crucifixion 
and resurrection grants forgiveness of sins, etemal life and salvation to 
all mankind. Finally, the strength of Islam lies in the unconditional 
belief in the One and Only God, in His sovereignty and transcendency, 
and the rejection of incarnation in any form. (7) Muslim missionaries 
(muballighs) must not be affected with a spirit of hate and contempt, 
but must be acquainted with the teachings of these other religions and, 
moreover, be able to show in a positive way what Islam has to offer 
towards a solution of social problems. 
The au th or emphasizes the need to tackle social problems and warns 
against negative apologetics. Muslims must not look back to a glorious 
past (Diponegoro and other Indonesian heroes), but must be involved 
in the present-day struggle for realizing Islam in society (masjarat-kan 
Islam), realizing its social principles (sosial-kannja) and making Islam 
function (fungsionil-kannja). 
In the final chapter the author summarizes the significance of 
comparative religion as follows. (1) This study can prove a great help 
in understanding the inner life and thoughts of mankind. (2) It is useful 
for discovering similarities between Islam and other religions, and for 
indicating those aspects of Islam which are superior to other religions, 
and furthermore for showing how pre-Islamic religions prepared man-
kind for the coming of Islam. (3) I t is, however, still more important to 
create sympathy and a feeling of responsibility toward those who do not 
yet know the truth of Islam. (4) Comparative religion can be dangerous 
if it is carried out in a wrong way, so that it weakens the position of 
Islam; in that case a new kind of apologetics would be needed in order 
to defend Islam; but comparative religion can also have good results and 
strengthen the Islamic offensive. (5) When studying other religions, we 
can arrive at a better understanding of our own religion and in this way 
our faith will be deepened. (6) Technological progress has made our 
world so small that we are facing new problerns in human relationships; 
comparative religion can help us to solve these problems. (7) Contact 
with other religions can help us understand other terminologies and 
simplify our own, so that our terminology no longer confuses the 
common man. (8) The greatest result of comparative religion wil! he 
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the ConvIctIOn of the universality, the sufficiency and the finality of 
Islam. (9) Perhaps Amold J. Toynbee ("An Historian's Approach to 
Religion", 1956) was right when he said that the three religions which 
have sprung from the same source (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) 
tend to exclusiveness and intolerance, but there are nevertheless signs of 
a development which promises a better future: improving methods of 
research and co-operation between the various social sciences will 
provide us with a wider and deeper understanding of religion; we shall 
discover the marvellous riches which are to be found in every religion, 
and in this way we shall arrive at mutual respect. 
The author emphasizes that with comparative religion one can over-
come all sorts of prejudices as weIl as an emotional and polemical 
attitude toward other religions. Besides various differences, comparative 
religion also shows the similarities between religions, such as (1) belief 
in a transcendent Being that is holy and differs from anything else, the 
ordering principle in creation (Tao, rtam, Logos), personified as Jahwe, 
Varul)a, Ahura-Mazda, Allah, Visht:lu, Krishl)a, Buddha, Käli, or 
Kwan-jin. (2) This Being is considered the summum bonum by every-
one and is sought everywhere, in mysticism, Buddhism, Christianity and 
also in Islam. (3) This holy Being is beneficent and merciful toward 
mankind and the world. (4) The way to God and to salvation - by 
continuously remembering Him and by ethical self-discipline - is the 
way of sacrifice. (5) The performance of religious duties is not only 
aimed at achieving salvation in the world to come but also well-being 
here on earth, the "Kingdom of God" according to Judaism and 
Christianity, and lJasana tï 'd-dunyä ("good in th is world") according 
to Islam.97 
If religion wants to fight for humanitarianism, it must promote 
co-operation between adherents of the various religions. Comparative 
religion has an important role in pursuing this ideal: it creates mutual 
understanding, respect and appreciation; it removes the feeling of 
distance between East and West and promotes the feeling of unity among 
mankind. The famous lines of Kipling's poem are outdated: "Oh, East 
is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet". And the 
lines suggesting that the difference will be done away with "When two 
strong men stand face to face" could suggest a kind of balance of power 
to prevent East and West from warring. Comparative religion, however, 
can make a contribution to arriving at a truly safe world, where people 
enjoy order and happiness based on religion and morals. 
97 Cf. Sura 2:201; 7:156; 16:41, 122. 
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More profound than Kipling's lines are those of Goethe: 
Gottes ist der Orient, 
Gottes ist der Okzident, 
Nord- und südliches Gelände 
ruhn im Frieden seiner Hände.98 
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Still more profound are the words of the Qur'än (Sura 2 : 115), 
which can be translated as follows: Vnto God belong the East and the 
West, and whithersoever ye turn, there is God's mercy, for all-embracing 
is God's mercy and He is all-knowing.99 
We may conclude that Mukti Ali advocates a dialogue on a high level, 
by means of comparative religion, between qualified representatives of 
various religions. This is, of course, a most important matter. 
A "meeting of religions", however, is not only a question of words 
and theories, let alone of theological discussions on strictly religious 
problems. According to Mukti Ali, it also includes practical co-operation. 
So the "meeting" or "dialogue" between adherents of various religions 
is also a question of daily life, of being involved together in current 
problems of the world in which we live. This aspect will have to be kept 
in mind when passing on to the following paragraphs. 
7. Reformation, Liberalization, Modernization 
Three Indonesian terms frequently used at present are reformasi, 
liberalisasi and modernisasi. They refer to a renewal that is still at work 
and has not yet become a fixed theory or school of thought such as 
"reformism" , "liberalism" or "modernism". 
The three terms are of ten used indiscriminately, without a definition 
of what each of them means. If we try to differentiate them, the term 
"reformation" could be connected primarily with the movement for 
renewal dating from the beginning of this century and led by Mu1:I. 
cAbduh in Egypt. lts aim was to awaken Muslims and raise Islam out 
of its conservatism and to cleanse it of non-Muslim impurities. This 
98 In English: To God belongs the Orient, To God belongs the Occident, 
Nothem lands and southern lands are kept safely in His hands. 
99 The tenn wadjhu 'llähi (literally, the face of God; Piekthall gives "coun-
tenance") is interpreted by Mukti Ali as rahmat (grace, mercy). The new 
official Indonesian translation of the Qur'än retains wadjah Allah, adding in 
an explanatory note that God's power embraces the whole cosmos, so that 
man cannot nee from Him. 
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refonnist movement advocated a return to the original Islam to free 
it from the shackles of the mediaeval schools of law. The term "liberal-
ization" can be used primarily to refer to this release and therefore 
indicates chiefly a process in the hu man mind. This "reformation" and 
"liberalization" together can be considered as paving the way to a 
necessary "modernization", i.e. a change in established patterns of life 
in order to meet the demands of modern times. 
In his booklet on Modern Islam in Indonesia Mukti Ali has indicated 
the significanee of the shift which took pi ace at about the beginning of 
this century with regard to influences from abroad on Indonesian 
Islam.1 0o From th at time onward the Arab countries clearly took the 
place th at India had occupied in fonner centuries, and according to 
Mukti Ali, th is meant that pure, orthodox Islam has been gaining ground 
in Indonesia, while remnants of "animism" and Hinduism have been 
combatted, particularly by the reformist Muhammadijah movement 
founded in 1912. 
The influence of the Arab countries initially made itself feit through 
contact with Mecca, but since about 1930 Cairo has definitely come to 
the fore. MuJ:!. cAbduh and Rashïd Riçl.ä are still honoured in Indonesia 
as the great refonners of Islam in our age; and there is still a close 
relationship between Indonesian Muslims and Al-Azhar in Cairo. 
Indonesian founders of the refonnist movement are still honoured in 
many recent books and leaflets. The reader may be referred to an article 
by H. Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (HAMKA), translated into 
Gennan.101 The author speaks first of all of Tahir Djalal ad-Din al-
Azhari from Central Sumatra (who studied in Cairo in about 1892), 
whom he considers a precursor of the Indonesia·n reformist movement. 
He then deals with three "Sumatran reformers", Abdul Karim Amrullah 
(his father), Muh. Djamil Djambek and Abdullah Ahmad. As far as 
Java is concerned, the author writes on Ahmad Soorkati (the reformist 
leader of AI-Irsjad, an association of Arabs living in Indonesia), K. H. 
Ahmad Dahlan (the founder of the Muhammadijah) and Ahmad 
Hassan of the famous Bangil pesantrèn. 
100 A. Mukti AH, Alam Pikiran Islam Modern di Indonesia, Djakarta 1964. 
101 Cf. HAMKA's article, Wie der Islam nach Indonesien kam - which offers 
more than its title suggests - in Rolf Italiaander, Die lIerausforderung des 
Islam, Göttingen 1965, pp. 146-168; more extensively in HAMKA, Pengaruh 
Muhammad Abduh di Indonesia, Djakarta 1961 (originally a lecture given 
at Al-Azhar University in Cairo when receiving an honorary doctor's degree 
on January 2lst, 1958) ; also HAM KA, Ajahku, Djakarta 1950. 
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It is of course K. H. A. Dahlan who is generaIly considered the great 
reformer of Islam in Indonesia. Publications on his life and work show 
a deep reverence for th is reformist leader,lo2 As has al ready been said, 
the foundation of the N.u. in 1926 can be regarded as an answer to 
these reformist endeavours, as the N.u. wanted to defend the authority 
of the four orthodox schools of law as weIl as a genuine J avanese style 
of life. Many informants assured me that the old conflicts between 
"reformers" and "orthodox" are now buried. The old points at issue 
are now said to be no longer relevant. Others stress that various ideas 
originating from reformist circles have now been commonly accepted. 
This applies in particular to practical questions of modernization in daily 
life, from the use of "Western"-style dress and modern transport to the 
calculation of the first day of Ramaq,än. But recent discussions on 
subjects such as farnily law and the law of inheritance (caused by 
Hazairin's outspoken publications) may indicate that old conflicts and 
controversies have not yet altogether disappeared. 
The question which for a long time was considered the most funda-
mental difference between reformers and orthodox was the reformers' 
struggle for the "new idjtihäd" (personal effort to answer modern 
problems from one's own study of the Qur'än and Tradition), whereas 
the orthodox wanted to defend the obligation of ta~lïd (to acknowledge 
the authority of the mediaeval schools of law and the verdicts they had 
passed). Nowadays there is in fact very little public discussion on this 
problem. Does it mean th at the "people of idjtihad" have won the day? 
In fact the most important authors, teachers and professors belong to 
the people who want to engage in "the fight for the reformation and 
modernization of Islam",lo3 Modern Muslims are accustomed to 
102 
103 
See, for example, Solichin Salam, K. H. Ahmad Dahlan, Re/ormer Islam 
Indonesia, Djakarta 1963. lts concluding chapter consists of quotations from 
foreign publications praising Dahlan and the Muhammadijah (Van Nieuwen-
huijze, Vlekke, Kahin, Wertheim, Gibb, W. C. Smith, Pijper, Kraemer, Berg, 
Drewes and others). On the other hand (p. 55 ff.) some Christian mission-
aries are mentioned who had to acknowledge Dahlan's superiority in their 
debates with him (for instance Father F. van Lith S.J. and Rev. D. Bakker 
Sr.), while other visitors are said not even to have had the courage to enter 
into a discussion with Dahlan (for instance "Pastoor Dr. Zwijmer", i.e. 
Samuel M. Zwemer). The name of Hendrik Kraemer, who apparently was 
on very good terms with K. H. A. Dahlan, is not mentioned in this con-
nection. 
According to its sub-title, Pandji Masjarakat aims to be the magazine for 
"the fight for the reformation and modernization of Islam". Af ter this 
magazine was banned, it was succeeded in 1962 by Gema Islam, which has 
a somewhat more cultural character. From 1966 onward both magazines 
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ascribing the backwardness of the Muslim world to the talfl'id mentality 
caused by the "dosing of the gate of idjtihäd". Thus "taklidist" has 
become a term of abuse which in a revolutionary country such as 
Indonesia is regarded as just as insuIting as "conservative". Hence 
hardly anyone has the courage to defend publidy the obligation of 
talfl'id. 
Vet there are young Muslims who wonder whether reformation and 
liberalization in Indonesia have really been effective and have really 
opened the door for continuing modernization. Did not reformation 
actually get stuck half way? Did not perhaps the reformers' path even 
turn off to the right again? To what extent was the work of Ahmad 
Dahlan afterwards overshadowed by the influence of ulamas such as 
Ahmad Hassan of Bangil? Did this development indude a shift to the 
right comparable with developments in Cairo, where MuJ:1. cAbduh was 
succeeded by Rashïd RiQ.ä? In the same way as Protestant reformers 
called for a return to the BibIe, so too Muslim reformers called for a 
return to the two sources of Islam, the Qur'än and the Tradition. But 
did not in both cases this return result in a return to the letter of the 
sacred books, rather than a return to the spirit? 104 
Before hearing a member of the younger generation who has apparent-
ly been searching for radical solutions, we shall have to quote once again 
from the booklet by Mukti Ali mentioned at the beginning of this 
paragraph. Obviously Mukti Ali wants to bridge the gap between the 
"people of idjtihäd" and the "people of the madhhab", as he calls 
them. According to him, the old contrast is no longer important, and a 
synthesis has already been arrived at. This synthesis can be described as 
follows. In order to find a solution for modern problems 105 the "people 
of idjtihäd" operate from the Qur'än and Tradition; afterwards they 
turn their attention to verdicts passed by great ulamas from the orthodox 
schools of law, and in th is way they usually arrive at a decision which 
have appeared side by side. The fortnightly Suara Muhammadi;ah has a 
more limited character, being the official periodical of this association. 
Finally the Islamic magazine Kiblat can be mentioned, published by "Jajasan 
Perdjalanan Hadji Indonesia" (Indonesian Foundation for the Pilgrimage). 
104 Compare W. C. Smith's remark in connection with reformation in Islam: 
"While there have been fundamentalist conservatives among those inspired 
by their orientation, others crying 'Back to the Qur'an!' and 'Back to the 
Sunnah!' have meant, 'Back to the God of the Qur'an and His commands; 
back to the spirit of the Sunnah and its exhilaration'." (Islam, p. 44). 
105 As examples we can take the questions of whether blood transfusions or lunar 
flights are allowed from a religious point of view. 
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is in agreement with the Qur'än and Tradition and not in conflict with 
the opinion of one or more of the authoritative ulamas. On the other 
hand, the "people of the madhhab" try to answer such a question by 
studying firstly the opinions of the ulamas; from these opinions they 
choose the best one, that is to say, the opinion which is in accordance, 
or at least not in conflict, with the Qur'än and Tradition. In this way 
both groups of scholars of ten arrive at the same decision, though by 
different methods. 
Vet, according to Mukti Ali, the call to idjtihäd was indeed of great 
significance. "With the call to return to the Qur'än and Tradition and 
the call to concentrate personallyon studying and analysing religious 
questions, a new phase in the history of modern Muslim thought in 
Indonesia has set in. This was where liberalism in Indonesian Islam 
originated . .. This liberalism, however, differs from the liberalism 
stemming from the Western Renaissance. Western liberalism considers 
Reason as the ultimate norm (the final judge), whereas liberalism in 
Islam considers Reason as only an aid in judging something, recognizing 
the limits put by God's revelation." 106 
With regard to the programme of the reformist movement, Mukti Ali 
takes over cAbduh's programme as summarized by Gibb in the following 
points: "( 1) the purification of Islam from corrupting influences and 
practices; (2) the reformation of Muslim higher education; (3) the 
re-formulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern thought; and 
(4) the defense of Islam against European influences and Christian 
attacks".1 07 
With regard to the last point, which concerns apologetics, Mukti Ali 
refers to W. C. Smith's "Islam in Modern History"; his explanations 
"can to some extent also he used for an analysis of apologetics as found 
in Indonesia".108 In view of the Indonesian situation, Mukti Ali adds 
a fifth point to the abovementioned programme, namely the liberation 
from colonialism; but this hj.s in fact already been achieved. According 
to Mukti Ali the remaining four points are essentially one; they can be 
comprised in the need to promote belief in the One and Only God. 
The endeavours to reform Muslim higher education (Gibb's point 2) 
have already been dealt with (Chapter II, par. 5). Gibb's point 4, 
106 Mukti Ali, Alam Pik iran, pp. 31-32. 
107 H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, Chicago 1947, p. 33. This hook has 
been translated into Indonesian and published under the title Aliran-aliran 
Modern dalam Islam, Djakarta 1952. 
108 Mukti Ali, Alam Pikiran, p. 48, n. 28. 
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including apologetics and polemics, will come under discussion in the 
final paragraph of this book. 
The "purification of Islam" (point 1) includes, of course, the struggle 
against various superstltIouS practices (for instance visiting graves as 
mentioned in Chapter 11, par. 6), originating from the so-called 
"animistic and Hinduistic period". In this context Mukti Ali refers in 
particular to mysticism and its Hindu-Javanese background. According 
to the author the Muhammadijah showed understanding for the liking 
of the Indonesian people for mysticism. Hence the Muhammadijah 
opposed the negative aspects of mysticism leading to asceticism and 
renunciation of the world, but did not reject every kind of mysticism. 
It rather gave a new interpretation and a new tenor to mysticism by 
emphasizing the ethical implications of religious life. In the widest sense 
of the word, modern mysticism includes wh at could rather be called 
"personal piety". 
One formula used by several informants was that Islam in Indonesia 
is developing into areligion which is indeed "rational, but not ration-
alistic". One informant added: "This rational character is quite different 
from a rationalism such as, for instance, can be found in the A1).madïya 
Movement, which for this reason can make no progress in Indonesia". 
With regard to "personal piety", Mukti Ali refers to HAMKA's books, 
which may indeed be taken as samples of modern Muslim piety. 
Obviously these works are very popular.109 
Here too one could ask in which direction Indonesian Islam is going 
to develop. It is clear th at Islam is a "living force" in Indonesia, as one 
of my informants used to say, that is, a "living force" as a political, 
social and cultural entity. But like all religions Islam too is facing the 
problem of its significance as dïn, as "religion in a narrower sense" for 
the individual, that is to say, as a source of spiritual strength and an 
inner anchorage for the man whose traditiogal pattern of life is breaking 
up. People in a developing country such as Indonesia are losing the 
certitude which sterns from communallife and thought, and are entering 
the bewildering complexity of a modern secularized world, in which 
everyone has to decide on his own way of life. What does religion mean 
109 See the List of Publications. HAMKA's book on "1,000 vita! questions" has 
gone through 9 reprints since 1940; his book on "modern mysticism" of 1939 
achieved its llth reprint in 1961; his "philosophy of life" of 1940 a 6th 
reprint in 1962; and his "mysticism throughout the ages", dating from 1952, 
appeared in its 5th reprint in 1962. 
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for the personal life of its adherents, especially of the younger 
generation? This question also belongs to the problem of modernization. 
The need to pay attention to this spiritual aspect of modernization is 
evident from the rise and thriving condition of numerous groups based 
on mysticism, inner piety or a kind of moral rearmament. This area of 
religious life in Indonesia actually requires special research, directed to 
at least three phenomena. First of all, there is the area of a more or less 
Islamic mysticism as it is practised by means of dhikr, ei th er privately 
or collectively in a tarï~a (Ind. tarèkat), i.e. a mysticalorder. Secondly 
there are dozens of groups, especially in Java, which bear a more 
Javanese-Hinduistic character, the so-called kebathinan movements (Ar. 
bätin = inner, interior) ; some of these use a more or less Islamic 
terminology, while others have a completely Javanese appearance.110 
Finally groups can be mentioned such as the Subud movement, founded 
by the Javanese guru Subuh (not to be confused with the name of the 
movement), which also has some followers in Europe and elsewhere. 
This movement claims to be a movement for adherents of all religions, 
without making its members disloyal to their own religion. According to 
some of its adherents th is movement could be characterized as a kind 
of Indonesian or Javanese "moral rearmament". Besides tarèkat and 
kebathinan, this third phenomenon is sometimes indicated as kedjiwaan 
(from the Indonesian djiwa = soul or spirit). 
It is my impression that these religious movements are in deed in a 
flourishing condition, in spite of the government's support for more 
orthodox and traditional forms of religious life. To what ex tent does 
this prove that people's religious needs cannot be satisfied only by 
emphasizing obedience to religious precepts and the observance of 
religious duties? How will modern Islam in Indonesia meet these needs? 
Returning to the present-day condition of modern Islam, it must be 
pointed out that reformism or liberalism in Indonesia has little in 
common with liberalism within Christianity. As has already been said, 
questions of doctrine are of ten considered speculative and therefore a 
luxury. To what extent are Muslim theologians aware th at thinking 
about the "re-formulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern 
110 I have already mentioned the stencilled publication Aliran-aliran Kebathinan 
(LA.LN., Jogja). A recent publication by an Indonesian Christian is the 
doctor's thesis of Harun Hadiwijono, Man in the Present Javanese Mysticism, 
Baarn (The Netherlands) 1967. 
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thought" (point 3 of cAbduh's programme, as given by Gibb) is a task 
which has to be carried on continuously? In my opinion it is not enough 
simply to repeat the apologetic thesis that Islam is the most rational 
religion, and that Islam has already accepted modern thought by accept-
ing the true elements of evolutionism. 
One of the few questions sometimes discussed is the Prophet's 
"ascension" or "Journey into Heaven". Educated people have difficulty 
in accepting this story literally. But, as far as I know, such questions 
are hardly dealt with in publications. In private talks theologians are 
wont to emphasize that this story may be taken either literally, as 
including body and soul (see Sura 17 : 1), or symbolically, as an elevation 
in the spirit (based on a tradition that according to cÄ'isha the Prophet 
was in Mecca th at night). With regard to such a story, people of ten act 
as many Christians do with regard to Bible stories: a teacher or preacher 
either tells the story without further comment (e.g. for children) or he 
simply allegorizes the story to give an edifying sermon, in both cases 
without touching upon questions of historicity. 
Modernism or liberalism in Islam certainly has nothing to do with 
such critical studies of the text of the Scriptures and its historical sources 
as are made by Christian theologians. Even the most "liberal" Muslim 
theologians maintain that such a critical study is simply impossible in 
Islam, as the Qur'än is the revealed Book, send down directly from God. 
Hence its contents may not he considered as ideas and opinions of the 
Prophet, who, for example, might have been influenced by his contact 
with Jews and Christians. 
Muslim apologists are inclined to apply this "fundamentalist" belief 
in the Holy Book also to the "original Gospel", which according to them 
must have been brought in the form of a Holy Baok by Jesus; this 
"original Gospel" is helieved to have been either falsified or lost, so that 
the Christians afterwards could only arrive at a faulty reconstruction of 
the original revelation. 
Anticipating the final paragraph of this book, it may be noted in 
passing that Muslims and Christians of ten talk at cross-purposes, due 
to their different attitudes towards Holy Scripture. For the former it is 
literally the Word of God, and for many among the latter it is a 
collection of traditions concerning the life and preaching of men who 
felt inspired to speak and act in God's Name. It is largely due to this 
different attitude towards the Scriptures that Muslim apologists and 
polemists are missing the target when they address non-fundamentalist 
Christians. 
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As far as the relation between the Qur'än and modem science is 
concemed, in Indonesia too the usual solutions can be heard. On the 
one hand, apologists want to prove that the results of modem research 
in the field of the natural sciences are already implicitly present in the 
Qur'än. On the other hand, religious belief and science are distinguished 
or separated, with the argument that the Qur'an leaves room for 
independent research or even stimulates such research. According to 
general opinion a conflict between the Qur'an (or religious belief) and 
scientific research is basically impossible. A seeming conflict only proves 
that our interpretation of certain verses has to be reviewed. In th is way, 
also familiar in certain Christian circles, attempts are made to safeguard 
religious belief from possible doubts which may be aroused by modern 
SClence. 
When reflecting on these developments in Indonesia, I am inclined 
to conclude that "reformation" has to a large extent resulted in a kind 
of "restoration", so that "modern Islam" in Indonesia is perhaps to be 
characterized as "neo-orthodox" rather than "liberal" . 
But Islam is primarily a practical religion. Most Muslims prefer 
practical solutions for daily life to theoretical speculations, so we may 
turn our attention from theoretical problems connected with "refor-
mation" and "liberalization" to practical questions of "modernization". 
It may first be stated that Muslims in Indonesia, generally speaking, 
do not feel difficulties with regard to most aspects of modernization. 
Some tenacious traditions which impede modem development (e.g. the 
use of a rice-knife, as already mentioned) do not originate in Islam 
but in pre-Islamic culture and are being combatted by modern Muslims. 
Religion in Indonesia does not actually imp ede technological develop-
ment. Of course, religions and religious leaders of ten tend to be suspicious 
of certain novelties and especially of devclopments which could change 
the established structure of society. But the process of modernization 
will go on, whether some alterations are wanted or not. Religions, Islam 
included, will simply have to find the right reasoning in order to get the 
new developments accepted by conservatives. Sura 13 : 11, for example, 
is a fitting starting-point to combat fatalism among the people and to 
promote personal initiative and a feeling of responsibility. The central 
part of this verse can be translated as follows: "God changeth not the 
condition of a folk until they (first) change that which is in their hearts". 
According to the official Indonesian translation, the last words could be 
rendered with "until they change their own condition" ; the following 
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no te has been added: "God wiU not change their condition as long as 
they themselves do not change what caused their backwardness". 
In order to give some specific examples connected with modernization, 
I mention first of all the question of banking and interest. Although this 
question has long been debated, it is now generally accepted that modern 
economic development is impossible without sound bank ing. Formerly 
the prohibition on riba (cf. Sura 2: 275-276; 3 : 130; 4 : 161) was of ten 
eXplained as only a prohibition on usury. Nowadays the term ribä is 
of ten interpreted as meaning "interest in the con su mer sector". That is 
to say, it is forbidden to lend money at interest to a poor man who needs 
it for his livelihood; the problem of poverty must be solved by social 
regulations. Ribä, however, does not include "interest in the producer 
sector"; in other words, it is not forbidden to take interest from money 
invested as shares in a business or other enterprise.111 
As far as the position of women is concerned, conditions in Indonesia are 
probably very progressive compared with other Muslim countries. Girls 
and women work in offices and factories beside, sometimes above, men; 
they study and teach together with male cOlleagues at the universities. 
Family-planning is being vigorously propagated by the present govern-
ment, in contrast with Soekarno's. Authoritative Muslims have bestowed 
their blessing on this propaganda. Theologians sometimes object to 
family-planning propaganda when based primarily on economic motives, 
as they consider this kind of reasoning a lack of trust in God's Providence. 
Some Muslim doctors oppose the introduction of "the piU" for similar 
reasons to those heard in conservative circles the world over. 11 2 
In many speeches and publications, however, it has been emphasized 
again and again that modernization does not mean Westernization (Ind. 
westernisasi). In particular the Islamic magazine Pandji Masjarakat, 
which aims to champion reformation and modernization, of ten warns 
against Westernization. In an article by HAMKA 113 modernization is 
defined as a renewal necessary for the development of the country: from 




A survey of the questions and the way they have been answered is given by 
A. Chotib, Bank dalam Islam, Djakarta 1962. The author himself is of the 
opinion that banking in our world is a necessary evil and can therefore be 
compared with the case of a hungry poor man eating forbidden food; neither 
of the two can be interdicted. 
So, for example, some articles on Family Planning (Keluarga Berentjana) 
written in 1968 by the lady psychiatrist Dr. Zakijah Dradjad in Pandji 
Masjarakat, nos. 31, 32, 33. 
HAM KA, Dengan Sekularisasi Pantjasila Akan Kosong, in Pandji Masjara-
kat, no. 29. 
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democracy, from an agrarian society to an industrialized country, and 
so on. But the au thor warns against Westernization, which could mean 
the acceptance of a Western style of life based on materialism and 
dominated by sex (films, dancing, pornography). Moreover, the au thor 
warns against a Westernization that would result in secularization (Ind. 
sekularisasi), for instance in politics. 
At the same time and in the same magazine Nurcholis Madjid, chair-
man of the most important Islamic student organization (Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Islam, H.M.!.), wrote a series of articles entitled "Modern-
ization is Rationalization, not Westernization".1l4 He too warned against 
secularism, which could destroy the religious basis of the Indonesian 
state ("Belief in the One and Only God") fis weIl as against Western 
rationalism, humanism and liberalism. Samson reported a revealing 
interview he had with th is student leader on April 4th, 1968. "The 
President of HMI (which is independent but considered close to 
Modernist Islam) stated that Communism is the highest point of secular-
ism. If a person is a secularist and if he carries his beliefs to their logical 
conclusion, he must perforce he a Communist. If he is a secularist but 
not a Communist he is suffering from a split personality. Both Com-
munism and secularism are dangers to Islam, but Communism, as the 
highest point, is the greater danger. When I asked him what he 
considered worse, Communism or Naziism, he replied that Communism 
was worse because Nazis helieved in God." 115 
Almost two years later, however, a pamphlet by the same author 
appeared which took another line.116 This pamphlet caused quite a stir 
and much discussion. I want to draw special attention to these recent 
opinions of a representative of Muslim youth. If my information is 
correct, the publication of th is pamphlet could have had something to 
do with attempts by some Muslim leaders to create a union of all Islamic 
political parties, in view of the elections of 1971. Such a unitary party, 
however, would require compromises, which would automatically result 
in a shift towards conservatism. Such a development would estrange 
many educated young people from such an Islamic party. Furthermore, 
it could be that the au thor, proceeding from his earl ier differentiation 
114 Nurcholis Madjid, Modernisasi ialah Rasionalisasi bukan Westernisasi, in 
Pandji M asjarakat, nos. 28, 29, 30; the articles are dated 1 Muharram 
1388 H./March 29th, 1968. 
115 Samson, Islam, p. 1,016. 
116 Nurcholis Madjid, Keharusan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah 
Integrasi Ummat, dated Djakarta, January 2nd, 1970. 
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betwecn "rationalism" and "rationalization", later camc to a similar 
distinction bctwecn "secularism" and "secularization" as discusscd in 
recent Western publications.117 
His pamphlet first of all states that unfortunately the idea of a rcnewal 
has of ten been held only by a part of the Muslim community. In the past 
th is resulted in reactions from another part, strengthening the opposite 
attitude. The au thor stresses that in recent ycars an encouraging growth 
of the Islamic community in Indonesia has taken place. But he wants 
to put the question of whether pcrhaps th is rush to join Islam means 
only a kind of social adaptation. Apparently many people were struck 
by the defeat of Communism, which suggested the victory of Islam. Tt 
seems, howcver, that many who now accept Islam, reject an Islamic 
political party or any Islamic organization ("Islam: yes; Islamic Party: 
no!"). So the important point is actually not thc quantity of the Islamic 
community, but its quality. 
In order to arrive at a true rencwal, Muslims must free themselves 
from certain traditional values and search for values orientated towards 
the future. Putting it plainly, the author wishes to call this devclopment 
the process of liberalization, and he does not hesitate to connect the 
process straightforwardly with present-day discussion on "secularization" . 
Unlike "sccularism", which has to be rcjected as a fixed ideology and 
a closed world view, "secularization" must be understood as a "liberating 
development". Muslims must come to a better differentiation between 
values that arc "transccndental" and those that are only "temporai". In 
other words, they must do away with traditional ideas which, un-
fortunately, have come to be considered as uchrowi (Ar. ukhrawï = 
connected with the world to come, Ar. al-ukhrä), although these ideas 
in fact belang to the changing cultural patterns. "Secularization", 
thcn, means that values which in fact are "worldly", ought to be 
considered "secular" ; the Islamic community must free itself from the 
tendency to treat them as eternal values (menguchrowikannja). 
Furthermore, "secularization" means emphasizing the task of man in 
this world, as God's represcntative sa to speak. That is to say, man is 
given the opportunity and freedom to exert himself for the improvement 
of his conditions of life and may act creatively, in accordance with the 
spirit of idjtihäd. 
117 This distinction goes back to the Gennan theologian Fr. Gogarten, in his 
Verhängnis und Hoffnung der Neuzeit, Stuttgart 1953; later the discussion 
has been dominated by the writings of Harvey Cox, in particular The Secular 
City, New York 1965. 
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In other words, true belief in God as the One and Only God indudes 
applying the idea of "transcendency" only to Him, whereas this world 
and all problems and values connected with th is world ought to be 
"desacralized". I t has been said that "Islam is Bolshevism plus God" 
(Iqbal). This means th at Islamic opinions concerning this world and 
its problems may sometimes coincide with those of the Communists (that 
is to say, he "realistic" ) ; Islam, however, adds that there is moreover a 
"transcendent" Being, namely God. 
Af ter this appeal for a positive appreciation of the terms "secular-
ization" and "desacralization", the au thor advocates true freedom of 
thought and freedom of speech. New ideas which are initially considered 
to be wrong, can afterwards prove to contain truth, and differences of 
opinion can stimulate doser examination. It was not nonsensical that 
the Prophet considered differences of opinion within the Muslim com-
munity as evidence of God's grace. We should not fear the use of terms 
such as "socialism". Based on the term sjura or musjawarah (cf. Sura 
42 : 38) we accepted the idea of democracy. Why then should the idea 
of socialism be taboo, whereas in accordance with the Holy Book Islam 
must champion social justice and protect the poor and oppressed? It was 
because the Islamic community was not prepared to take the initiative 
for social development that others took this task in hand, and Islam was 
exduded. It was lack of freedom of thought that caused th is development. 
It is true that Islam in Indonesia created organizations for renewal 
(e.g. the Muhammadijah), but the au thor wants honestly to face the 
truth that these organizations are no longer functioning as movements 
for renewal, because they have lost their dynamic and progressive 
character. On the other hand some organizations which initially bore 
the mark of counter-reformation (e.g. the N.U.) have been forced to 
take over some ideas from the former renewers, but th is change does not 
promise much. For th is reason a new, liberal movement for renewal in 
Islam has to be started ("liberal" in the sense of "non-traditional" and 
"non-sectarian") . 
According to the au thor, Muslims must realize that the va lues of Islam 
have a dynamic, not a static, character. Some basic elements of the 
Islamic faith (first and foremost belief in God), some principles of 
worship and some fundamental social values are in deed unchanging. But 
apart from these values, Islam does not give any definite prescriptions 
concerning activities in this world. The latter are determined by cultural 
values, which must be in a process of continuous development, in order 
to suit the actual situation. The struggle for improving the condition of 
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mankind is not a monopoly of the Islamic community, but a task for 
all men. In this struggle the intellectuals will have to stand in the fore-
front, in particular the former members of Islamic student movements 
- "With God's help and Ris guidance". 
Listening to independent members of the younger generation such as 
Nurcholis Madjid, one may indeed speak of "self-conscious Islamic 
youth, which is increasingly making itself felt", so that "we may have 
confidence and hope in the future of Islam".1 18 
8. Muslims and Christians 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith asserts: "Nowhere in the Muslim world 
(except perhaps in Indonesia? ) do Muslims feel that a non-Muslim 
member of their nation is 'one of us'. And nowhere do the minorities 
feel accepted." 119 
Probably one point different from elsewhere is that Muslims in Indo-
nesia cannot simply disregard the existence of Christian Churches in 
their country. Before 1945 Christians we re of ten regarded by Muslims 
as belonging to "the other side" (Ind. pihak sana), that is to say, the 
side of Dutch colonial power. Many Christians, however, were in the 
forefront of the fight for freedom, together with Muslims and other 
nationalists. So it became clear that Indonesian Christians too could be 
true Indonesians and good patriots. In this way many Muslims and 
Christians got to knowand respect each other as fellow-citizens, and 
thus relations between Muslims and Christians within the Republic of 
Indonesia turned first in a favourable direction. 
Af ter the fight for freedom, however, new dissensions arose. Beside the 
old contrast between various ethnic groups, four important confessionalj 
political groups came into being, the Muslims, the "secular" Nationalists, 
the Communists and the Christians. Unfortunately in the course of the 
years they were to confront each other more and more as closed groups, 
although for a time some of them made opportunistic alliances. Soekarno 
did see the danger of a country and a people divided against itself. 
Passionately he sought for new means of achieving unity and "a return 
to the spirit of 1945". The Dutch proffered him one, by stubbornly 
holding on to "Dutch New Guinea"; later the national fight could be 
directed against Malaysia as a neo-colonialist creation, or in general 
against the Oldefos, the Old Established Forces. As a clever phrase-
118 Vredenbregt, De Islam, p. 10. 
119 Smith, Islam, p. 80. 
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monger Soekarno tried to bridge the gaps between the vanous groups 
by creating the NASAKOM slogan. 
But in spite of Soekarno at the end of 1965 developments resulted in 
an attempt to exterminate one of these groups, the Communists. For 
the time being the extermination of Communism seemed to be furthering 
the unity of the other groups, but this did not last for long. Afterwards 
the authorities again and again warned against the subversive working 
of Communism, but these warnings too could not be repeated endlessly. 
The military way of thinking, proceeding from the doctrine of "lawand 
order", also could not create real unity. Thus the "New Order" inherited 
a dissension still requiring a new ideal in order to achieve unity. 
Developments af ter 1965 led to obvious tensions and conflicts between 
Muslim groups and others. The struggle for an Islamic society did have 
some positive results, but at the same time produced disappointments 
and contrary reactions. The political ideology of Islam aroused suspicion 
and fear among other groups, also af ter 1965. The Islamization of the 
]avanese masses was like a mirage. The belief in a Muslim victory at the 
elections of 1971 is probably diminishing. As far as a religious revival 
has taken place, it has also been manifested in a revival of Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Javanese mysticism (although a number of these groups 
are said to have been dissolved af ter 1965 because of left-wing sympathies 
among their leaders).120 Thus af ter 1965 great tensions continued to 
exist between adherents of Muslim organizations and other groups of the 
population, in particular the merely nominal Muslims and non-Muslims. 
All these tensions, however, seemed to concentrate and find an outlet 
in the controversy with Christians. 
I t could perhaps be said that the soil for conflicts with Christians had 
already been prepared by an cndless stream of apologetic and polemic 
publications. Before turning to topical problems, some examples of these 
Muslim apologetics and polemics must be cited. 
120 In the stencilled publication Fungsi Dacwah, already mentioned, Muh. Natsir 
wamed against the activities of Buddhists in Indonesia, who were using the 
army newspaper Berita Yudha for their propaganda and claimed the use of 
Borobudur, Mendut and other old monuments in Central Java as their places 
of worship. As far as Hinduism is concemed, E. Utrecht reported on articles 
in the Indonesian newspaper Su/uh Marhaen (Bali edition) concerning the 
rapid growth of Hinduism in Central and East Java in 1968; the author 
himself estimated the number of converts to Hinduism during recent years 
as 250,000 yearly (E. Utrecht, in De Groene Amsterdammer, 5 October 1968, 
p.5). 
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While respecting the efforts of Muslim apologists, it is difficult for a 
non-Muslim to appreciate the content of their publications (just as it 
must be difficult for a Muslim to appreciate what some non-Muslim 
authors write on Islam). "Christianity" as it is rendered in apologetic 
and polemic publications is sometimes almost unrecognizable to a 
Christian reader. Authors of such publications are, for instance, in the 
habit of giving quotations from all sorts of "Christian" publications 
without realizing to what extent the books quoted can be considered 
representative of Christianity. In the same indiscriminate way all sorts 
of critical remarks on Christianity or Christian doctrines are employed. 
Following a well-known Arabic expression, an apologist seems not to be 
interested in man ~äla ("who" said something) but only in mä ~àla 
("what" he said). So he just quotes what he considers useful for attack-
ing another religion and justifying his own. 
Among the publications issued by Muhammadijah headquarters, two 
pamphlets appeared on "Christology" and on "The Old and New 
Testament", written by Djarnawi Hadikusumo (the first chairman of the 
new Islamic party, the Parmusi) .121 In these pamphlets, for example, 
critical remarks by Arnold Toynbee (popular in many Muslim publica-
tions) and curiosities taken from a publication of the Jehovah's Witnesses 
are considered equally authoritative. The au thor refers to "the book 
Nieuwe Hemelen en een Nieuwe Aarde, a [Dutch] translation of the 
hook N ew H eavens and a N ew Earth, published by the International 
Bible Students' Association at Brooklyn, N ew York" (obviously an old 
publication of the Jehovah's Witnesses, who originally called themselves 
"International Bible Students"). With the help of th is book a list 
covering three pages is given concerning the dates and authors of the 
BibIe, "according to the belief of the Christians": 
"Af ter 4025 E.C. 
before 3096 B.C. 
crrc. 2370 E.C. 
af ter 2020 E.C. 
And so on. 
Adam wrote Gen. 1 : 1 to 2 : 4 
Adam wrote Gen. 2 : 5 to 5 : 2 
Noah wrote Gen. 5 : 3 to 6 : 9 
The three sons of N oah (Shem, Ham and 
Japheth) wrote Gen. 6 : 9 to 10 : 11." 
121 Djarnawi Hadikusumo, Sekitar Kristologi, Jogjakarta 19653 and Sekitar 
Perdjandjian Lama [dan] Perdjandjian Baru, Jogjakarta no date, both 
especially published for Muharnrnadijah missionaries by headquarters of the 
"Muhammadijah, Madjlis Tabligh". 
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On the basis of th is exposition the au thor easily arrives at the conclusion 
that "these Christian beliefs" cannot be proved reliable by historical 
and scientific research. 
More vehement attacks are made in a stencilled Muhammadijah 
pamphlet edited by Bisjron A. Wardy and intended to be a contribution 
to a refresher course of Muhammadijah members, in order to open their 
eyes to the activities of Christians, in particular in the area of Jogja-
karta. 122 According to this pamphlet, the Christians (here called N asrani 
instead of the more polite modem Indonesian term orang Kristen) 123 
had set up a scheme to Christianize (menasranikan) the Indonesian 
people. "To begin with, they chose the island of Java as a pilot project; 
in Java they chose Central Java, in Central Java in particular the Special 
Administrative Area Jogjakarta; and within th is area of Jogjakarta they 
chose the district of Sleman to become the centre of their activities, 
i.e. the area along the road to Kali U rang." 1 24 
This pamphlet furthermore refers to an anonymous paper which some 
time before had been spread in Java and had caused consternation. It 
had revealed "that in a joint conference of Roman Catholic and 
Protestant Churches held in 1962 in East Java a plan was drawn up 
for the Christianization (Nasranisasi) of Java within 20 years and of all 
Indonesia in a period of 50 years".125 Some of the points on that 
"programme" were said to be the building of schools and the furtherance 
of mixed marriages of Christian gids with a strong belief to Muslim 
boys with a weak belief. Finally the pamphlet gives an "explanation" of 
the tactics of Christian strategy: based on the doctrine of the Trinity, 
this strategy would consist of creating a system of Christian cells, in such 
a way that triangles come into being when one draws lines connecting 
one cell (e.g. a church) with the other on es (e.g. a school or hospital). 
This system, then, is called the "Trinity cell system". 
A well-known series of polemic pamphlets has been published by JAPI 
(= Jajasan Penjiaran Islam, Foundation for the Spread of Islam) In 
122 Bisjron A. Wardy, Memahami Kegiatan Nasrani, Jogjakarta 1964. 
123 Just as alter 1965 the Chinese, unfortunately, are again being called Tjina 
instead of the more poli te orang Tjiong Hoa. 
124 On the road from Jogjakarta to Kaliurang there was formerly a Protestant 
hospital at Pakem. Now on this road a huge Roman Catholic complex is 
being built (seminary, monastery, printing house and other dwelIings). This 
recent display of power may have been the main origin of the abovementioned 
"explanation" of Christian strategy. 
125 I have not succeeded in discovering the origins of this rumour. Such a con-
ference has certainly never been held. I was told that a leader of one of the 
many sectarian revivalist movements may have said something like it. 
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Surabaja. To mention a few titles, these pamphlets deal with The 
Messiah and the Cross, The Death of the Messiah and the Azhar 
University, Jesus in the Qur'än, The Trumpet of Death from the Valley 
of Qumran ("Qumran", where the "Dead Sea ScroIls" were found, is 
supposed to have revealed the true origin of Christianity and therefore 
means the end of the orthodox Christian belief in J esus). A somewhat 
higher standard is shown by the booklet by Hasbullah Bakry, entitled 
"The Qur'än as a Correction to the Old and New Testament"; the 
same author wrote a pamphlet on "Jes us Christ according to Islam and 
Christianity". Finally a pamphlet by Aftabuddin Ahmad on "Woman in 
Islam and Christianity" can be mentioned. 126 In the same series a 
pamphlet was recently published by O. Hashem, entitled "A Complete 
Answer to Rev. Dr. J. Verkuyl", the latter being a Dutch theologian who 
lived for years in Indonesia and wrote a stencilled pamphlet for private 
use in Christian circles, intended to prepare Christians for a dialogue 
with Muslims. 127 There is no need to pay attention here to the content 
of all these pamphlets. They are samples of cheap polemics, suited to 
semi-intellectuals and using arguments which could have been taken over 
mainly from Al)madïya publications (although this movement itself has 
little following in Indonesia and is considered heretical ) . 
A somewhat more important book was written by Hasbullah Bakry, 
entitled "Jesus in the Qur'än and Muhammad in the Bible".1 28 Accord-
ing to a Dutch reviewer, this book was written because of the author's 
"uneasiness about the fact that hundreds, nay thousands, of young 
Muslims had gone over to Christianity since leadership of Churches and 
Missions was transferred from foreigners to Indonesian hands". The 
reviewer continued: "This book contains areaction to F. L. Bakker's 
abovementioned work; 129 moreover, it offers a series of quotations from 
the Bible which allegedly prove that Muhammad's coming was already 
predicted in the Old and New Testaments. According to Bakry too, 
it was Paul who deflected early Christianity from the true Gospel of 
Christ. So Paul was a false prophet according to the definition Jesus 
himself gave in order to distinguish a false from a true prophet." 
126 All these publications except the last are mentioned by D. C. Mulder, 
Stemmen uit de Islam, in De Heerbaan, 1968, no. 1, pp. 41-42. 
127 J. Verkuyl, Tentang Interpretasi Iman Kristen Kepada Orang2 Islam, special 
issue of Bulletin Lembaga Penjelidikan Pekabaran Indjil, Djakarta, no date. 
Mulder, Stemmen, pp. 41-42. 128 
129 This refers to a Christian publication by F. L. Bakker, earlier mentioned by 
Mulder, entitled Tuhan Jesus didalam Agama Islam ("The Lord Jesus in 
Islam"), Djakarta 1957, the content of which is as questionable in my 
opinion as its title. 
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The Egyptian visiting professor Ahmad Shalaby also wrote a pamphlet 
in Indonesian on Islam and Christianity, followed by a hook on 
Christianity intended as a contribution to comparative religion,130 In 
these publications too the apostle Paul is described as the crafty enemy 
of Christianity, who feigned conversion in order to destroy Christianity 
from within by means of his theology of Trinity and Reconciliation. The 
emperor Constantine is said to have organized the victory of those who 
advocated the Divinity of Jesus at Nicaea (A.D. 325), although they in 
fact numbered only 318 out of 2,048 delegates,131 The "Gospel of 
Barnabas", rejected and hidden by the Christians, is put forward as the 
only reliable Gospel. 
It is not necessary to discuss the qualities of these apologetic and 
polemic publications. Gibb may weIl be right wh en emphasizing th at 
"much that, on the face of it, looks like anti-Christian polemic is, in 
reality, an apologetic directed toward Muslim doubters"; but according 
to W. C. Smith we should not forget how Islam was attacked by Western 
critics at the beginning of this century, "attacks in the name of Christian-
ity, rationalism, liberal progress, or the like",132 Nowadays, however, 
these Muslim apologetic efforts are as naïve as some Christian attempts 
to explain old formulations of Christian doctrines to Muslims. 133 
A critical attitude toward apologetics is also shown by some Muslim 
scholars. Mukti Ali, for example, wrote that "Apologetics is a good 
thing, but it is not a good thing to concentrate all one's energy and 
strength on apologetics. Apologetics only formulates things that are 
already known and conditions that already exist; its character is there-





Ahmad Sjalabi, Perkembangan Keagamaan dalam Islam dan Maséhi, Solo 
1960, and Perbandingan Agama, bahagian Agama Maséhi, Djakarta 19601, 
19642. 
Cf. SjaIabi, Perbandingan, p. 67. According to reliable handbooks on Church 
History, the number of delegates at Nicaea was about 250-300; tradition 
afterwards gave the symbolical figure of 318 (compare Genesis 14: 14). The 
number of 2,048 mentioned by Sjalabi apparently originates from later 
Arabic sources and is perhaps based on an estimate of the total number of 
delegates and their following. Cf. Charles Joseph Hefele, Histoire des 
Conciles, Paris 1907, Vol. I, p. 409. 
Gibb, Modern Trends, p. 53; Smith, Islam, p. 86. 
Cf. John Crossley, Explaining the Gospel to Muslims, London 19676 ; in this 
pamphlet there is, for instanee, reference to discussions on whether the 
doctrine of the Trinity can he criticized by Muslims as a (faulty) addition 
(1 + 1 + 1 = 1), or may perhaps be considered a multiplication sum 
(1 X 1 X 1 = 1). The author himself prefers to give some "illustrations 
of the Trinity", as "no one can give a perfect explanation" (p. 24-25). 
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and making progress ; therefore religion and society cannot he developed 
hy negativism and conservatism. Apologetics may arouse emotions and 
give self-satisfaction, but they cannot produce true convict ion and 
discernment. Apologetics cannot be practised in a scientific way, because 
science and scholarship have a dynamic and progressive character. They 
search for the 'new' and refuse to call a halt." 134 
Some basic weaknesses of polemic writings have already been mention-
ed, as for instance the use of worthless sources. If anywhere, Muslims and 
Christians could help each other here by pointing the way through each 
other's reading-matter, in order to find out which publications nowadays 
can he considered representative for Islam and Christianity, or at least 
for some groups within both religions, in particular modern groups. 
Af ter this survey of Muslim apologetic and polemic publications, we 
return to the topica! prohlem of the relationship between Muslims and 
Christians in Indonesia af ter 1965. Since that time occasion al incidents 
have occurred between Muslims and Christians (though they did not 
assume proportions at all comparable with incidents between Hindus 
and Muslims in India). On October 1st, 1967 Muslim youth in Makassar 
(South Sulawesi) caused damage to furniture in various churches. 
According to a Muslim reporter this incident was caused by a discussion 
at the home of a Christian teacher of religion who had insulted Islam 
by saying "that Muhammad (the Prophet of Islam) was only married 
to nine of his wives and lived in adultery with the others" .135 This 
reporter added "that the activities of the Christian community in Sula-
wesi show a provocative character, because almost all Christian congresses 
are held in Sulawesi",136 while, moreover, "a Christian church has been 
built opposite the Great Mosque of Makassar, although practically no 
Christians live in that quarter". 
These last passages may indicate things that of ten cause annoyance 
among Muslims and have sometimes led to open conflicts. They are 
( 1) conspicuous Christian activities which take place in such a way that 
they can be interpreted as being provocative, and (2) the building of 
churches in an area or quarter where almost all people are considered 
to be Muslims, let alone wh en even a mosque has to he pulled down 
134 Editorial in Al-Djami'ah, March 1967, p. 2. 
135 Pandji Masjarakat, no. 19, October 1967, p. 25. Cf. also no. 20, pp. 3-8. 
136 This remark probably refers to preparations for the General Assembly of the 
Indonesian Council of Churches held in Makassar from October 29th to 
November 8th, 1967. 
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to make room for Christian buildings, such as an Adventist Hospital in 
Kebajoran-Baru (Djakarta). 
At the beginning of 1967, for instance, difficulties arose about the 
building of a small Methodist church in Meulaboh (West Atjeh). At the 
beginning of 1969 even in one of the new suburbs of Djakarta a 
Protestant church was destroyed. Such incidents also occurred in Djati-
barang (West Java) and Purwodadi (Central Java). I was told that 
once or twice similar difficulties arose from the other side, for instance 
on the island of Sangihe, where Muslims planned to build a mosque 
amidst the Christian community; the authorities managed to prevent 
a conflict by persuading the Muslims to change the plan. Christian 
activities considered provocative (e.g. by articles in Pandji M asjarakat) 
were mass-meetings such as those held by the American Adventist 
preacher Moseley in the Senajan Stadium in Djakarta. Criticism became 
concentrated on foreign sponsors of missionary activities (sometimes 
indicated as "the Rome-Geneva Axis", i.e. the Roman Catholic Church, 
together with those Protestant Churches that are united in the World 
Council of Churches in Geneva). This criticism culminated in accusing 
the Christians (or "the Christian West") of trying again to subjugate 
the world of Islam (Ind. menaklukkan dunia Islam), th at is to say, by 
means of the Missions, af ter colon ia I subjugation had come to an end. 
Solutions which were repeatedly suggested by Muslims during these 
years were the following. (1) Every religious group ought to restrict its 
activities to its own circle. (2) "Competition" may in deed take pI ace 
between Muslims and Christians to convert those sections of the 
people who do not yet possess areligion (i.e. the so-called animists). 
(3) Religious communities, however, should he forbidden to direct their 
propaganda at people who do possess areligion (that is to say, Christians 
should not try to convert Muslims to Christianity). 
One of the most important issues confusing relations between Muslims 
and Christians is mission work aimed at proselytizing or considered to 
aim at proselytizing. This problem came to a head in the developments 
af ter 1965. According to Christian reports, in recent years several hundred 
thousand Indonesians decided on Christianity as their religion. Some 
of them were former "animists" (e.g. Karo Bataks in Northern Sumatra), 
who actually had to choose one of the officially recognized religions. 
Others, however, stemmed from the millions of Javanese nominal 
Muslims or abangans. 
This choice for Christianity of ten had little connection with mission 
work or Christian propaganda. Many decided to become Christians 
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hardly knowing any more about Christianity than its name. To give one 
illustration, I quote the foIlowing story from a first-hand source. Some 
years ago a Protestant minister somewhere in Java passed the entrance 
to a little village and sawa notice stating that this was a "Christian 
Village" . As he did not know any Christians living there, the pastor 
wanted to make their acquaintance. Then the villagers told him th at 
actuaIly they had not yet become Christians, but had decided to go over 
to Christianity and therefore had already put this notice at the entrance 
to their village (probably in order not to be troubled by Muslim mission-
aries or by Communist-hunters). 
Such examples may show that a decision in favour of Christianity 
sometimes has little to do with direct missionary activities, and also 
cannot be eXplained as a result of bribery (by handing out food and 
clothing), a criticism of ten brought forward in Muslim publications. It 
would he useful if Muslims as weIl as Christians tried in arealistic and 
sober way to discover the true reasons for such developments. It might 
then turn out that the one side need not become too anxious nor the 
other too joyful. As has already been said, a Muslim author stated that 
since 1965 "people are now constantly wondering: wh at and where is 
the real mainstay of our souis?" 137 In such circumstances some turn to 
Islam, others to Christianity, and yet others to Hinduism, Buddhism or 
J avanese mysticism. Some of those who formerly belonged to the Com-
munist Party or any Communist controIled organization are now search-
ing for a new community in order to find a new spiritual home. Why 
do some of them decide in favour of Christianity? 
The answers I coIlected were, for example, (1) that some nominal 
Muslims found it easier to choose a new religious community than to 
turn definitely to Islam; (2) th at some considered Islam as a trouble-
some, foreign religion, because of its many Arabic formulas and its 
Arabic Holy Book, whereas for instance in Protestant churches only the 
national or even the regional language is used; (3) that some people 
feared being bothered with a numher of precepts and prohibitions when 
becoming Muslims, e.g. religious duties such as prayer and fasting, and 
the prohibition on eating park. Apart from "theological" considerations, 
some Christian reporters stress and generalize one answer sometimes 
heard from new converts, namely that "the great massacre of so-caIled 
atheistic Communists by jang beragama (religious people), especiaIly by 
137 Amiruddin Djamil in the foreword to S. Abul Ala Maududi, Menudju 
Pengertian Islam, Djakarta 1967. 
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Muslim youth groups" had resulted in a choice for Christianity, as the 
Christians had not been involved in these murders,138 
As far as these new Christians included ex-Communists and fellow-
travellers, one Muslim informant reacted as follows: "You Christians 
can have them; we don't want to get a fifth column within Islam". 
With regard to Christian activities in prison camps, another Muslim 
informant said: "As for me, it doesn't matter if former Communists 
become Christians, if only they get a new indoctrination somehow". It 
can be understood that Churches did not refuse to accept these new 
members, although their entrance created great problems, both with 
regard to religious af ter-care and because of criticism and insinuation 
launched by other religious and political groups. 
When trying to understand these developments and their background, 
I do not want to excuse or gloss over missionary practices by those people 
and groups which like fishing in troubled waters. Generally speaking it 
can be acknowledged that leaders of the "official" Protestant Churches 
united in the Indonesian Council of Churches do understand the 
difficulties and try to avoid controversy and conflict with their Muslim 
fellow-citizens. Present-day Indonesia, however, is being flooded by all 
sorts of so-called faith-missions and sects which are only interested in 
Muslims as objects for conversion. Indonesian Christians wil! have to 
realize that the image of a religion is of ten determined by the behaviour 
of its most fanatical representatives. In Indonesia such fanatical groups 
are in particular Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists, who 
cause offense by their methods of the door-ta-door selling of pamphlets. 
Unfortunately, Muslims consider these propagandists as representatives 
of "the Christian religion" and of ten do not realize that these visitors 
not only try to convert Muslims to their belief but Christians as weil. 
In my opinion Indonesian Churches should clearly dissociate themselves 
from such groups and their methods. I t is not enough to emphasize th at 
"mission work" does not mean "proselytism", followed by putting a 
finger on the Bible to explain that even so the Gospel must be preached 
to all men (Matthew 28 : 19). One should not be surprised if Muslims 
fail to see the difference between "proselytism" and this kind of 
"obedience to the call to mission". 
138 Cf. S. C. Graaf van Randwijck, Missiologia in loco - Een andere visie, in 
Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift, October 1969, pp. 37-50, a criticism of 
my article Missiologia in loco - Christendom en Islam in Indonesië, in 
the same joumal, October 1968, pp. 46-65. 
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At the initiative of the govemment on November 30th, 1967 an 
Inter-Religious ConsuItation was held in Djakarta, in order to improve 
the strained relations between the various religious communities.139 
The meeting was chaired by the Minister of Religion, K. H. M. 
Dachlan. Mter his opening speech he requested President Soeharto "to 
give his important instructions and fatwas". The President emphasized 
in his address th at the fundamental principles conceming religion 
and freedom of religion were anchored in the 1945 Constitution, inspired 
by the Pantjasila. According to the President all religions feit called 
to spread their message, but all religions also aimed at the well-being of 
mankind. Hence the spread of a religious message must not lead to 
conflicts. Tbe govemment had to feel concemed when this spread tumed 
out to be aimed only at an increase in the number of its adherents and 
when adherents of one religion were called on to change over to another. 
So the President appealed for tolerance, as tolerance was taught by every 
religion as weIl as by the Pantjasila. He wamed against disunity, which 
would benefit the remaining followers of the "Old Order" and the 
Communists. 
The Minister of Religion also appealed for good relations and mutual 
understanding between adherents of various religions. The highest ideal 
would be a form of co-operation as had in the past occasionally occurred, 
for instance when Christians helped Muslims to build a mosque and 
Muslims helped Christians to build a church. If th is ideal were not 
attainable, then religious groups must at least achieve peaceful co-
existence, based on tolerance and mutual respect. He reminded those 
present of the President's wish, expressed at a recent meeting of the 
cabinet, that through this Inter-Religious Consultation the following two 
things should be achieved. (1) Quarreis among religious people must 
come to an end. (2) One religious community must not address its 
propaganda to another religious community. 
The representative of the "Hindu-Balinese community", of course, 
could easily agree with the idea of unity within the variety found among 
religions. He advocated tolerance, by telling the story of the blind men 
who tried to discover wh at exactly an elephant was like; the one who 
happened to touch the ear of the elephant said it was like a fan; the 
one who seized the tusks said it was like a stick; and the one who feit 
the belly said it was like a little hill; so none of them could give a 
complete picture. 
139 The speeches, but not the discussions, held at this Consultation have been 
published in Al-Djami'ah, May 1968. 
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The Minister of Social Affairs, Tambunan, speaking for the Protestant 
group, told of an informal talk he had recently had with his Muslim 
friend Natsir. They both wanted to acknowledge the Divine call to 
spread the message of their religion, and so had to face the question: 
how can we re ach a modus vivendi in our multi-religious state, without 
each betraying his own religion? He denied that Christian Churches 
aimed at la conquête du monde musulman (the conquest of the Muslim 
world). 
The Roman Catholic politician Kasimo reminded his audience of their 
unity in the struggle for freedom, as well before 1945 as af ter that date. 
The differences between the various religious and ethnic groups could 
be overcome at that time. He proposed that this Consultation should 
issue a statement calling the various religious groups to tolerance, without 
diminishing the fundamental freedom of man to choose areligion based 
on his own conviction, and without denying anyone's duty to spread the 
message of his own religion, although this had to be done in a 
proper way. 
For the Muslim participants addresses were given by Lt. Gen. Sudir-
man,140 K. H. Masjkur, H. M. Rasjidi and Muh. Natsir. The essence 
of their speeches can be summarized in two points. (1) The Christians 
- and in particular Protestant and Catholic Missions -- were accused 
of aiming at wiping out Islam; Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the 
Muhammadijah had been right when he warned that, although it would 
not be possible to expel Islam from this world, it might perhaps be 
expelled from Indonesia. (2) The only way to improve the relationship 
between the various religious groups would be an arrangement stipulating 
that people of one religion might not be made the object of missionary 
work by others. 
Professor Rasjidi's speech in particular became rather sharp. In his 
introduction he quoted some passages from W. C. Smith's "The Faith 
of Other Men", criticizing the Christian view of man kind as being 
divided into two sections, the Christians (who would be saved) and the 
non-Christians (who would be damned). He then told of two Christian 
proselytizers who visited him at home and turned out even to be ignorant 
of Hugh Schofield's "The History of Biblical Literature" and the books 
by A. Powell Davies and Charles Francis Potter on the significance of 
140 This Sudinnan is the younger brother of the Sudinnan who was the first 
Chief-of-Staff of the Indonesian anny in 1945. He was one of the founders 
of the dacwa organization P.T.D.I., mentioned in paragraph 4 of th is 
Chapter. 
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the Dead Sea Scrolls. Having just returned from Jogjakarta, he wanted 
to report two cases of irritating missionary activities by Roman Catholics. 
Firstly, the family of a Communist prisoner had been able to get rice 
and money if he would sign a "contract" (surat kontrak) making him 
a Roman Catholic. Secondly, the Roman Catholics in Jogja wanted to 
build a church at a very strategic point; in order to get the land they 
had offered the owner a price eight times its real worth. He outlined 
how formerly the Missions had tried to Christianize the Indonesian 
people. The Dutch government, however, had resisted mission work, in 
spite of much criticism in Parliament. Finally the government had given 
in to the reasoning of the Missions th at they only wanted to carry 
out social work in the medical and educational fields. In contrast to 
W. C. Smith's moderate attitude towards non-Christian religions, 
Hendrik Kraemer's book "The Christian Message in a non-Christian 
World" clearly revealed th at Christians did have a plan of action to 
Christianize the world and in particular Indonesia. So in spite of Tam-
bunan's words it appeared th at Christians were indeed aiming at "the 
conquest of the Muslim world". Rasjidi ended his speech by reading out 
a draft for a "Charter" to be accepted by this Consultation. This Charter 
would lay down the principle of religious tolerance, stipulating that one 
religious community would not be allowed to make another religious 
community the object of its propaganda. 
Muh. Natsir also criticized the "old recipe" of Roman Catholic and 
Protestant Missions to conquer the Muslim world, whereas Islam based 
its code and ethics on the word of the Qur'án that "there is no 
compulsion in religion" (Sura 2 : 256). He appealed to the Christians 
to realize th at Muslims do have their own religion and their own 
identity. Finally he expressed his optimism with regard to the future, 
pointing to the developments in the relationship between Protestants 
and Catholics. Af ter a long religious war, now Tambunan's group and 
Kasimo's group obviously feit no longer "called" to make Protestants of 
the Roman Catholics and Roman Catholics of the Protestants. Why 
could not th is development also take pI ace in the relationship between 
Muslims and Christians? 
According to oral information, the discussions unfortunately ended in 
an unpleasant atmosphere. The meagre result of the Consultation was 
a communiqué stating that a Committee for Inter-Religious Consultation 
would be set up which would assist the government in solving religious 
difficulties. 
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The faiIure of this Consultation produced fierce reactions in Muslim 
circles. The whole discussion and all the difficulties between the various 
religious groups were reduced to this fact: th at the Christians, following 
in the footsteps of the Missions, appeared to be fundamentally intolerant, 
because they refused to accept the formula that one religious community 
should not address its propaganda to adherents of another religious 
community. Christians for their part used to explain that they disagreed 
with various improper methods of religious propaganda, but on the other 
hand simply had to be obedient to the Divine call to preach the Gospel 
to all mankind. 
The crucial point is, of course, the question of religious tolerance, its 
principle and its practice. Apart from apologetic-polemic writings, a 
great number of publications dealt with this question of tolerance. The 
following examples may be referred t~. 
One of the older and very conservative publications was a booklet by 
M. Arsjad Thalib Lubis on "The Guarantee of Religious Freedom in 
Islam", dating from 1955 and reprinted in 1961.141 In fact the au thor 
deals wi th the guaran tee of religious freedom wi th in (or under) an 
Islamic State. Islam divides the world into believers, unbelievers and 
hypocrites (mukmin, kalir, munaliq). Belief cannot be enforced. There-
fore within or under Islam there is no compulsion in religion as far as 
non-Muslims are concerned (Sura 2 : 256). Further, the author explains 
the precepts of Islamic law concerning the various groups of non-
Muslims. These groups are, (1) the Zimmi, who enjoy protection and 
freedom of worship in return for paying poll-tax (djizja) instead of the 
zakät contributed by Muslims; (2) Mu'ahad, people with wh om the 
Muslim government has made an alliance; (3) Muamman, who enjoy 
security while temporarily living in a Muslim state, e.g. for trade 
purposes, and ( 4) Harbi, enemies who mayor must be combatted. 
Special attention is paid to precepts concerning one's attitude towards 
non-Muslim parents and the marriage of Muslim men to non-Muslim 
women. (Marriages between Muslim women and non-Muslim men could 
not be permitted, because according to Luke 14 : 26 a Christian husband 
had to hate his father and mother, wife and children, brothers and 
sisters). The author repeats the precepts concerning a Holy War for 
self-defense and the defense of religious freedom (= the freedom of 
Islam), which he had already eXplained in a publication mentioned 
141 M. Arsjad Thalib Lubis, Risalat Djaminan Kemerdekaan Beragama Dalam 
Islam, Medan 19551, 19612• 
238 CHAPTER IV: STOCKTAKING 
above (Chapter I, par. 8). He concludes, quite abruptly: so it is clear 
that freedom of religion is indeed guaranteed in Islam. 
A leaflet by H. Aboebakar Atjeh on "Islam and Freedom of Religion" 
appears to be more moderate and broadminded.142 The author proceeds 
from Sura 49 : 13, interpreting th is verse as follows: "Mankind on earth 
is created consisting of various groups (bergolong-golongan) in order 
th at they may know one another". Examples taken from history can 
prove that if anywhere it was in Muslim countries that "neutrality 
towards religion" and "freedom of thought" were upheld. Referring to 
Sura 22 : 40 the au thor concludes : "If freedom of religion for everyone 
is not realized, the result will be that churches, pagodas and mosques, 
where people invoke the Name of God, will be destroyed". 
Part of this leaflet can again be found in a pamphlet by the same 
au thor entitled "The Tolerance of the Prophet and His Companions",143 
According to the preface, this pamphlet was handed out to muballighs 
and Muslim youth who feIt called to exterminate the atheistic "Gestapu/ 
P.K.!.". Basing himself on illustrations from the Tradition and the 
history of Islam, the au thor arrives at the following conclusions. (1) The 
Prophet was tolerant towards Muslims as far as their performance 
of religious duties was concerncd, and he respected adherents of other 
religions. (2) The Caliphs were sometimes very liberal in granting 
religious freedom to people living in new areas of Islam. (3) Later on 
freedom of religion was of ten maintained in order to promote scholar-
ship and development of the country. (4) The Prophet liked people to 
forgive and respect one another, and this attitude afterwards produced 
a policy which did not emphasize the importance of one's own tribe, 
but stressed the ideals of Islam, i.e. equality, fraternity and justice. 
(5) As a matter of course, we cannot advocate a kind of tolerance 
which would be detrimental to Islam, but nevertheless we can and must 
show respect for the religious convictions of others. 
M. Junan Nasution has written several articles on religious tolerance 
in the Islamic magazine Pandji Masjarakat.144 The author defines the 
tolerance of Islam as a "mental attitude" which must result in moderate 
behaviour toward others. In this way it will be possible to arrive at 
142 H. Aboebakar Atjeh, Islam dan Kemerdekaan Beragama, Tjirebon, no date. 
143 H. Aboebakar Atjeh, Toleransi Nabi Muhammad dan Sahabat-Sahabatnja, 
Tjirebon/Djakarta 1959\ 19662 • 
144 Pandji Masjarakat, nos. 18 and 19, September-October 1967. The Jatter 
contains a heated editorial (by HAMKA?) on the attempts to Christianize 
Indonesia within 20-50 years. 
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harmonious contact with others, (in English) "a liberality towards the 
opinions of others, patience with others". As basic principles of toleranee, 
he refers to Sura 2 : 256; 10 : 99; 29: 46; 3 : 64; 60: 8-9 and 16: 125. 
In addition to the tolerance of Islam, the Indonesian people are aware 
of their common principle of Belief in the One and Only God (Ketu-
hanan Jang Maha Esa) and the other principles of the Pantjasila. This 
condition provides a ferti!e soi! for the seed of toleranee. 
In 1967 the influential Kasman Singodimedjo, last chairman of the 
Masjumi, published his "Thoughts from Prison", dating from the years 
before 1966, when he was imprisoned under the Soekarno regime. 145 
Ris opinions on the first principle of the Pantjasila are as folJows. "This 
Belief in the One and Only God may certainly not be interpreted as 
freedom with regard to religion (kebebasan beragama) . .. The word 
of God in the Qur'än, Al-Baqarah [Sura 2] verse 256 - lii ikràha tï 
'd-dïn, there is no compulsion in religion - is not aimed at a Muslim 
who has already entered Islam, but is intended to protect those who do 
not have a religion or adhere to a wrong religion. Those people will 
not he forced to enter Islam, but will he Ie ft free ... Muslims, however, 
who have already entered Islam, are no longer free, that is to say, they 
do no longer have the freedom to be religious or not, and are not allowed 
to apostatize (murtad), i.e. leave Islam. Muslims who have entered 
Islam are obliged to practise their Muslim belief. If they become 
apostates, God will punish them in the world to come with a severe 
judgement" (Sura 2 : 217; 5 : 54; 4 : 89). Why does Islam object to 
the Communist and Marxist idea of freedom with regard to religion? 
The reason is that those people tend to interpret such freedom as 
including the freedom to be non-religious or even anti-religious. Sura 
2 : 256, however, has to be interpreted as follows: "Th is command from 
God means that Muslims may not force others to enter Islam. But th is 
command also means that non-Muslims may not force Muslims to 
apostatize or leave Islam, th at is to say, neither by means of subde pres-
sure nor in a crude way, for example by building a church, monastery, 
synagogue or temple in areas which are inhahited predominandy by 
Muslims. That would not be in accordance with the Pantjasila either. 
The Pantjasila may not he misused, may not he perverted, may not be 
played around with" (an Indonesian pun: Pantjasila... tidak boleh 
dipentjaksilatkan) . 
145 Kasman Singodimedjo, Renungan dari Tahanan, Djakarta 1967; cf. pp. 
67-68. 
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The summary of Kasman's pamphlet brings us back on ce more to the 
tense atmosphere af ter the Inter-Religious Consultation of November 
30th, 1967. On the one hand, the failure of this Consultation seemed to 
have increased tensions. Once again a great quantity of polemic publica-
tions began to appear, for instance pamphlets by Arsjad Thalib Lubis, 
Abujamin Roham, Hazairin and Rasjidi. 146 It is not necessary to 
summarize the contents of these works as weIl. Generally speaking they 
all deal with the usual polemic themes. One new tendency is perhaps 
that recent publications seem to concentrate their attacks on the Christian 
doctrine of the Trinity. "Attempts to win Muslims over to Christianity" 
are now frequently typified as "attempts to win Muslims over from 
belief in God to belief in the Trinity". 
On the other hand, however, it is worth calling attention to an official 
letter from the Ministry of Religion, headed "Explanation concerning the 
Policy and Ideology of the Government with regard to the Question of 
Religion and Religious Life in Indonesia", dated May 1lth, 1968.147 
This letter referred to the President's speech of August 16th, 1967, in 
which the President clearly stated that there is no question of a majority 
or a minority with regard to religion. This means, according to the 
Ministry of Religion, that a larger religious community may not suppress 
a smaller community or vice versa. For the government all religious 
groups in Indonesia have equal freedom for worship and for carrying 
out their activities. All organizations for dacwa/mission which have 
obtained legal recognition are allowed to exist and to continue their. 
activities, on the understanding that they take due no te of this Explana-
tion and other regulations made by the government. 
146 
147 
Arsjad Thalib Lubis, Keesaan TUHAN menurut adjaran Kristen dan Islam, 
Djakarta 1968; Abujamin Roham, Agama2 Kristen dan Islam serta Perban-
dingannja, Djakarta 1968; Hazairin, Isa Almasih dan Ruh, Djakarta 1969; 
H. M. Rasjidi, Islam di Indonesia Dizaman Modern, Djakarta 1968. The 
lastmentioned pamphlet shows a kind of "rehabilitation" of Snouck Hur-
gronje, who acknowledged that Indonesia was a Muslim country. So af ter 
aU Snouck was a great man, the opposite to Kraemer who wanted to teach 
the Churches how to Christianize Muslims and moreover dared to compare 
Islam with national-socialism, the pseudo-religion of Nazi Gennany (cf. 
Kraemer, The Christian Message, p. 353). The same author published a 
pamphlet entitled Mengapa aku tetap memeluk Agama Islam, Djakarta 1968, 
in which he repeated many of his opinions expressed in the Inter-Religious 
ConsuItation, and once again stressed the difference hetween Kraemer and 
W. C. Smith; the latter wants to he considered a Christian hut not a 
missionary like Kraemer. 
Pendjelasan Sekitar Politik dan Idiologj Pemerintah Mengenai Soal Agama 
dan Keagamaan di Indonesia (unpuhlished stencil). 
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Finally President Soeharto himself may be quoted here once again. 
In an address given on May 29th, 1969, at the celebration of the 
Prophet's Birth, he used some decisive words which as far as I know 
had never before openly been used by an Indonesian government or its 
representatives. Emphasizing that the spread of areligion may not be 
accompanied by intimidation, the President said: "Just because religion 
is based on one's personal conviction and because the freedom of religion 
is a fundamental human right, one may not be obstructed by compulsion 
from outside either in choosing the religion one wants to followor in 
changing one's religion",148 The last words (in Indonesian berpindah 
agama) have always been the crucial expression in debates on the 
meaning of tolerance. 
Some questions emerging from the concluding chapter of this book 
are the following. In which way are the relations between tbe various 
confessionaljpolitical groups going to develop? Who will take the 
initiative to arrive at a reconciliation between the various communities 
and groups? Will the present Indonesian government, led by President 
Soeharto, succeed in making social and economic development the new 
vehicle for the unity which Indonesia so badly needs? 
Important suggestions, I believe, were made by an Indonesian in-
formant, who summarized the conditions for successful development as 
follows: the Nationalists (especially those united in the P.N.I.) will have 
to learn to think along social lines and be aware of the necessity for 
social changes; the military may no longer think only in terms of "law 
and order", but must learn to think along political lines, so th at 
democratic political life can develop anew; the religious groups will 
have to learn to think along national lines instead of being only 
concerned with strengthening their own positions. 
With regard to the various religious groups, especially Muslims and 
Christians, I believe that there are more important things than winning 
or losing a couple of hundred thousand followers, resulting in a con-
centration of energy on questions of the "defense" or the "spread" of 
areligion. Discussions on principles of "tolerance" and the "caU to 
mission" may be of theoretical importance, but are sometimes in-
opportune. Even co-operation between religious communities for the 
building of mosques and churches will not be of primary importance, 
148 SinaT HaTapan, a (Christian) Djakarta daily newspaper, May 30th, 1969, 
p. 1. 
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and neither will co-operation in combatting Communism in a negative 
way, by simply rejecting its principles and aims. 
In my opinion the message of the various religions becomes empty 
and hollow if their adherents do not involve themselves in the struggle 
for a just society, both nationally and internationally. The social problems 
of Indonesia cannot be solved by worship and preaching, supplemented 
with the zakät of Muslims and philanthropy of Christians. These problems 
must be grappled with by tackling socio-economic structures in such a 
way th at the profits of development do not only fall into the hands 
of the rich and powerful, but first and foremost benefit the poor and 
weak. I believe th at Muslims and Christians should join in just th is 
struggle for justice. 
So I do not advocate exclusive co-operation between "religious people" 
for the sake of religion. Rather than "religion" nowadays the criterion 
for co-operation should be a progressive attitude towards socio-economic 
problems. But it would be a bad thing if "religious people" should stand 
aloof, while others once again took the initiative for socio-economic 
development. Therefore I believe th at Muslims and Christians should 
stand in the forefront together, co-operating with all those who want to 
fight for a just society, by carrying out a progressive programme of 
development and combatting all forms of corrupt ion and injury. 
Is not this fight the order of the day for Muslims as weIl as for 
Christians? Muslims are aware of the ideal of f:tasana fJ 'd-dunyä ("good 
in this world") in a balda tayyiba, a land that is good to live in 
(Sura 34 : 15). Christians hold th at God does not want this world to 
become a chaos but to become and remain inhabitable for mankind 
(Isaiah 45 : 18). Let them together prove their belief through their 
works (James 2 : 18). 
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PIAGAM DJAKARTA 1 
Bahwa sesungguhnja kemerdékaan itu jalah hak segala bangsa, dan 
oléh sebab itu maka pendjadjahan diatas dunia harus dihapuskan, 
karena tidak sesuai dengan peri-kemanusiaan dan peri-keadilan. 
Dan perdjuangan pergerakan kemerdékaan Indonésia telah sampai-
(lah) kepada saat jang berbahagia dengan selamat-sentausa mengan-
tarkan rakjat Indonésia kedepan pintu gerbang Negara Indonésia jang 
merdéka, bersatu, berdaulat, adil dan makmur. 
Atas berkat Rahmat Allah Jang Maha Kuasa, dan dengan didorong-
kan oléh keinginan luhur, supaja berkehidupan kebangsaan jang bébas, 
maka rakjat Indonésia menjatakan dengan ini kemerdékaannja. 
Kemudian dari pad a itu untuk membentuk suatu Pemerintah Negara 
Indonésia Merdéka jang melindungi segenap bangsa Indonésia dan 
seluruh tumpah-darah Indonésia, dan untuk memadjukan kesedjahteraan 
umum, mentjerdaskan kehidupan bangsa, dan ikut melaksanakan keter-
tiban dunia jang berdasarkan kemerdékaan, perdamaian abadi dan 
keadilan sosial, maka disusunlah kemerdékaan kebangsaan Indonésia 
itu dalam suatu hukum dasar Negara Indonésia jang terbentuk dalam 
suatu susunan negara Republik Indonésia, jang berkedaulatan rakjat, 
dengan berdasar kepada: ke-Tuhanan, dengan kewadjiban mendjalankan 
sjari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknja, menurut dasar kemanusiaan 
jang adil dan beradab, persatuan Indonésia, dan kerakjatan jang di-
pimpin oléh hikmat kebidjaksanaan dalam permusjawaratan perwakilan 





A. A. Maramis 
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso 
Abdulkahar Muzakkir 




1 The readings of the Charter as given in many publications show a number 
of small variants, in particular in the punctuation and the use of capitals. 
The form I give is based on Yamin, Naskah, I, p. 154, which may be c10sest 
to the original version, except for the use of "u" instead of a probable "oe". 
Compare also Yamin, Naskah, I, p. 401; Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Ummat 
Islam, p. 7; Sidjabat, Religious Toleranee, p. 195. 
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BISMILLAHIRRAHMANIRRAHIM 
PEMERINTAH NEGARA ISLAM INDONESIA 
NOTA RAHASIA 
Assalamu'alaikum w.w., 
1. Alhamdu li-Llah! 
Barang disampaikan Allah kiranja kepada 
jang terhormat: 
SAUDARA Ir. SOEKARNO 
PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INOONESIA, 
jang bersemajam di 
DJAKARTA. 
Allahumma! Iyaka na'budu, wa iyaka nasta'in, 
ihdinassirathal-mustaqim! 
Bismillahi, tawakkalna 'ala-Llah! 
Lahaula wala quwwata, illa bi-Llah! 1 
2. Dengan seputjuk surat jang berwudjudkan Nota-Rahasia ini, maka 
terkandunglah didalamnja keinginan Kami, jang - Insja Allah -
tumbuh daripada hati jang sutji dan ni at jang ichlas dengan penuh 
rasa pertanggungan-djawab atas nasibnja bangsa Indonesia pad a 
umumnja dan Ummat Islam Bangsa Indonesia pada chususnja, 
serta atas nasibnja Negara Indonesia, dimasa jang mendatang. 
3. Lebih dulu baiklah kiranja Kami njatakan disini, bahwa segala 
peristiwa jang terdjadi diseluruh Indonesia dan sekitarnja, militer 
dan politis, nasional maupun internasional, terutama jang langsung 
mengenai Bangsa Indonesia dan Ummat Islam Bangsa Indonesia, 
senantiasa Kami ikuti dengan teliti dan seksama. Maka bolehlah 
agaknja Nota-Rahasia ini dianggap sebagai hasil dan natidjah dari-
pada pendjeladjahan dan analyse serta synthese daripadanja. 
4. Mudah2an segala sesuatu jang hendak Kami rawaikan [= uraikan?] 
dibawah ini disertai dengan Hidajatu-Llah dan Hidajatut taufiq 
1 The letter is opened with the basmala-fonnula: "In the Name of God, the 
Beneficent, the Merciful". Af ter the greeting, "Peace he with you and God's 
mercy and His hlessings he upon you", the Arahic phrases foJlowing in the 
firs t point are: 
Praise he to God! 
o God, Thee we worship and Thee we ask for help, 
Guide us in the straight path! (Sura 1 : 5-6). 
In the Name of God; we put trust in God (Sura 7 : 89; 10 : 85). 
There is no power and no strength save in God. 
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jang sempurna, sehingga bolehlah kiranja mendjadi obor dan pelita 
bagi tiap2 pemimpin Negara jang bertanggung-djawab. Insja Allah. 
Amin. 
Kemudian, chusus kepada Saudara, sebagai Kepala Negara Repu-
blik Indonesia, jang dipertjajakan orang memikul pertanggungan-
djawab jang amat besar atas hantjur dan luhurnja Negara dan 
Bangsa Indonesia, maka Kami ingin sekali menjatakan persilahan: 
Sudi apalah kiranja Saudara suka memperhatikan isi dan maksud 
Nota-Rahasia ini, dengan sepertinja. 
5. Dalam Nota-Rahasia ini Kami tjukupkan dengan menindjau 
beberapa peristiwa politik dan militer, pada masa jang achir2 in i, 
ialah natidjah atau resultante daripada segala kedjadian (proces) 
dan keadaan (toestand), dikala jang tel ah lampau. 
6. Sjahdan, maka masuknja Republik Indonesia mendjadi anggauta 
P.B.B. (Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa), seperti djuga tiap2 langkah 
dan tindakan poli tik jang lainnja, pastilah membawa hasil "untung" 
dan "rugi", manfaat dan mudlorotnja [= mudaratnja]. 
7. Djika diperhitungkan benar2 dan sedalam-dalamnja, terutama djika 
mengingat kedudukan Republik Indonesia sebagai negara mud a, 
maka masuk dan diterimanja Republik Indonesia sebagai anggauta 
P.B.B. itu, nistjajalah menimbulkan kerugian jang amat bes ar 
sekali, bagi Negara dan Bangsa serta Ummat, djika dibandingkan 
dengan keuntungan jang ta' seberapa besarnja dan bersifat semen-
tara itu. Lebih2, djika diingati akan letaknja Indonesia di-tengah2 
negara2 besar, jang kini lagi 'asjik menjalakan api-peperangan, jang 
mem-bakar2 dibenua Asia. 
Demikianlah pendapat daripada umumnja politici golongan "mod-
erate". 
8. Satu-dua resiko "ke-anggauta-an P.B.B." diwaktu ini, ialah: 
a. Bahwa Republik Indonesia, mau atau tidak mau, sengadja atau 
tidak sengadja, akan disorong kesatu arah dan djurusan jang 
tertentu, jang membawa dia kepada satu tingkatan: Memilih 
salah satu diantara dua Blok, jang lagi bertentangan. 
b. Kiranja tidak djauh daripada kenjataan (realiteit) dalam wak tu 
jang dek at, djika orang meramalkan, bahwa Republik Indonesia 
akan masuk dalam Blok Amerika. 
c. Djika terdjadi jang demikian, maka "neutraliteitspolitiek" jang 
tempo hari dilahirkan oleh jang terhormat Saudara Drs. Mohd. 
Hatta, sebagai Perdana Menteri, dalam menegaskan haluan 
poli tik Pemerintah terhadap Luar Negeri, lenjaplah, laksana 
debu ditiup angin. Dan lebih landjut, Republik Indonesia akan 
mendjadi satu Negara jang anti-Blok-RusiaJ at au anti Komunis. 
Kami jakin, bahwa semuanja itu telah masuk perhitungan Pemerin-
tah Republik Indonesia, sebelum melakukan langkah jang "sportief" 
itu. 
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9. Berkenaan dengan jang tersebut dalam angka 8 diatas, mak a Kami 
atas nama Pemerintah Negara Islam Indonesia menjatakan: 
Selamat! Terima Kasih! Dan, Alhamdu li-Llah! 
Karena dengan terbukanja "topeng" haluan poli tik Republik Indo-
nesia jang sesungguhnja itu, dari politik "neutral" beralih mendjadi 
politik "anti-Komunis", maka Negara Islam Indonesia merasa 
mempunjai kawan jang sedjalan, dalam melaksanakan usaha mem-
basmi dan mengenjahkan lawan jang sama (gemeenschappelijke 
vijand), ialah: kaum Komunis. 
10. Lebih djauh, Kami pertjaja dan jakin, bahwa Pemerintah Republik 
Indonesia telah lebih mengetahui akan sarang2 dan gerak-gerik 
kaum Komunis Indonesia didalam tiap2 lapangan dan lapisan 
masjarakat Indonesia, djuga didalam tubuh Pemerintah Republik 
Indonesia dan alat2 kekuasaannja sendiri, jang makin hari makin 
bertambah berbahaja bagi Negara Republik Indonesia. 
Agaknja ta' perlu lagi kami tundjukkan akan perbuatan2 mereka 
itu, dalam usahanja meruntuhkan negara, baik dalam lapangan 
poli tik dan militer maupun dalam lapangan ekonomi, keuangan, 
dll-nja, legaal dan illegaal. 
11. Sebagai kawan sedjalan, semaksud dan setudjuan didalam mengha-
dapi bahaja-Komunisme di Indonesia itu, maka baik djuga agaknja, 
bila disini kami njatakan dengan terus-terang dan dengan hati jang 
terbuka, kepada Saudara, sebagai Kepala Negara Republik Indo-
nes ia, kalau2 - dengan tolong dan kurnia Allah pula - akan 
mendjadi sebab terhindarnja Negara dan Bangsa Indonesia dari-
pad a bahaja keruntuhan dan kedjatuhannja, dimasa jang akan 
datang. 
Pertimbangan dan and juran dari pihak kami, ialah: 
a. Tiada satu djalan lain, jang menudju kearah "Keselamatan 
Negara dan Bangsa Indonesia", melainkan: "Djika Pemerintah 
Republik lndonesia mulai sekarang djuga, dengan tjepat dan 
tepat, membasmi Komunisme, dalam tiaP2 lapangan, terutama 
sekali jang melekat didalam tubuh Pemerintah Republik lndo-
nesia dan alat2 kekuasaannja, dengan wudjud dan si/at apa dan 
manapun djuga". 
Lebih tjepat, lebih baik! 
b. Bilamana Republik Indonesia segan2 dan terlambat dalam 
melakukan tindakan dan usaha membasmi "bahaja" jang selalu 
mengantjam-antjam itu, maka terbukalah kemungkinan jang 
amat bes ar sekali, bahwa Republik Indonesia dalam waktu jang 
singkat akan djatuh sebagai Negara, seperti nasibnja Tiongkok 
ditahun-tahun jang achir2 ini, setelah kaum "merah" dapat 
mengusir kaum "Nasionalis", dari pus at tanah-tumpah-darahnja. 
c. Terutama djika kelambatan melakukan tindakan tersebut me-
mandjang hingga sampai kepada meletusnja Perang Dunia 
ke 111, maka sepandjang perhitungan sjari'at [?], nistjajalah 
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Republik Indonesia akan menemui djalan bun tu dan nasib 
malang, jang sedikitnja senisbat dengan nasib Korea pada 
dewasa ini. Bahkan, mungkin sekali lebih djelek dan lebih buruk 
daripada itu. 
Oleh sebab itu, maka sekali lagi Kami pertimbangkan dan serukan 
kepada Saudara: 
"Hendaknja disegerakanlah, melakukan tindakan jang tjepat dan 
tepat atas bahaja nasional dan internasional tersebut, jang pad a 
hemat kami, tindakan jang serupa itu adalah salah satu tugas dan 
wadjib-mutlak bagi Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, untuk meng-
hindarkan Negara dan Bangsa Indonesia daripada antjaman mara-
bahaja jang am at dahsjat itu!" 
Adapun ten tang tjara, alasan dan lakunja, maka Kami pertjaja 
dengan sepenuh-penuhnja atas kebidjaksanaan Pemerintah Repu-
blik Indonesia dalam hal ini. 
12. Dalam pad a itu, baik djuga Kami njatakan disini akan Sikap dan 
Pendirian Pemerintah Negara Islam Indonesia tcrhadap bahaja 
Komunisme, bahwa sedjak mula berdirinja - 7 Agustus 1949 --
telah ditetapkan: 
"Pemerintah Negara Islam Indonesia dengan seluruh Ummat 
Islam Bangsa Indonesia beserta segenap alat kekuasaannja sudah, 
lagi dan akan terus-menerus melakukan wadjib sutjinja: 
Membasmi bahaja-Negara, bahaja-Agama Allah (Islam) dan 
bahaja-Ummat itu, hingga sa mp ai kepada akar2 dan dasar2nja". 
Karena dalam pandangan Islam, Komunisme itu adalah musuh 
ideologi jang amat besar sekali. 
13. Lebih djauh lagi, tentulah Saudara tel ah mengetahui pula, bahwa 
"tiada lagi ideologi melainkan hanja "Islamisme" sadjalah jang 
sanggup dan kuasa membendung aliran Komunisme dan meng-
hantjur-musnakannja" . 
Insja Allah. 
Sedang sementara itu, bolehlah kami njatakan, dengan tiada samar2 
lagi, bahwa N asionalisme jang mend jadi sendi dan dasar serta 
haluan Negara Republik Indonesia, bukanlah satu ideologi sematjam 
Islamisme atau Komunisme. Melainkan ia hanjalah merupakan 
satu tingkatan "kasih sajangnja" sesuatu bangsa kepada tanah 
kelahiran dan dirinja. 
Dengan analyse ringkas seperti jang tertulis diatas, njatalah sudah, 
bahwa didalam pertentangan antara Nasionalisme dan Komunisme, 
didalam masa jang lama (longterm), terutama djika Komunisme 
dibiarkan mendjadi agressor, maka amat bol eh djadi sekali Nasio-
nalisme akan terpaksa menjerah kal ah, atau patah dan terpelanting 
serta terpentjar dalam pertentangan tersebut. 
Sebagai tjontoh dan bukti jang njata daripada nasibnja negara2 
jang berdasarkan Nasionalisme dalam "pertentangan ideologi", 
hendaklah Saudara suka memeriksai lembaran riwajat Eropah-
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Timur dan Asia-Timur, setelah Perang Dunia ke II, teristimewa 
nasibnja Tiongkok Nasional jang amat tragis itu. 
Djika perhitungan Saudara, dalam hal in i, tidak sesuai dengan 
perhitungan kami, su di apalah kiranja suka memperma'afkan 
ban jak-ban jak! 
14. Mengingat segala apa jang Kami uraikan diatas itu, mak a njatalah 
sudah, bahwa: 
a. Nasionalisme tidak akan mampu dan tidak pula kuasa memben-
dung derasnja arus Komunisme, karena Nasionalisme tidak 
dapat mengikat djiwa rakjat Indonesia, jang sebagian terbesar 
memeluk Agama Islam dan tidak pul a mendjadi ikatan-djiwa 
antara Pemerintah Indonesia dan Rakjat Indonesia; 
b. Karenanja, Negara Republik Indonesia tidak akan dapat meng-
hindarkan dirinja daripada mara-bahaja jang amat besar itu, 
jang langsung akan mengakibatkan runtuh-djatuhnja Negara 
Indonesia, sebagai Negara N asional; dan 
c. Hanja Islamisme sadjalah, sebagai ideologi dan stelsel dunia 
(worldstelsel) [= socio-political system?], jang sanggup menga-
tasi kesulitan, jang boleh timbul karen a datangnja bahaja 
Merah itu. 
Berhubung dengan itu, maka Kami berpendapat, bahwa obat jang 
paling mudjarrab jang akan mendjadi sebab sembuhnja Negara 
Indonesia dan Bangsa Indonesia daripada penjakit, jang berwu-
djudkan seribu sa tu kesulitan dalam tiap2 lapangan-usaha itu, tidak 
lain, hanjalah: 
"Djika Islamisme didjadikan sendi dasar daripada Pemerintah 
dan Negara Indonesia!" 
Atau dengan kata2 lain: 
"Satu2nja Djalan-Selamat bagi Indonesia dan Bangsa Indonesia, 
ialah: 
Djika Negara Indonesia atau Republik Indonesia dalam waktu 
jang sesingkat-singkatnja beralih si/at dan wudjudnja, dari 
"Nasional" kepada "Islam", mendjadi NEGARA ISLAM IN-
DONESIA". 
Dengan ini Kami ingin sekali menjatakan persilahan kepada Sau-
dara, sebagai Kepala Negara Republik Indonesia, sudi apalah 
kiranja Saudara suka mempertimbangkan baik2 dan se-dalam-
dalamnja akan pendapat Kami ini. 
Sebelum dan sesudahnja, atas perhatian Saudara itu, Kami meng-
haturkan diperbanjak-banjak terima kasih, dan Alhamdu li-Llah. 
15. Selain daripada itu, tidak pula boleh dilupakan akan peristiwa2 
jang terdjadi disekitar K.M.B. [= Konferensi Medja Bundar] atau/ 
dan natidjah jang timbul daripadanja, jang semuanja itu makin 
hari makin mendekati kepada punt jak keruntjingan dan kegen-
tingannja, jang achir-kemudiannja - lambat atau tjepat - akan 
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mengakibatkan "pertentangan antara Republik Indonesia dan 
Belanda". 
Kini teranglah sudah, bahwa K.M.B. dengan segala sebab jang 
menimbulkannja dan segala akibat jang timbul daripadanja, tidak-
lah sekali-kali mendjadi obat jang dapat menjembuhkan Bangsa 
Indonesia daripada serangan penjakit "Kolonialisme Belanda". 
Maka pad a achir2 ini, tampaklah dengan tegas dan njata, akan 
timbulnja kembali penjakit "Kolonialisme" itu. 
Oleh sebab itu, maka Uni lndonesia-Belanda jang tadinja diharap-
kan akan mendjadi tali persahabatan antara kedua Negara itu, pad a 
achir-kemudiannja, beralih sifat dan tjoraknja, mendjadilah lapang 
pertikaian. 
Kiranja Saudara tidak menaksir rendah (onderschatten) dan terlalu 
"optimistis" tentang hal in i, dan baiklah agaknja, djika mulai 
sekarang djuga Pemerintah Republik Indonesia "bersedia pajung, 
sebelum hudjan". 
16. Sekianlah hal2 jang kin i perlu kami njatakan kepada Saudara, 
sebagai Kepala Negara Republik Indonesia, jang bertanggung-
djawab berat dan besar atas nasibnja Negara dan Bangsa, dimasa 
jang akan datang. 
Sekali lagi! Sudi apalah kiranja Saudara suka menaruh perhatian, 
dimana perlu dan seberapa perlunja. 
17. Semoga Allah selalu berkenan mentjurahkan Hidajat dan Taufiq-
Nja atas kita, Ummat Islam Bangsa Indonesia, dan berkenan 
pul al ah kiranja la menuntunnja kearah .Bahagia-Sentausa, dunia 
dan achirat. Amin. 
Inna fatahna laka fathan mubina ... Insja Allah. Amin. 
Bismillahi ........... Allahu Akbar!!! 2 
Wassalam, 
PEMERINT AH NEG ARA ISLAM INDONESIA 
IMAM: 
S. M. KARTOSOEWIRJO 
Mardhotillah, 22 Oktober 1950/10 Muharram 1370.3 
T embusan N ota-Rahasia ini 
disampaikan kepada jang terhormat 
Saudara M. Natsir, Perdana Menteri 
Republik Indonesia. 
2 The letter is closed with a quotation from Sura 48 : 1, "We have given thee 
[= Muhammad] a manifest victory", followed by the formulas "If it be God's 
will. Amen. In the Name of God ... God is great". 
3 The secret place from which the letter was sent is called "Mardhotillah", 
which is probably intended to be rendered "The place of God's rÏl!ä' 




NEGARA ISLAM INDONESIA 
Nota Rahasia Kedua 
Assalamu'alaikum W.w., 
1. Alhamdu li-Llah! 
Barang disampaikan Allah kiranja kepada 
jang terhormat : 
SAUDARAI~SOEKARNO 
Presiden Republik Indonesia, 
jang bersemajam di 
DJAKARTA. 
Allahumma! Iyaka na'budu, wa iyaka nasta'in, 
ihdinassirathal-mustaqim! 
Bismillahi, tawakkalna 'ala-Llah! 
Lahaula wala quwwata, illa bi-Llah! 1 
2. Sjahdan, maka baiklah kiranja terlebih dulu Kami njatakan kepada 
Saudara, bahwa telah genap hampir 4 bulan jang lalu sudahlah 
Kami lajangkan sebuah Nota Rahasia (jang pertama) kepada 
Saudara, nota mana bertarich "Mardhotillah, 22 Oktober 19501 
10 Muharram 1370". Kiranja sementara ini, Saudara telah meneri-
manja dengan sempurna, serta menaruh perhatian atasnja, seberapa 
perlu dan dimana perlunja. Hanja bagi kepentingan Negara, Bangsa 
dan Agama Allah, djuga adanja. Atas perhatian Saudara jang 
seksama dalam hal2 jang Kami tuliskan dalam Nota tersebut, maka 
sebelum dan sesudahnja Kami njatakan diperbanjak-banjak terima 
kasih dan Alhamdulillah! 
Semoga Allah berkenan menimbulkan manfaat dan maslahat dari-




3. Selain daripada itu, perlu djuga agaknja Kami njatakan disini, 
bahwa Nota Rahasia Kedua ini mengandung maksud, untuk: 
a. Memberi pendjelasan dalam beberapa hal, atas Nota Rahasia 
jang pertama; dan 
1 Cf. Appendix 11, note 1. 
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b. Menambah sesuatu jang dianggap perlu, jang harus diper-
hatikan oleh tiap2 Pimpinan Negara, teristimewa sekali oleh 
Kepala Negara jang bertanggung-djawab, menghadapi nasib-
nja Negara dan Bangsa, dimasa jang mendatang, mengarungi 
Lautan Merah, menghadapi Perang Brata Juda Djaja Binangun 
dan Revolusi Dunia, dimasa jang - Insja Allah - tidak djauh 
lagi.2 
4. Bila didalam Nota Rahasia Kedua ini Kami njatakan terus terang 
segala sesuatu kepada Saudara, tiada lain maksud kami, melainkan 
hanjalah untuk kepentingan Negara dan Bangsa Indonesia belaka, 
jang langsung atau tidak langsung mengenai nasibnja Republik 
Indonesia dan Negara Islam Indonesia, mul ai sekarang kedepan. 
Kiranja Saudara dalam hal ini sependapat dengan Kami. 
5. Sebaliknja, djika didalam sual-sual tersebut ada selisih faham dan 
pendapat antara Saudara dan Kami, su di apalah kiranja Saudara 
suka memperma'afkan banjak-banjak! 
Berhubung dengan pergolakan internasional, baiklah kiranja, djika 
Kami njatakan sebagai jang berikut: 
a. Tentang akan terdjadinja Perang Dunia Ketiga, agaknja tidak 
lagi patut dipersualkan. 
b. Didalam Perang Dunia tersebut tidak mungkin Republik Indo-
nesia akan tetap memegang haluan "Bebas" (neutral) jang 
mendjadi pendiriannja, baik lambat maupun tjepat. 
c. Didalam memilih Blok, dengan sukarela atau dengan terpaksa, 
maka amat besar sekali kemungkinan bahwa R.l. akan masuk 
Blok Amerika, sedang pada waktu ini poli tik Luar-Negeri R.l. 
tel ah menundjukkan tjondongnja kearah dan djurusan itu. 
d. Djika terdjadi jang demikian, maka segala langkah dan tindakan 
tentulah ditudjukan kesatu arah, ja'ni: keluar (internasional), 
atau/dan mengenai urusan luar. Dalam pada itu, usaha dan 
tindakan kedalam amat kekurangan tenaga, waktu dan sjarat 
(miniem). 
e. Letaknja Indonesia ditengah-tengah rantai-pertahanan Amerika 
di Pasifik, membawa dia kesatu arah - mau ataupun tidak 
mau -, terseret dal am gelanggang peperangan. Bahkan praktis 
Indonesia akan masuk salah satu rantai didalam "garis depan". 
f. Kiranja semuanja itu tel ah Saudara perhitungkan masak2, ter-
lebih dulu. 
2 The writer wams against the imminent struggle to overcome the Communists 
(here indicated as "Lautan Merah"?) and compares this war to the great 
war of the Bhllratas, "Perang Brata Juda Djaja Binangun", found in the 
Mahäbhärata and in Javanese literature and wajang. 
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6. Didalam menindjau dan meneliti situasi interinsuier, baiklah Kami 
harapkan perhatian Saudara atas: 
a. Persiapan kaum Komunis, dalam semua lapangan, untuk mei a-
kukan perampasan kekuasaan, "coup d'etat", politis dan militer. 
Kiranja Saudara telah lebih mengetahui tentang hal ini dan 
memperhitungkan langkah dan tindakan, bagi mendjaga dan 
memelihara kedaulatan Negara. 
b. Persiapan pihak jang lainnja, ideologis atau tidak, didalam 
lapangan poli tik dan militer, untuk mentjapaikan maksudnja. 
c. Akibat daripada K.M.B., Konferensi lrian, dan lain2 su al 
kenegaraan (staatkundige vraagstukken) dan ketentaraan, jang 
kini masih merupakan sual2 jang harus penting dan kurang 
mendapat perhatian, mak a pad a saat meletusnja Perang Dunia 
Ketiga itu, sepandjang hitungan, akan menimbulkan bahaja 
jang amat bes ar sekali, jang natidjahnja akan merugikan kepada 
negara. 
d. Keadaan alat-alat negara dan pesawat-pesawat negara djauh 
daripada apabie [= capable?], untuk menghadapi segala ke-
mungkinan, karena: 
(1) Didalamnja telah penuh dengan benih2 dan 'anasir2 serta 
aliran "anti-negara" (anti-R.I.), terutama sekali jang meru-
pakan: Komunisme. 
(2) Meradjalelanja kerusakan achlak dan budi pekerti, dan 
sepnja [= resapnja?] kesadaran bemegara, sehingga mem-
bawa akibat korrupsi, tidak boleh dipertjaja, sabotage 
- dengan sengadja atau tidak -, menen tang usaha Peme-
rintah, melakukan tindakan dan perbuatan sehingga rakjat, 
dan masjarakat anti kepada pemerintah, dan lain2 sebagai-
nja. 
Kiranja tentang hal ini, Kami tidak perlu menundjukkan 
tjontoh2 jang njata. 
e. Ol eh sebab itu, maka disaat jang kritik nanti, Kami chawatirkan, 
bahwa Republik Indonesia akan mengalami nasib jang tragis, 
seperti jang telah Kami gambarkan dalam Nota Rahasia ter-
dahulu (pertama) . 
(1) Djika terdjadi jang demikian, bukanlah negara lain jang 
akan menjerang dan membunuh Indonesia, melainkan alat2 
dan pesawat2 R.1. sendiri-lah jang akan menjerang dan 
membunuh R.I., bagi kepentingan dan keperluan sesuatu 
ideologi, ialah: Komunisme. 
(2) Djika R.1. "bunuh diri", karena "sendjata makan tuan" , 
maka pergolakan politik dan militer serta huru-hara di 
Indonesia tidaklah akan berhenti sampai dibatas itu. 
Karena proces ini hanja merupakan pangkal dan bukan 
udjung daripada revolusi dunia didaerah Indonesia, nanti. 
Lebih djauh, dengan hantjur-lebumja R.1. sebagai negara, 
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maka Nasionalisme Indonesia akan mengalami perpetjahan 
jang hebat; sebagian mungkin beralih tempat, masuk go-
longan Komunis, dan jang sebagian lagi akan menggabung-
kan diri dengan golongan Islam. 
(3) Sudah boleh dikira-kirakan dan dibajangkan terlebih 
dahulu, betapakah gerangan kelak sikap, langkah dan 
pendirian Ummat Islam, jang hingga kini masih mempu-
njai sikap Nasional-Islamistis-parlementer itu. Karena tusuk-
an dan tekanan kaum Komunis - dengan tjara dan sifat 
apa dan jang manapun djuga - maka Ummat Islam akan 
disorong kesudut "memilih pihak". 
Dan, Insja Allah, kelak kemudian mereka akan masuk 
Blok Islam, tegasnja: Negara Islam Indonesia. 
(4) Djika dengan idzin Allah terdjadi jang serupa itu, mak a 
didalam lapangan dan gelanggang perdjuangan di Indo-
nesia hanja akan ada dua golongan, jang ber-hadap2an 
sebagai musuh dan lawan jang ta' kenal damai, antara satu 
dengan jang lain, ialah: Komunisme lawan Islamisme. 
7. Inilah beberapa hal, jang perlu Kami kemukakan kepada Saudara, 
dengan harapan mendapat perhatian sepenuhnja. Dengan ini pul a 
Kami njatakan sekali lagi pertimbangan dan andjuran daripada 
pihak Kami, sebagaimana jang termaktub didalam Nota Rahasia 
terdahulu (pertama), angka 11, berkenaan dengan sual2 tersebu t: 
a. Tiada djalan lain, jang menudju kearah "Keselamatan Negara 
dan Bangsa Indonesia", melainkan: "Djika Pemerintah Republik 
Indonesia mulai sekarang djuga, dengan tjepat dan tepat, mem-
basmi Komunisme, dalam tiaP2 lapangan, terutama se kali 
jang melekat didalam tubuh Pemerintahan Republik Indonesia 
dan alat2 kekuasaannja, dengan wudjud dan sifat apa dan jang 
manapun djuga". 
Lebih tjepat, lebih baik! 
b .................. [= etc.] 
8. Kemudian daripada itu, berkenaan dengan sual Proklamasi berdiri-
nja Negara Islam Indonesia, 7 Agustus 1949, dan sual2 lain dise-
kitarnja seperti jang berikut: 
a. Proklamasi 7 Agustus 1949 adalah sa tu tjurahan Kurnia Illahy, 
atas Ummat Islam Indonesia, satu idzin dan perkenan Allah 
jang berwudjudkan: "inti-pati (kristalisasi, realisasi dan mani-
festasi) daripada pengharapan, du'a, tekad, dan 'amal-usaha 
perdjuangan Ummat Islam Bangsa Indonesia". 
b. Oleh sebab itu, maka Proklamasi 7 Agustus 1949 merupakan 
satu hak-sutji daripada Ummat Islam Bangsa Indonesia, jang 
tidak hanja harus serta wadjib dihargai dan dihormati ol eh 
Ummat Islam sendiri, melainkan djuga oleh tiap2 bangsa dise-
luruh dunia. 
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c. Hak-sutji tersebut diatas bolehlah kiranja dibagi mendjadi dua 
bagian: 
(1) J ang mengenai isi, maksud, dan wud jud bulat sem purna 
(essensiel substantif), ialah: Kemerdekaan Islam bulat 
100 %, seperti jang dimaksudkan dalam Pendjelasan Sing-
kat atas Proklamasi tersebut, angka 5, sub a. hingga d. 
Tentang hal ini, sedikitpun tiada tawaran, tambahan, 
pengurangan at au perubahan apa dan jang manapun 
djuga. 
Lantaran, sebagaimana Saudara tentu ma'lum dan meng-
erti, bahwa tiap2 perubahan dalam hal ini, walaupun 
hanja sedikit, akan membawa aki bat perubahan jang bes ar 
dalam bagian2 jang lainnja. 
(2) Jang mengenai technik-pelaksanaan, seperti mitsalnja: 
batas daerah dan lain2 jang serupa itu, berbeda dengan 
jang tersebut dalam angka 8, sub c. (1) dia tas, jang mem-
punjai sifat "absoluut" (pasti), maka bagian (2) ini ber-
sifat "relatif" (boleh berubah-ubah). Boleh pandjang atau 
pendek, boleh luas atau sempit, dan lain2 sifat 'alam dahry 
(materieel). Walhasil, tentang hal ini bolehlah dilakukan 
tawar-menawar, perdamaian, dan lain2 usaha penjelesaian 
jang serupa itu. 
d. Agaknja keterangan ringkas jang dituliskan diatas, bolehlah 
kiranja dianggap sebagai bantuan daripada pihak Kami kepada 
Saudara, kalau2 dapat meringankan dan memudahkan Saudara, 
dalam pertanggungan-djawab Saudara, memetjahkan su al Pro-
klamasi 7 Agustus 1949 itu dan sual2 disekitarnja. 
e. Dengan ini, maka atas nama Pemerintah Negara Islam lndo-
nesia, bolehlah dengan terus-terang Kami njatakan kepada 
Saudara, sebagai Kepala Negara Republik Indonesia, bahwa: 
( 1) Djika Pemerintah Republik lndonesia suka mengakui 
dengan resmi akan Proklamasi berdirinja Negara Islam 
Indonesia, maka Kami anggap mendjamin, bahwa Repu-
blik Indonesia akan mempunjai sahabat sehidup-semati 
dalam menghadapi tiap2 kemungkinan dari luar dan dari 
dalam, terutama menghadapi Komunisme, jang makin hari 
makin bertambah tampak bahajanja, bagi Negara dan 
Bangsa lndonesia maupun bagi seluruh dunia demokrasi 
( in ternasional ) . 
(2) Sebaliknja daripada itu, djika Republik lndonesia tidak 
su ka mengakui Proklamasi 7 Agustus 1949 - jang kini 
sudah mendjadi kenjataan (fait accompli) - mak a Kami 
tidak akan ikut tanggung-djawab atas nasibnja Negara dan 
Bangsa Indonesia, baik dihadapan Mahkamah Sedjarah 
maupun didepan Mahkamah Allah kelak. 
(3) Dalam hal ini, Kami pertjaja sepenuh-penuhnja atas ke-
bidjaksanaan Saudara! 
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9. Adapun ten tang perubahan dan peralihan Republik Indonesia, 
kedalam maupun keluar, sebagai djalan dan obat jang lainnja, 
untuk menghindarkan "Negara dan Bangsa Indonesia" daripada 
bahaja keruntuhan, sudahlah agaknja tjukup dirawaikan [= diurai-
kan?] dalam Nota Rahasia jang terdahulu (pertama), angka 14. 
Sudi apalah kiranja Saudara suka menganggapnja sebagai bantuan 
daripada pihak Kami, bagi memetjahkan sual2 ketata-negaraan 
jang sukar-sulit itu. 
10. Achirul-kalam, segala sesuatu harus dilakukan dengan tjepat dan 
tepat. Demikianlah harapan kam i kepada Saudara, bagi kepentingan 
Negara dan Bangsa Indonesia, djuga adanja. Dibalik itu, djika 
langkah dan tindakan jang diharapkan itu lambat atau terlambat, 
mak a tidaklah boleh diharapkan akan menimbulkan natidjah jang 
sebaik-baiknja, bagi kepentingan Negara dan Bangsa. Bahkan amat 
mungkin sekali, sebaliknja. 
Sekali lagi, sudi apalah kiranja Saudara suka menaruh perhatian 
sepenuhnja! 
Sebelum dan sesudahnja, terima kasih dan Alhamdu li-Llah, Kami 
haturkan. 
11. Semoga Allah berkenan menuntun kita sekalian kearah dan maqam 
jang diliputi rachmat dan ridlo-Nja [= rida-Nja], bagi kepentingan 
Republik Indonesia dan Negara Islam Indonesia, serta Ra'jat dan 
Ummat Islam Bangsa Indonesia, djua adanja. 
Inna fatahna laka fathan mubina. Insja Allah. Amin. 
BismiIIahi ............ Allah u Akbar! 3 
Wassalam, 
PEMERINT AH NEGARA ISLAM INDONESIA 
IMAM: 
S. M. KAR TOSOEWIRjO 
Mahdjurah-Tegal-Luar, 17 Pebruari 1951/10 Djumadil-awal 1370.4 
Tembusan Nota-Rahasia Kedua ini 
disampaikan kepada jang terhormat 
Saudara M. Natsir, Perdana Menteri 
Republik Indonesia. 
3 Cf. Appendix 11, note 2. 
4 The letter was sent from "Mahdjurah-Tegal-Luar", which may be intended 
to mean "the place of hidjra in the open fields", or "the fields of refuge". 
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KANUN AZASY 
NEGARA ISLAM INDONESIA 
Bismillahirrahmanirrahim. 
Inna fatahna laka fathan mubina.1 
Muqaddimah 
Sedjak mula pertama Ummat Islam berdjuang, baik sedjak masa 
kolonial Belanda jang dulu, maupun pada zaman pendudukan Djepang, 
hingga pada zaman Republik Indonesia, sampai pada saat ini, selama 
itu mengandung suatu maksud jang sutji, menudju suatu arah jang 
mul ia, ialah: "Mentjari dan mendapatkan Mardhotillah,2 jang meru-
pakan hidup didalam suatu ikatan dunia barn, ja'ni Negara Islam 
Indonesia jang Merdeka" . 
Dalam masa Ummat Islam melakukan wadjibnja jang sutji itu 
dengan beraneka djalan dan haluan jang diikuti, maka diketemuinjalah 
beberapa djembatan jang perlu dilintasi ialah djembatan pendudukan 
Djepang dan Kemerdekaan Kebangsaan Indonesia. 
Hampir djuga kaki Ummat Islam selesai melalui djembatan emas 
jang terachir ini, maka badai baru mendampar bahtera Ummat Islam 
hingga keluar dari daerah Republik, terlepas dari tanggung djawab 
Pemerintah Republik Indonesia. 
Alhamdulillah, pasang dan surutnja airdigelombang samuderé\ tidak 
sedikitpun mempengaruhi niat sutji jang terkandung dalam kalbu 
Muslimin jang sedjati. Didalam keadaan jang demikian itu, Ummat 
Islam bangkit dan bergerak mengangkat sendjata, melandjutkan 
Revolusi Indonesia, menghadapi musuh, jang senantiasa hanja ingin 
mendjadjah belaka. 
Dalam masa revolusi jang kedua ini, jang karena sifat dan tjoraknja 
merupakan revolusi Islam, keluar dan kedalam, maka Ummat Islam 
tidak lu pa pula kepada wadjibnja membangun dan menggalang suatu 
Negara Islam Jang Merdeka, suatu Keradjaan Allah jang dilahir-
kannja diatas dunia, ialah sjarat dan tempat untuk mentjapai kesela-
matan tiap2 manusia dan seluruh Ummat Islam, dilahir maupun 
bathin, di dunia hingga di acherat kelak. 
Kiranja . dengan tolong dan Kurnia Illahy, Kanun Azasy jang 
sementara ini mendjadi pedoman kita, melakukan bakti sutji kepada 
'Azza wa Djalla [= Allah], dapatlah mewudjudkan amal perbuatan 
1 Cf. Sura 48: 1, mentioned in Appendix 11, note 2. 
2 Cf. Appendix 11, no te 3. 
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jang njata, dari pada tiap2 warga negara di-daerah2 dimana mulai 
dilaksanakan hukum2 Islam, ialah Hukum Allah dan Sunnatin Nabi. 
Mudah-mudahan Allah S.W.T. melimpahkan taufik dan hidajatNja 
serta tolong dan KurniaNja atas seluruh Negara dan Ummat Islam 
Indonesia, sehingga terdjaminlah keselamatan Ummat dan Negara 
daripada tiap2 bentjana jang manapun djuga. Amin. 
"Lau anna ahlal qura amanu wattaqau lafatahna 'alaihim barakatin 
min as-sama'i wal-ardli".3 
Bab I. 
Neg a r a, Huk u m dan Kek u a s a a n 
Pasal 1. 
1. Negara Islam Indonesia adalah Negara Kurnia Allah Subhanahu 
wa Ta'ala kepada bangsa Indonesia. 
2. Sifat Negara itu Djumhuryah (Republik). 
3. Negara mendjamin berlakunja Sjari'at Islam didalam kalangan 
kaum Muslimin. 
4. Negara memberi keleluasan kepada pemeluk Agama lainnja, 
didalam melakukan 'ibadatnja. 
Pasal 2. 
1. Dasar dan Hukum jang berlaku di Negara Islam Indonesia adalah 
Islam. 
2. Hukum jang tertinggi adalah Qur'an dan Hadits sahih. 
Pasal 3. 
1. Kekuasaan jang tertinggi membuat hukum, dalam Negara Islam 
Indonesia, ialah Madjlis Sjuro (Parlemen). 
2. Djika keadaan memaksa, hak Madjlis Sjuro boleh beralih kepada 
Imam dan Dewan Imamah. 
Ba b IJ. 
Madjlis Sjuro 
Pasal 4. 
1. Madjlis Sjuro terdiri at as wakil2 rakjat, ditambah dengan utusan 
golongan2 menurut aturan jangditetapkan dengan Undang2. 
2. Madjlis Sjuro bersidang sedikitnja sekali dalam satu tahun. 
3. Sidang Madjlis Sjuro dianggap sjah, djika 2Js daripada djumlah 
anggota hadIir. 
4. Keputusan Madjlis Sjuro diambil dengan suara terbanjak. 
5. Djika forum [= quorum?] (ketentuan) jang tersebut diatas 
(Bab II pasal 4 ajat 3) tidak mentjukupi, mak a sidang Madjlis 
3 A quotation from Sura 7 : 96, meaning "Had the people of the towns believed 
and shown piety, We [= God] should have opened up to them blessings 
from the heaven and the earth" (see Sura 7 : 94 in Richard Bell's trans-
lation) . 
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Sjuro jang berikutnja harus diadakan selambat-lambatnja 14 hari 
kemudian daripada sidang tsb., dan djika sidang Madjlis Sjuro 
jang kedua inipun tidak mentjukupi forum [= quorum?] diatas 
(Bab II pasal4 ajat 3), maka selambat-lambatnja 14 hari kemudian 
dari padanja harus diadakan lagi sidang Madjlis Sjuro ketiga jang 
dianggap sjah, dengan tidak mengingati djumlah anggota jang 
hadlir. 
Pasal 5. 
Madjlis Sjuro menetapkan KANUN AZASY dan garis2 besar haluan 
Negara. 
Bab lIl. 
[Dewan Sj uro] 
Pasal 6. 
1. Susunan Dewan Sjuro ditetapkan dengan Undang2. 
2. Dewan Sjuro bersidang sedikitnja se kali dalam 3 bulan. 
3. Dewan Sjuro itu adalah Badan Pekerdja daripada Madjlis Sjuro 
dan mempunjai tugas-kewadjiban: 
a. menjelesaikan segala keputusan2 Madjlis Sjuro, 
b. melakukan segala sesuatu sebagai wakil Madjlis Sjuro mengha-
dapi Pemerintah, selainnja jang berkenaan dengan prinsip. 
Pasal 7. 
Tiap2 undang2 menghendaki persetudjuan Dewan Sjuro. 
Pasal 8. 
1. Anggauta Dewan Sjuro berhak memadjukan rentjana undang2. 
2. Djika sesuatu rentjana undang2 tidak mendapat persetudjuan 
Dewan Sjuro, maka rentjana tadi tidak baleh dimadjukan iagi 
dalam sidang Dewan Sjuro itu. 
3. Djika rentjana itu meskipun disetudjui ol eh Dewan Sjuro tidak 
disahkan oleh Imam, maka rentjana tadi tak boleh dimadjukan 
lagi dalam sidang Dewan Sjuro masa itu. 
Pasal 9. 
1. Dalam hal ichwal kegentingan jang memaksa, Imam berhak 
menetapkan peraturan2 Pemerintah sebagai pengganti Undang2. 
2. Peraturan Pemerintah itu harus mendapat persetudjuan Dewan 
Sjuro dalam sidang jang berikut. 
3. Djika tidak mendapat persetudjuan maka peraturan Pemerintah 
itu harus ditjabut. 
Ba b IV. 
Kekuasaan Pemerintah Negara 
PasallO. 
Imam Negara Islam Indonesia memegang kekuasaan Pemerintah me-
nurut Kanun Azasy, sepandjang Hukum Islam. 
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Pasal 11. 
1. Imam memegang kekuasaan membentuk undang2 dengan perse-
tudjuan MadjIis Sjuro. 
2. Imam menetapkan peraturan Pemerintah, setelah berunding 
dengan Dewan Imamah untuk mendjalankan Undang2 sebagai-
mana mestinja. 
Pasal 12. 
1. Imam Negara Islam Indonesia ialah orang Indonesia asli jang 
beragama Islam dan thaat kepada Allah dan Rasulnja. 
2. Imam dipilih oleh MadjIis Sjuro dengan suara paling sedikit 
2/3 daripada seluruh anggauta. 
3. Djika hingga dua kali berturut-turut dilakukan pemilihan itu, 
dengan tidak mentjukupi ketentuan diatas (Bab IV pasal 12 
ajat 2), mak a keputusan diambil menurut suara jang terbanjak 
dalam pemilihan jang ketiga kalinja. 
Pasal 13. 
1. Imam melakukan wadjibnja, selama: 
a. mentjukupi bai'atnja,4 
b. tiada hal2 jang memaksa, sepandjang Hukum Islam. 
2. Djika karena sesuatu, Imam berhalangan melakukan wadjibnja, 
maka Imam menundjuk salah seorang anggauta Dewan Imamah 
sebagai wakilnja sementara. 
3. Didalam hal2 jang amat memaksa, maka Dewan Imamah harus 
selekas mungkin mengadakan sidang untuk memutuskan wakil 
Imam sementara, daripada anggauta2 Dewan Imamah. 
Pasal 14. 
Sebelum melakukan wadjibnja, Imam menjatakan bai'at dihadapan 
Madjlis Sjuro sebabai berikut: 
"Bismillahirrahmanirrahim, 
Asjhadu an la ilaha illa-Llah, wa asjhadu anna Muhammadar rasulu-
Llah,5 
Wallahi (Demi Allah), saja menjatakan bai'at saja, sebagai Imam 
Negara Islam Indonesia, dihadapan sidang Madjlis Sjuro ini, dengan 
ichlas dan sutji hati dan tidak karena sesuatu diluar kepentingan 
Agama dan Negara. Saja sanggup berusaha melakukan kewadjiban 
saja sebagai Imam Negara Islam Indonesia, dengan se-baik2nja dan 
sesempuma-sempumanja sepandjang adjaran Agama Islam, bagi ke-
pentingan Agama dan Negara". 
4 Bai'at (Ar. baica) means here and in the following article "the oath of 
office". 
5 Af ter the basmala-formula, the oath of office includes the profession of 
faith: "I testify that there is no god but God, and I testify that Muhammad 
is God's Messenger". 
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Pasal 15. 
Imam memegang kekuasaan jang tertinggi atas seluruh Angkatan 
Perang Negara Islam Indonesia. 
Pasal 16. 
Imam dengan persetudjuan Madjlis Sjuro menjatakan perang, mem-
buat perdamaianjperdjandjian dengan negara lain. 
Pasal 17. 
Imam menjatakan keadaan bahaja. Sjarat2 dan akibat [keadaan] 
bahaja, ditetapkan dengan undang-undang. 
Pasal 18. 
1. Imam mengangkat duta dan konsul, 
2. menerima duta Negara lain. 
Pasal 19. 
Imam memberikan amnesti, aboIisi, grasi dan rehabilitasi. 
Pasal 20. 




1. Dewan Fatwa terdiri dari seorang Muf ti besar dan beberapa 
Muf ti lainnja, sebanjak-banjaknja 7 orang. 
2. Dewan ini berkewadjiban memberi djawab at as pertanjaan Imam 
dan berhak menundjukkan usul kepada Pemerintah. 
Angkatan dan pemberhentian anggauta2 itu dilakukan oleh Imam. 
Ba b VI. 
Dewan Imamah 
Pasal 22. 
1. Dewan Imamah terdiri dari Imam dan Kepala2 MadjIis. 
2. Anggauta2 Dewan diangkat dan diberhentikan oleh Imam. 
3. Tiap2 anggauta Dewan Imamah bertanggung djawab atas kebaik-
an berlakunja pekerdjaan Madjlis jang diserahkan kepadanja. 
4. Dewan Imamah bertanggung djawab kepada Imam dan Madjlis 
Sjuro atas kewadjiban jang diserahkan kepadanja. 
Ba b VII. 
Pembagian Daerah 
Pasal 23. 
Pembagian daerah dalam Negara Islam Indonesia ditentukan menurut 
undang-undang. 
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Ba b VIII. 
Ke-uangan 
Pasal 24. 
1. Anggaran pendapatan dan belandja ditetapkan tiap2 tahun dengan 
undang2. Apabila Dewan Sjuro tidak menjetudjui anggaran jang 
diusulkan Pemerintah, maka Pemerintah mendjalankan anggaran 
tahun jang lalu. 
2. Padjak dilenjapkan dan diganti dengan infaq. Segala infaq untuk 
kepentingan Negara berdasarkan undang2. 
3. Mat jam dan harga mata uang ditetapkan dengan undang2. 
4. Hal ke-uangan Negara selandjutnja diatur dengan undang2. 
5. Untuk memeriksa tanggung djawab ten tang keuangan negara 
diadakan suatu Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, jang peraturannja 
ditetapkan dengan undang2. 
Hasil pemeriksaan itu diberitahukan kepada Dewan Sjuro. 
Ba b IX. 
Kehakiman 
Pasal 25. 
1. Kehakiman dilakukan oleh sebuah Mahkamah Agung dan lain2 
badan Kehakiman menurut undang2. 
2. Susunan dan kekuasaan Badan Kehakiman itu diatur dengan 
undang2. 
Pasal 26. 
Sjarat2 untuk mendjadi dan untuk diperhatikan sebagai Hakim dite-




1. Jang mendjadi warga negara ialah orang Indonesia asli dan orang2 
bangsa lain jang disjahkan dengan undang2 sebagai warga negara. 
2. Sjarat2 jang mengenai warga negara ditetapkan dengan undang2. 
Pasal 28. 
1. Segala warga negara bersamaan kedudukannja didalam hukum 
dan pemerintahan dan wadjib mendjundjung hukum dan Peme-
rintahan itu dengan tidak ada ketjualinja. 
2. Tiap2 warga negara berhak atas pekerdjaan dan penghidupan 
jang lajak bagi kemanusiaan. 
3. Djabatan2 dan kedudukan jang penting dan bertanggung djawab 
didalam pemerintahan, baik sipil maupun militer, hanja diberikan 
kepada muslim. 
Pasal 29. 
Kemerdekaan berserikat dan berkumpul, melahirkan fikiran dengan 
lisan dan tulisan dan sebagainja, ditetapkan dengan undang2. 
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Ba b XI. 
Pertahanan Negara 
Pasal 30. 
1. Tiap2 warga negara berhak dan wadjib ik ut serta dalam usaha 
pembelaan negara. 
2. Tiap2 warga negara jang beragama Islam wadjib ikut serta dalam 
pertahanan negara. 
3. Sjarat2 tentang pembelaan diatur dengan undang2. 
Ba b XII. 
Pe nd i dik a n 
Pasal 31. 
1. Tiap2 warga negara berhak dan wadjib mendapat pengadjaran. 
2. Pemerintahan mengusahakan dan menjelenggarakan satu sistim 
pengadjaran Islam jang diatur dengan undang2. 
Ba b XIII. 
[Ekonomi?] 
Pasal 32. 
1. Peri-kehidupan dan penghidupan rakjat diatur dengan dasar 
tolong-menolong. 
2. Tjabang2 produksi jang penting bagi Negara, dan jang menguasai 
hadjat orang banjak, dikuasai oleh Negara. 
3. Bumi dan air dan kekajaan alam jang terkandung didalamnja 
dikuasai oleh Negara dan dipergunakan sebesar-besarnja untuk 
kemakmuran rakjat. 
Bab XIV. 
Bendera dan Bahasa 
Pas al 33. 
Bendera Negara Islam Indonesia ialah "Merah-Putih-ber-Bulan-
Bintang". 
Bahasa Negara Islam ialah "Bahasa Indonesia". 
Bab XV. 
Perobahan Kanun Azasy 
Pasal 34. 
1. Untuk mengubah Kanun Azasy harus sekurang-kurangnja 213 
daripada djumlah anggauta Madjlis Sjuro hadlir. 
2. Putusan diambil dengan persetudjuan sekurang-kurangnja setengah 
daripada djumlah seluruh anggauta Madjlis Sjuro. 
* * * 
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Tja ra Berputarnja Roda Pemerintahan 
1. Pada umumnja roda pemerintahan N.l.l. berdjalan menurut dasar 
jang ditetapkan dalam "Kanun Azasy", dan sesuai dengan pasal 3 
dari Kanun Azasy tadi, sementara belum ada Parlemen (Madjlis 
Sjuro), segala undang2 ditetapkan oleh Dewan Imamah dalam 
bentuk Maklumat-Maklumat jang ditanda-tangani oleh Imam. 
2. Berdasarkan Maklumat-Maklumat Imam tadi, Madjlis2 (Ke-
menterian-Kementerian) menurut pembagian tugas kewadjiban 
masing-masing, membuat peraturan at au pendjelasan untuk me-
mudahkan pelaksanaannja. 
3. Djuga dasar poli tik pemerintah N.l.l. ditentukan oleh Dewan 
Imamah. 
4. Anggauta Dewan Imamah pad a waktu pembentukannja ialah: 
1. S.M. Kartosuwirjo, selaku Imam merangkap Kepala Madjlis 
Pertahanan. 
2. Sanoesi Partawidjaja,,, Kepala Madjlis Dalam Negeri dan 
3. K.H. Gozali Tusi, 




" Kepala Madjlis Kehakiman. 
" Kepala Madjlis Penerangan. 
" Anggauta. 
" Anggauta. 








Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces 
Agama Djawa Asli Republik Indonesia, Original Javanese Religion 
of the Republic of Indonesia 
Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama, Government Academy for Religious 
(Islamic) Studies 
Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia, (Atjehnese) Brigade of Indonesian 
Youth 
Darul Islam, Islamic State Movement 
Daérah Satu, Region Number One 
Gerakan September Tigapuluh, September 30th Movement 
Hadji, Alhaji 
Hidjra (A.D. 622), beginning of the Islamic era 
H.M.I. Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic Student Association 
I.A.I.N. Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Islamic Institute 
I.P.I. Ikatan Pemuda Indonesia, (Atjehnese) Association of Indonesian 
Youth 
I.P.K.1. Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, League of Upholders of 
Indonesian Independence 
JAP! Jajasan Penjiaran Islam, Foundation for the Spread of Isla~ 
K. Kiyai, independent religious teacher 
KAMI Komité Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, Action-Committee of Indonesian 
Students 
KAPPI Komité Aksi Para Peladjar Indonesia, Action-Committee of Indo-
nesian Secondary School PupiIs 
Ketuhanan J. M. E., Ketuhanan Jang Maha Esa, Belief in the One and 
Only God 
K.N.I.L. Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, (Colonial) Netherlands East 
Indies Army 
K.N.I.P. Komité Nasional Indonesia Pusat, Central Indonesian National 
Committee 
K.R.I.S. Kebaktian Rakjat Indonesia Sulawesi, Service of the Indonesian 
People of Sulawesi (Celebes) 
Manipol Manifesto Politik, Political Manifesto 
Masjumi Madjlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indo-
nesian M uslims 
M.I.A.1. Madjlisul Islamil Aclaa Indonesia, Supreme Indonesian Council of 
Islam 
M.I.N. Madrasah Ibtida'ijah Negeri, (Islamic) Elementary State School 
M.P.R.S. 
Murba 
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Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Indonesia, Provisional People's 
Congress 
Part ai Murba, Common-People's Party 
NASAKOM Nasionalis-Agama-Komunis, (intended unity of) Nationalists, Reli-
gious people, and Communists 
NASASOS Nasionalis-Agama-Sosialis, (intended unity of) Nationalists, Reli-






















Neokolonialis-Imperialis, Neo-colonial imperialists 
Nederlands-Indische Artsen School, Netherlands Indies Medical 
School 
Netherlands Indies Civil Administration 
Negara Islam Indonesia, Islamic State of Indonesia 
Nahdatul Ulama, Awakening of the Ulamas 
Old Established Forces 
Orde Baru, New Order 
Orde Lama, Old Order 
Partai Kristen Indonesia, (Protestant) Indonesian Christian Party 
Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Party of Indonesian Muslims 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Five-Year Developmcnt 
Perdjuangan Semesta, Common Struggle Movement 
Pergerakan Tarbijah Indonesia, Indonesian Movement for (the 
improvement of) Education (in Sumatra) 
Pendidikan Hakim Islam Negeri, State College for Muslim Juris-
prudents (at Religious Courts) 
Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party 
Partai Muslimin Indonesia, see: Parmusi 
(also: Palang Mérah Indonesia, the Indonesian Red Cross) 
Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Association 
of Muslim Students 
Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National(ist) Party 
Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Govern-
ment of the Republic of Indonesia 
Part ai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party 
Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia, Islamic Political Association of 
Indonesia 
P.T.A.I.N. Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri, State Islamic College 
P.T.D.1. Perguruan Tinggi Dacwah Islam, Islamic Mission College 
P.U.S.A. Persatuan Ulama-ulama Seluruh Atjeh, All Atjeh Ulama Union 
REPELITA Rent jan a Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Five-Year Development Plan 
R.1. Republik Indonesia, Republic of Indonesia 
R.I.S. Republik Indonesia Serikat, United Indonesian Republic 
R.U.S.1. Republic of the United States of Indonesia (= R.I.S.) 
S.1. Sarékat Islam, Islamic Association 
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Tahun Vivere Pericoloso, Year of Living Dangerously 
Teungku, Atjehnese ulama 
Tentara Islam Indonesia, Islamic Anny of Indonesia 
Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Anny 
Universitas Islam Djakarta, Islamic University of Djakarta 
University/Universitas Islam Indonesia, Islamic University of Indo-
nesia 
Undang-undang Dasar 1945, the 1945 Constitution, 
Sosialisme (à la) Indonesia, Indonesian Socialism, 
Demokrasi Terpimpin, Guided Democracy, 
Ekonomi Terpimpin, Guided Economy, 
Kepribadian Indonesia, the Indonesian Identity. 
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